Judgment : 1. With the consent of learned counsel for parties, and, as ordered by this Court on 07.07.2015, we have proceeded to hear the counsel for the parties to decide the appeal finally. 2. There are two question for determination in this appeal; (i) whether Family Court at Rampur had jurisdiction to entertain application under Section 6 of Guardian and Wards Act, 1890 (hereinafter referred to "Act, 1890"), and (ii) whether the application in question was to be governed by the provisions of Act, 1890, or of Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to "Act, 1956"). 3. The facts in brief are that the respondent moved an application under Section 6 of the Act, 1890 in Family Court at Rampur registered as a Civil Misc. Case No. 73 of 2014, requesting for giving custody of his minor son Parth Rajput who was in the custody of appellant, Chhatrasal Singh, and, was studying at Diggia Institute at Noida, living with the defendant-appellant. In order to justify jurisdiction at Rampur she stated in para 5 and 6 of the petition dated 03.11.2014 that though her minor son was residing with his father at Noida, but when she visited her in-laws house in Noida on 05.06.2014, she had taken him to her father's residence. On 08.06.2014, her husband and some other came at her father's residence at Rampur and in absence of her father, under the threat, snatched away her minor son and took him away. 4. In the application filed by the respondent she has specifically asserted that her minor son ordinarily resides at Noida with his father. After demanding dowry when the demand was not fulfilled she was thrown out of the house but her son Parth Rajput was retained by her husband with him. In para 6 she has said that on 05.06.2014 she went to place of her inlaws when her son was quite frightened and met the respondent in law whereupon she took him along with her and cam back to the place of her father. It shows that she brought the son along with her on 05.06.2014 only. Then she complained in para 7 that her son was taken back by her husband and some others on 08.06.2014. It shows that she brought the son along with her on 05.06.2014 only. Then she complained in para 7 that her son was taken back by her husband and some others on 08.06.2014. The place of residence, therefore, of her son was/is at Noida and only for a short period of three days he came to stay at the place of his maternal grand father at Rampur. The jurisdiction where an application for appointing guardianship under Section 6 of Act, 1890 can be made is governed by Section 9 of Act, 1890 and reads as under: "Court having jurisdiction to entertain application.-(1) If the application is with respect to the guardianship of the person of the minor, it shall be made to the District Court having jurisdiction in the place where the minor ordinarily resides. (2) If the application is with respect to the guardianship of the property of the minor, it may be made either to the District Court having jurisdiction in the place where the minor ordinarily resides or to a District Court having jurisdiction in a place where he has property. (3) If an application with respect to the guardianship of the property of a minor is made to a District Court other than that having jurisdiction in the place where the minor ordinarily resides, the Court may return the application if in its opinion the application would be disposed of more justly or conveniently by any other District Court having jurisdiction." 5. This Court has occasion to construe Section 9 in Jagdish Chandra Gupta Vs. Vimla Gupta, (2003) 6 AIC 643(All) and it has been held that the expression ordinarily resides and residing at the time of application are not synonymous though stipulates different situations which are not interchangeable. The Apex Court in Ruchi Majoo Vs. Sanjeev Majoo, (2011) 6 SCC 479 has also observed that the solitary test for determining jurisdiction of the Court under Section 9 is ordinarily residence of minor. The use of the word "resides" implies something more than a flying visit to, or casual stay at a particular place. In the present case the respondent-applicant herself has stated in the application that her son was residing along with his father at Noida. The use of the word "resides" implies something more than a flying visit to, or casual stay at a particular place. In the present case the respondent-applicant herself has stated in the application that her son was residing along with his father at Noida. This fact has further been stated with greater specificity in the application dated 31.03.2015 (Annexure-3 to the affidavit filed in support of the stay application in the appeal) in which respondent Smt. Priyanka while seeking direction from the Court below to direct defendant-appellant to allow the respondent to meet her son has said as under: ^^izkfFkZuh dk iq= ikFkZ fnx;k bafLVV;wV lsDVj&49 fgUMu fogkj uks,Mk es f’k{kk xzg.k dj jgk gS Ldwy es Hkh izkfFkZuh ls izkkfFkZuh ds iq= ds feyus ij jksd yxk j[kh gS rFkk izkfFkZUkh dk ifr izkfFkZuh dks vius ?kj esa Hkj Hkh ugh ?kqlus nsrk gSA^^ "Parth, son of applicant is studying at Diggia Institute, Sector-49, Hindon Vihar, Noida. Ban has been imposed on the applicant's meeting her son even in the school and the applicant's husband does not even let her enter his house." (English translation by Court) ^^vr% Jheku th ls izkFkZuk gS fd izkfFkZuh ds iq= ikFkZ ls mlus Ldwy fnx;k bafLVV~;wV fgUMu fogkj lsDVj& 49 uks,Mk esa feyus dh vuqefr iznku djrs gq, mDr fo|ky; ds izcU/kd dks feyokus gsrq funsZf’kr djus dk d”V djsA** "Hence, you, sir, are requested to direct the Manager of the said school to grant permission to the applicant to meet her son at Diggia Institute, Hindon Vihar, Noida, thereby enabling her to meet her son." (English translation by Court) 6. We are clearly of the view that the application under Section 6 of Act, 1890, therefore, could not have been entertained by the Court at Rampur and the application was maintainable in the competent Court in judgeship Gautam Budh Nagar. 7. The next question is as to whether for the purpose of jurisdiction the provisions of Act, 1890 would apply or that of 1956 would apply. 8. Section 2 of Act, 1956 provides that provisions of Act, 1956 shall be in addition to, and not, save as expressly provided, in derogation of Act, 1890. Thus where specific provision has been made in Act, 1956 which is inconsistent or in derogation of Act, 1890 to that extent only the provision of Act 1890 would stand superceeded by Act, 1956. Thus where specific provision has been made in Act, 1956 which is inconsistent or in derogation of Act, 1890 to that extent only the provision of Act 1890 would stand superceeded by Act, 1956. In respect to determining jurisdiction of the Court in which application for guardianship can be filed, we find no otherwise inconsistent or contrary provision in Act, 1956. Therefore, in this regard we have no manner of doubt that the provision of Act, 1890 would continue to apply and Section 9 which determines jurisdiction to file application for guardianship would continue to govern this issue. Question No.2, therefore, is answered in favour of appellant observing that for the purpose of determining jurisdiction it has to be determined in the light of Section 9 of Act, 1890. In view of above discussion both the question are answered in favout of appellant. 9. In the result, appeal is allowed. The impugned order dated 29.05.2015 as also the proceedings of Case No. 73 of 2014(Smt. Priyanka Vs. Chatrasal Singh), pending in the Court of Principal Judge, Family Court, Rampur are hereby set aside. The respondent, however, has liberty to move appropriate application in the Court of competent jurisdiction for same subject matter and if such an application is filed before the competent Court it shall be proceeded in accordance with law expeditiously.