JUDGMENT Mr. P.B. Bajanthri, J.:- In this petition, petitioner has questioned the order dated 26.6.2014 vide Annexure P-10, issued by respondent No.1, by which sanction for prosecution has been granted arising out of FIR No. 7 dated 17.1.2006 under Section 7, 13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, (hereinafter to be referred as “the P.C. Act”) filed by Vigilance Bureau, Patiala. 2. The petitioner was in the cadre of Medical Officer. While he was working at Civil Hospital, Bassi Pathana, he was alleged to have been trapped while accepting bribe of Rs.2,000/- for issuance of MLR certificate to the complainant. There was a quarrel between Kashmir Singh s/o Bant Singh, his nephew Mukhtiar Singh with Rajwinder Singh @ Raji and Sukhvinder Singh @ Kinda of their village, Buchin, Tehsil Bassi Pathana, District Fatehgarh Sahib. The petitioner had treated injuries to complainant and to others. The complainant is stated to have requested the petitioner to give severe injury certificate, so as to file necessary criminal proceedings against the other party. Arising out of these facts and circumstances, the complainant’s allegation is that the petitioner had demanded a sum of Rs.5,000/- and on negotiation it was reduced to Rs.2,000/- and it was alleged to have been thrusted in the petitioner’s coat pocket. On 17.1.2006, FIR No. 7 was registered in the Police Station, Vigilance Bureau, Patiala Range, Patiala. The alleged quarrel between the complainant and Rajwinder Singh occurred and the petitioner had handed over copy of the MLR to the complainant on the same day. 3. The Vigilance Department requested the Ist respondent to give sanction to prosecute petitioner. The first respondent declined to grant sanction to prosecute on 5.11.2008 vide Annexure P-8 and thereafter, in the year 2011, once again sought sanction for prosecution. Even the same was declined on 1.8.2011 vide Annexure P-9 by the first respondent. Further in the year 2014, once again sought for sanction to prosecute petitioner. Pursuant to the request, on 26.6.2014 the first respondent granted sanction to prosecute the petitioner vide Annexure P-10. Petitioner, feeling aggrieved by the Ist respondent order dated 26.6.2014 by which sanction to prosecute petitioner has been ordered. Hence this petition. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that petitioner was on duty on 17.1.2006. Pursuant to the request, on 26.6.2014 the first respondent granted sanction to prosecute the petitioner vide Annexure P-10. Petitioner, feeling aggrieved by the Ist respondent order dated 26.6.2014 by which sanction to prosecute petitioner has been ordered. Hence this petition. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that petitioner was on duty on 17.1.2006. Complainant Kashmir Singh rushed in the hospital and forcible thrusted bribe amount in the pocket of coat of the petitioner which was hanging in the petitioner’s room. When the petitioner stopped Kashmir Singh, currency notes which were thrusted in the pocket of coat fell on the ground. At that juncture, the petitioner was caught by the officials of the Vigilance Bureau and was arrested on the allegations that he had demanded and accepted bribe amount of Rs.2,000/-. Further, petitioner contended that complainant Kashmir Singh is a habitual offender as is evident from FIR No. 11 dated 11.1.1986 under Section 5 (2) RWS 5 (1) of 4 of P.C. Act and FIR No. 111 dated 5.9.1985 under Section 5 (2) 47 of the P.C. Act. The complainant is also involved in FIR No. 56 in the year 1995 under Section 302 IPC and FIR No. 59 dated 7.7.2001 under Sections 323, 326, 447, 148 and 149 IPC and so also under Section 25, 27, 54 and 59 of Arms Act and in another FIR No. 249 dated 14.12.2005 under Sections 326, 324, 34 IPC. Having regard to the complainant’s character, read with his involvement in many criminal proceedings, indicates that in order to fix the petitioner under the P.C. Act, the complainant has hatched a plan. Therefore, Kashmir Singh’s complaint that the petitioner had demanded and accepted illegal gratification, is only to harass the petitioner on account of non-issuance of favourable certificate to the complainant. The first respondent, after taking due notice of the alleged incident against the petitioner, did not approve sanction to prosecute the petitioner on 5.11.2008 vide Annexure P-8. It was further contended that unnecessarily, once again sanction to prosecute the petitioner was sought. The first respondent once again examined the comments of Vigilance Bureau, seeking for prosecution, so also explanation of the petitioner, and refused to grant approval for petitioner’s prosecution. Thereafter, one more attempt was made to get sanction to prosecute the petitioner. It was further contended that unnecessarily, once again sanction to prosecute the petitioner was sought. The first respondent once again examined the comments of Vigilance Bureau, seeking for prosecution, so also explanation of the petitioner, and refused to grant approval for petitioner’s prosecution. Thereafter, one more attempt was made to get sanction to prosecute the petitioner. In the third attempt, the first respondent while referring to the facts of the case, approved the sanction to prosecute the petitioner in FIR No. 7 dated 17.1.2006 under Section 7, 13 (2) and Section 19 of the P.C. Act, in the Court. It was contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that while granting sanction to prosecute the petitioner in the third attempt on 26.6.2014, no fresh materials were produced or relied. Therefore, in the absence of fresh materials, question of re-look for prosecuting the petitioner, is not tenable and while giving sanction what has been stated in the impugned sanction order dated 26.6.2014 is “after thoroughly perusing the challan file and enclosed documents related to this case, Hon’ble Governor, Punjab, has satisfied that Dr. Ravinder Kumar Verma, SMO, has committed an offence under Section 7, 13 (2), 88 of the P.C. Act”. In view of the aforesaid decision, it is evident that no fresh materials have been produced to re-look or review to sanction to prosecute the petitioner. Therefore, the impugned order dated 26.6.2014, vide Annexure P-10, is liable to be set aside. 5. The petitioner’s counsel relied on the following decisions:- 1. State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Nishant Sareen, [2011(1) Law Herald (SC) 6] : 2010 (14) SCC 527 . Extract of paragraph 12 of the aforesaid judgment is reproduced hereunder:- “12. It is true that the Government in the matter of grant or refusal to grant sanction exercises statutory power and that would not mean that power once exercised cannot be exercised again or at a subsequent stage in the absence of express power of review in no circumstance whatsoever. The power of review, however, is not unbridled or unrestricted. It is true that the Government in the matter of grant or refusal to grant sanction exercises statutory power and that would not mean that power once exercised cannot be exercised again or at a subsequent stage in the absence of express power of review in no circumstance whatsoever. The power of review, however, is not unbridled or unrestricted. It seems to us sound principle to follow that once the statutory power under Section 19 of the 1988 Act or Section 197 of the Code has been exercised by the Government or the competent authority, as the case may be, it is not permissible for the sanctioning authority to review or reconsider the matter on the same materials again. It is so because unrestricted power of review may not bring finality to such exercise and on change of the Government or change of the person authorised to exercise power of sanction, the matter concerning sanction may be reopened by such authority for the reasons best known to it and a different order may be passed. The opinion on the same materials, thus, may keep on changing and there may not be any end to such statutory exercise. In our opinion, a change of opinion per se on the same materials cannot be a ground for reviewing or reconsidering the earlier order refusing to grant sanction. However, in a case where fresh materials have been collected by the investigating agency subsequent to the earlier order and placed before the sanctioning authority and on that basis, the matter is reconsidered by the sanctioning authority and in light of the fresh materials an opinion is formed that sanction to prosecute the public servant may be granted, there may not be any impediment to adopt such course.” 2. State of Punjab and another vs. Mohammed Iqbal Bhatti, [2009(5) Law Herald (SC) 2924 : 2009(3) Law Herald (P&H) 2459 (SC)] : 2009 (17) SCC 92 . Extract of paragraph 23 of the aforesaid judgment is reproduced hereunder:- “23. The High Court in its judgment has clearly held, upon perusing the entire records, that no fresh material was produced. There is also nothing to show as to why reconsideration became necessary. On what premise such a procedure was adopted is not known. Extract of paragraph 23 of the aforesaid judgment is reproduced hereunder:- “23. The High Court in its judgment has clearly held, upon perusing the entire records, that no fresh material was produced. There is also nothing to show as to why reconsideration became necessary. On what premise such a procedure was adopted is not known. Application of mind is also absent to show the necessity for reconsideration or review of the earlier order on the basis of the materials placed before the sanctioning authority or otherwise.” 3. Harbans Lal vs. State of Punjab and another, [2009(1) Law Herald (P&H) (DB) 46] : 2009 (2) RCR (Criminal) 305. Extract of paragraph 13 of the aforesaid judgment is reproduced hereunder:- “13. The sanction has been accorded vide order Annexure P-3 without any further investigation or without there being any material collected by the concerned authority. Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 prohibits a Court from taking cognizance of offence punishable under Sections 7,10,13 and 15 except with the previous sanction of the concerned Government. When there is no valid sanction, the Court cannot take cognizance of the offence. Therefore, the FIR and other consequential proceedings, including the sanction order, have to be quashed.” 4. Harlochan Singh vs. State of Punjab 2010 (2) RCR (Criminal) 358. Extract of paragraphs 8 and 9 of the aforesaid judgment is reproduced hereunder:- “8. In the present case also, it is an admitted position that no fresh material was placed before the Competent Authority when the order dated 1.10.2008 came to be passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Ludhiana granting the sanction to prosecute the petitioner. The earlier order passed by the Competent Authority i.e. by the Deputy Commissioner, Ludhiana on 12.10.2001 was also not brought to the notice of the competent Authority which has passed the subsequent order. 9. The order dated 1.10.2008 (Annexure P-4) is, thus, contrary to the settled principles of law with regard to the review of the order passed by the Competent Authority for granting sanction by the Competent Authority to prosecute a government servant. In the absence of some technical infirmity or some clerical error or some fresh material on the record, the Competent Authority had no jurisdiction or power to review the earlier order passed by it on merits.” 5. In the absence of some technical infirmity or some clerical error or some fresh material on the record, the Competent Authority had no jurisdiction or power to review the earlier order passed by it on merits.” 5. Mohan Singh and another vs. State of Punjab and another, [2013(3) Law Herald (P&H) 2350] : 2013 (2) RCR (Criminal) 959. Extract of paragraphs 10 to 13 of aforesaid judgment are reproduced hereunder:- “10. The present petitioners are placed on better footing. In the present case, sanction to prosecute the petitioners was declined by President Municipal council, Payal vide P-10 and P-11 by observing that TS-1 certificate was issued as per record. No mistake was committed by the employees and they were innocent. 11. A Division Bench of this Court in Mohammed Iqbal Bhatti vs. State of Punjab, [2006(1) Law Herald (P&H) (DB) 725] : 2006 (2) RCR (Criminal) 430 in paragraph 9 has held as under:- 9. As regards point NO. 2, that the Government having once exercised its power under Section 197 of the code, had exhausted its power and as such it could not exercise the same for the second time, we are inclined to hold that there is merit in this contention. The power given to the State Government under Section 197, having been exercised by it while passing the first order, annexure P-2 stood exhausted and the same could not be exercised second time while passing the impugned order, annexure P-3. For this decision of ours, we find support not only from the decision ion Kanta Devi’s case (supra), but also from the quotation reproduced above in the case of M/s Western India Watch Co’s case (supra) wherein the Supreme Court did not consider the question of exhausting the power. In that case, it came to the conclusion that since the Government had refused to exercise its power therefore it was not exhausted. The necessary implication that if the power had been exercised, then the same could not be exercised twice over. Furthermore, we find support from the decision of the Supreme Court in D.N. Ganguly’s case (supra) where the subsequent order was held to be bad although not on the reasoning that the power had been exhausted while passing the earlier order. The necessary implication that if the power had been exercised, then the same could not be exercised twice over. Furthermore, we find support from the decision of the Supreme Court in D.N. Ganguly’s case (supra) where the subsequent order was held to be bad although not on the reasoning that the power had been exhausted while passing the earlier order. Hence, we hold that the Government exhausted its power under Section 197 of the Code while passing the earlier order, annexure P-2, it could not exercise that power twice over while passing the impugned order, annexure P- 3. On this ground also, the impugned order annexure P- 3 is liable to be quashed as being null and void.” 12. The State had gone in S.L.P against this judgment and Hon’ble the Supreme Court in a case of State of Punjab and another vs. Mohammed Iqbal Bhatti, [2009(5) Law Herald (SC) 2924 : 2009(3) Law Herald (P&H) 2459 (SC)] : 2009 (3) R.C.R. (Criminal) 861 : 2009 (4) Recent Apex Judgments (R.A.J.) 605 : JT 2009 (13) SC 180 has dismissed the SLP and observed in paragrpah 23, which reads as under:- “The High Court in its judgment has clearly held, upon perusing the entire records, that no fresh material was produced. There is also nothing to show as to why reconsideration became necessary. On what premise such a procedure was adopted is not known. Application of mind is also absent to show the necessity for reconsideration or review of the earlier order on the basis of the materials placed before the sanctioning authority or otherwise.” 13. The sanction to prosecute Mahesh Kumar the other co-accused had been withdrawn by the Punjab government vide order dated 21.02.2012. In the facts of the present case, on three occasions, sanction to prosecute the petitioners had been declined and thereafter, sanction to prosecute these employees was issued vide orders dated 21.01.2009 (P-13 and P-14) by the Director, Department of Local Government, Punjab Chandigarh who was not even the appointing authority of the petitioners. There was no new material with the authorities to review its earlier decision.” 6. Per contra, learned counsel for the State vehemently contended that the petitioner is involved in trap proceedings under the P.C. Act. For the purpose of sanction for prosecution, admittedly, it was refused on two occasions. There was no new material with the authorities to review its earlier decision.” 6. Per contra, learned counsel for the State vehemently contended that the petitioner is involved in trap proceedings under the P.C. Act. For the purpose of sanction for prosecution, admittedly, it was refused on two occasions. However, on the third occasion allegations read with records have been taken into consideration. The Ist respondent – competent authority had perused records in detail and there is a total application of mind and there is compliance to Section 19 of the P.C. Act. Therefore, there is no infirmity in the order of sanction for prosecution. The contention of the petitioner that first respondent, before passing the impugned sanction order, has not examined the materials, is absolutely incorrect. Details of allegations have been narrated and it was taken note of and sanction order was issued in accordance with law. 7. Heard counsel for the parties. 8. Section 19 of the P.C. Act reads as follows:- “ 19. Previous sanction necessary for prosecution (1) No court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under section 7, 10, 11, 13 and 15 alleged to have been committed by a public servant, except with the previous sanction,- (a) in the case of a person who is employed in connection with the affairs of the Union and is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Central Government, of that Government; (b) in the case of a person who is employed in connection with the affairs of a State and is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the State Government, of that Government; (c) in the case of any other person, of the authority competent to remove him from his office. (2) Where for any reason whatsoever any doubt arises as to whether the previous sanction as required under sub-section (1) should be given by the Central Government or the State Government or any other authority, such sanction shall be given by that Government or authority which would have been competent to remove the public servant from his office at the time when the offence was alleged to have been committed. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in the code of Criminal Procedure, 1973,- (a) no finding, sentence or order passed by a special Judge shall be reversed or altered by a Court in appeal, confirmation or revision on the ground of the absence of, or any error, omission or irregularity in, the sanction required under sub-section (1), unless in the opinion of that court, a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby; (b) no court shall stay the proceedings under this Act on the ground of any error, omission or irregularity in the sanction granted by the authority, unless it is satisfied that such error, omission or irregularity has resulted in a failure of justice; (c) no court shall stay the proceedings under this Act on any other ground and no court shall exercise the powers of revision in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any inquiry, trial, appeal or other proceedings. (4) In determining under sub-section (3) whether the absence of, or any error, omission or irregularity in, such sanction has occasioned or resulted in a failure of justice the court shall have regard to the fact whether the objection could and should have been raised at any earlier stage in the proceedings. Explanation.-For the purposes of this section,- (a) error includes competency of the authority to grant sanction; (b) a sanction required for prosecution includes reference to any requirement that the prosecution shall be at the instance of a specified authority or with the sanction of a specified person or any requirement of a similar nature.” The object underlying under Section 19 is to ensure that a public servant does not suffer harassment on false, frivolous, concocted or unsubstantiated allegations. Therefore, while exercising power under Section 19, is not an empty formality. The Competent Authority or for that matter, the Sanctioning Authority is supposed to apply its mind to the entire material and evidence placed before it and on such examination thereof reach a conclusion fairly, objectively and consistent with public interest as to whether or not in the facts and circumstances, sanction be accorded to prosecute the public servant. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in number of decisions, while examining Section 19 of P.C. Act, held as follows:- 1) P.L. Tatwal vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, [2014(2) Law Herald (SC) 1707 : 2014(3) Law Herald (P&H) 2372 (SC)] : (2014) 11 SCC 431 . The Hon’ble Supreme Court in number of decisions, while examining Section 19 of P.C. Act, held as follows:- 1) P.L. Tatwal vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, [2014(2) Law Herald (SC) 1707 : 2014(3) Law Herald (P&H) 2372 (SC)] : (2014) 11 SCC 431 . Extract of paragraph 14 of the aforesaid judgment is reproduced hereunder:- 14. After referring to subsequent decisions, the main principles governing the issue have been culled out at paragraph 14 which reads as follows: “14.1. It is incumbent on the prosecution to prove that the valid sanction has been granted by the sanctioning authority after being satisfied that a case for sanction has been made out. 14.2. The sanction order may expressly show that the sanctioning authority has perused the material placed before it and, after consideration of the circumstances, has granted sanction for prosecution. 14.3. The prosecution may prove by adducing the evidence that the material was placed before the sanctioning authority and its satisfaction was arrived at upon perusal of the material placed before it. 14.4. Grant of sanction is only an administrative function and the sanctioning authority is required to prima facie reach the satisfaction that relevant facts would constitute the offence. 14.5. The adequacy of material placed before the sanctioning authority cannot be gone into by the court as it does not sit in appeal over the sanction order. 14.6. If the sanctioning authority has perused all the materials placed before it and some of them have not been proved that would not vitiate the order of sanction. 14.7. The order of sanction is a prerequisite as it is intended to provide a safeguard to a public servant against frivolous and vexatious litigants, but simultaneously an order of sanction should not be construed in a pedantic manner and there should not be a hypertechnical approach to test its validity.” 2) CBI vs. Ashok Kumar Aggarwal, (2014) 14 SCC 295 . 16. In view of the above, the legal propositions can be summarised as under: 16.1 The prosecution must send the entire relevant record to the sanctioning authority including the FIR, disclosure statements, statements of witnesses, recovery memos, draft charge sheet and all other relevant material. The record so sent should also contain the material/document, if any, which may tilt the balance in favour of the accused and on the basis of which, the competent authority may refuse sanction. The record so sent should also contain the material/document, if any, which may tilt the balance in favour of the accused and on the basis of which, the competent authority may refuse sanction. 16.2 The authority itself has to do complete and conscious scrutiny of the whole record so produced by the prosecution independently applying its mind and taking into consideration all the relevant facts before grant of sanction while discharging its duty to give or withhold the sanction. 16.3 The power to grant sanction is to be exercised strictly keeping in mind the public interest and the protection available to the accused against whom the sanction is sought. 16.4 The order of sanction should make it evident that the authority had been aware of all relevant facts/materials and had applied its mind to all the relevant material. 16.5 In every individual case, the prosecution has to establish and satisfy the court by leading evidence that the entire relevant facts had been placed before the sanctioning authority and the authority had applied its mind on the same and that the sanction had been granted in accordance with law. 17. In view of the above, we do not find force in the submissions advanced by Shri Vishwanathan, learned ASG that the competent authority can delegate its power to some other officer or authority, or the Hon’ble Minister could grant sanction even on the basis of the report of the SP. The ratio of the judgment relied upon for this purpose, in A. Sanjeevi Naidu etc. v. State of Madras & Anr., AIR 1970 SC 1102 , is not applicable as in the case of grant of sanction, the statutory authority has to apply its mind and take a decision whether to grant sanction or not.” 3) Manzoor Ali Khan vs. Union of India, [2014(3) Law Herald (SC) 2226] : (2015) 2 SCC 33 . Relevant extracts of the abovsaid judgment are reproduced hereunder:- “ In concurring judgment, it was further observed: “68. Today, corruption in our country not only poses a grave danger to the concept of constitutional governance, it also threatens the very foundation of the Indian democracy and the Rule of Law. The magnitude of corruption in our public life is incompatible with the concept of a socialist secular democratic republic. It cannot be disputed that where corruption begins all rights end. The magnitude of corruption in our public life is incompatible with the concept of a socialist secular democratic republic. It cannot be disputed that where corruption begins all rights end. Corruption devalues human rights, chokes development and undermines justice, liberty, equality, fraternity which are the core values in our Preambular vision. Therefore, the duty of the court is that any anticorruption law has to be interpreted and worked out in such a fashion as to strengthen the fight against corruption. That is to say in a situation where two constructions are eminently reasonable, the court has to accept the one that seeks to eradicate corruption to the one which seeks to perpetuate it. 70. The learned Attorney General in the course of his submission fairly admitted before us that out of the total 319 requests for sanction, in respect of 126 of such requests, sanction is awaited. Therefore, in more than one-third cases of request for prosecution in corruption cases against public servants, sanctions have not been accorded. The aforesaid scenario raises very important constitutional issues as well as some questions relating to interpretation of such sanctioning provision and also the role that an independent judiciary has to play in maintaining the Rule of Law and common man’s faith in the justice-delivering system. Both the Rule of Law and equality before law are cardinal questions (sic principles) in our constitutional laws as also in international law and in this context the role of the judiciary is very vital. In his famous treatise on Administrative Law, Prof. Wade while elaborating the concept of the Rule of Law referred to the opinion of Lord Griffiths which runs as follows: “… the judiciary accepts a responsibility for the maintenance of the rule of law that embraces a willingness to oversee executive action and to refuse to countenance behaviour that threatens either basic human rights or the rule of law.” [See R. v. Horseferry Road Magistrates’ Court, ex p Bennett, AC at p. 62 A.] I am in respectful agreement with the aforesaid principle. 74. 74. Keeping those principles in mind, as we must, if we look at Section 19 of the PC Act which bars a court from taking cognizance of cases of corruption against a public servant under Sections 7, 10, 11, 13 and 15 of the Act, unless the Central or the State Government, as the case may be, has accorded sanction, virtually imposes fetters on private citizens and also on prosecutors from approaching court against corrupt public servants. These protections are not available to other citizens. Public servants are treated as a special class of persons enjoying the said protection so that they can perform their duties without fear and favour and without threats of malicious prosecution. However, the said protection against malicious prosecution which was extended in public interest cannot become a shield to protect corrupt officials. These provisions being exceptions to the equality provision of Article 14 are analogous to the provisions of protective discrimination and these protections must be construed very narrowly. These procedural provisions relating to sanction must be construed in such a manner as to advance the causes of honesty and justice and good governance as opposed to escalation of corruption. 75. Therefore, in every case where an application is made to an appropriate authority for grant of prosecution in connection with an offence under the PC Act it is the bounden duty of such authority to apply its mind urgently to the situation and decide the issue without being influenced by any extraneous consideration. In doing so, the authority must make a conscious effort to ensure the Rule of Law and cause of justice is advanced. In considering the question of granting or refusing such sanction, the authority is answerable to law and law alone. Therefore, the requirement to take the decision with a reasonable dispatch is of the essence in such a situation. Delay in granting sanction proposal thwarts a very valid social purpose, namely, the purpose of a speedy trial with the requirement to bring the culprit to book. Therefore, in this case the right of the sanctioning authority, while either sanctioning or refusing to grant sanction, is coupled with a duty. 76. The sanctioning authority must bear in mind that what is at stake is the public confidence in the maintenance of the Rule of Law which is fundamental in the administration of justice. Therefore, in this case the right of the sanctioning authority, while either sanctioning or refusing to grant sanction, is coupled with a duty. 76. The sanctioning authority must bear in mind that what is at stake is the public confidence in the maintenance of the Rule of Law which is fundamental in the administration of justice. Delay in granting such sanction has spoilt many valid prosecutions and is adversely viewed in public mind that in the name of considering a prayer for sanction, a protection is given to a corrupt public official as a quid pro quo for services rendered by the public official in the past or may be in the future and the sanctioning authority and the corrupt officials were or are partners in the same misdeeds. I may hasten to add that this may not be the factual position in this (sic case) but the general demoralising effect of such a popular perception is profound and pernicious. 77. By causing delay in considering the request for sanction, the sanctioning authority stultifies judicial scrutiny and determination of the allegations against corrupt official and thus the legitimacy of the judicial institutions is eroded. It, thus, deprives a citizen of his legitimate and fundamental right to get justice by setting the criminal law in motion and thereby frustrates his right to access judicial remedy which is a constitutionally protected right. In this connection, if we look at Section 19 of the PC Act, we find that no time-limit is mentioned therein. This has virtually armed the sanctioning authority with unbridled power which has often resulted in protecting the guilty and perpetuating criminality and injustice in society. 79. Article 14 must be construed as a guarantee against uncanalised and arbitrary power. Therefore, the absence of any time-limit in granting sanction in Section 19 of the PC Act is not in consonance with the requirement of the due process of law which has been read into our Constitution by the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India. 80. I may not be understood to have expressed any doubt about the constitutional validity of Section 19 of the PC Act, but in my judgment the power under Section 19 of the PC Act must be reasonably exercised. 80. I may not be understood to have expressed any doubt about the constitutional validity of Section 19 of the PC Act, but in my judgment the power under Section 19 of the PC Act must be reasonably exercised. In my judgment Parliament and the appropriate authority must consider restructuring Section 19 of the PC Act in such a manner as to make it consonant with reason, justice and fair play. 81. In my view, Parliament should consider the constitutional imperative of Article 14 enshrining the Rule of Law wherein “due process of law” has been read into by introducing a time-limit in Section 19 of the PC Act, 1988 for its working in a reasonable manner. Parliament may, in my opinion, consider the following guidelines: (a) All proposals for sanction placed before any sanctioning authority empowered to grant sanction for prosecution of a public servant under Section 19 of the PC Act must be decided within a period of three months of the receipt of the proposal by the authority concerned. (b) Where consultation is required with the Attorney General or the Solicitor General or the Advocate General of the State, as the case may be, and the same is not possible within the three months mentioned in clause (a) above, an extension of one month period may be allowed, but the request for consultation is to be sent in writing within the three months mentioned in clause (a) above. A copy of the said request will be sent to the prosecuting agency or the private complainant to intimate them about the extension of the time-limit. (c) At the end of the extended period of time-limit, if no decision is taken, sanction will be deemed to have been granted to the proposal for prosecution, and the prosecuting agency or the private complainant will proceed to file the chargesheet/ complaint in the court to commence prosecution within 15 days of the expiry of the aforementioned time-limit.” The above observations fully cover the issue raised in this petition. 4) Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan vs. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke, [2015(1) Law Herald (SC) 204 : 2015 LawHerald.Org 513 : 2015(1) Law Herald (P&H)) 822 (SC)] : (2015) 3 SCC 123 Extract of paragraph 19 of the aforesaid judgment is reproduced hereunder:- 19. 4) Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan vs. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke, [2015(1) Law Herald (SC) 204 : 2015 LawHerald.Org 513 : 2015(1) Law Herald (P&H)) 822 (SC)] : (2015) 3 SCC 123 Extract of paragraph 19 of the aforesaid judgment is reproduced hereunder:- 19. Once the prosecution is of the view that no case is made out so as to prosecute an accused, unless the court finds otherwise, there is no point in making a request for sanction for prosecution. If the prosecution is simply vexatious, sanction for prosecution is not to be granted. That is one of the main considerations to be borne in mind by the competent authority while considering whether the sanction is to be granted or not. In Mansukhlal Vithaldas Chauhan v. State of Gujarat[11], this Court has in unmistakable terms made it clear that no court can issue a positive direction to an authority to give sanction for prosecution. To quote: (SCC p.635, para 32) “32. By issuing a direction to the Secretary to grant sanction, the High Court closed all other alternatives to the Secretary and compelled him to proceed only in one direction and to act only in one way, namely, to sanction the prosecution of the appellant. The Secretary was not allowed to consider whether it would be feasible to prosecute the appellant; whether the complaint of Harshadrai of illegal gratification which was sought to be supported by “trap” was false and whether the prosecution would be vexatious particularly as it was in the knowledge of the Government that the firm had been blacklisted once and there was demand for some amount to be paid to the Government by the firm in connection with this contract. The discretion not to sanction the prosecution was thus taken away by the High Court.” 9. Coming to the facts of the case in hand, the first respondent declined to give sanction to prosecute the petitioner on two occasions. Thereafter, due to some pressure sanction has been given to prosecute the petitioner for the reasons that there is no new material available to give sanction while decline to grant sanction in the earlier two occasions. Coming to the facts of the case in hand, the first respondent declined to give sanction to prosecute the petitioner on two occasions. Thereafter, due to some pressure sanction has been given to prosecute the petitioner for the reasons that there is no new material available to give sanction while decline to grant sanction in the earlier two occasions. At this stage, it is relevant to reproduce extract of the earlier two orders dated 5.11.2008 and 1.8.2011 :- “From the case documents, challan and concerned documents, and after perusing the requests made by doctor, Governor Punjab convinced that allegations leveled under Section 7, 13 (2) 88 of P.C. Act for accepting bribe of Rs.2,000/- by Dr. Ravinder Kumar Verma, Sr. Medical Officer, Civil Hospital Bassi Pathana, District Fatehgarh from Kashmira Singh abovesaid were not proved. Therefore, now Governor, Punjab, has approved to deny the sanction of prosecution against Dr. Ravinder Kumar Verma, Senior Medical Officer (at that time at Civil Hospital Bassi Pathana, District Fatehgarh Sahib) by denying the allegations leveled against him.” XXX XXX XXX “7. Therefore, from the above situation it comes out that doctor was implicated in false case by the complainant. His grudge is also proved that doctor has not made his 326 and as per record copy of MLR was already obtained by him on 12.12.05. Copy of report of injuries under observation was also obtained from ASI, Police on 15.1.06 before the date of raid 17.01.06, for which no need to give bribe. 8. Vigilance Department had been already denied to grant the sanction of prosecution vide letter No. 139-141. If approved then it should be written to Vigilance Department that on their asking matter to reconsider and the matter is not liable for approval of sanction of prosecution.” 10. Having regard to the aforesaid judgments it is relevant to extract order dated 14.6.2014 by which sanction has been given to prosecute the petitioner under Section 19 of the PC Act:- “After thoroughly perusing the challan file and enclosed documents related to this case, Hon’ble Governor, Punjab has satisfied that Dr. Ravinder Kumar Verma, S.M.O. has committed an offence under Section 7, 13 (2) 88 P.C. Act. I Smt. Vini Mahajan, Chief Secretary, Punjab Government, Health and Family Welfare Department, Punjab, Chandigarh having a right to dismiss Dr. Ravinder Kumar Verma, S.M.O. has committed an offence under Section 7, 13 (2) 88 P.C. Act. I Smt. Vini Mahajan, Chief Secretary, Punjab Government, Health and Family Welfare Department, Punjab, Chandigarh having a right to dismiss Dr. Ravinder Kumar Verma, SMO, from service, approve the sanction of prosecution in case No. 7 dated 17.1.2006 u/s 7, 13 (2) 88 P.C. Act, V.B. Patiala against Dr. Ravinder Kumar Verma, under Section 19 P.C. Act, 1988 in the Court, so that appropriate Hon’ble Court may prosecute the Dr. Ravinder Kumar Verma.” 11. On perusal of the aforesaid orders, refusal to sanction to prosecute the petitioner, as well as, giving sanction to prosecute the petitioner dated 26.6.2014, it is evident that there is no fresh materials as on 26.6.2014, when compare with the earlier orders of decline to give sanction to prosecute the petitioner. Moreover, order dated 26.6.2014 does not discuss earlier orders dated 5.11.2008 and 1.8.2011. Having regard to the allegations made by the complainant and he being habitual offender, rightly, the first respondent declined to grant sanction to prosecute the petitioner on two occasions. While passing the impugned sanction order, no fresh materials were available so as to appreciate new materials. The first respondent merely stated that he has perused the challan file and enclosed documents related to the case and there is no discussion of availablity of fresh materials. No doubt, giving sanction to prosecute a person under Section 19 of the P.C. Act, is an administrative decision, at the same time, the competent/concerned authority is bound to assign some basic reasons in order to comply Section 19 of the P.C. Act. The rule of reason is anti-thesis to arbitrariness in action and it is necessary concomitant of the principle of natural justice. A Constitution Bench of Apex Court has laid down in Krishna Swami v. Union of India & Ors. [ 1992 (4) SCC 605 ] that if a statutory or public authority/functionary does not record the reasons, its decision would be rendered arbitrary, unfair, unjust and violating Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. Court has laid down thus : “Undoubtedly, in a parliamentary democracy governed by rule of law, any action, decision or order of any statutory/public authority/functionary must be founded upon reasons stated in the order or staring from the record. Court has laid down thus : “Undoubtedly, in a parliamentary democracy governed by rule of law, any action, decision or order of any statutory/public authority/functionary must be founded upon reasons stated in the order or staring from the record. Reasons are the links between the material, the foundation for their erection and the actual conclusions. They would also demonstrate how the mind of the maker was activated and actuated and their rational nexus and synthesis with the facts considered and the conclusions reached. Lest it would be arbitrary, unfair and unjust, violating Article 14 or unfair procedure offending Article 21. But exceptions are envisaged keeping institutional pragmatism into play, conscious as we are of each other’s limitations.” Courts have time and again held that even administrative decisions must be supported by some reasons. In the present case, the first respondent has merely stated that he has perused the challan file and enclosed documents, related to the case. Almost same words have been used while declining sanction in the earlier two occasions. The Ist respondent while passing the impugned sanction order completely ignored the earlier orders, which shows that there is absolutely no application of mind in passing the sanction order dated 26.6.2014, vide Annexure P-10. Therefore, in the absence of fresh materials, the first respondent’s giving sanction to prosecute the petitioner, is liable to be set aside. 12. In the result, the writ petition is allowed and the impugned sanction order dated 26.6.2014 (Annexure P-10) passed by the Ist respondent, is set aside. 13. No order as to costs.