Judgment : R. Sudhakar, J. 1. This miscellaneous petition has been filed for a direction on the respondents/department to refund a sum of Rs.1,50,00,000/= (Rupees One Crore Fifty Lakhs only) to the petitioner along with interest in consequence to the common order dated 21.3.2014 passed by this Court in T.C. (R) No.119/2009. 2. This Court, vide order dated 3.8.10 directed the petitioner to pay a sum of Rs.1,50,00,000/= (Rupees One Crore Fifty Lakhs only) as condition precedent for grant of stay within a stipulated time frame, which order was complied with by the petitioner. The tax case revisions were, thereafter, directed to be posted for hearing on 6.12.2010. Subsequently, after hearing the respondents/Department, vide order dated 21.03.2014, the tax case revisions were allowed and the order of the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal was set aside, the relevant portion of the order is extracted hereinbelow for better clarity :- "8. Considering the above said circumstances narrated by learned Senior Counsel, this Court thought fit to call for the records pertaining to the Criminal Court proceedings and the Enforcement Wing Officials records from the Government Pleader, so that the nature of transaction as contended by the assessee could be seen from verification of the same. Sufficient opportunity was given to the Revenue to find out whether in respect of the criminal proceedings any records were available with the Revenue and also to find out whether any statement at all were recorded from the assessee too at the time of inspection, since according to the assessee no statements were recorded and no documents pertaining to the alleged purchase of raw films were effected. However the learned Additional Government Pleader appearing for the Revenue expressed his inability to produce the same on the ground that none of the documents pertaining to inspection were available with the Revenue. However, considering the fact that criminal proceedings are already pending before the Criminal Court, this Court again asked the Additional Government Pleader to find out whether anything was available with the police official or in the learned Magistrate Court as regards the seizure of records during the inspection. Learned Government Pleader placed before this Court the letter written by the Assistant Commissioner (CT) T.Nagar (North) Assessment Circle to the Special Government Pleader dated 10.03.2014 enclosing the copy of the letter received from the Superintendent of Police, Central Bureau of Investigation, Economic Offences Wing dated 10.03.2014. Learned Government Pleader placed before this Court the letter written by the Assistant Commissioner (CT) T.Nagar (North) Assessment Circle to the Special Government Pleader dated 10.03.2014 enclosing the copy of the letter received from the Superintendent of Police, Central Bureau of Investigation, Economic Offences Wing dated 10.03.2014. The said letter reads as under: "Kind attention is invited to the subject and reference cited above. In this connection, it is intimated that the proceedings/statement given by the assessee before the Enforcement Officers of the Commercial Tax Officer is not cited as Exhibit in RC 2/E/98-CBI/BS & FC/BLR (CC 82/2001) pertaining to M/s.Prasad Properties and Investments (P) Ltd., Chennai." Thus, we regretfully note that there is practically no assistance in this matter from the Revenue to place the inspection records or for that matter search records to find out the statement recorded from the assessee, the details of the records recovered and the findings thereon. 9. Thus with the available materials, when we looked at the facts of the case, it is evident, particularly from the confirmation letters of the Indian Bank, as regards the granting of credit in favour of the suppliers and the bills discounted for the purchase of raw films by the assessee. The assessee had noted this transaction as loan in the books of accounts. Read in the context of the factual absence of any block of raw films at the time of inspection and the affidavit filed from the various suppliers as well as the Indian Bank on the proceedings taken against Indian Bank on the bogus transactions, we can only draw an inference that the contentions of the assessee merited acceptance by this Court. We may point out that the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal had not adverted to the facts as stated above on the other hand, it had relied on the decision of this Court reported in 1993(4) MTCR 4 and held that the case is not substantiated by the assessee." This Court allowed the tax case revisions and, accordingly, the assessee/the petitioner herein, succeeded in the tax case revisions on merits. 3. It is also pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner and not denied by the learned standing counsel for the Department that so far the Department has not filed any appeal against the above said order of this Court. 4. 3. It is also pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner and not denied by the learned standing counsel for the Department that so far the Department has not filed any appeal against the above said order of this Court. 4. Consequent to the allowing of the revisions, the petitioner filed an application to the Department on 29.5.2014 seeking refund of the amount deposited, which was replied by the Department on 7.7.14 stating that the order passed by the High Court in the tax case revisions has not yet been received in their office and that action will be taken on receipt of the orders of this Court. Thereafter, on 27.10.14 another reminder was sent by the assessee/petitioner, which evoked no response forcing the petitioner to file a writ petition, W.P. No.29018 of 2014. 5. When the writ petition, W.P. No.29018 of 2014 was taken up for hearing, learned single Judge of this Court passed the following order dismissing the writ petition stating that the petitioner should approach the appropriate Tax Court. The relevant portion of the order is extracted hereinbelow :- "In this writ petition, the petitioner seeks for refund of a sum of Rs.1,50,00,000/- which according to the petitioner was deposited by the petitioner pursuant to the direction issued by the Hon'ble Division Bench in Tax Cases (Revision) Nos.119, 120 and 121 of 2009. The said tax cases were disposed of by order dated 21.03.2014. If the petitioner seeks for any direction pursuant to the order passed by the Hon'ble Division Bench, then he has to move the Division Bench either by way of separate application or a miscellaneous application in the tax case revision and for which purpose, a separate writ petition is not maintainable and that too before a Single Judge of this Court. 2. Accordingly, the writ petition is disposed of by giving liberty to the petitioner to file appropriate application in the tax cases revision numbers seeking for the relief sought for in this writ petition." 6. Thereafter, the petitioner pursued the matter by way of appeal in W.A. No.65 of 2015 and the Division Bench, by order dated 23.1.2015, passed the following order :- "2. Thereafter, the petitioner pursued the matter by way of appeal in W.A. No.65 of 2015 and the Division Bench, by order dated 23.1.2015, passed the following order :- "2. The learned Single Judge, recording the facts in nutshell, observed that since the order of refund is sought consequent to the direction/order, as aforestated, passed by the Division Bench in Tax Case (Revision) Nos.119, 120 and 121 of 2009, it would be proper to file a separate application or miscellaneous application in the tax case revision. 3. We do not find any error in the order as the cause of action arose from the common order passed by this Court in the tax case revision. Thus, the proper course would be to prefer an application in the same Tax Case (Revision) Nos.119, 120 and 121 of 2009 for appropriate relief and as such, it was rightly held that the writ petition was not maintainable. The learned Writ Court has also granted liberty to the petitioner accordingly. We do not find any merit worthwhile to interfere with the order passed by the learned writ court. Accordingly, the writ appeal is dismissed, upholding liberty granted to the writ petitioner. No costs." 7. In consequence to the order of the Division Bench in the above writ appeal, W.A. No.65 of 2015, the present miscellaneous petition is filed before this Court in T.C. (R) No.119 of 2009 for the relief stated supra. 8. When the matter was taken up, this Court entertained a doubt as to whether such a miscellaneous petition could be filed before this Court after the Tax Case (Revisions) have been disposed of finally, since the Court would become functus officio. 9. Mr.Joseph Prabhakar, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner took pains to point out that the petitioner has no other option except to approach this Court in view of the order passed in the writ petition by the learned single Judge as confirmed by the Division Bench of this Court. Learned counsel submitted that there being no other effective and efficacious remedy under the statute, by which the petitioner could seek refund of the amount, which was deposited pursuant to the interim order of this Court, left with no other alternative, the petitioner has approached this Court by filing the present petition. 10. Learned counsel submitted that there being no other effective and efficacious remedy under the statute, by which the petitioner could seek refund of the amount, which was deposited pursuant to the interim order of this Court, left with no other alternative, the petitioner has approached this Court by filing the present petition. 10. The respondents/Department was noticed and Mr.Manoharan Sundaram, learned standing counsel for the Department, on instructions, states that under the statute, no time limit has been specified for the respondent/Department to pass a revised assessment, except that what the statute contemplates is that once a revised assessment order is passed, if refund is not granted within three months from the date of the revised assessment, interest is liable to be paid on the amount to be refunded on and from the said date, i.e., after three months, till the date of payment. 11. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and the learned standing counsel appearing for the respondents/Department and also perused the material available on record. This Court also gave its anxious considerations to the different Sections of the Act and Rules on which reliance was placed by the learned counsel for the parties. 12. Learned counsel for the petitioner drew the attention of this Court to the fact that the deposit was made pursuant to a direction issued by this Court while entertaining the tax case (revisions) vide order dated 3.8.10. It was urged that on the petitioner succeeding in the revisions, the Department is bound to implement the orders of this Court passed under Section 38 (4) (a) of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act (for short 'the Act') disposing the matter either by reversing, confirming or amending the order against which the petitions were preferred. It is further submitted that it is the bounden duty of the authority to implement the order passed by this Court as envisaged under Rule 34 of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Rules (for short 'the Rules'). It is further submitted that it is the bounden duty of the authority to implement the order passed by this Court as envisaged under Rule 34 of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Rules (for short 'the Rules'). For better clarity and appreciation of the matter on hand, Section 38 (4) (a) and Rule 34 are extracted hereinbelow :- "Sec. 38 (4) (a) - If the Special Tribunal does not dismiss the petition summarily, it shall, after giving both the parties to the petition a reasonable opportunity of being heard, determine the question of law raised and either reverse, affirm or amend the order against which the petition was preferred or remit the matter to the Appellate Tribunal, with the opinion of the Special Tribunal on the question of law raised or pass such order in relation to the matter as the Special Tribunal thinks fit. Rule 34.Every order passed by the Appellate Tribunal or the Special Appellate Tribunal shall, on authorisation by the Appellate Tribunal or the Special Appellate Tribunal, as the case may be, be given effect to by the assessing authority, who shall refund without interest, within three months from the date of communication of the authorisation, any excess tax found to have been collected, and for this purpose shall serve upon the dealer a notice in Form C notifying the dealer of the adjustment of excess tax towards arrears, if any, or if there are no arrears of tax due under the Act from the dealer, or if after such adjustment there is still an excess, the assessing authority shall refund the amount of the excess tax and along with such notice, he shall also send to the dealer a voucher for claiming refund of that amount t without interest from the treasury. If any amount is found to be due from the dealer, the assessing authority shall serve upon the dealer a notice in [Form B-3] and the dealer shall pay the sum demanded in the manner specified in the notice." 13. A reading of Section 38 (4) (a) of the Act would reveal that the High Court, after hearing the parties, shall pass an order either reversing, affirming or amending the order on the question of law raised or pass such or other order as it thinks fit. 14. A reading of Section 38 (4) (a) of the Act would reveal that the High Court, after hearing the parties, shall pass an order either reversing, affirming or amending the order on the question of law raised or pass such or other order as it thinks fit. 14. From a cursory reading of Rule 34, it is evident that the said rule mandates that the assessing authority shall give effect to the order of the High Court (Special Tribunal) within three months from the date of communication of the order. It is clear from the above provisions that there appears to be no other option except to comply with the order of the High Court (Special Tribunal), except where the order in issue is challenged in a higher forum and the order has been stayed. 15. It is evident from the record that the respondents/Department have not filed any appeal against the order of this Court. In such circumstances, this Court is of the considered view that the provisions, as noticed above, have not been followed by the assessing authority, thereby causing grave injustice to the petitioner. It is also not denied by the respondents/department that till date the order has not been given effect to by refunding the amount deposited by the petitioner. 16. In the above scenario, the moot question arises whether after disposal of the tax case revision, it would not be appropriate for the Court to entertain further miscellaneous petition, even if such petition does not touch upon the merits of the matter that has already been decided. However, it is pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner that this Court under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to secure the ends of justice or prevent abuse of process of Court, can, in exercise of its inherent powers, ensure that the orders passed by this Court are complied with. 17. The Supreme Court in SCBA - Vs - B.D. Kaushik ( 2012 (6) SCC 152 ), while considering the scope of the Court to entertain miscellaneous petitions after delivery of judgment in the main petition, held that to do complete and substantial justice to the parties in the proceedings, when the miscellaneous petition filed is curative in nature and not used for supplanting substantive law, in exercise of inherent powers, shall entertain such petitions for implementing the orders of the Court. For better clarity, the said portion of the order reads as under :- "86. We are unable to accept the said submission made by Mr Dwivedi and Mr Singh, since the need to implement the directions contained in the judgment does not cease upon the judgment being delivered. In order to enforce its orders and directions, the Supreme Court can take recourse to the powers vested in it under Article 142 of the Constitution to do complete justice to the parties. In such cases, the lis does not cease and the expression “matter pending before it” mentioned in Article 142 of the Constitution, would include matters in which orders of the Supreme Court were yet to be implemented, when particularly such orders were necessary for doing complete justice to the parties to the proceedings. To take any other view would result in rendering the orders of the Supreme Court meaningless. 87. In this regard, reference may be made to the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in Supreme Court Bar Assn. v. Union of India, referred to hereinbefore, wherein the question before the Bench was the power of the Supreme Court to punish for contempt of itself under Article 129 read with Article 142 of the Constitution. While considering the same and holding that the power vested in the Supreme Court under Article 142 should not be used to supplant substantive law applicable to a case, being curative in nature, Their Lordships also observed that : - “47. The plenary powers of this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution are inherent in the Court and are complementary to those powers which are specifically conferred on the Court by various statutes though are not limited by those statutes.” (emphasis in original) This Court held that these powers also exist independent of the statutes with a view to doing complete justice between the parties. This power exists as a separate and independent basis of jurisdiction, apart from the statutes, and stands upon the foundation for preventing injustice in the process of litigation and to do complete justice between the parties. 88. This Court in Supreme Court Bar Assn. case further observed that: (SCC p. 431, para 47) “47. This power exists as a separate and independent basis of jurisdiction, apart from the statutes, and stands upon the foundation for preventing injustice in the process of litigation and to do complete justice between the parties. 88. This Court in Supreme Court Bar Assn. case further observed that: (SCC p. 431, para 47) “47. … This plenary jurisdiction is, thus, the residual source of power which this Court may draw upon as necessary whenever it is just and equitable to do so and in particular to ensure the observance of the due process of law, to do complete justice between the parties, while administering justice according to law.” (emphasis in original) In the event the parties do not or refuse to abide by its decision, the Supreme Court would have no option, but to take recourse to the provisions of Article 129 of the Constitution or under the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. 18. The inherent powers of the Court under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been dealt with by the Supreme Court in the case of Jet Ply Wood (P) Ltd. - Vs - Madhukar Nowlakha ( 2006 (3) SCC 699 :: AIR 2006 SC 1260 ), wherein the Court held as under :- "25. The aforesaid position was reiterated by the learned Single Judge of the High Court in his order dated 4-2-2005 though the language used by him is not entirely convincing. However, the position was clarified by the learned Judge in his subsequent order dated 14-3-2005 in which reference has been made to a Division Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court in Rameswar Sarkar which, in our view, correctly explains the law with regard to the inherent powers of the Court to do justice between the parties. There is no doubt in our minds that in the absence of a specific provision in the Code of Civil Procedure providing for the filing of an application for recalling of an order permitting withdrawal of a suit, the provisions of Section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code can be resorted to in the interest of justice. The principle is well established that when the Code of Civil Procedure is silent regarding a procedural aspect, the inherent power of the court can come to its aid to act ex debito justitiae for doing real and substantial justice between the parties. The principle is well established that when the Code of Civil Procedure is silent regarding a procedural aspect, the inherent power of the court can come to its aid to act ex debito justitiae for doing real and substantial justice between the parties. This Court had occasion to observe in Manohar Lal Chopra v. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal as follows: “It is well settled that the provisions of the Code are not exhaustive for the simple reason that the legislature is incapable of contemplating all the possible circumstances which may arise in future litigation and consequently for providing the procedure for them.” 26. Based on the aforesaid principle, the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court, in almost identical circumstances in Rameswar Sarkar case, allowed the application for withdrawal of the suit in exercise of inherent powers under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, upon holding that when through mistake the plaintiff had withdrawn the suit, the court would not be powerless to set aside the order permitting withdrawal of the suit." (Emphasis supplied) 19. A plain reading of the aforesaid decisions would reveal that the power of the Court does not end with the passing of the order, but more so, in seeing that the order is implemented in letter and spirit, howsoever difficult it may be. In case where the orders passed by the Court are not implemented, the Court, in exercise of the inherent powers, should see to it that the orders passed by the Court are implemented. 20. In the background of the well settled position of law as emerges from the above decision of the Supreme Court, the facts, not being disputed are that, inspite of the petitioner having succeeded in the tax case revisions, which order has been passed way back on 21.3.2014, the deposit, as made by the petitioner pursuant to the directions issued by this Court vide order dated 3.8.2010, has not been refunded back to the petitioner. Though the petitioner has made representation on 29.5.14 asking for refund, the Department had issued a reply stating that action will be taken after receipt of the orders of this Court. It is nowhere the case of the department that it has not received the orders of this Court. Though the petitioner has made representation on 29.5.14 asking for refund, the Department had issued a reply stating that action will be taken after receipt of the orders of this Court. It is nowhere the case of the department that it has not received the orders of this Court. Inspite of passage of more than a year since the order was passed, which order, as is evident from the Court records, has been despatched on 15.4.14, no action has been taken by the Department to refund the amount, inspite of the second representation made by the petitioner on 27.10.2014. 21. Therefore, applying the ratio enunciated by the Supreme Court in the decisions referred to above, to do complete and substantial justice and to see that the orders passed by this Court are implemented in letter and spirit, in exercise of inherent powers under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, this Court is constrained to direct the respondents/department to give effect to the order passed by this Court forthwith, as the petitioner, having succeeded in the tax case revisions, is entitled to refund of deposit. 22. Insofar as the interest for the delayed payment is concerned, Rule 34 mandates that the assessing authority shall refund without interest within three months from the date of communication of the order, any excess tax found to have been collected. A reading of Rule 34 makes it abundantly clear that beyond the period of three months from the date of communication of the authorisation (order of the High Court), any delay in refund of excess tax is liable to attract interest and the department is bound to pay the same. In the present case, inspite of the order being despatched by this Court on 15.4.2014, almost a year having passed, the department has not refunded the amount back to the petitioner. Therefore, invoking Rule 34, the petitioner is entitled to interest on delayed payment beyond the period of three months from the date of communication of the order. Therefore, this Court is of the considered view that the department is liable to pay interest on the amount deposited by the petitioner pursuant to the order of this Court dated 3.8.2010, as provided under Rule 34 of the Rules. 23. Therefore, this Court is of the considered view that the department is liable to pay interest on the amount deposited by the petitioner pursuant to the order of this Court dated 3.8.2010, as provided under Rule 34 of the Rules. 23. Accordingly, this miscellaneous petition is allowed and the respondent/department is directed to give effect to the order passed in T.C. No.119 of 2009 by refunding the amount of Rs.1,50,00,000/= (Rupees One Crore Fifty Lakhs) deposited by the petitioner along with interest as contemplated under Rule 34 of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Rules. However, in the circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs.