JUDGMENT : 1. The aforementioned SB Civil Misc. Appeal No.3487/2014 & 3473/2014 have been filed by the appellant Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 being aggrieved by the judgment and award dated 8th July, 2014 passed by the Judge, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal and Additional District Judge No.14, Jaipur Metropolitan, (herein after referred to as `the Tribunal') in Claim Petition Nos.15/2013 (1168/2009) and 17/2013 (1169/2009). Whereas SB Civil Misc. Appeal No.236/2015 and 238/2015 have been filed by the claimants being dissatisfied with the amount of compensation. Since, all the four appeals arise out of the common judgment and are related to the same accident, the same are being decided by this common judgment. 2. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that claimants-respondent Nos. 1 to 4 filed claim petitions before the Tribunal on 20th June, 2009 on account of the alleged loss suffered by them due to the death of Dr. Raju Ratnani and Meena Ratnani who died in the road accident which took place on 5th June, 2009 at about 1.00 P.M. As per the allegation of the claimants, the accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of non-claimant Ramswaroop Gurjar, driver of Trolla No. RJ-32-GA-4436 owned by non-claimant Ramesh Chand Gurjar and insured with the non-claimant-appellant. In short the case of the claimants was that on 5th June, 2009, Dr. Raju Ratnani along with his wife Meena Ratnani and son Nishant were going towards Ajmer from Jaipur in his car No. RJ-01-CA-2064. Dr. Ratnani was driving his car in lane No.1 at a normal speed. Then at about 1.00 P.M. suddenly and without giving any indication and negligently, the driver of Trolla No. RJ-32-GA-4436 came from 2nd lane to 1st lane and the car collided with the back portion of Trolla. Due to the accident the car got badly damaged and Meena Ratnani died on the spot while Dr. Raju Ratnani died during treatment. Their son Nishant Ratnani sustained serious injuries. Due to the loss suffered by the claimants on account of the death of Dr. Raju Ratnani and Meena Ratnani, the claimants filed two claim petitions. Claimant Nishant Ratnani filed separate claim petition No.16/2013(1412/2009) claiming compensation for the injuries suffered by him in the accident. It was further mentioned that at the time of the accident, deceased Dr. Due to the loss suffered by the claimants on account of the death of Dr. Raju Ratnani and Meena Ratnani, the claimants filed two claim petitions. Claimant Nishant Ratnani filed separate claim petition No.16/2013(1412/2009) claiming compensation for the injuries suffered by him in the accident. It was further mentioned that at the time of the accident, deceased Dr. Raju Ratnani was 45 years of age and was working as Associated Professor in Chemistry Department of Mehrishi Dayanand Saraswati University, Ajmer. He was getting monthly salary as Rs.37,445/-. At the time of accident Meena Ratnani was 43 years of age and was posted as teacher in Mayur School, Ajmer and was getting a monthly salary as Rs.22,435/-. Thus, under various heads, the claimants claimed total compensation of Rs.1,37,73,500/-on account of death of Dr. Raju Ratnani and Rs.1,08,03,940/-on account of death of Meena Ratnani. For the injuries sustained by claimant Nishant Ratnani, he claimed total claim of Rs.64,70,000/-as in the accident he sustained serious injuries on the right leg and left ear which resulted in permanent disability. 3. The appellant Insurance Company filed its reply to the claim petitions and disputed the fact that the accident had occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of the Trolla. Rather the deceased was driving the car at a high speed and could not control the same when the Trolla changed its lane from lane no.2 to lane no.1. Some objections regarding non-compliance with statutory provisions of the MV Act by the owner of the Trolla were also raised. 4. Ramswaroop Gurjar, driver of the Trolla in his separate reply has disputed the fact of his having any connection with the Trolla and the accident which took place with the vehicle. 5. Some objections regarding non-compliance with statutory provisions of the MV Act by the owner of the Trolla were also raised. 4. Ramswaroop Gurjar, driver of the Trolla in his separate reply has disputed the fact of his having any connection with the Trolla and the accident which took place with the vehicle. 5. On the basis of the pleading of the parties, the Tribunal framed the following issues:- ¼1½ vk;k iz’uxr okgu Vªksyk uEcj 32&th,&443 ds pkyd foi{kh la[;k ds }kjk fnukad 5-6-2009 dks xzke funkuh] nwnw ds ikl us’kuy gkbos la[;k 8 ij mDr okgu dks mrkoysiu ls pykdj dh xbZ nq?kZVuk esa vkbZ pksVksa ds ifj.kkeLo:i jrukuh ,oa Jherh ehuk jrukuh dh e`R;q gqbZ ,oa fu’kkUr jrukuh ds pksVs vkbZ\ ¼2½ vk;k mDr okgu pkyd rc mDr okgu Lokeh foi{kh 2 ds la[;k fu;kstu esa gksdj mlh ds fgrkFkZ ,oa ykHkkFkZ dk;Z dj jgk Fkk\ ¼3½ vk;k foi{kh la[;k 3 chek daiuh }kjk vius fyf[kr dFku dh izkajfHkd vkifr;ksa ,oa fo’ks”k dFku ds e/;utj chek daiuh vius nkf;Ro ls eqDr gks ldrh gS ;k ugh rks bldk izHkko iMs+xk\ ¼4½ vk;k nkosnkj vius nkos esa vafdr iz’uxr jkf’k ;k vU; dksbZ U;k; lEer jkf’k] gka ikrks ldk gS dkSu&dkSu nkosnkj fdruh&fdruh jkf’k] fdl&fdl foi{kh ls ,oa fdl izdkj ls ik ldrs gS\ ¼5½ vuqrks”k\ 6. To prove their case, the claimants examined AW.1 Vijay Kumar Ratnani, AW.2 Nishant Ratnani, AW.3 Pradeep Kumar Purohit and got exhibited as many as 39 documents including pay-slip and ITR of Meena Ratnani and Pay Fixation order and Last Pay Certificate of Dr. Raju Ratnani. 7. No evidence either oral or documentary was produced by the non-claimants. 8. The Tribunal after recording evidence of the parties and hearing both the sides, recorded findings on issue Nos. 1 and 2 in favour of the claimants holding that the accident took place due to the rash and negligent driving by the driver of the Trolla. Issue No.3 and 4 were decided in favour of claimants and against the Insurance Company. The Tribunal vide judgment and award dated 8th July, 2014 awarded compensation as mentioned in the impugned award with interest at the rate 6% per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition i.e. from 29th June, 2009 till the date of realisation. Hence, these appeals. 9. The Tribunal vide judgment and award dated 8th July, 2014 awarded compensation as mentioned in the impugned award with interest at the rate 6% per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition i.e. from 29th June, 2009 till the date of realisation. Hence, these appeals. 9. It is submitted by Shri Virendra Agarwal, learned counsel for the appellant Insurance Company that if the learned tribunal had arrived at the conclusion that the driver of the Trolla was negligent in driving the Trolla, then also it was evidently clear that the driver of the car i.e. Deceased Raju Ratnani also contributed to the accident and thus, the plea of contributory negligence was wrongly disallowed by the learned tribunal. It is next submitted that the learned tribunal while computing compensation amount failed to consider the aspect that there are only two dependents i.e. respondent No. 3 and 4. Claimant-respondent No.2 Smt. Indrawati, the mother of the deceased, is dependent upon her husband Vijay Kumar Ratnani who is getting monthly pension. Therefore, instead of 1/3rd, ½ share should have been deducted as personal expenses of the deceased. 10. Learned counsel has further submitted that family pension has been sanctioned in the name of claimant-respondent No. 3 Nishant Ratnani and claimant-respondent Nos.3 and 4, Nishant Ratnani and Ritika Ratnani are drawing family pension to the tune of Rs. 25360/-per month. The said amount ought to have been deducted from the amount of compensation. 11. On the other hand, Sh. Sandeep Mathur, the learned counsel for the claimant-respondents has submitted that ground of contributory negligence had neither been taken by the appellant Insurance Company in its reply filed before the Tribunal nor the appellant Insurance company led any evidence either about negligence or about contributory negligence on the part of the deceased. Thus, the learned tribunal rightly decided issue Nos. 1 and 2 in favour of the claimant-respondents. Lastly, Shri Mathur has submitted that it is a settled law that while computing compensation, amount of pension/family pension is not to be considered. 12. While arguing on appeal No. 236/2015 and 238/2015, Shri Mathur has submitted that the learned tribunal wrongly held that claimant-appellant No.2, Smt. Indrawati was not dependent upon the income of the deceased. In this regard, the learned tribunal wrongly deducted 1/3 part of the income as the economic contribution, by the deceased towards his family. 12. While arguing on appeal No. 236/2015 and 238/2015, Shri Mathur has submitted that the learned tribunal wrongly held that claimant-appellant No.2, Smt. Indrawati was not dependent upon the income of the deceased. In this regard, the learned tribunal wrongly deducted 1/3 part of the income as the economic contribution, by the deceased towards his family. Claimant-appellant No. 2, Smt. Indrawati was also dependent upon the deceased and while assessing the economic contribution only ¼ part of the income, as personal expenses of the deceased should have been deducted. 13. The next submission of the learned counsel for the claimant-appellants is that the learned tribunal while deducting Rs. 1,65,143/-out of the assessed annual income on account of deduction as income tax. Overlooked the deductions to be made of income tax as per Section 10 and Section 80 C of the Income Tax Act, according to which, assessed income tax was not deductible from the compensation. The learned tribunal also overlooked that the deduction of income tax out of the assessed income should be the exact amount of income tax. Learned tribunal deducted income tax only on the basis of presumption. 14. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material on record minutely and carefully. Issue regarding contributory negligence: 15. Regarding negligence of driver of the offending Trolla, claimant Nishant Ratnani was examined as AW.2 who has deposed that on the day of occurrence he was traveling along with his father and mother from Jaipur to Ajmer in car No. RJ-01-CA-2064. Then on the way, the driver of the offending Trolla without giving any indicator brought his Trolla from second lane to first lane due to which the rear portion of the Trolla hit the front portion of the car, due to which the car was damaged and he along with his father and mother sustained injuries due to which both his parents died. It is to be noted that regarding the accident FIR Ex.2 was registered immediately at Police Station, Dudu on the basis of a written report (Ex.3) submitted by Dr. S. Datta. The report also disclosed the fact that due to the rash and negligent driving of the offending Trolla accident had occurred in which Dr. Raju Ratnani and Smt. Meena Ratnani died. S. Datta. The report also disclosed the fact that due to the rash and negligent driving of the offending Trolla accident had occurred in which Dr. Raju Ratnani and Smt. Meena Ratnani died. The site plan (Ex.4) prepared by the police also shows that the driver of the Trolla brought the same from second lane to first lane. Thus, from the oral as well as from the documentary evidence it is clear that the accident took place due to the rash and negligent driving of the Trolla and the learned Tribunal has not committed any illegality in recording its finding that the driver of the Trolla was responsible for the accident. 16. It is also to be noticed that since the appellant insurance company failed to bring the driver of the Trolla to the witness box to give evidence and face cross-examination of the claimants despite allegation of rash and negligence driving levelled against him adverse inference against the appellant should be drawn and thus, this Court would not be justified in entertaining the plea of contributory negligence on part of the deceased Raju Ratnani. The position would have been different if from the evidence given by the witnesses for the claimants themselves it would appear that there had been some contributory negligence on the part of the deceased. Such being not the case, it is a fit case of drawing adverse inference against the appellant Insurance Company and the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant Insurance Company is devoid of merit. A reference can be placed on the observations made by the Apex Court in its judgment in the case of Vidhyadhar vs. Manikrao & Ors. ( AIR 1999 SC 1441 ) wherein the Apex Court has as under:- “16. Where a party to the suit does not appear into the witness box and states his own case on oath and does not offer himself to be cross examined by the other side, a presumption would arise that the case set up by him is not correct as has been held in a series of decisions passed by various High Courts and the Privy Council beginning from the decision in Sardar Gurbakhsh Singh v. Gurdial Singh and Anr. This was followed by the Lahore High Court in Kirpa Singh v. Ajaipal Singh and Ors. This was followed by the Lahore High Court in Kirpa Singh v. Ajaipal Singh and Ors. AIR (1930) Lahore 1 and the Bombay High Court in Martand Pandharinath Chaudhari v. Radhabai Krishnarao Deshmukh AIR (1931) Bombay 97. The Madhya Pradesh High Court in Gulla Kharagjit Carpenter v. Narsingh Nandkishore Rawat also followed the Privy Council decision in Sardar Gurbakhsh Singh's case (supra). The Allahabad High Court in Arjun Singh v. Virender Nath and Anr. held that if a party abstains from entering the witness box, it would give rise to an inference adverse against him. Similarly, a Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Bhagwan Dass v. Bhishan Chand and Ors. , drew a presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act against a party who did not enter into the witness box.” 17. From the discussions hereinabove, this Court is of the view that no interference is called for in the finding recorded by the learned Tribunal holding that the accident occurred due to the rash and negligent driving by the driver of the Trolla and the question of contributory negligence does not arise. Issue regarding deduction of Family Pension. 18. So far as the argument of the learned counsel for the Insurance Company that family pension sanctioned to Nishant, one of the claimants should be deducted from the amount of compensation. I am of the view that this argument of learned counsel for the Insurance company is per-se bereft of any merit. Payment of Family pension is in accordance with law and in the event of death of any government employee, his widow or minor children are entitled for the same. Thus, payment of family pension cannot be considered as a mitigating factor for altering the amount of compensation awarded. Reference may be placed on Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur & Ors. Vs. Smt. Shyama Devi & Ors. {2014 R.A.R.95 (Raj.)}. 19. Considering the issue whether Provident Fund, pension and Insurance receivable by claimants come within the periphery of the Motor Vehicles Act to be termed as “Pecuniary Advantage” liable for deduction, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Vimal Kanwar (supra) in paragraph No.19 have observed as under:- 19. Smt. Shyama Devi & Ors. {2014 R.A.R.95 (Raj.)}. 19. Considering the issue whether Provident Fund, pension and Insurance receivable by claimants come within the periphery of the Motor Vehicles Act to be termed as “Pecuniary Advantage” liable for deduction, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Vimal Kanwar (supra) in paragraph No.19 have observed as under:- 19. The first issue is “whether Provident Fund, Pension and Insurance receivable by claimants come within the periphery of the Motor Vehicles Act to be termed as “Pecuniary Advantage” liable for deduction.” The aforesaid issue fell for consideration before this Court in Helen C. Rebello (Mrs) and others vs. Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation & Anr. reported in (1999) 1 SCC 90 . In the said case, this Court held that Provident Fund, Pension, Insurance and similarly any cash, bank balance, shares, fixed deposits, etc. are all a “pecuniary advantage” receivable by the heirs on account of one’s death but all these have no correlation with the amount receivable under a statute occasioned only on account of accidental death. Such an amount will not come within the periphery of the Motor Vehicles Act to be termed as “pecuniary advantage” liable for deduction. The following was the observation and finding of this Court: “35. Broadly, we may examine the receipt of the provident fund which is a deferred payment out of the contribution made by an employee during the tenure of his service. Such employee or his heirs are entitled to receive this amount irrespective of the accidental death. This amount is secured, is certain to be received, while the amount under the Motor Vehicles Act is uncertain and is receivable only on the happening of the event, viz., accident, which may not take place at all. Similarly, family pension is also earned by an employee for the benefit of his family in the form of his contribution in the service in terms of the service conditions receivable by the heirs after his death. The heirs receive family pension even otherwise than the accidental death. No correlation between the two. Similarly, life insurance policy is received either by the insured or the heirs of the insured on account of the contract with the insurer, for which the insured contributes in the form of premium. It is receivable even by the insured if he lives till maturity after paying all the premiums. No correlation between the two. Similarly, life insurance policy is received either by the insured or the heirs of the insured on account of the contract with the insurer, for which the insured contributes in the form of premium. It is receivable even by the insured if he lives till maturity after paying all the premiums. In the case of death, the insurer indemnifies to pay the sum to the heirs, again in terms of the contract for the premium paid. Again, this amount is receivable by the claimant not on account of any accidental death but otherwise on the insured's death. Death is only a step or contingency in terms of the contract, to receive the amount. Similarly any cash, bank balance, shares, fixed deposits, etc. though are all a pecuniary advantage receivable by the heirs on account of one's death but all these have no correlation with the amount receivable under a statute occasioned only on account of accidental death. How could such an amount come within the periphery of the Motor Vehicles Act to be termed as “pecuniary advantage” liable for deduction. When we seek the principle of loss and gain, it has to be on a similar and same plane having nexus, inter se, between them and not to which there is no semblance of any correlation. The insured (deceased) contributes his own money for which he receives the amount which has no correlation to the compensation computed as against the tortfeasor for his negligence on account of the accident. As aforesaid, the amount receivable as compensation under the Act is on account of the injury or death without making any contribution towards it, then how can the fruits of an amount received through contributions of the insured be deducted out of the amount receivable under the Motor Vehicles Act. The amount under this Act he receives without any contribution. As we have said, the compensation payable under the Motor Vehicles Act is statutory while the amount receivable under the life insurance policy is contractual.” (emphasis supplied by me) 20. Thus, in view of the settled legal position, I find no merit in the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant Insurance Company that while computing the amount of compensation, the pension amount ought to have been deducted. Deduction for personal and living expenses: 21. Thus, in view of the settled legal position, I find no merit in the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant Insurance Company that while computing the amount of compensation, the pension amount ought to have been deducted. Deduction for personal and living expenses: 21. Method for the computation of amount to be deducted as personal and living expenses was explained by the Apex Court, in paragraphs Nos.12, 13 and 14, in the case of Sarla Verma vs. Delhi Transport Corporation (2009 ACT 1298), the Court held that the deduction towards personal and living expenses of the deceased should be one- third (1/3rd) where the number of dependent family members is 2 to 3; one-fourth (1/4th )where the number of dependent family members is 4 to 6; and one-fifth (1/5th) where the number of the dependent family members exceed six. It would be appropriate to reproduce the relevant paragraph Nos.12,13 and 14 which are as follow:- 12. We have already noticed that the personal and living expenses of the deceased should be deducted from the income, to arrive at the contribution to the dependents. No evidence need be led to show the actual expenses of the deceased. In fact, any evidence in that behalf will be wholly unverifiable and likely to be unreliable. Claimants will obviously tend to claim that the deceased was very frugal and did not have any expensive habits and was spending virtually the entire income on the family. In some cases, it may be so. No claimant would admit that the deceased was a spendthrift, even if he was one. It is also very difficult for the respondents in a claim petition to produce evidence to show that the deceased was spending a considerable part of the income on himself or that he was contributing only a small part of the income on his family. Therefore, it became necessary to standardize the deductions to be made under the head of personal and living expenses of the deceased. This lead to the practice of deducting towards personal and living expenses of the deceased, one-third of the income if the deceased was a married, and one-half (50%) of the income if the deceased was a bachelor. This practice was evolved out of experience, logic and convenience. This lead to the practice of deducting towards personal and living expenses of the deceased, one-third of the income if the deceased was a married, and one-half (50%) of the income if the deceased was a bachelor. This practice was evolved out of experience, logic and convenience. In fact one-third deduction, got statutory recognition under Second Schedule to the Act, in respect of claims under Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (`MV Act' for short). 13. But, such percentage of deduction is not an inflexible rule and offers merely a guideline. In Susamma Thomas, it was observed that in the absence of evidence, it is not unusual to deduct one-third of the gross income towards the personal living expenses of the deceased and treat the balance as the amount likely to have been spent on the members of the family/dependents. In UPSRTC v. Trilok Chandra [ 1996 (4) SCC 362 ], this Court held that if the number of dependents in the family of the deceased was large, in the absence of specific evidence in regard to contribution to the family, the Court may adopt the unit method for arriving at the contribution of the deceased to his family. By this method, two units is allotted to each adult and one unit is allotted to each minor, and total number of units are determined. Then the income is divided by the total number of units. The quotient is multiplied by two to arrive at the personal living expenses of the deceased. This Court gave the following illustration: "X, male, aged about 35 years, dies in an accident. He leaves behind his widow and 3 minor children. His monthly income was Rs. 3500. First, deduct the amount spent on X every month. The rough and ready method hitherto adopted where no definite evidence was forthcoming, was to break up the family into units, taking two units for and adult and one unit for a minor. Thus X and his wire make 2+2=4 units and each minor one unit i.e. 3 units in all, totaling 7 units. Thus the share per unit works out to Rs. 3500/7=Rs. 500 per month. It can thus be assumed that Rs. 1000 was spent on X. Since he was a working member some provision for his transport and out-of-pocket expenses has to be estimated. Thus the share per unit works out to Rs. 3500/7=Rs. 500 per month. It can thus be assumed that Rs. 1000 was spent on X. Since he was a working member some provision for his transport and out-of-pocket expenses has to be estimated. In the present case we estimate the out-of-pocket expense at Rs. 250. Thus the amount spent on the deceased X works out to Rs. 1250 per month per month leaving a balance of Rs. 3500-1250=Rs.2250 per month. This amount can be taken as the monthly loss of X's dependents." In Fakeerappa vs Karnataka Cement Pipe Factory 2004 (2) SCC 473 , while considering the appropriateness of 50% deduction towards personal and living expenses of the deceased made by the High Court, this Court observed: "What would be the percentage of deduction for personal expenditure cannot be governed by any rigid rule or formula of universal application. It would depend upon circumstances of each case. The deceased undisputedly was a bachelor. Stand of the insurer is that after marriage, the contribution to the parents would have been lesser and, therefore, taking an overall view the Tribunal and the High Court were justified in fixing the deduction." In view of the special features of the case, this Court however restricted the deduction towards personal and living expenses to one-third of the income. 14. Though in some cases the deduction to be made towards personal and living expenses is calculated on the basis of units indicated in Trilok Chandra, the general practice is to apply standardized deductions. Having considered several subsequent decisions of this court, we are of the view that where the deceased was married, the deduction towards personal and living expenses of the deceased, should be one-third (1/3rd) where the number of dependent family members is 2 to 3, one-fourth (1/4th) where the number of dependent family members is 4 to 6, and one-fifth (1/5th) where the number of dependent family members exceed six.” In the instant case if it is taken that the mother of the deceased cannot be treated as dependent, even then as per the law laid down by the Apex Court in Sarla Verma's case (supra) quoted hereinabove, deduction towards personal and living expenses of the deceased would be 1/3rd. Therefore, the learned Tribunal committed no error while deducting 1/3rd part of actual income of the deceased. Deduction of Income Tax: 22. Therefore, the learned Tribunal committed no error while deducting 1/3rd part of actual income of the deceased. Deduction of Income Tax: 22. As regard the issue of income tax liable to be deducted for determination of compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act, considering the various pronouncements, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Vimal Kanwar & Ors vs Kishore Dan & Ors.(2013 RAR 118 (SC), in paragraph Nos.21, 22 and 23 have observed as under:- “21. The third issue is “whether the income tax is liable to be deducted for determination of compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act” In the case of Sarla Verma & Anr.(Supra), this Court held “generally the actual income of the deceased less income tax should be the starting point for calculating the compensation.” This Court further observed that “where the annual income is in taxable range, the word “actual salary” should be read as “actual salary less tax”. Therefore, it is clear that if the annual income comes within the taxable range income tax is required to be deducted for determination of the actual salary. But while deducting income-tax from salary, it is necessary to notice the nature of the income of the victim. If the victim is receiving income chargeable under the head “salaries” one should keep in mind that under Section 192(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 any person responsible for paying any income chargeable under the head “salaries” shall at the time of payment, deduct income-tax on estimated income of the employee from “salaries” for that financial year. Such deduction is commonly known as tax deducted at source (‘TDS’ for short). When the employer fails in default to deduct the TDS from employee salary, as it is his duty to deduct the TDS, then the penalty for non-deduction of TDS is prescribed under Section 201(1A) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Therefore, in case the income of the victim is only from “salary”, the presumption would be that the employer under Section 192 (1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 has deducted the tax at source from the employee’s salary. In case if an objection is raised by any party, the objector is required to prove by producing evidence such as LPC to suggest that the employer failed to deduct the TDS from the salary of the employee. In case if an objection is raised by any party, the objector is required to prove by producing evidence such as LPC to suggest that the employer failed to deduct the TDS from the salary of the employee. However, there can be cases where the victim is not a salaried person i.e. his income is from sources other than salary, and the annual income falls within taxable range, in such cases, if any objection as to deduction of tax is made by a party then the claimant is required to prove that the victim has already paid income tax and no further tax has to be deducted from the income. 22. In the present case, none of the respondents brought to the notice of the Court that the income-tax payable by the deceased Sajjan Singh was not deducted at source by the employer-State Government. No such statement was made by Ram Avtar Parikh, PW-2 an employee of Public Works Department of the State Government who placed on record the Last Pay Certificate and the Service Book of the deceased. The Tribunal or the High Court on perusal of the Last Pay Certificate, have not noticed that the income-tax on the estimated income of the employee was not deducted from the salary of the employee during the said month or Financial Year. In absence of such evidence, it is presumed that the salary paid to the deceased Sajjan Singh as per Last Pay Certificate was paid in accordance with law i.e. by deducting the income-tax on the estimated income of the deceased Sajjan Singh for that month or the Financial Year. The appellants have specifically stated that Assessment Year applicable in the instant case is 1997-98 and not 1996-97 as held by the High Court. They have also taken specific plea that for the Assessment Year 1997-98 the rate of tax on income more than 40,000/-and upto Rs.60,000/-was 15% and not 20% as held by the High Court. The aforesaid fact has not been disputed by the respondents. 23. In view of the finding as recorded above and the provisions of the Income-tax Act, 1961, as discussed, we hold that the High Court was wrong in deducting 20% from the salary of the deceased towards income-tax, for calculating the compensation. The aforesaid fact has not been disputed by the respondents. 23. In view of the finding as recorded above and the provisions of the Income-tax Act, 1961, as discussed, we hold that the High Court was wrong in deducting 20% from the salary of the deceased towards income-tax, for calculating the compensation. As per law, the presumption will be that employer-State Government at the time of payment of salary deducted income-tax on the estimated income of the deceased employee from the salary and in absence of any evidence, we hold that the salary as shown in the Last Pay Certificate at Rs.8,920/-should be accepted which if rounded off comes to Rs.9,000/-for calculating the compensation payable to the dependent(s). 23. It is a well-settled law that generally the actual income of the deceased less income tax should be the starting point for calculating the compensation and where the annual income is in taxable range, the word “actual salary” should be read as “actual salary less tax”. Therefore, it is clear that if the annual income comes within the taxable range, income tax is required to be deducted for determination of the actual salary. But while deducting income-tax from salary, it is necessary to notice the nature of the income of the victim. If the victim is receiving income chargeable under the head “salaries” one should keep in mind that under Section 192(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 any person responsible for paying any income chargeable under the head “salaries” shall at the time of payment, deduct income-tax on estimated income of the employee from “salaries” for that financial year. Such deduction is commonly known as tax deducted at source (‘TDS’ for short). When the employer fails in default to deduct the TDS from employee salary, as it is his duty to deduct the TDS, then the penalty for non-deduction of TDS is prescribed under Section 201(1A) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. As per law, the presumption will be that employer-State Government at the time of payment of salary deducted income-tax on the estimated income of the deceased employee from the salary and in absence of any evidence, the salary as shown in the Last Pay Certificate should be accepted for calculating the compensation payable to the dependent(s). 24. In light of the settled legal proposition, now I will consider the evidence available on record. 24. In light of the settled legal proposition, now I will consider the evidence available on record. To prove the monthly income of the deceased, the claimant-appellants have produced Last Pay Certificate of the deceased issued by the Registrar, Maharishi Dayanand Saraswati University, Ajmer (Ex.21), according to which, the total monthly salary of the deceased-Dr. Raju Ratnani was Rs.72,262/-from which only an amount of Rs.4,565/-was deducted towards P.F. and no income tax was deducted. Similarly, to prove the monthly income of the deceased Meena Ratnani, the claimants have produced pay slip (Ex.-25) issued by the Mayur School, Ajmer. According to which the total monthly salary of the deceased Meena Ratnani was Rs. 22,435/-from which only an amount of Rs. 2,288/-was deducted towards P.F. and no income tax was deducted. In case such certificate and pay slip would not have been on record, as has been held by the Apex Court in the case of Vimal Kanwar (supra), this Court would have drawn a presumption that the employer of the deceased deducted Tax at source and the salary as shown in the LPC and pay slip ought to have been accepted for calculating the compensation payable to the claimant-appellants but in the instant case, there is no such mention in the LPC and pay slip that tax at source was deducted. Therefore, no presumption can be drawn that tax at source was deducted and as such, income tax is liable to be deducted from the salary of both the deceased. Further, it is not submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant-claimants as to who much of the amount is to be deducted as benefits and under what provision. Further, no evidence for the same was produced. 25. For the discussions hereinabove, I find no merit in the submission of learned counsel for the claimant-appellants that the learned Tribunal has erred in law deducting income tax from the salary of the deceased Raju Ratnani and Meena Ratnani. 26. Coming to the quantum of adequacy of the compensation warded, it is settled law that compensation not a bonanza, largesse or source of profit. In the case of Sarla Verma Vs. Delhi Transport Corporation reported in 2009 ACJ 1298 , the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed as under:- “Just compensation is adequate compensation which is fair and equitable, on the facts and circumstances of the case, to award of compensation. In the case of Sarla Verma Vs. Delhi Transport Corporation reported in 2009 ACJ 1298 , the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed as under:- “Just compensation is adequate compensation which is fair and equitable, on the facts and circumstances of the case, to award of compensation. It is not intended to be a bonanza, largess or source of profit. Assessment of compensation though involving certain hypothetical considerations, should nevertheless be objective. Just and justness emanate from equality in treatment, consistency and thoroughness in adjudication and fairness and uniformity in the decision-making process and the decisions. While it may not be possible to have mathematical precision or identical awards, in assessing compensation, same or similar facts should lead to awards in the same range. When the factors/inputs are the same and the formula/legal principles are the same, consistency and uniformity, and not divergence and freakiness, should be the result of adjudication to arrive at just compensation 27. In the present case the learned trial Court has awarded a sum of Rs. 85,17,609/-for the loss suffered by the claimants on account of accidental death of Dr. Raju Ratnani and Rs. 31,58,279/-for the loss suffered by the claimants on account of accidental death of Meena Ratnani. While arriving at the amount of compensation in respect of both the deceased persons, the learned trial Court has taken into account all the facts and circumstances of the case and the law laid down by the Apex Court in arriving at just compensation. 28. In view of the above discussions, all the appeals are devoid of merits and hence are dismissed.