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2015 DIGILAW 1765 (RAJ)

Varun Tiwari v. State of Rajasthan

2015-10-08

ANUPINDER SINGH GREWAL

body2015
JUDGMENT : Hon'ble GREWAL, J.—Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that although the petitioner had submitted his thesis for M.Tech. within time as evident from perusal of Annexure-3 dated 22.07.2015, the result of M.Tech. was declared only on 24.09.2015 while the process for admissions to the Ph.D. Course had been completed on 27.07.2015. He has further contended that due to the fault of the Rajasthan Technical University in not extending the cut off date for admissions to the Ph.D. Course till finalisation of the result for M.Tech., the petitioner can only apply for admission to the Ph.D. Course in the next year, which is wholly arbitrary and jeopardises not only the career of the petitioner but other students as well. 2. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner. 3. I am of the considered view that there is no merit in the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner as it is entirely up to the Rajasthan Technical University to lay down the schedule for admissions. It is apparent from perusal of the guidelines for admission to the Ph.D. Course for the Session 2015-16 that the last date for online application is 26.06.2015. As no other date has been specified in these guidelines by which the candidates have to attain the basic eligibility of having qualified M.Tech Examination, we have to take the last date for submission of the applications as the cut off date for eligibility in view of the settled law on the subject. It is well settled that in the absence of any other date being specified in the prospectus, notification or the rules, the eligibiltiy would be determined on the last date of submission of application. This was reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Rakesh Kumar Sharma vs. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors. ( (2013) 11 SCC 58 ) wherein it was held as under: “11. There can be no dispute to the settled legal proposition that the selection process commences on the date when applications are invited. Any person eligible on the last date of submission of the application has a right to be considered against the said vacancy provided he fulfils the requisite qualification. 12. In U.P. Public Service Commission, U.P., Allahabad and Anr. There can be no dispute to the settled legal proposition that the selection process commences on the date when applications are invited. Any person eligible on the last date of submission of the application has a right to be considered against the said vacancy provided he fulfils the requisite qualification. 12. In U.P. Public Service Commission, U.P., Allahabad and Anr. vs. Alpana, ( (1994) 2 SCC 723 ), this Court, after considering a large number of its earlier judgments, held that eligibility conditions should be examined as on last date for receipt of applications by the Commission. That too was a case where the result of a candidate was declared subsequent to the last date of submission of the applications. This Court held that as the result does not relate back to the date of examination and eligibility of the candidate is to be considered on the last date of submission of applications, therefore, a candidate, whose result has not been declared upto the last date of submission of applications, would not be eligible. 13. A three Judge Bench of this Court, in Dr. M.V. Nair vs. Union of India and Ors. ( (1993) 2 SCC 429 ), held as under: “9. ... It is well settled that suitability and eligibility have to be considered with reference to the last date for receiving the applications, unless, of course, the notification calling for applications itself specifies such a date.” 14. In Smt. Harpal Kaur Chahal vs. Director, Punjab Instructions, Punjab and Anr. (1995 (Suppl) 4 SCC 706), this Court held: “2. ... It is to be seen that when the recruitment is sought to be made, the last date has been fixed for receipt of the applications, such of those candidates, who possessed of all the qualifications as on that date, alone are eligible to apply for and to be considered for recruitment according to Rules.” 15. This Court in Rekha Chaturvedi vs. University of Rajasthan (1993 Supp (3) SCC 168) held: “10. The contention that the required qualifications of the candidates should be examined with reference to the date of selection and not with reference to the last date for making applications has only to he stated to be rejected. The date of selection is invariably uncertain. The contention that the required qualifications of the candidates should be examined with reference to the date of selection and not with reference to the last date for making applications has only to he stated to be rejected. The date of selection is invariably uncertain. In the absence of knowledge of such date the candidates who apply for the posts would be unable to state whether they are qualified for the posts in question or not, if they are yet to acquire the qualifications. Unless the advertisement mentions a fixed dale with reference to which the qualifications are to be judged, whether the said date is of selection or otherwise, it would not be possible for the candidates who do not possess the requisite qualifications in praesenti even to make applications for the posts. The uncertainty of the date may also lead to a contrary consequence, viz., even those candidates who do not have the qualifications in praesenti and are likely to acquire them at an uncertain future date, may apply for the posts thus swelling the number of applications. But a still worse consequence may follow, in that it may leave open a scope for malpractices. The date of selection may be so fixed or manipulated as to entertain some applicants and reject others, arbitrarily. Hence, in the absence of a fixed date indicated in the advertisement/notification inviting applications with reference to which the requisite qualifications should be judged, the only certain date for the scrutiny of the qualifications will be the last date for making the applications. Reference in this connection may also be made to two recent decisions of this Court in A.P. Public Service Commission vs. B. Surat Chandra ( (1990) 2 SCC 669 ) and District Collector and Chairman. Vizianagaram Social Welfare Residential School Society vs. M. Tripura Sundari Devi (1990) 3 SCC 655 .” 16. In Ashok Kumar Sharma vs. Chander Shekhar (1993 Supp (2) SCC 611) (hereinafter referred to as Ashok Kumar (1993)), the majority view was as under: “15. ... The fact is that the Appellants did pass the examination and were fully qualified for being selected prior to the date of interview. By allowing the Appellants to sit for the interview and by their selection on the basis of their comparative merits, the recruiting authority was able to get the best talents available. ... The fact is that the Appellants did pass the examination and were fully qualified for being selected prior to the date of interview. By allowing the Appellants to sit for the interview and by their selection on the basis of their comparative merits, the recruiting authority was able to get the best talents available. It was certainly in the public interest that the interview was made as broad based as was possible on the basis of qualification. The reasoning of the learned Single Judge was thus based on sound principle with reference to comparatively superior merits. It was in the public interest that better candidates who were fully qualified on the dates of selection were not rejected, notwithstanding that the results of the examination in which they had appeared had been delayed for no fault of theirs. The Appellants were fully qualified on the dates of the interview and taking into account the generally followed principle of Rule 37 in the State of Jammu & Kashmir, we are of opinion that the technical view adopted by the learned Judges of the Division Bench was incorrect....” However, the opinion of Justice R.M. Sahai had been that these 33 persons could not have been allowed to appear for the interview as they did not possess the requisite eligibility/qualification on the last date of submission of applications. 17. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Ashok Kumar Sharma vs. Chander Shekhar ( (1997) 4 SCC 18 ) reconsidered and explained the judgment of Ashok Kumar Sharma (1993) (supra) observing: “6. The proposition that where applications are called for prescribing a particular date as the last date for filing the applications, the eligibility of the candidates shall have to be judged with reference to that date and that date alone, is a well-established one. A person who acquires the prescribed qualification subsequent to such prescribed date cannot be considered at all. An advertisement or notification issued/published calling for applications constitutes a representation to the public and the authority issuing it is bound by such representation. It cannot act contrary to it. One reason behind this proposition is that if it were known that persons who obtained the qualifications after the prescribed date but before the date of interview would be allowed to appear for the interview, other similarly placed persons could also have applied. It cannot act contrary to it. One reason behind this proposition is that if it were known that persons who obtained the qualifications after the prescribed date but before the date of interview would be allowed to appear for the interview, other similarly placed persons could also have applied. Just because some of the persons had applied notwithstanding that they had not acquired the prescribed qualifications by the prescribed date, they could not have been treated on a preferential basis. Their applications ought to have been rejected at the inception itself. This proposition is indisputable and in fact was not doubted or disputed in the majority judgment.” The Court further explained that the majority view in Ashok Kumar Sharma (1993) (supra) was not correct, rather the dissenting view by Justice R.M. Sahai was correct as the Court held as under: “6. ... The reasoning in the majority opinion that by allowing the 33 Respondents to appear for the interview, the recruiting authority was able to get the best talent available and that such course was in furtherance of public interest is, with respect, an impermissible justification. It is, in our considered opinion, a clear error of law and an error apparent on the face of the record. In our opinion, R.M. Sahai, J. (and the Division Bench of the High Court) was right in holding that the 33 Respondents could not have been allowed to appear for the interview.” 18. It may also be pertinent to mention here that in the aforesaid case reference to Rekha Chaturvedi (supra) appears to have been made by a typographical error as the said judgment is by a two-Judge Bench of this Court. Infact the court wanted to make a reference to the case of Ashok Kumar Sharma (1993) (supra). 19. In Bhupinderpal Singh vs. State of Punjab ( AIR 2000 SC 2011 ), this Court placing reliance on various earlier judgments of this Court held: “13. ... Infact the court wanted to make a reference to the case of Ashok Kumar Sharma (1993) (supra). 19. In Bhupinderpal Singh vs. State of Punjab ( AIR 2000 SC 2011 ), this Court placing reliance on various earlier judgments of this Court held: “13. ... The High Court has held (i) that the cut-off date by referen-ce to which the eligibility requirement must be satisfied by the candidate seeking a public employment is the date appointed by the relevant service rules and if there be no cut-off date appointed by the rules then such date as may be appointed for the purpose in the advertisement calling for applications; (ii) that if there be no such date appointed then the eligibility criteria shall be applied by reference to the last date appointed by which the applications have to be received by the competent authority.The view taken by the High Court is supported by several decisions of this Court and is therefore well settled and hence cannot be found fault with. 20. This Court lately in State of Gujarat vs. Arvind Kumar T. Tiwari ( AIR 2012 SC 3281 ) held: “14. A person who docs not possess the requisite qualification cannot even apply for recruitment for the reason that his appointment would be contrary to the statutory rules, and would therefore, he void in law. Lacking eligibility for the post cannot be cured at any stage and appointing such a person would amount to serious illegality and not mere irregularity. Such a person cannot approach the court for any relief for the reason that he does not have a right which can be enforced through court. (Sec Prit Singh vs. S.K. Mangal, 1993 Supp (1) SCC 714 and Pramod Kumar vs. U.P. Secondary Education Services Commission - (2008) 7 SCC 153 .) A similar view has been re-iterated by this Court in Pramod Kumar vs. U.P. Secondary Education Services Commission ( (2008) 7 SCC 153 ) and State of Orissa vs. Mamta Mohanty ( (2011) 3 SCC 436 ). 21. In the instant case, the Appellant did not possess the requisite qualification on the last date of submission of the application though he applied representing that he possessed the same. The letter of offer of appointment was issued to him which was provisional and conditional subject to the verification of educational qualification, i.e., eligibility, character verification etc. 21. In the instant case, the Appellant did not possess the requisite qualification on the last date of submission of the application though he applied representing that he possessed the same. The letter of offer of appointment was issued to him which was provisional and conditional subject to the verification of educational qualification, i.e., eligibility, character verification etc. Clause 11 of the letter of offer of appointment dated 23.2.2009 made it clear that in case character is not certified or he did not possess the qualification, the services will be terminated. The legal proposition that emerges from the settled position of law as enumerated above is that the result of the examination docs not relate back to the date of examination. A person would possess qualification only on the date of declaration of the result. Thus, in view of the above, no exception can be taken to the judgment of the High Court.” 4. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Naushad Anwar vs. State of Bihar ( (2014) 11 SCC 203 ) while endorsing this principle of law that eligibility would be determined on last date of application, however, deviated therefrom as in that case there was confusion regarding eligibility criteria on the date of application in 2008 and the selection process had dragged till 2012. It was held as under: “14. The High Court has, as noticed above, taken the view that recognition by Distance Education Council was granted belatedly inasmuch as such recognition had come after the conclusion of the entire selection process hence was of no avail to the petitioners. There can indeed be no quarrel with the abstract proposition of law that any recognition granted after the conclusion of the selection process cannot possibly help the candidates concerned who ought to satisfy the conditions of eligibility according to the relevant Rules on the date the applications are submitted and scrutinised to determine their eligibility. The difficulty, however, is that the relevant Rules, did not in the case at hand stipulate whether a degree in library science obtained by Distance Education mode will constitute a recognised qualification. All that Rule 4(vii)(b) stipulated was that the candidates should have a degree in library science recognised by the Department of Education. The Department of Education has not by itself recognised any university or academic qualification awarded whether by regular or Distance Education mode. All that Rule 4(vii)(b) stipulated was that the candidates should have a degree in library science recognised by the Department of Education. The Department of Education has not by itself recognised any university or academic qualification awarded whether by regular or Distance Education mode. It was only when candidates who had secured degrees in Library Science by Distance Education mode applied for appointment that the Government issued a clarification that such degrees will be recognised provided the University awarding the same has been recognised by the Distance Education Council. There was in other words considerable confusion as to what would constitute a recognised qualification for purposes of appointment as Librarians. Such being the case, the normal rule that candidates must satisfy the conditions of eligibility on the date of the applications will have to be applied liberally so as to prevent injustice to candidates who possessed the requisite degree qualification but such qualification required recognition by another statutory authority which came during the selection process but was effective from a date earlier than the date on which the applications were made. The fact that the candidates were in the meantime allowed to participate in the selection process under Orders of the Court and their result kept in a sealed cover makes it so much easier for the Court to apply the relaxed standard for determination of the conditions of eligibility especially when the consideration of such candidates will in no way prejudice any other candidate already appointed or selected for appointment.” 5. Admittedly, the petitioner did not have the basic eligibility on the last date when the applications were to be submitted. There are no exceptional circumstances brought forth by the petitioner warranting any deviation from the aforesaid principle of law. Mere fact that the petitioner had submitted his thesis on 22.07.2015 and its result was declared on 24.09.2015 cannot, in any manner, be construed as unforeseen or extraordinary situation warranting interference by this Court. 6. As far as the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner that the prescribed date for submission of applications should have been after the declaration of result of M.Tech., I do not find any merit in this submission as well. 7. 6. As far as the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner that the prescribed date for submission of applications should have been after the declaration of result of M.Tech., I do not find any merit in this submission as well. 7. It is open to the University to fix cut off date and the schedule for admissions and in such matters the scope for interference by the Court is extremely limited and confined to exceptional circumstances. Reference in this regard can be made to the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Chandigarh Administration & Anr. vs. Jasmine Kaur & Ors. ( (2014) 10 SCC 521 ) wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has reiterated its earlier consistent view that the time schedule fixed by the educational institutions for admission to professional courses should be strictly adhered by all concerned including the courts. It was held as under: “33. Having noted the various decisions relied upon by the Appellant in SLP (C) No. 18099 of 2014 and the contesting Respondent, we are able to discern the following principles: 33.1 The schedule relating to admissions to the professional colleges should be strictly and scrupulously adhered to and shall not be deviated under any circumstance either by the courts or the Board and midstream admission should not be permitted. 33.2 Under exceptional circumstances, if the court finds that there is no fault attributable to the candidate i.e., the candidate has pursued his or her legal right expeditiously without any delay and that there is fault only on the part of the authorities or there is an apparent breach of rules and Regulations as well as related principles in the process of grant of admission which would violate the right to equality and equal treatment to the competing candidates and the relief of admission can be directed within the time schedule prescribed, it would be completely just and fair to provide exceptional reliefs to the candidate under such circumstance alone. 33.3 If a candidate is not selected during a particular academic year due to the fault of the Institutions/Authorities and in this process if the seats are filled up and the scope for granting admission is lost due to eclipse of time schedule, then under such circumstances, the candidate should not be victimised for no fault of his/her and the Court may consider grant of appropriate compensation to offset the loss caused, if any. 33.4 When a candidate does not exercise or pursue his/her rights or legal remedies against his/her non-selection expeditiously and promptly, then the Courts cannot grant any relief to the candidate in the form of securing an admission. 33.5 If the candidate takes a calculated risk/chance by subjecting himself/herself to the selection process and after knowing his/her non-selection, he/she cannot subsequently turn around and contend that the process of selection was unfair. 33.6 If it is found that the candidate acquiesces or waives his/her right to claim relief before the Court promptly, then in such cases, the legal maxim vigilantibus et non dormientibus jura subveniunt, which means that equity aids only the vigilant and not the ones who sleep over their rights, will be highly appropriate. 33.7 No relief can be granted even though the prospectus is declared illegal or invalid if the same is not challenged promptly. Once the candidate is aware that he/she does not fulfil the criteria of the prospectus he/she cannot be heard to state that, he/she chose to challenge the same only after preferring the application and after the same is refused on the ground of eligibility. 33.8 There cannot be telescoping of unfilled seats of one year with permitted seats of the subsequent year i.e., carry forward of seats cannot be permitted how much ever meritorious a candidate is and deserved admission. In such circumstances, the Courts cannot grant any relief to the candidate but it is up to the candidate to re-apply next academic year. 33.9 There cannot be at any point of time a direction given either by the Court or the Board to increase the number of seats which is exclusively in the realm of the Medical Council of India. 33.10 Each of these above mentioned principles should be applied based on the unique and distinguishable facts and circumstances of each case and no two cases can be held to be identical.” 8. 33.10 Each of these above mentioned principles should be applied based on the unique and distinguishable facts and circumstances of each case and no two cases can be held to be identical.” 8. This principle would also be equally applicable to the instant case as it concerns admission to rightly specialized course of Ph.D. which entails highest level of academic knowledge and skill. As already noticed there is no extraordinary situation in the facts obtaining in this case for departing from this principle. For these reasons, I do not find any merit in the instant petition which is accordingly dismissed.