JUDGMENT S. Tamilvanan, J. 1. This Writ Petition has been filed seeking an Order in the Nature of Writ of Mandamus or any other Order or direction, in the nature of Writ, forbearing the Respondents from in any way interfering with any marriage being solemnized as per the Muslim Personal Law, by invoking the provisions of the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") and the Rules made thereunder. This Writ Petition has been filed in the nature of Public Interest Litigation. The Miscellaneous Petition in M.P.(MD) No. 2 of 2015 was filed by the Writ Petitioner, seeking an Order to direct the Respondents 7 to 9 to produce Miss Aysha Banu, daughter of one Syed Abuthahir and set her at liberty, to the custody of her parents, stating that the minor girl, aged 16 years was taken by the officials of Social Welfare Department and kept in the Home, run by the 9th Respondent, on account of the marriage being arranged by her parents, against the provisions of Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006. Having considered the facts and circumstances, this Court, by Order dated 6.3.2015, had directed the Respondents to produce the minor girl Aysha Banu before this Court and accordingly, she was produced on 9.3.2015. There was no Complaint by the minor girl against the Authorities whatsoever especially in respect of providing food, shelter and the treatment in the home. While we enquired the minor girl, Aysha Banu, expressed her willingness to go along with her parents who were present before this Court. Having considered the willingness expressed by the girl and the Affidavit of Undertaking filed by her parents that they would not perform her marriage until final Orders being passed in the main Writ Petition, against the provisions of the Act, we permitted the girl to go along with her parents. 2. Mr. W. Peter Ramesh Kumar, learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner submitted that Muslims are governed by Mahomedan Law, being their Personal Law, so far as marriage, divorce and other matrimonial rights are concerned. According to him, a mohammedan girl is entitled to marry on attaining her puberty or after the age of 15 years, for which even the consent of her parents or guardian is not required. According to him, a mohammedan girl is entitled to marry on attaining her puberty or after the age of 15 years, for which even the consent of her parents or guardian is not required. The Counsel for the Petitioner argued that invoking the provisions, pertaining to Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 is improper and illegal, so far as the Muslims are concerned. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner further contended that the provisions of Child Marriage Act, 2006, stipulating minimum age limit as 18 years, so far as, any Muslim girl is concerned, to be void. It is seen that the relief sought for in this Writ Petition is not to declare the Act or any provision of the Act as void or not applicable to any Muslim girl on the ground that the same is contrary to Shariat Law. In the Writ Petition, no declaratory relief is sought for. The Petitioner has filed the Writ Petition as 'Pro bono publico', seeking an Order in the nature of Writ of Mandamus or any other Writ, forbearing the Respondents from interfering with any marriage being solemnized as per Muslim Personal Law, by invoking the provisions of the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006. In support of his contention, the learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner relied on the following decisions: "1. Munshi v. Mt. Alam Bibi, AIR 1932 Lahore 280; 2. Saifuddin Saheb v. State of Bombay, AIR 1962 SC 853 ; 3. Smt. Ass Kaur (deceased) rep. by L.Rs. v. Kartar Singh (Dead) by L.Rs. & others, Appeal (Civil) No. 12395 of 1996, dated on 18.5.2007." 3. Per contra, Mr. K. Chellapandian, learned Additional Advocate General, strenuously argued that the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 is applicable to everyone in the country, irrespective of their religion, including Muslims, hence the relief sought for in the Writ Petition is not legally sustainable. In support of his contention, the learned Additional Advocate-General relied on the following decisions rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court: "1. Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum and others, AIR 1985 SC 945 ; 2. Javed v. State of Haryana, 2003 (3) CTC 620 (SC) : 2003 (8) SCC 369 ;and 3. Khursheed Ahmad Khan v. State of U.P., 2015 (2) MLJ 237 (SC)." 4. In Munshi v. Mt. Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum and others, AIR 1985 SC 945 ; 2. Javed v. State of Haryana, 2003 (3) CTC 620 (SC) : 2003 (8) SCC 369 ;and 3. Khursheed Ahmad Khan v. State of U.P., 2015 (2) MLJ 237 (SC)." 4. In Munshi v. Mt. Alam Bibi, AIR 1932 Lahore 280, it was held by a Division Bench of Lahore High Court, that under Mohammedan Law even a girl, who attained puberty or completed the age of 15 years, is competent to enter into a marriage contract. Learned Additional Advocate-General argued that the decision reported in AIR 1932 Lahore 280, was rendered during pre-independence period, prior to the commencement of the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006, hence, the said decision is inapplicable to decide the relief sought for in this Writ Petition. According to the learned Additional Advocate-General, the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, safeguards the rights of the children, including the Muslim girls, since child marriage is against welfare of the child. 5. In Saifuddin Saheb v. State of Bombay, AIR 1962 SC 853 , a Five-Judges Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, by a majority view, held thus: "44. ...The barring of excommunication on grounds other than religious grounds, say, on the breach of some obnoxious social rule or practice might be a measure of social reform and a law which bars such excommunication merely might conceivably come within the saving provisions of Clause 2(b) of Article25. But barring of excommunication on religious grounds pure and simple, cannot however be considered to promote social welfare and reform and consequently the law in so far as it invalidates excommunication on religious grounds and takes away the Dai's power to impose such excommunication cannot reasonably be considered to be a measure of social welfare and reform. As the Act invalidates excommunication on any ground whatsoever, including religious grounds, it must be held to be in clear violation of the right of the Dawoodi Bohra community under Article 26(b) of the Constitution." 6. In Saifuddin Saheb case, the issue involved relates to Constitutional validity of Bombay Prevention of Excommunication Act (42 of 1949) with reference to Articles 26(b) & 25(2) of the Constitution of India. In Saifuddin Saheb case, the issue involved relates to Constitutional validity of Bombay Prevention of Excommunication Act (42 of 1949) with reference to Articles 26(b) & 25(2) of the Constitution of India. Learned Additional Advocate-General appearing for the Respondents strenuously argued that the aforesaid decision is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of this case and according to him, the said decision is not helpful to the Petitioner, but supports only the case of the Respondents. 7. In Smt. Ass Kaur (deceased), rep. by L.Rs. v. Kartar Singh (Dead) by L.Rs. & others, Appeal (Civil) No. 12395 of 1996, dated on 18.5.2007, it has been held as follows: "8. There cannot be any dispute in law that Raj Kaur did not inherit the interest of Mehar Singh in whom the interest of Inder Singh had also vested upon his death. His interest under the general law had devolved upon Sobhi. The question, however, which remains as to whether in a case of this nature the customary law would prevail in regard to the question as to whether Appellant or the said Raj Kaur inherited the interest of Sobhi." 8. In the decision, referred to above, it was held that any question regarding succession, special property of females, betrothal, marriage, divorce, dower, adoption, guardianship, minority, bastardy, family relations, wills, legacies, gifts, partitions or any religious usage or institution, personal law would be relevant and it was decided thus: "(a) any custom applicable to the parties concerned, which is not contrary to justice, equity or good conscience, and has not been by this or any other enactment altered or abolished, and has not been declared to be void by any Competent Authority, (b) the Muhammadan law, in cases where the parties are Muhammadans and the Hindu law, in cases where the parties are Hindus, except in so far as such law has been altered or abolished by legislative enactment, or is opposed to the provisions of this Act, or has been modified by any such customs as is above referred to." The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that custom is one of the three sources of Law. 9. It is well settled that custom, Rules or Bye-laws cannot override any Statute or Act enacted by legislature. 9. It is well settled that custom, Rules or Bye-laws cannot override any Statute or Act enacted by legislature. Even the enacted law or Act should be within the purview of the Constitutional mandate, otherwise, as per Article 13(2), the law made in contravention of Part III of the Constitution or to the extent of the contravention of such law be declared void. Similarly, the State shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the Fundamental Rights, guaranteed under Part-Ill of the Constitution. It is well settled that usage in a long run becomes custom and custom is accepted as a source of law, however, custom cannot over ride the statute. Even as per Article 13(3)(a), "laws" includes any Ordinance, Order, Bye-law, Rule, Regulation, Notification, custom or usage having the force of law, in the territory of India. When there is possibility for conflicting views, while interpreting two different Articles of the Constitution, the Court has to adopt the legal principle of harmonious construction. 10. Learned Additional Advocate-General, contended that the relief sought for in the Writ Petition is not legally sustainable and in support of his arguments, he relied on Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bono Begum and others, AIR 1985 SC 945 , and other decisions. In the decision reported in AIR 1985 SC 945 , while deciding the Constitutional validity of Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, so far as Muslims are concerned, a Five-Judge Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court categorically held that the said provision is applicable to all the people in the territory of India, irrespective of their religion. It was also found in the decision that Mulla 's Mahomedan Law (18th edition); Tyabji's Muslim law (4th edition) are inadequate to establish the proposition that a Muslim husband is not under an obligation to provide maintenance to his divorced wife, who has not performed any remarriage, after the divorce and unable to maintain herself. Section 125, Cr.P.C. deals with any husband, who possess sufficient means but neglects or refuses to maintain his wife, including a divorced wife, who is unable to maintain herself. Section 125, Cr.P.C. deals with any husband, who possess sufficient means but neglects or refuses to maintain his wife, including a divorced wife, who is unable to maintain herself. It was argued on the side of the Petitioner that the Muslim Personal Law, limits the husband's liability to provide maintenance for the divorced wife till the period of iddat, which does not contemplate or countenance the situation envisaged by Section 125, Cr.P.C. and a Muslim husband, as per his Personal Law, is not under an obligation to provide maintenance, beyond the period of iddat, to his divorced wife, even if she is unable to maintain herself. 11. However, Hon'ble Supreme Court has categorically ruled that Section 125, Cr.P.C. provides for payment of maintenance to a wife even after divorce, if she remains without any remarriage with another person and hence, she is entitled to claim maintenance from her husband, irrespective of her religion. Mr. K. Chellapandian, learned Additional Advocate-General argued that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has ruled that Statutory law prevails over Personal law of any parties, as it is a welfare legislation with a noble object of providing financial assistance to any divorced wife, who is unable to maintain herself, irrespective of any religion. 12. Relying on the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Javed and others v. State of Haryana and others, 2003 (3) CTC 620 (SC): 2003 (8) SCC 369 , learned Additional Advocate-General submitted that personal law does not prevail over the general law, as held by the Hon'ble Apex Court. While interpreting the scope of Article 25 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court has held as follows: "42. It was then submitted that the Personal Law of Muslims permits performance of marriages with four women, obviously for the purpose of procreating children and any restriction thereon would be violative of the right to freedom of religion enshrined in Article 25 of the Constitution. The relevant part of Article 25 reads as under: "25. Freedom of conscience and free profession, practice and propagation of religion.--(1) Subject to Public Order, morality and health and to the other provisions of this Part, all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practise and propagate religion. The relevant part of Article 25 reads as under: "25. Freedom of conscience and free profession, practice and propagation of religion.--(1) Subject to Public Order, morality and health and to the other provisions of this Part, all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practise and propagate religion. (2) Nothing in this Article shall affect the operation of any existing law or prevent the State from making any law: (a) regulating or restricting any economic, financial, political or other secular activity which may be associated with religious practice; (b) providing for social welfare and reform or the throwing open of Hindu religious institutions of a public character to all classes and sections of Hindus." 13. In Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum and others, AIR 1985 SC 945 , it has been held by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court that a Muslim husband is also bound to pay maintenance to his wife, as per Section 125, Cr.P.C. and cannot raise any defence under the Muslim Personal Law. In the decision, the legal question was: when the Personal Law makes a provision for maintenance to a divorced wife, whether the provision for maintenance under Section 125, Cr.P.C. would run in conflict with the Personal Law. The Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down two principles; firstly, the two provisions operate in different fields and therefore there is no conflict, and secondly, even if there is a conflict it should be set at rest by holding that the statutory law will prevail over the Personal Law of the parties, in cases both are in conflict to each other. 14. In Sarla Mudgal v. Union of India, 1995 (3) SCC 635 , the Supreme Court held that polygamy can be superseded by the State just as it can prohibit human sacrifice or the practice of Sati in the interest of Public Order. The Personal Law operates under the authority of the legislation and not under any religion and, therefore, the Personal Law can always be superseded or supplemented by legislation. 15. Mr. W. Peter Ramesh Kumar, learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner submitted that minority rights are being taken away by way of interference in the Personal Mahomedan law. The Personal Law operates under the authority of the legislation and not under any religion and, therefore, the Personal Law can always be superseded or supplemented by legislation. 15. Mr. W. Peter Ramesh Kumar, learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner submitted that minority rights are being taken away by way of interference in the Personal Mahomedan law. According to him, as per Principles of Mulla's Mohammed Law, Edition 9, on attaining puberty or at the age of 15, a Muslim girl is entitled to enter into a marital contract with a male member, for which even consent of her parents or guardian is not required and further he contended that 'majority' under Mahomedan Law for a girl is, on her attaining puberty or attaining the age of 15. 16. It is well settled that as per Civil laws in India, one could be a major only on attaining the age of 18 years, irrespective of any religion and for the purpose of marriage, a girl attaining the age of 18 years and a boy attaining 21 years of age are one of the eligible conditions. The Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 says "child" means a person who, if a male, has not completed twenty-one year of age, and if a female, not completed eighteen years of age. 17. The short question involved in the Writ Petition, is whether the minimum age limit fixed as 18 years for a girl and preventing Muslim girls before attaining the age of 18 years under the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 is violating the Constitutional mandate, in view of Mahomedan Personal Law, which permits a girl to marry either on attaining puberty or completing 15 years. 18. The main issue involved in the Writ Petition relates to the validity and the legal bar of marriage being performed for any Muslim girl below the age of 18 years, in view of Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006. The object of the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006, as stated in the Act is to enhance the health of children and the status of women in the society, hence, marriage should not be performed below the age of 18 years for a girl child. The object of the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006, as stated in the Act is to enhance the health of children and the status of women in the society, hence, marriage should not be performed below the age of 18 years for a girl child. Considering the maturity of mind required for the bride and the bridegroom in understanding their marital life, their health factor and also their right to have proper education and empowerment, the age limit has been fixed for a girl as 18 years. It was argued by the learned Additional Advocate-General, that permitting to perform the marriage of a girl immediately after attaining puberty or at the age of 15 would not be a right of any Muslim to file PIL, since the right of the bride and the bridegroom should be paramount. Hence, the provisions of Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 cannot be construed, as it affects the rights of a Muslim girl. While deciding the age factor of a girl and boy, who are bride and bridegroom in a marriage, the Court cannot ignore the laudable object of the Act, which considers mainly the welfare of the bride and bridegroom. 19. Therefore, performing marriage of a girl below 18 years would not be a religious right as contemplated under Articles 25 &26 of the Constitution of India. The Court has to consider, whether performing marriage of a girl below 18 years would be for the welfare of the girl or bride in the marriage. Mr. W. Peter Rameshkumar, learned Counsel for the Petitioner submitted that though Shariat Law permits polygamy, permitting Muslim male to have number of wives, as per the normal practice, every Muslim male member is having only one wife and the Counsel further submitted that even after marriage, there could be possibility for a Muslim girl to continue her studies. However, we are not inclined to accept the view, since it would not be a reasonable opportunity, that is available to a girl belongs to other religions. While interpreting the Fundamental Rights, Courts are considering Directive Principles of State Policy and various International Conventions, to which India is a party. International Conventions, relating to women and children emphasis for gender equality and gender justice and accordingly, education and empowerment of a women are mandatory, in any civilized society. While interpreting the Fundamental Rights, Courts are considering Directive Principles of State Policy and various International Conventions, to which India is a party. International Conventions, relating to women and children emphasis for gender equality and gender justice and accordingly, education and empowerment of a women are mandatory, in any civilized society. In Public appointments, election to local bodies, 1/3 reservation is being provided for women in our country to maintain gender equality, in view of the provisions of CEDAW. In order to implement the mandate of Articles 14 & 15 and also 'CEDAW, providing opportunity to all the girl children for proper education, irrespective of any religion is a prerequisite, otherwise they will be the losers in the society. Even the Court can take a judicial notice that all educated people, having higher strata in the society used to perform marriage for their daughter, only after attaining the age of below 18 years. Only uneducated poor people living in remote rural areas and tribal areas, are indulging in child marriages, detrimental to the welfare of the girl child. 20. Therefore, we are of the view that any claim to perform marriage of a girl less than 18 years would not be for the welfare of the girl child but, such marriage would be against the interest of the girl, whereby education and empowerment of the girl is being denied unreasonably. In Saifuddin Saheb case (supra), it was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, that a divorced Muslim woman is also entitled to get maintenance from his husband like any other divorced wife of other religion, in view of Section 125of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Such interpretation of the Hon'ble Supreme Court has properly protected any helpless divorced Muslim woman, which cannot be considered as a view against Muslims. Judicial wisdom in the landmark decision has ruled that a Muslim woman is equally entitled to get rights like any other woman of other religions. In the same way, Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 would enable Muslim girls to get proper education, empowerment and also opportunity of understanding to lead proper marital life like other girls, which cannot be considered as an Act by implementing the Act against Muslim Community in general. Providing education and empowerment to any girl child will certainly strengthen the society, which would not be detrimental to any religion. 21. Providing education and empowerment to any girl child will certainly strengthen the society, which would not be detrimental to any religion. 21. While deciding harmonious construction, in case of possibility of conflicting views pertaining to different Articles of the Constitution, the Court has to consider the prime object of the Articles towards the harmonious construction. In the instant case, the Court has to consider the mandate of Articles 25 & 26 with reference to Articles 14, 15 & 21 of the Constitution. Article 14,15(1) & 16 prohibits discrimination. There shall be no discrimination, solely based on the ground of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth. However, Article 15(3) emphasises that if there is any concession or benefit in favour of women and children, that would not be a discrimination and if it is in favour of the male members, that would be a discrimination, violative of Articles 14 &15. Article 21 has been interpreted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court so as to maintain proper social justice, accordingly, right to life and personal liberty, guaranteed under Article 21 emphasize for decent living, which should be available to everyone, including Muslim girls, to decide their future by getting proper education and empowerment and also to decide their marital life. Hence, merely referring Articles 25 & 29, the Constitutional safeguards given under Articles 14, 15(3), 16 & 21 cannot be taken away, as the prime objective is towards gender equality. 22. When the World community is considered as a global village in the modern society and the Constitution emphasises equal right for men and women, legitimate right of education and empowerment should not be denied for any girl. It is also relevant to note that Shariat Law, never says that marriage should be performed for a girl before she attains the age of 18 years. In olden days Hindus were also accepting 'Balya Vivaha' or Child marriage, which is prohibited under the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act. Hence, the Act is not against Muslim religion and that the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 would not be detrimental to the Muslim community. 23. Having considered the facts and circumstances as discussed above, we hold that the provisions of Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 are in no way against the religious rights guaranteed under Articles 25 & 29 of the Constitution of India. 23. Having considered the facts and circumstances as discussed above, we hold that the provisions of Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 are in no way against the religious rights guaranteed under Articles 25 & 29 of the Constitution of India. In fact, the same is in favour of all the girl children in getting proper education and empowerment and equal status as that of men in the Society, as guaranteed under Articles 14, 15, 16 & 21 of the Constitution. Therefore, the Writ Petition is liable to be dismissed as not legally sustainable. In the result, the Writ Petition is dismissed. The Interim Order passed, while handing over the minor girl Ms. Aysha Banu to her parents, on the undertaking given by her father not to perform marriage of the minor girl until further Orders to be passed in the Writ Petition is made absolute. It is made clear that it is open to the minor Aysha Banu to solemnize her marriage independently or according to the wishes of her parents on attaining majority. No order as to costs. Connected Miscellaneous Petitions are closed.