JUDGMENT (PER A.K. MENON, J.) By this common judgment and order we dispose of two appeals. The order impugned in these appeals dated 19.9.2005 is passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, setting aside the findings of the arbitral tribunal on one specific issue pertaining to rate of conversion to be adopted in respect of claim for reimbursement of costs of spares and consumables. 2. The brief facts which led to passing of the arbitral award and subsequent challenge under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act are as under : The appellant Oil and Natural Gas Commission (ONGC) in Appeal No.1079 of 2005 entered into an agreement dated 10 November 1993 with the respondent Dolphin Overseas Pvt. Ltd. (Contractor) for operation and management of marine and diving services on board ONGC's vessel 'MSV SAMUDRA PRABHA'. Under the contract the contractor was required to provide consumables and spares and undertake repairs with the approval of the ONGC to ensure that the vessel was in constant state of readiness to undertake the tasks specified by the ONGC. 3. The contract was duly performed, however, certain disputes arose between the parties some of which are briefly deal with hereafter. One of the claims was for the costs of material procured by the contractor left unconsumed by the contractor on the ONGC vessel. The other claim was regarding valuation of the stock of consumables and spares belonging to ONGC on board of the vessel and which were used by the contractor. ONGC had a counter claim for recovery of certain items, the price of which was not determined in an agreed manner. 4. The arbitral tribunal framed 7 points for determination which were as follows; “1. What was the value/price in Singapore Dollars of the consumables and spares consumed by the claimants from the store on board the vessel 'Samudra Prabha' for the purposes of the contract for being accounted for in the total costs of the consumable and spare with a ceiling fixed under the contract at Singapore Dollars 1,32,000 ? 2. Whether the claimants are entitled to the return of the material procured and brought by them on board the vessel but left behind by them on board unconsumed at the conclusion of the contract or be paid the price thereof and if so what ? 3. 2. Whether the claimants are entitled to the return of the material procured and brought by them on board the vessel but left behind by them on board unconsumed at the conclusion of the contract or be paid the price thereof and if so what ? 3. Whether the Respondents prove that they have paid for the said material brought on board by the claimants and left behind unconsumed at the conclusion of the contract a contended by them ? 4. Whether the claimants were entitled to reappropriate the material left behind by them on board unutilised as envisaged under Note to the schedule of prices, Annexure I(E) to the contract ? 5. Whether the Respondents were entitled under the contract to take into consideration for the purposes of determining the ceiling of cost fixed under the contract, the price of all the material procured and brought on board by the claimants whether consumed or not ? 6. Whether the Respondents were entitled to claim from the claimants, the price of those items from the store on board consumed by the claimants in respect of which no unit rate was recorded in the Cardex Register and if so what ? 7. Whether the Respondents were entitled to claim from the claimants towards the price of the material on board utilised by the claimants, over and above the unit cost shown in the Cardex Register, insurance, freight and handling charges under the term 'Landed Cost' used in clauses 8.5 and 8.6 of the contract and if so what ?” 5. After hearing the parties, the arbitral tribunal made an award dated 14 February 2002. One of the Arbitrators made a dissenting award. The dissent was restricted to the quantum awarded in respect of one of the claims. The operative portion of the award reads as follows : “a. The Respondents are liable to pay to the claimants and do pay to the Claimants a sum of SD 276653.17 with interest at 18% p.c. / P.A. from 11121998 till payment. b. The Claimants are liable to pay to the Respondents and do pay to the Respondents a sum of SD 97575.10 with interest at 18% p.c. / P.A. from 11121998 till payment. c. Liberty to set off. d. Each party to bear its costs of the arbitration. ” The operative portion of the dissenting award is as follows:“ 1. b. The Claimants are liable to pay to the Respondents and do pay to the Respondents a sum of SD 97575.10 with interest at 18% p.c. / P.A. from 11121998 till payment. c. Liberty to set off. d. Each party to bear its costs of the arbitration. ” The operative portion of the dissenting award is as follows:“ 1. The Respondents are liable to pay to the claimants and do pay to the claimants a sum of SD 690683.88 with interest at 18% p.c. / P.A. from 11121998 till payment. 2. The claimants are liable to pay to the Respondents and do pay to the Respondents a sum of SD 97575.10 with interest at 18% p.c. / P.A. from 11121998 till payment. 3. Liberty to set off. 4. Each party to bear its costs of the arbitration. ” 6. The award under item (a) dealt with the Contractor's claims (w.r.t Issues 1 to 5 and clause (b) dealt with ONGC's claims w.r.t. Issues 6 and 7. The difference between the majority and minority awards is in the amount awarded vide clause (a) of the award. The majority award granted Singapore $276653.17 whereas the dissenting award granted a sum of Singapore $690683.88. The awards are the same in respect of clause (b) including as to rate of interest as well as the date from which the interest is awarded. The award came to be challenged under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. 7. The Tribunal awarded a sum of Singapore $2,76,653.17 towards the cost of consumed goods and spares procured by the contractor with consent of ONGC but left behind on board the vessel. At the stage of admission of the petition, the learned Single Judge held that the challenge to the award of Singapore $ 276,653.17 (first issue) fails, since according to the learned Single Judge, the decision of the Tribunal was not violative of the terms of contract. The petition came to be admitted insofar as the dispute relating to the valuation of the opening stock consumed by the respondent(second issue) was concerned. According to the appellant ONGC, the unit cost was to be paid in Singapore Dollars by converting the value in the currency of purchase to Singapore Dollars on the date of purchase. The petition came to be admitted insofar as the dispute relating to the valuation of the opening stock consumed by the respondent(second issue) was concerned. According to the appellant ONGC, the unit cost was to be paid in Singapore Dollars by converting the value in the currency of purchase to Singapore Dollars on the date of purchase. According to the respondent/contractor, the value in the currency of purchase was required to be converted to Indian rupees and thereafter then the unit cost in Indian rupees was to be converted into Singapore Dollars on the date of consumption. As far as the second issue is concerned, the Tribunal adopted a different method valuation. According to the appellant, the tribunal ignored the valuation on the basis of landed costs. 8. Whereas the petition stood rejected as far as the first issue is concerned. It is seen that the appellant-ONGC did not challenge the order dated 12 September 2002 of the learned Single Judge. The petitioner thereafter came to be finally heard and disposed of vide order dated 19 September 2005. At the final hearing of the petition, counsel for the ONGC urged that the first issue also could be agitated at the final hearing of the petitioner. However, the learned single judge observed that since the first issue is rejected by a reasoned order, the ONGC cannot be permitted to reagitate the same at the final hearing as the same was not in the interest of administration of justice and had to be discouraged and avoided. The learned Single Judge then proceeded to hear the challenge only the second point which relates to valuation of items of consumable and spares which were put on board the vessel. After hearing the parties, the learned Single Judge observed that the course adopted by the Tribunal in arriving at its conclusion is neither based on the case of the appellant nor that of the respondent. The learned Single Judge held that simply because there is no data available on record, the award could not be made on an hypothetical basis and therefore, it was held that the rate of conversion based on which the consumables were purchased by the ONGC should have been taken as the price. The learned Single Judge then set aside the finding of the Arbitrator by leaving it to the parties to adopt their remedy. The learned Single Judge then set aside the finding of the Arbitrator by leaving it to the parties to adopt their remedy. It is this order that has been challenged before us. 9. When the appeal was taken up for hearing, Mr.Sawant, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of ONGC tendered a draft of extensive amendments ONGC proposed. The amendment sought to renew the challenge to the order dated 12 September 2002. The amendment is opposed by Mr. Ramabhadran, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent. Perusal of the appeal memo reveals that the only challenge in the memo of appeal is to the order dated 19 September 2005 and not the earlier order dated 12 September 2002. We therefore, proceeded to hear the parties. Mr.Ramabhadran submitted that the order dated 12th September 2005 operates as res judicata at the final hearing of the petition. The first issue, once adjudicated, cannot be agitated again. He submitted that the principles of res judicata also applies as between the two stages in the same litigation and where the Court has at an earlier stage decided a matter in one way, it will not allow the parties to agitate the same matter again at a subsequent stage in the same proceedings. In support of his contention, Mr.Ramabhadran relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Satyadhyan Ghosal Vs. Deorajin Debi, AIR 1960 SC 941 . 10. There is considerable force in the submission made by Mr.Ramabhadran. Ordinarily, allowing an amendment may have been a routine matter, however, since the amendment would have the effect of relating back to the date of the petition, we do not propose to allow the amendment. Moreover we are exercising jurisdiction under Section 37 and not appellate jurisdiction under the CPC. Mr.Sawant, learned senior counsel on behalf of ONGC reiterated that the amendment is necessary, otherwise the ONGC appeal would be rendered ineffective since the challenge as on date is only in relation to the said first issue. 11. Having considered the submissions, we are not inclined to allow the amendment for the reasons set out hereinafter. Mr. Sawant submitted that it was only for the first issue that was relevant in the appeal since the second issue is already decided in favour of ONGC. He submitted that even without the amendments proposed, the appellants were entitled to urge the first issue. Mr. Sawant submitted that it was only for the first issue that was relevant in the appeal since the second issue is already decided in favour of ONGC. He submitted that even without the amendments proposed, the appellants were entitled to urge the first issue. We do not agree. Unlike an order against an adinterim or interim order where all issues may be gone into in an appeal, the present appeal under section 37 does not have the same scope. However, since the appeal of ONGC was admitted along with the Appeal no. 29 of 2006 filed by the contractor, we have proceeded to hear them together. We may mention here that there was a third appeal by the contractor, challenging the failure of the Tribunal to award amounts towards 5% service charges, freight and handling charges. At the hearing of these appeals the contractor withdrew that third appeal no.31 of 2006. 12. Mr.Sawant submitted that the arbitral tribunal as well as the learned Single Judge ignored the express terms of the contract and travelled beyond. The contract provided an all inclusive cost to ONGC with a ceiling limit of Singapore $13,20,000/( the Ceiling) but the respondents has been awarded $276,653.17 over and above the Ceiling. He further submitted that clause 6.1 and 7.3 of Annexure-II of the contract clearly refers to the cost of the consumables and spares required during the contract period of two years for smooth operation of the vessel (emphasis supplied) and that all items that were supplied / delivered to ONGC only because they were “required for the purpose of contract”. He made further reference to clause 7.1 of Annexure II and submitted that there is no doubt that the contractor alone was responsible for running maintenance, scheduled maintenance, break down maintenance and preventive maintenance of all plant, equipment and machinery on board the vessel. 13. According to Mr.Sawant, the entire responsibility of maintaining the vessel lay with the contractor. He further submitted that landed cost has been defined in clause 2.15 and was payable in terms of the spares and consumables supplied at the ONGC's base. There were differences of opinion on the meaning of expression “landed costs”. The expression “landed costs” was defined in clause as follows : “Landed cost means cost of item(s) supplied at the commission’s base at Nhava / 12 VB / Helibase etc. There were differences of opinion on the meaning of expression “landed costs”. The expression “landed costs” was defined in clause as follows : “Landed cost means cost of item(s) supplied at the commission’s base at Nhava / 12 VB / Helibase etc. excluding custom duty in case of imported items. Custom duty as applicable on callout equipment, operational consumables and Maintenance spares shall be paid by the Commission against documentary evidence." 14. He stressed the word use of the term 'supplied' and submitted that it means mere supply and delivery and it does not connect with the actual consumption or utilisation. Mr.Sawant further submitted that it is not possible to supply or deliver any material without the authorisation of the ONGC and thus, once the authorisation of the ONGC was granted, the contractor could raise invoice upon the ONGC irrespective of the actual consumption or utilisation. According to Mr.Sawant, under the contract, ONGC was liable to reimburse such costs only upto the Ceiling. Mr.Sawant then admitted that it was the contractor who decided the quantity of spares and consumables required to be supplied, delivered and maintain on board for smooth operation of the vessel. According to Mr.Sawant, once the supplies were made, the contractor can claim payment from ONGC without waiting for the actual consumption, however, no such payment could be claimed for any supplies or delivery above the ceiling limit. In the present case, Mr.Sawant submitted that a sum $2,76,653/ has been awarded in excess of the ceiling. The Arbitrator has travelled beyond the terms of the contract and acted contrary to the contract and hence the said award is liable to be set aside. 15. Mr.Sawant then submitted that even if the contractor offered to take the unconsumed spares and consumables at the end of the contract period, the contract does not provide for such a procedure. There is no question of the contractor taking back the unconsumed material and paying ONGC for the same. According to Mr. Sawant if the findings of the arbitral Tribunal are to be accepted, then the spares and consumables worth hundreds of thousands of dollars would be procured by the contractor and left on the vessel and the ONGC would be required to pay for the same ignoring the ceiling limit. 16. According to Mr. Sawant if the findings of the arbitral Tribunal are to be accepted, then the spares and consumables worth hundreds of thousands of dollars would be procured by the contractor and left on the vessel and the ONGC would be required to pay for the same ignoring the ceiling limit. 16. Mr.Sawant submitted that the arbitral tribunal and the learned Single Judge have failed to consider the effect of the contractor's letter dated 29 June 1993 in which the contractor stated that it was their commercial judgment to include substantial portion of reimbursable costs in their rate itself instead of quoting separately. He relied upon the contents of this letter as an indication of the intention and conduct of the respondent. The contractor allegedly misled ONGC into accepting its bid by claiming that in exercise of their commercial judgment they included a substantial portion of reimbursable costs in their rate itself instead of quoting separately. Reliance on this letter is misplaced and the conclusion drawn by ONGC misconceived. What the letter indicates at best is that the contractor will not claim any amounts beyond the ceiling of Singapore$ 1,320,000/even if the contractor used consumables and/or spares of a value which along with the day rate exceeded in aggregate the ceiling limit. It did not contemplate value of consumables and spares left behind on board MSV Samudra Prabha. 17. Now, coming to the second issue of valuation of the stock which was consumed by the vessel, Mr. Sawant, learned senior counsel right at the commencement of the contract, the contractor was aware that any onboard stocks will be charged against the contractual ceiling limit at the landed cost. It is submitted that the landed cost has to be fixed and it cannot fluctuate and cannot be subjected to any variation depending on exchange rates. The contract is silent as far as the rate of exchange is concerned. According to him, the rate of exchange is not relevant and what is relevant is the date of delivery on board the vessel. Mr.Sawant submitted that clause 8.1 of the contract uses the word for the quantities of consumables and spares delivered against authorization of commissions' representatives (emphasis supplied). He therefore, submits that the contractor was required to indicate the cost of general operational consumables and tools required during the contract period for the smooth operation of the vessel. Mr.Sawant submitted that clause 8.1 of the contract uses the word for the quantities of consumables and spares delivered against authorization of commissions' representatives (emphasis supplied). He therefore, submits that the contractor was required to indicate the cost of general operational consumables and tools required during the contract period for the smooth operation of the vessel. The tribunal had travelled beyond the terms of contract for valuing the ONGC's onboard stock consumed by the contractor. He submitted that all items of ONGC's onboard stock are listed in the Cardex system maintained onboard the vessel. The items are listed at their unit cost and the currency of purchase. The tribunal was only required to take the unit cost of the said items and arrive at the landed cost by adding a percentage for carriage, insurance and tariff. What was required to be done was to convert the currency of purchase into Singapore dollars on the date when the item was brought on board and that the tribunal should have ascertained the unit cost in Singapore dollars incurred by the ONGC. Instead, the tribunal hypothetically converted the actual currency into Singapore dollars midterm of the contract. In doing so, the arbitral tribunal erred and travelled beyond the terms of the contract in converting the cost based on exchange rates on the basis of hypothetical date instead of converting it on the basis of the actual dates of purchase of the said items which were available on board. He therefore, submitted that the appeal is liable to be allowed and the award set aside even on the first issue. 18. He relied upon the decision in the case of the Supreme Court in the case of Security Printing and Minting Corpn. Ofg India Ltd. V/s. Gandhi Industrial Corpn., (2007) 13 SCC 235 wherein it is held as under: “14. In ONGC Ltd. this Court has laid down certain parameters that in certain cases, the Court can set aside the award if it is contrary to fundamental policy of Indian law, or the interest of India; or justice or morality; or is patently illegal; or is so unfair and unreasonable that it shocks the conscience of the court. In ONGC Ltd. this Court has laid down certain parameters that in certain cases, the Court can set aside the award if it is contrary to fundamental policy of Indian law, or the interest of India; or justice or morality; or is patently illegal; or is so unfair and unreasonable that it shocks the conscience of the court. In the present case on the face of the terms of the contract, the award, in our opinion, appears to be patently illegal as the terms and conditions of the supply order would govern and not the terms of the tender. 16. .... Therefore, what is binding is the terms of the contract and not the terms in the offer of advertisement. Therefore, under these circumstances, the view taken by the arbitrator as well as the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court is exfacie illegal. It is true that normally the courts are very slow in interfering with the finding and interpretation given by the arbitrator. So far as the principle of law is concerned, there are no two opinions and it has to be accepted. But the fact remains that if any perverse order is passed, then the Courts are not powerless to interfere with the matter. As pointed out above, once the concluded contract has come into existence, then in that case the offer of advertisement cannot override the terms and conditions of the completed contract. Therefore, in our opinion, the view taken by the arbitrator, as affirmed by learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court on the face of it is illegal and against the law.” 19. He then relied on the case ONGC Ltd. V/s. Garware Shipping Corpn. Ltd., (2007) 13 SCC 434 , and relied upon the following paragraph: “There is no proposition that the courts could be slow to interfere with the arbitrator's award, even if the conclusions are perverse, and even when the very basis of the arbitrator's award is wrong. He then relied on the case ONGC Ltd. V/s. Garware Shipping Corpn. Ltd., (2007) 13 SCC 434 , and relied upon the following paragraph: “There is no proposition that the courts could be slow to interfere with the arbitrator's award, even if the conclusions are perverse, and even when the very basis of the arbitrator's award is wrong. In any case this is a case where interference is warranted and we set aside the norms prescribed by the arbitrator as upheld by the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench.” He then relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of DDA V/s. R.S.Sharma and Co., (2008) 13 SCC 80 wherein the Supreme Court observed that:“ It is open to the court to consider whether the award is against the specific terms of contracts and if so, interfere with it on the ground that it is patently illegal and opposed to the public policy of India.” Mr.Sawant also relied on the case of ONGC Ltd. V/s. Western Geco International Ltd., (2014) 9 SCC 263 wherein it is observed as under: “40. It is neither necessary nor proper for us to attempt an exhaustive enumeration of what would constitute the fundamental policy of Indian law nor is it possible to place the expression in the straitjacket of a definition. What is important in the contest of the case at hand is that if on facts proved before the arbitrators fail to drawn an inference which ought to have been drawn or if they have drawn an inference which is on the face of it, untenable resulting in miscarriage of justice, the adjudication even when made by an Arbitral Tribunal that enjoys considerable latitude and play at the joints in making awards will be open to challenge and may be cast away or modified depending upon whether the offending part is or is not severable from the rest. ” Mr.Sawant also relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Udaipur Sahakari Upbhokta Thok Bhandar Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax (2009) 8 SCC 393 , (2009) 8 SCC 393 and submitted that the construction and interpretation of the contract would depend on the terms and the conduct of the parties. 20. ” Mr.Sawant also relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Udaipur Sahakari Upbhokta Thok Bhandar Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax (2009) 8 SCC 393 , (2009) 8 SCC 393 and submitted that the construction and interpretation of the contract would depend on the terms and the conduct of the parties. 20. Relying upon the above decisions, Mr.Sawant submitted that the order dated 12 September 2002 passed by the learned Single Judge while admitting the petition to the extent it prevents the ONGC from canvassing first issue was bad in law and liable to be set aside. This argument that the order dated 12th September 2002 should not prevent ONGC from agitating the first claim is raised for the first time before us while seeking amendment to the appeal at this belated stage. According to Mr.Sawant, the findings of the learned Single Judge and the Tribunal if accepted mean that the respondent's contention that the goods consumed cannot be included in the ceiling, which is totally erroneous and contrary to the contract. According to Mr.Sawant, the ONGC is not required to compensate the contractor beyond the ceiling under any circumstances. The ceiling is fundamental to the contract and sacrosanct. No amount whatsoever can be claimed or should be paid over and above the ceiling limit. We have heard Mr.Sawant at length on this first issue only because ONGC's appeal was admitted but in our view there was no scope to challenge the order of the Single Judge dated 12th September, 2002. 21. Mr.Ramabhadran, learned senior counsel representing the contractors reiterated the preliminary objection to the proposed amendment and reiterated the objection of res judicata which was submitted in view of the fact that the ONGC had not mounted a challenge to the order on the second point decided by the order dated 19 September 2005, nothing survives in the present appeal. Mr.Ramabhadran submitted that the respondent has also filed appeal bearing Appeal No.29 of 2006 against the impugned order dated 19 September 2005. The challenge in the said order was for setting aside the award namely, manner of calculation arrived at. According to Mr. Ramabhadran, the tribunal has taken hypothetical basis for computing the amount, he submitted for substituting that portion of the award. Mr.Ramabhadran submitted that on the first issue, the conclusion laid down in Satyadhyan Ghosal (supra) is clear and unambiguous. The challenge in the said order was for setting aside the award namely, manner of calculation arrived at. According to Mr. Ramabhadran, the tribunal has taken hypothetical basis for computing the amount, he submitted for substituting that portion of the award. Mr.Ramabhadran submitted that on the first issue, the conclusion laid down in Satyadhyan Ghosal (supra) is clear and unambiguous. There is no room for any discussion over the fact that principles of res judicata would apply between two stages in the same litigation. According to him, it would apply to the order passed at an interim stage and at a subsequent stage. In fact, in an order at adinterim stage, the observations would be prima facie in nature. He further submitted that in the present case, the learned Single Judge while rejecting the ONGC petition on the first issue clearly held that there was no merit in the challenge and, therefore, the petition is admitted only on the second issue. The said order is a reasoned order which has not been challenged. He submitted that the ONGC was conscious of this fact and it proposed the amendment and seeks to bring in a belated challenge to the rejection of the first issue at the threshold and on merits. He has, therefore, contended that the ONGC's appeal is not sustainable. 22. Even on merits, the reimbursement quantified at $276653.17 was fully justified. He submitted that the value of material brought in and utilised had to be reimbursed upto the ceiling but the ceiling did not prevent the contractor from claiming the value of consumables and spares brought on board and left behind. Mr. Ramabhadran submitted that the material clauses in the contract are that the contract price and landed cost are at clause 2.8 to 5.0, 6, 8.6, 8.7. He submitted that the bare reading of the aforesaid clauses reveals that the contractor had indicated the costs of general operational consumables / tools required during the contract period of two years. The total costs of the operational consumables have been the basis for evaluation of the bid and therefore these costs are subject to the ceiling. The consumables that were not utilised but were left on board the vessel will have to be paid for by ONGC. He therefore, submitted that the award of the tribunal was perfectly in order and allowed the reimbursement of Singapore $276653.17. The consumables that were not utilised but were left on board the vessel will have to be paid for by ONGC. He therefore, submitted that the award of the tribunal was perfectly in order and allowed the reimbursement of Singapore $276653.17. He submitted that the ceiling of $13,20,000 is of no consequence and that the actual costs of material left behind must be paid over. ONGC could not deduct the value of these items left behind from the price payable merely because the Ceiling was breached. 23. Insofar as the second issue is concerned Mr. Ramabhadran supported the award and the manner of valuation by the tribunal. However without prejudice to this contention he submitted two tables with regard to the value of spares and consumables consumed by the contractor during the contract period. We reproduce the tables below for ease of reference : TABLE I Calculation in regard to value of spares and consumables consumed by Dolphin during the contract according to ONGC Sr.No. Singapore $ 1. ONGC claimed the value consumed of the items mentioned in the Cardex Register (Ref : Page 16 of Award) 495,483.00 2. Items for which value was not mentioned in the Cardex Register (Ref : Page 21 of Award) 83,591.42 Total 579,074.42 Add : 7.3% towards cost of freight and insurance equal to 43,272.43 Total 621,346.85 TABLE II Sr.No. Singapore $ 1. Cost of material consumed by Dolphin out of the material procured by Dolphin and reimbursed by ONGC 866,110.64 Add : Value of material of ONGC consumed by Dolphin 621,346.85 Total 1,487,457.49 ONGC had reimbursed to Dolphin in excess of the ceiling of SD 1,320,000 by 167,457.49 24. With reference to table I, it sets out the value of items consumed which were reflected in the Cardex register and therefore, the valuation of the items which was not mentioned in the Cardex register which the tribunal referred to in page 21 of the award. The award itself records the costs of 267 items were not recorded in the Cardex register. Having based the computation of 7.3% towards the cost of freight and insurance, computed the calculation of value of spares and consumables at Singapore $621,346.85. In table-II, Mr. Ramabhadran points out the costs of the material consumed out of material procured by respondent-Dolphin pursuant to the consent of the ONGC and brought on board was $866,110.64. Having based the computation of 7.3% towards the cost of freight and insurance, computed the calculation of value of spares and consumables at Singapore $621,346.85. In table-II, Mr. Ramabhadran points out the costs of the material consumed out of material procured by respondent-Dolphin pursuant to the consent of the ONGC and brought on board was $866,110.64. The value of the material belonging to the ONGC and consumed by the contractor is $621,346.85 resulting in total $1,487,457.49. The ONGC had reimbursed the contractor a further sum of $167,457.49. In this manner, he submitted that this amount of $167,457.49 is payable by the contractor. Mr.Sawant on instructions admitted that the computations in Table-I and Table-II are arithmetically correct. 25. Mr.Ramabhadran placed strong reliance on the judgment of Supreme Court in the case of Associate Builders V/s. Delhi Development Authority reported in (2015) 3 Supreme Court Cases 49, (2015) 3 SCC 49 , wherein the Supreme Court has culled out limitations on the power of the Courts to look into merits of the findings and interfere with Award under various head of the public policy of India. 26. Having considered the factual matrix and hearing the learned senior counsel for the parties we are in agreement with the submissions of Mr.Ramabhadran that the amendment proposed by ONGC at this belated stage after having failed to challenge the order on the first count cannot be allowed. We are in respectful agreement with the decision of the Supreme Court in Satyadhyan Ghosal (supra). We hold that in the facts of this case principles of res judicata would apply. The ONGC has admittedly not challenged the order dated 19 September, 2002. This is evident from the grounds of appeal memo wherein the entire challenge is to the order dated 19 September 2005. In some of the grounds in the appeal memo a reference has been made to the order dated 12 September 2002. These grounds are reproduced below: (i) The Learned Trial Judge erred in holding that on point one the Ld. In some of the grounds in the appeal memo a reference has been made to the order dated 12 September 2002. These grounds are reproduced below: (i) The Learned Trial Judge erred in holding that on point one the Ld. Single Judge by an order dated 12/9/2002 has rejected the contentions of the petitioners on the first point; (ii) The Learned Trial Judge erred in relying only upon the Order dated 12 September 2002, which was passed by the Single Judge at the time of Admission of the Petition; (iii) The Learned Trial Judge erred in relying upon the observations made in the Order dated 12 September 2002, which were only prima facie observations made by the Ld. Single Judge while admitting the Petition and could not under any circumstances have been binding at the final hearing of the Arbitration Petition. (iv) The Learned Trial Judge failed to appreciate that any goods supplied by the Respondents and not consumed should have been included in the Ceiling Limits in terms of the provisions of the contract and interpretation of Ceiling Limits as fixed as per the terms of the contract. 27. None of these grounds raise any challenge to the order dated 12 September 2002. However, they proceed on the basis that the entire challenge is to the order dated 19 September 2005. It must be said that it is not as if the ONGC is completely unaware of the fact that the order dated 12 September 2002 may come in their way at the final hearing of the petition. They had believed albeit mistakenly that the same will be reopened and reagitated at the time of hearing of the petition. We are unable to agree with Mr.Sawant that the order dated 12 September 2002 was an interim order. The legal effect of the admission of a petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is to render an award inexecutable during the pendency of the challenge. 28. In the instant case, the challenge was admitted only on the second issue and insofar as the first issue is concerned, the petition stood rejected. With the rejection of the petition, the award on the same attained finality and it is not open for any one to challenge the same. 28. In the instant case, the challenge was admitted only on the second issue and insofar as the first issue is concerned, the petition stood rejected. With the rejection of the petition, the award on the same attained finality and it is not open for any one to challenge the same. Moreover, it is a matter of record that both the parties had filed appeals challenging the order dated 19 September 2005. Both the appeals were admitted vide order dated 24 January 2006 which records that both the parties were aggrieved by the order of the learned Single Judge dated 19 September 2005. Hence the appeals were admitted only on the basis that the impugned order was of 19 September 2005. Furthermore, ONGC had taken out Notice of Motion No.3696 of 2005 seeking stay of the impugned order dated 19 September 2005. Even at that stage, there was no challenge mounted to the order dated 12 September 2002. The Notice of Motion was disposed of since both the appeals had been admitted. 29. If the first issue was finally decided against ONGC as it undoubtedly was, it seemed like an oddity that Appeal no.1079 filed by ONGC was admitted at all. The reason is not difficult to fathom. Both the ONGC and the contractor had filed appeals. In view of the cross appeals, the division bench admitted both appeals without examining the maintainability of ONGC's appeal on the first issue. The contractor does not appear to have objected to the admission of the ONGC appeals. Hence there was no debate. 30. Having considered the relevant factual aspects and written submissions filed by Mr.Sawant, we are not in agreement with the submissions made on behalf of ONGC. The ONGC contends that if the costs were not limited to the ceiling ONGC will have to go on paying these amounts without any limit. This contention is rather simplistic. Surely, no material would go on board the vessel without the permission of the ONGC. Once the ONGC grants permission, the materials came on board. The consent is not given in a mechanical manner by the ONGC. Furthermore, when the ONGC had terminated the contract there were some materials on board. Some of it or all of it may have been consumed by the contractor. Once the ONGC grants permission, the materials came on board. The consent is not given in a mechanical manner by the ONGC. Furthermore, when the ONGC had terminated the contract there were some materials on board. Some of it or all of it may have been consumed by the contractor. If the contractor has additionally requisitioned the materials which could be required in the course of the contract, but in fact he did not surely use them as anticipated, the value of such excess spares or consumables could not be claimed back from the contractor. The contractor would be entitled to receive value of those materials left behind by the contractor on board. After all they will be at the disposal of the ONGC. The ONGC or the next contractor would obviously utilise the same on the same vessel or on any other vessel or equipment. We must note here that it is not ONGC's case that the materials entered and supplied on board were not required or useable by the vessel. The ONGC does not contend that the consumables/spares were to be discarded or otherwise rendered useless. Furthermore, if other contractors have been appointed after the duration of the subject contract, the ONGC would recover the value of these consumables brought on board from such other contractor just as Dolphin Offshore did pay the cost of consumables and spares that were on board and utilised by it. In fact, at some stage, we find that the contractor did contend that the consumables on board could be utilised free of cost, a contention that was promptly turned down by the tribunal and rightfully so. To that extent, the ONGC cannot stand enriched at the cost of the respondent-contractor Dolphin. Surely, this amount cannot be retained by the ONGC in the manner sought to be done and as submitted by learned senior counsel for the respondent. This value must be reimbursed and we have no hesitation in holding that even on merits, the ONGC is not entitled to claim or retain this amount covered by the first issue. 31. Various judgments cited by Mr. Sawant, learned senior counsel for ONGC do not really justify interference. The principles enunciated in the facts and circumstances of those cases juxtaposed with the facts in the present case do not justify interference with the award. 31. Various judgments cited by Mr. Sawant, learned senior counsel for ONGC do not really justify interference. The principles enunciated in the facts and circumstances of those cases juxtaposed with the facts in the present case do not justify interference with the award. We are not persuaded to hold that the award contains perverse findings or that the award is against the fundamental policy of the Indian law. The judgment in the case of Security Printing (supra) also does not come to the assistance of the appellant inasmuch as the award cannot be stated to be against the fundamental policy of the Indian law or the interest of India or justice or morality or is patently illegal or is unfair and unreasonable that it shocks the conscience of the Court. In these set of facts we will not believe that the award granting reimbursement of the costs is in any manner unreasonable or violative of the law which we have dealt with above. Given the fact situation and the nature of this contract at hand there is no justification in interfering with the impugned order. 32. The principles which should guide the Court in dealing with challenges to an award under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 have been well articulated in the judgment of Associate Builders(supra). The Supreme Court has reiterated that the award may be assailed on merits provided it meets the following tests: (a) The award should be violative of fundamental policies of India including compliance with (i) Indian statutes and judicial precedents; (ii) judicial approach; (iii) principles of natural justice and (iv) wednesbury reasonableness; and/or (b) The award should be against the interests of India (obviously with respect to its relation with foreign powers); and/or (c) The award should be against justice or morality; and/or (d) The award must perpetuate a patent illegality. Only if any of these tests are met will the court be justified in interfering with the award. 33. Applying these tests to the present case and given the fact that the Arbitral Tribunal is the master of the quantity and quality of evidence, the award on the first issue does not suffer from any vice. We are unable to find anything that is arbitrary or capricious in the award as far as the first issue is concerned. 33. Applying these tests to the present case and given the fact that the Arbitral Tribunal is the master of the quantity and quality of evidence, the award on the first issue does not suffer from any vice. We are unable to find anything that is arbitrary or capricious in the award as far as the first issue is concerned. On the other hand, the learned Single Judge has rightly set aside the award on the second issue since the Tribunal has proceeded to independently determine the amount which was payable without reference to the contractual mandate. It determined the quantum by applying a method alien to the contract and a method propounded by neither the claimant nor the respondent. 34. The change in method of valuation could not have been effected considering the provisions of the contract and an hypothetical view could not have been taken in the given set of facts. The impugned order of the learned Single Judge requires no interference and on the second issue the award has been correctly set aside. Although we are not bound to quantify the amount payable by the contractor to ONGC under clause (b) of the award, since the computation provided by Mr.Ramabhadran on instructions of the contractor is admitted by ONGC as being arithmetically correct, the parties need not labour over the amount payable to ONGC. We clarify that in lieu of the sum of $ 97,575.10 the contractor will now be liable to pay @167,457.49. 35. In the circumstances, we pass the following order: (i) Appeal No.1079 of 2005 and Appeal No.29 of 2006 are dismissed with the clarification that in clause (b) of the Award, instead of the sum of Singapore $ 97,575.10 the contractor will now be liable to pay to ONGC a sum of Singapore $167,457.49 with interest as awarded. (ii) There will be no order as to costs.