JUDGMENT : R.S. Chauhan, J. Having allegedly committed the dowry death of his wife, Shahida, having been convicted and sentenced for offence under Sections 498A and 304B IPC, the appellant, Mohammad Rafiq, has approached this court. By judgment dated 1.4.2006 passed by the learned Special Judge, Woman Atrocities & Dowry Cases, Jaipur District, Jaipur for the offence under Section 498A IPC, the appellant was sentenced to three years of rigorous imprisonment, imposed with a fine of Rs.100/-, and further directed to undergo three months of rigorous imprisonment for default thereof. For offence under Section 304-B IPC, the appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment, imposed with a fine of Rs.500/-, and further directed to undergo three months of rigorous imprisonment in default thereof. The sentences were directed to run concurrently. 2. Briefly, the facts of the case are that Shahidullah (P.W.5) submitted a written report (Ex.P.5) at Police Station Galta Gate, Jaipur wherein he claimed that "I live in Saiyad colony along with my family. My sister, Shahida, was married to Mohammad Rafiq r/o. Idgah Kachhi Basti about five to seven years ago. They have a four years old child, Azim. Mohammad Rafiq is in the habit of drinking liquor and gambling. Daily he demands money from my sister, Shahida. Our sister has told us about his habits and demands. Since we are poor people, we could not fulfil his monitory demands. Rafiq used to assault my sister. Since she was tired of his cruelties, most of the time she would come and live with us. One week ago, Rafiq came to our house, and promised us that he will no longer beat up our sister. He took my sister with him. Yesterday, on 15.3.2004, in the evening we came to know, at our house, that Shahida is admitted in the Burns Ward at SMS Hospital. When we reached there, Shahid was not in a position to speak. Today, on 16.3.2004, when I, my brother Rashidullah, my mother, and other relatives were with her, she became conscious. When we asked her as to what had happened, she told us that on 14.3.2004, Rafiq had fought with her, and around 12 O'clock in the night he poured kerosene on her and put her on fire. Her condition is critical. Rafiq used to demand money from my sister, Shahida. When she would not give him money, he would beat her up. Her condition is critical. Rafiq used to demand money from my sister, Shahida. When she would not give him money, he would beat her up. Now, with the intention of killing her, he has burned her. I am filing this report so that legal proceedings can be carried out." 3. On the basis of this written report, a formal FIR (Ex.P.6), FIR No.81/2004, was chalked out for offences under Sections 498A, 307 IPC. However, with the death of Shahida on 19.3.2004, an offence under Section 304B IPC was added and the investigation began. The appellant was put on trial and was charged for offences under Sections 498A and 304B IPC. In order to support its case, the prosecution examined twenty witnesses, and submitted twenty-eight documents. The defence examined three witnesses, and submitted three documents. After going through the oral and documentary evidence, the learned Judge convicted and sentenced the appellant, as aforementioned. Hence, this appeal before this court. 4. Mr. Anshuman Saxena, the learned counsel for the appellant, has raised the following contentions before this court: firstly, there are two dying declarations in the present case. The first is a statement given by Shahida under Section 161 Cr.P.C. (Ex.P.20). The said statement was given to Rajpal Godara (P.W.19) SHO, P.S. Galta Gate, Jaipur; the dying declaration (Ex.P.22) was recorded by Sunil Kumar Yadav (P.W.18) the Additional Civil Judge (JD) & Judicial Magistrate No.21, Jaipur City. But there are inherent contradictions between the two dying declarations. Therefore, neither of these two dying declarations is reliable. Hence, the learned Judge has erred in relying upon these dying declarations for convicting the appellant. 5. Secondly, according to the dying declaration itself the appellant had tried to save his wife, and had rushed her to the hospital. These acts on his part clearly prove that his intention was not to kill her. 6. Lastly, vague statements have been made by the complainant, Rashidullah (P.W.4), the brother of the deceased, the complainant, Shahidullah (P.W.5), another brother of the deceased, and Smt. Munni (P.W.7), the mother of the deceased with regard to the demand of dowry. All the three witnesses have made vague allegations about the dowry demand. Hence, the offence under Section 304B IPC has not been established by the prosecution. Therefore, the appellant deserves to be acquitted of the said offence. 7. On the other hand, Mr. All the three witnesses have made vague allegations about the dowry demand. Hence, the offence under Section 304B IPC has not been established by the prosecution. Therefore, the appellant deserves to be acquitted of the said offence. 7. On the other hand, Mr. Aladeen Khan, the learned Public Prosecutor, has contended that firstly both the statement of Smt. Shahid, given under Section 161 Cr.P.C. (Ex.P.20) as well as her dying declaration (Ex.P.22) are consistent in their contents. In both the dying declarations she has clearly stated that the appellant would drink often and would consistently demand money from her. Whenever she refused to give him money, he used to beat her up. On 14.3.2004 at the dead of the night, he had burned her. Thus, the learned Judge was justified in convicting the appellant for offences under Sections 304B and 498A IPC. 8. Secondly, the three factors required for offence under Section 304B IPC are clearly present in the case: firstly, Shahida had died "seven years of her marriage"; Secondly, she has died under "other than normal circumstances"; thirdly, "soon before her death" there was a demand for dowry by the appellant. Hence, the offence under Section 304B IPC is clearly established. 9. Thirdly, Rashidullah (P.W.4), Shahidullah (P.W.5), Smt. Munni (P.W.7) have consistently given statement that the appellant used to not only demand money, but also demand fridge, T.V. and other items. Thus, the element of dowry demand is well established. Therefore, the learned Public Prosecutor has supported the impugned judgment. 10. Heard the learned counsel for the parties, examined the record and perused the impugned order. 11. In the case of Atbir v. Government of NCT of Delhi [ (2010) 9 SCC 1 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down the principles governing the admissibility and the evidentiary value of dying declaration in a criminal trial. The Apex Court has held as under:- "22. The analysis of the above decisions clearly shows that: (i) Dying declaration can be the sole basis of conviction if it inspires the full confidence of the Court. (ii) The Court should be satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind at the time of making the statement and that it was not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. (ii) The Court should be satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind at the time of making the statement and that it was not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. (iii) Where the Court is satisfied that the declaration is true and voluntary, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration. (iv) It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence. (v) Where the dying declaration is suspicious, it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence. (vi) A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity such as the deceased was unconscious and could never make any statement cannot form the basis of conviction. (vii) Merely because a dying declaration does not contain all the details as to the occurrence, it is not to be rejected. (viii) Even if it is a brief statement, it is not to be discarded. (ix) When the eye-witness affirms that the deceased was not in a fit and conscious state to make the dying declaration, medical opinion cannot prevail. (x) If after careful scrutiny, the Court is satisfied that it is true and free from any effort to induce the deceased to make a false statement and if it is coherent and consistent, there shall be no legal impediment to make it the basis of conviction, even if there is no corroboration". 12. Therefore, while appreciating the evidence, these principles will have to be kept in mind. 13. For the sake of considering the evidence in totality, it would be appropriate to reproduce the statement given by Shahid under Section 161 Cr.P.C. (Ex.P.20), and the dying declaration (Ex.P.22) given by her to Sunil Kumar Yadav (P.W.18). 14. Her statement (Ex.P.20) is reproduced in English as under:- "Smt. Shahida stated that she was married to Rafiq about six years ago. My father-in-law's name is Ishaq who lives in Azad Nagar. I have a son named Mohammad Shameer who is about five years old. For the last four years, I am living with my husband at Van Vihar Kachhi Basti. After my marriage, my husband use to beat me up under the influence of liquor and use to demand money for the purpose of drinking. I have a son named Mohammad Shameer who is about five years old. For the last four years, I am living with my husband at Van Vihar Kachhi Basti. After my marriage, my husband use to beat me up under the influence of liquor and use to demand money for the purpose of drinking. He also used to demand that I should bring money from my family. Tired of his behaviour, I used to go to my parental place at Saiyad Colony. After staying there for fifteen days, about eight days ago, I came back with my husband to my matrimonial home, at Van Vihar. But even after coming back, Rafiq used to fight with me after consuming liquor, and used to beat me up, and used to threaten my life. This Sunday, around 11 O'clock at night, my husband came home and had dinner. After dinner, he asked me whether I had brought money from my parental family, or not. I told him that my father has died, and from whom could I ask for money in my family. He started fighting with me. I left my hut and came outside. My son was sleeping inside the hut. After sitting outside my hut for some time, I went inside. My husband was inside the hut. After I went inside, with the intention to kill me, my husband poured the kerosene from the can and lit a match. Consequently, both my feet, my hands, my stomach, my chest, my face, my neck have gotten burned. I shouted loudly, and I fell. Since it was night time, nobody came to my hut to rescue me. My husband put me in a rickshaw-trolley to take me to the hospital. On the way, he hired an auto rickshaw and brought me to the hospital and got me admitted. From where he picked up auto rickshaw, I do not know". Her dying declaration (Ex.P.22) was recorded by Sunil Kumar Yadav (P.W.18) in a question-answer form. Q. What is your name? A. My name is Shahida. Q. What is your husband's name? A. Mohammad Rafiq. Q. How many kids do you have? A. I have one son whose name is Mohd. Sameer and who is five years old. Q. How long you have been married? A. I have been married for last six years. Q. How have you reached this condition? A. My name is Shahida. Q. What is your husband's name? A. Mohammad Rafiq. Q. How many kids do you have? A. I have one son whose name is Mohd. Sameer and who is five years old. Q. How long you have been married? A. I have been married for last six years. Q. How have you reached this condition? A. Six years ago, I was married to Mohammad Rafiq at Jaipur. After my marriage, I lived at different places on rent with my husband. About one and a half years ago at Idgah Van Vihar Colony, we had constructed a Kachhi Jhopadi (a hut). I was living there with my husband and my son. My husband is a rickshaw-trolley puller. Very frequently he fights with me and assaults me. He has been demanding that I should bring money from my parental family. He drinks liquor on a daily basis, and fights with me. On Sunday, my husband threatened me that either bring Rs.4000/- from your parental family, or you will be in trouble. I told him that I had lost my father, and my brothers are poor. They are not in a position to give any money. On Sunday, at night around 11.30 PM, I was sleeping inside my hut. My son had also fallen sleep. My husband came and asked me if I had brought the money. I told him that I had not. Therefore, he started fighting with me. He went outside the hut, but I stayed inside. He brought an oil can and poured the kerosene on me. He lit a match, and put me on fire. Although I shouted, but nobody came. My husband put me in a rickshaw-trolley. On the way, he put me into an auto-rickshaw and brought me to SMS Hospital. Even earlier, my husband used to demand money, and used to beat me up in order to persuade me to bring money. About a month ago, he had caused injury on my head, and had hit on my teeth. My husband has reduced me to this condition." 15. Except for the minor contradictions in regard to the fact as to who had gone out of the hut, and who had stayed inside the hut, there are no major or inherent contradictions between the two dying declarations. My husband has reduced me to this condition." 15. Except for the minor contradictions in regard to the fact as to who had gone out of the hut, and who had stayed inside the hut, there are no major or inherent contradictions between the two dying declarations. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the two dying declarations suffer from inherent contradictions is clearly unacceptable. 16. In both these dying declarations, Shahida squarely spells out the appellant's culpability. The learned counsel has not contended that these dying declarations are tutored by Shahida's family members. Moreover, Sunil Kumar Yadav (P.W.18) clearly states in his cross-examination that when he recorded the dying declaration, none of the relatives of the deceased were near about. Therefore, the possibility that the dying declaration (Ex.P.22) recorded by the Judicial Magistrate is a tutored one does not exist. In fact, the dying declarations are natural. For, in both of them Shahida has merely narrated her pitiable condition as the appellant's wife. 17. Shahida's dying declarations are further corroborated by Rashidullah (P.W.4), Shahidullah (P.W.5) and Smt. Munni (P.W.7). In their testimonies they have clearly narrated that appellant used to assault Shahida both for seeking money for his liquor and for demanding dowry. Their testimonies are further corroborated by Exhibit-P.25, an application submitted by Shahida under Section 125 Cr.P.C. seeking maintenance from the appellant, and by Exhibit-P.27, a compromise dated 19.7.2003 entered into between the parties in maintenance case. According to the compromise, the appellant had agreed that he would no longer physically abuse his wife, that he will no longer drink liquor, and most importantly, that he will no longer demand dowry. 18. Her dying declarations are further corroborated by the site plan (Ex.P.3) which clearly shows that pieces of broken bangles were lying at the spot. This clearly indicates that she had been assaulted by the appellant prior to being burned. Since there is a corroboration of her dying declarations, the dying declarations are not only natural, but are also reliable pieces of evidence. 19. The learned counsel for the appellant is also unjustified in contending that the prosecution has failed to establish a case for offence under Section 304B IPC. 20. Since there is a corroboration of her dying declarations, the dying declarations are not only natural, but are also reliable pieces of evidence. 19. The learned counsel for the appellant is also unjustified in contending that the prosecution has failed to establish a case for offence under Section 304B IPC. 20. In the case of Pawan Kumar v. State of Haryana [ (1998) 3 SCC 309 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court has opined that in cases of dowry death and suicides, the circumstantial evidence plays an important role and inference can be drawn on the basis of such evidence. The evidence could be either direct, or indirect. 21. Admittedly, according to Rashidullah (P.W.4), Shahidullah (P.W.5), Smt. Munni (P.W.7), Shahida was married to the appellant five to six years prior to the incident. Thus, the incident had occurred within seven years of her marriage. 22. According to Dr. Rajesh Kumar Verma (P.W.13), he was working as a Medical Jurist at the SMS Hospital on 18.3.2004. He had attended Shahida W/o. Mohammad Rafiq. According to him, "Shahida had suffered third degree burns. She had suffered burns on her faet, neck, chest, the front part of the stomach, both her arms were burned, both her thighs were burned. Parts of her feet were equally burned". 23. Further, according to Dr. P.C. Vyas (P.W.15), who had carried autopsy, and according to the Post-Mortem Report (Ex.P.13), the cause of death was "septicemia shock due to extensive ante-mortem burns with super added secondary infection which was sufficient to cause death." Hence, Shahida died under "other than normal circumstances". Her death was not a natural one, but a homicidal one. 24. Further, Shahidullah (P.W.5) clearly states in his cross-examination that just one and a half years after her marriage, Mohammad Rafiq started torturing his sister. At times, he would ask for money, and at times he would ask for dowry. As stated above, his testimony is buttressed by Exhibit-P.27, the compromise entered between Shahida and Mohammad Rafiq wherein Mohammad Rafiq has promised not to demand dowry in future. Even according to dying declaration (Ex.P.22), the appellant had demanded Rs.4000/- from his in-laws. Thus, just soon before her death there was a dowry demand of Rs.4000/- from the in-laws. Hence, the three essential ingredients have been established by the prosecution. Thus, the learned Judge was justified in invoking the presumption under Section 113B, Evidence Act. 25. Even according to dying declaration (Ex.P.22), the appellant had demanded Rs.4000/- from his in-laws. Thus, just soon before her death there was a dowry demand of Rs.4000/- from the in-laws. Hence, the three essential ingredients have been established by the prosecution. Thus, the learned Judge was justified in invoking the presumption under Section 113B, Evidence Act. 25. Most importantly, according to Shahida, she and her husband and her child were living in a hut. At night while she and her child were sleeping, the appellant came in from outside. Thus, the husband and the wife were inside the house at night. In the early hours, the appellant rushed Shahida to the hospital. Yet he has not given a justifiable reason as to how Shahida got burned at the dead of the night. Although he has claimed that she got burned while cooking, but it is very unlikely that she would be cooking food for her husband around 11 or 12 O'clock at night. Most importantly, according to the site plan (Ex. P. 3), the mouth of the stove was found open and it was lying to a side. The stove still contained some kerosene. These tell-tale signs clearly prove that the husband and wife had a fight, her husband poured the kerosene, lit the match and put Shahida on fire. Hence, the offence under Section 304B IPC is clearly established by the prosecution. 26. As far as the offence under Section 498A IPC is concerned, Shahida, in her dying declaration, clearly states that she had been subjected to cruelty shortly after her marriage. Her dying declaration is also corroborated by Rashidullah (P.W.4), Shahidullah (P.W.5), Smt. Munni (P.W.7). Furthermore, even in her application under Section 125 Cr.P.C. (Ex.P.25), she had mentioned the fact that she was subjected to cruelty by the appellant. Most importantly, in the compromise (Ex.P.27) tendered by both the parties, the appellant had promised that he would no longer treat his wife with cruelty. Hence, the offence under Section 498A IPC is also well established by the prosecution. 27. Therefore, for the reasons stated above, there is no merit in this appeal. The judgment dated 1.4.2006 passed by the learned Judge is, hereby, confirmed. The appeal is, hereby, dismissed.