JUDGMENT The unsuccessful defendants have called in question the judgment and decree passed by the learned District Judge, Kalahandi, Bhawanipatna in Title Appeal No.11 of 1992 confirming the judgment and decree passed by the learned District Judge, Bhawanipatna in Title Suit No.47 of 1974. 2.For the sake of convenience, to avoid confusion and in order to bring clarity the parties have been referred to hereinafter as they have been arrayed in the trial Court. 3.The case of the plaintiff is that Narasingh Mishra, father of the appellant nos. 1 and 2 executed a registered sale deed in favour of Mr. P.K. Deo, Ex-Ruler of Kalahandi in the year 1959 and in pursuance of the same had delivered possession to the vendee who continued to enjoy of the same. Subsequently, Mr. P.K. Deo sold the property to the plaintiff by a registered sale deed in the year 1972. It is stated that in the year, 1973, Narasingh Mishra forcibly entered into the suit land, put up some temporary structures over that and thus disturbed the possession of the plaintiff. So, the suit has come to be filed in the year 1974.After having undergone arduous journey, it was finally decreed on 31.03.1992 on contest, i.e., after having twice during the period decreed ex parte and then being set aside. The suit is with the prayer for declaration of right, title and interest and for recovery of possession, as also damage with alternative prayer for recovery of the consideration amount etc. from defendant no.2, the vendor of the plaintiff if so found that he had no title over the property but has sold the same to the plaintiff. 4.The original defendant no.1 in the written statement denied the execution of the sale deed to have been done by him in favour of Mr. P.K.Deo in the year 1959. He asserts to be the owner of the suit land and in possession of the same. It is his case that he has never sold the property to defendant no.2 by registered sale deed dated 20.06.1959 which, according to him, is a forged document and thus has conferred no right, title and interest in favour of the defendant no.2 at any point of time nor he has delivered with the possession of the land purchased under the said purported sale deed. It has been specifically averred that on the alleged date, i.e 20.06.1959 he was at Jeypore in connection with the admission of his nephew in JELC High School, Jeypore and was not at all present at Bhawanipatna where the deed of sale is purported to have been executed and registered. In other words, he claims to have continued as the owner of the suit land in possession all along and the sales as pleaded by the plaintiffs have not arrested the flow of title so far as the suit land is concerned. The defendant no.2 supported the case of the plaintiffs. 5.With such pleadings, both the Courts below have found possession of the suit land to be remaining with defendant no.2 since the year 1959 from the time of his purchase and then to have flown to the hands of the plaintiff since his purchase in the year 1972. Thus, it appears that both the Courts below have rendered concurrent findings on facts with regard to execution of the sale deed, delivery of possession pursuant to the respective sales as also the factum of possession to be remaining with the plaintiff till his dispossession in the hands of the original defendant no.1.These are now assailed in this appeal. 6.At this stage, it is felt apposite to have a look of the scope of Section 100 of the Code of Civil procedure, the power of the High Court in interfering with the findings of the lower appellate Court in a second appeal. In case of Tirumala Tirupati Devasthanams Vrs. K.M. Krishnaiah, 1998 (3) SCC 331 , it has been held that it was not open to the second appellate Court to reappreciate the evidence and reject the evidence accepted by the Courts below on the question of possession. In case of Dnyanoba Bhaurao Shemade Vrs. Maroti Bhaurao Marnor, (1992) 2 SCC 471 it has been held that whether a finding of fact reached by the Courts below is against the weight of evidence or not in a question, which will remain in the realm of appreciation of evidence and does not project any question of law, much less, any substantial question of law, which enables the High Court in second appeal to upset such a finding of fact. In case of K. Raj and Another Vrs. In case of K. Raj and Another Vrs. Muthamma, (2001) 6 SCC 279 , it has been held that the substantial question of law as may be involved in the appeal are to be precisely stated in the memorandum of appeal itself. If the High Court feels satisfied about existence of substantial question of law, it is for the High Court to formulate that question and the appeal is generally to be heard on the question so formulated. Referring to the provision of Section 100 of the Code, it has been held that formulation of such questions of law gives proper direction in which arguments have to be advanced by the parties. The facts and the questions of law are also appreciated in the current perspective. Such provisions as made under sub-Section (3) and (4) of Section 100 C.P.C. are meant to be acted upon and complied with. It appears that the High Court did not advert to the said requirement of law and without addressing itself to that aspect of the matter heard the appeal and disposed of the same. In case of Veerayee Ammal Vrs. Seeni Ammal, (2002) 1 SCC 134 , it has been held that the substantial question of law in the instant case cannot, in any way, be termed to be question of law much less a substantial question of law. The question formulated in fact is a question of fact. Merely because of appreciation of evidence another view is also possible that would not clothe the High Court to assume the jurisdiction by terming the question as substantial question of law. In this case Issue 1, as framed by the trial Court, was admittedly, an issue of fact which was concurrently held in favour of the appellant-plaintiff and did not justify the High Court to disturb the same by substituting its own finding for the findings of the Court below, arrived at on proper appreciation of evidence. It has been held in case of Gobindaraju Vrs. Mariamman, (2005) 2 SCC 500 quoting the decision in case of Santosh Hazari Vrs. Purushottam Tiwari, (2001) 3 SCC 179 that a point of law which admits of no two opinions may be a proposition of law but cannot be a substantial question of law. It has been held in case of Gobindaraju Vrs. Mariamman, (2005) 2 SCC 500 quoting the decision in case of Santosh Hazari Vrs. Purushottam Tiwari, (2001) 3 SCC 179 that a point of law which admits of no two opinions may be a proposition of law but cannot be a substantial question of law. To be ‘substantial’ a question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by law of the land or a binding precedent, and must have a material bearing on the decision of the case, if answered either way, insofar as the rights of the parties before it are concerned. To be a question of law ‘involving in the case’ there must be first a foundation for it laid in the pleadings and the question should emerge from the sustainable findings of fact arrived at by Court of facts and it must be necessary to decide that question of law for a just and proper decision of the case. An entirely new point raised for the first time before the High Court is not a question involved in the case unless it goes to the root of the matter. It will, therefore, depend on the facts and circumstances of each case whether a question of law is a substantial one and involved in the case, or not, the paramount overall consideration being the need for striking a judicious balance between the indispensable obligation to do justice at all stages and impelling necessity of avoiding prolongation in the life of any lis.” This judgment has been followed in a number of decisions including in case of ‘Thiagarajan v. Sri Venugopalaswamy B. Koil, (2004) 5 SCC 762 . As per settled law, the scope of exercise of the jurisdiction by the High Court in second appeal under Section 100 is limited to the substantial questions of law framed at the time of admission of the appeal or additional substantial question of law framed at a later date after recording reasons for the same. It was observed in Santosh Hazari case that a point of law which admits of no two opinions may be a proposition of law but cannot be a substantial question of law. It was observed in Santosh Hazari case that a point of law which admits of no two opinions may be a proposition of law but cannot be a substantial question of law. To be a “substantial” question of law it must be debatable, not previously settled by the law of the land for a binding precedent and answer to the same will have a material bearing as to the rights of the parties before the Court. As to what would be the question of law “involving in the case” it was observed that to be a question of law “involving in the case” there must be first a foundation for it laid in the pleadings and the question should emerge from the sustainable findings of fact arrived at by the Court of fact and it must be necessary to decide that question for a just and proper decision between the parties, It has also been held in case of Hans Raji (Smt) Vrs Yosodanand, (1996) 7 SCC 122 that so far as the applicability to the proviso to Section 68 of the Evidence Act is concerned, it must be noted that there was no occasion for the respondent to examine any attesting witness to the document in question as it was a sale deed which never required any attestation and even if some ‘marginal’ witnesses had attested the document the document did not attract Section 68 of the Act which in term applies to the proof of execution of document required by law to be attested. In case of Vishwanath Agrawal Vrs.Sarla Vishwanath Agrawal, (2012) 7 SCC 288 , it has been held that the High Court in a second appeal should not disturb the concurrent findings of fact unless it is shown that the findings recorded by the Courts below are perverse being based on no evidence or that on the evidence on record no reasonable person based on no evidence or that on the evidence on record no reasonable person could have come to that conclusion. It has also been held in case of Ramlal Vrs. Phagua, AIR 2006 S.C. 623 that where the lower Courts concurrently erred in not appreciating oral and documentary evidence properly, the High Court in a second appeal is at liberty to re-appreciate the evidence and record its own conclusion for reversing orders passed by the lower Courts. It has also been held in case of Ramlal Vrs. Phagua, AIR 2006 S.C. 623 that where the lower Courts concurrently erred in not appreciating oral and documentary evidence properly, the High Court in a second appeal is at liberty to re-appreciate the evidence and record its own conclusion for reversing orders passed by the lower Courts. It has also been held in case of Jagdish Singh Vrs. Natthu Singh, AIR 1992 SC 1604 that when findings by Court of facts vitiated by non-consideration of relevant evidence or by essentially wrong approach to the matter, the High Court is not precluded from recording proper findings. 7.Learned counsel for the appellants submits that the Courts below have not taking into consideration the material evidence available on record both oral and documentary and, therefore, the findings are liable to be interfered with and this Court can re-appreciate the evidence to arrive at proper findings. In this connection he made reference to the evidence of P.Ws. 1 to 4. 8.Learned counsel for the respondents vehemently refutes the above submission. According to him, these are all findings of facts and if one simply goes through the judgment of both the Courts, simultaneously giving a reading to the depositions of the witnesses and viewing other documentary evidence available on record, it will clearly show as to how both the Courts have appreciated the matter and made strenuous exercise. It is further submitted that even the lower appellate Court has gone to take into consideration some other important features emanating from the evidences which had gone unnoticed by the trial Court. Referring to the evidence of all the witnesses as well as the documents admitted in evidence during trial, he contends that there remains no justification to say that the Courts below have not considered the relevant materials while appreciating the evidence and no the evidence and no error surfaces in the said exercise done by the Courts below. Therefore, he contends that there appears no question of interfering with the said concurrent finding of facts and there remains no substantial question to be answered. Therefore, he contends that there appears no question of interfering with the said concurrent finding of facts and there remains no substantial question to be answered. He further contends that the very defence of non-execution of the sale deed in the year 1959 has been directly demolished by positive evidence by placing before the Court that the specific defence of absence of the executants on that particular date of deed at Bhawanipatna is falsehood and when the signature is denied, the same has been found to be that of defendant no.1 by the handwriting expert. He has also placed that in the present case the expert’s evidence which according to him has been rightly accepted. For the purpose he places reliance on two decisions of the Apex Court, i.e. State of Maharashtra Vrs. Sukhdev Singh and Another, (1992) 3 SCC 700 and Murari Lal Vrs.State of Madhya Pradesh, (1980) 1 SCC 704 . He also contends that in the present case so far as the registered sale deed is concerned, the presumption remains about its correctness. In order to bolster the contention, he has again placed reliance in case of Dinesh Chandra Guha Vrslk.Satchidananda Mukherji and Others, AIR 1972 Orissa 235 (V 59 C 75) and Mst.Susila Sa and others Vrs. Durju and others, AIR 1977 Orissa 178 as well as Bhagat Ram and Another Vrs. Suresh and Others, (2003) 12 SCC 35 . It is his last contention that the document whose execution is challenged and which is said to be a forged document having been proved in original, the presumption available under Section 90 of the Evidence Act arises as by the time it was tendered in evidence it had completed the required age. In support of this he places reliance in case of Mst. Radha Hota Vrs.Dutika Satpathy & another, 1979 (48) CLT 211, Aziz Ahmed Khan Vrs. I.A. Patel, AIR 1974 AP 1 and Bundu Vrs. Smt. Jawala Devi, AIR 1983 Allahabad 36. 9.The substantial questions of law formulated at the time of admission of this appeal are as per the ground mentioned in a,b,c,d and e of the memorandum of appeal which are as under; (a)Whether the learned Courts below have adopted an erroneous legal approach with regard to the execution of the sale deed dated 20.06.1959 purported to have been executed by the defendant no.1 in favour of the defendant no.2? (b)Whether the learned lower appellate Court have committed an error of law and procedure in interpreting the sale deed of the year 1959 (Ext.2) in the context of Section 90 of the Evidence Act? (c)Whether the lower appellate Court has committed an error of law land procedure in holding that the document (Ext.2) has completed 30 years and has been produced from proper custody and their execution can be presumed under Section 90 of the Evidence Act, even though admittedly the suit was filed in 1974 and the 30 years period admittedly have not been completed and therefore the provision of Section 90 of the Evidence Act is not attracted in the case at hand? (d)Whether the finding of the lower Courts below with regard to the evidential value of the report of the handwriting expert can at all be sustained in the eye of law? (e)Whether the learned Courts below have committed a serious error of law in placing onus lies on the defendant to establish their title even though it is settled that the plaintiff has to establish his own case without depending upon on the witnesses of the defence case. So in order to answer the above questions, it has become the necessity to refer to the evidence and then to judgment so as to if both the Courts below have made proper approach in appreciating the evidence and have ultimately so appreciated in rendering the findings. 10.The first issue is with regard to the validity of the sale deed purported to have been executed by defendant no.1 in favour of defendant no.2. The next one is in relation to the right of the defendant no.2 to transfer and that is wholly dependent upon the answer to the former. The other issue is in relation to possession, which in the present case is also to follow the answer to the first issue as here no case of acquisition of title by adverse possession has been set up. So, if the title of the plaintiff is found to be there in respect of the suit land on the basis of the sale deed of the year 1959 in favour of his vendor and the subsequent sale deed of the year 1972 in his favour, the fate of the suit gets decided. So, if the title of the plaintiff is found to be there in respect of the suit land on the basis of the sale deed of the year 1959 in favour of his vendor and the subsequent sale deed of the year 1972 in his favour, the fate of the suit gets decided. The registered sale deed is of the year 1959 is Ext.2 when it has been tendered in evidence during contested hearing it has become 30 years old. The trial Court has not accepted it to be so, in view of the fact that when it was first tendered in evidence during ex parte hearing in the year 1985, there was no completion of the required period. However, the lower appellate Court has differed and has taken it to be a thirty years old document with necessary presumption arising thereby. Once an ex parte decree is set aside, its legal effect is that what was done from the date of the defendant’s non-appearance in Court becomes nonest as against him and the parties relegate back to the same position as they occupied before nonappearance of the defendants. That testimony no longer remains as evidence in the case thereof. So here in the present case, for computation of age of the document (Ext.2), the date to be reckoned is the date when it was tendered during hearing on contest. In that view of the matter, the presumption under Section 90 of the Evidence Act comes into play as the same fulfils all the criteria required for the purpose. The presumption relates to its genuineness as to execution etc. Leaving aside the above aspect of the presumption which has not been very much pressed into service by the plaintiff, let us now come to the evidence with regard to the execution and registration of Ext.2.At this stage, it may be stated that in course of hearing defendant no.2 filed an application to send Ext.2 the sale deed dated 20.06.1959 for examination by handwriting expert and the expert’s opinion is to the effect that it is the defendant no.1 who had signed on the said sale deed. The expert’s evidence is attacked on the ground of not being duly corroborated. The expert’s evidence is attacked on the ground of not being duly corroborated. However, it is seen that the scribe of the deed has been examined as P:.W. 4 and he has categorically deposed about the factum of execution of the sale deed by defendant no.1 with further details. The defence to the sale deed has of course appeared as D.W. 3 to support the case of the defendant no.1. His signature has been examined by the expert and that has been found to be very much appended by him. This deed of sale (Ext.2) has been registered. It finds mention with all endorsements as required under the law, So, as provided in Section 60 (2) of the Registration Act, the presumption that facts mention within the endorsement referred in Section 59 of the Act that is of endorsement made under Section 52 to 58 have occurred as therein mentioned. This of course is an initial presumption and stands for final consideration in the absence of any evidence standing to rebut the same. Now, if we go to the evidence of handwriting expert, it is seen that he has given his opinion based on reasons and his ultimately arrived at a conclusion to opine the signature of defendant no. 1 to be there in the sale deed (Ext.2) and so also that of the witness. 11.The Courts below have found the fality of the case set up by the defendant no.1 as an additional ground in providing support to the plaintiffs case with regard to execution of the document of the year 1959 and its registration. The specific case of the defendant no.1 that he had gone by Jeypore with his nephew on 20.06.1959 has been found to be unacceptable. The nephew of defendant no.1 has been examined as D.W. 5. He has stated that on 20.6.1959 the defendant no.1 was not present at Bhawanipatna and was at Jeypore. His evidence has been scanned in detail and that again having been tested with the evidence of defendant no.1 examined as D.W. 4 has been found by the Courts below to be not acceptable and they are said to be not stating the truth on that score. The Courts below appear to have assigned very good reasons for the same. His evidence has been scanned in detail and that again having been tested with the evidence of defendant no.1 examined as D.W. 4 has been found by the Courts below to be not acceptable and they are said to be not stating the truth on that score. The Courts below appear to have assigned very good reasons for the same. Thus, when it is found that both the Courts below have based the findings with regard to the execution of the sale deed under Ext. 2 by defendant no.1 in favoaur of defendant no.2 and nothing surfaces to be viewed by this Court in that regard for arriving at a conclusion that such finding is either based on perverse appreciation of evidence for arriving at such finding on facts, the Courts below have omitted the materials evidence available on record which if would have been taken into consideration the conclusion might have been different. For the aforesaid reasons and discussions, this Court finds no justification to interfere with the concurrent finding of facts as regards execution of Ext. 2. 12.Now coming to the question of possession. Again, it is seen that both the Courts in this connection have churned the evidence and have arrived at a concurrent finding as regards the delivery of possession under Ext.2 by defendant no.1 to defendant no.2. Next finding is that on the basis of Ext.1 whose execution stands admitted, there has been delivery of possession of the suit land to the plaintiff. Given a careful reading of the judgments of both the Courts, this Court finds the approach to be justified and reasons arrived for accepting such evidence cannot at all be said to be actuated by any bias or by ignoring material evidence and bringing in something not available on record. Therefore, this Court declines to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact with regard to possession. Therefore, this Court declines to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact with regard to possession. 13.In view of positive finding with regard to execution of registered sale deed (Exts.1) and the subsequent sale on that basis to the plaintiff under registered sale deed (Exts.2 ) and the title when found to be resting with the plaintiff and so also with his vendor prior to that, having flown from the defendant no.1 in the absence of a case being set up by defendant no.1 as regards acquisition of title by adverse possession, there remains no necessity even to look into that aspect in this suit filed for declaration of title and recovery of possession by the plaintiff. 14.For the discussions and reasons as aforesaid, this Court accordingly answers the substantial questions of law formulated at the time of admission of the appeal favouring confirmation of the findings rendered by the Courts below. 15.Resultantly, the second appeal is dismissed being devoid of merit with costs throughout. Appeal dismissed.