JUDGMENT : TARLOK SINGH CHAUHAN, J. 1. The petitioner/plaintiff has filed this petition under Sections 10 and 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act (for short Act) read-with Section 215 of the Constitution of India for initiation of contempt proceedings against the respondents for violation of the judgment and decree passed by this Court on 11.6.2013 in Civil Suit No. 23 of 2010. 2. The undisputed facts are that the parties to the lis settled their dispute before the Mediator and thereafter moved joint application being OMP No. 228 of 2013 for passing a decree in terms of the compromise. On 11.6.2013, this application was taken on record and after recording statement of the respective parties their representatives, a consent decree came to be passed, the operative portion whereof reads as follows:- “4. The parties shall abide by the terms and conditions of compromise Ext.C-1, including the clause with regard to deferment of further proceedings in the complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, filed by the plaintiff-company against defendants No. 1 to 3 and pending in the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Chandigarh (U.T.) by one year from today, that is, 11.6.2013 till 10.6.2014, failing which consequences as per law shall ensue and the decree shall be enforceable through intervention of this Court. 5. The plaintiff shall be entitled for refund of Court fee as per rules.” 3. It is averred by the petitioner that the respondents by their acts and conduct made this Court to believe that an amicable settlement had been arrived at between the parties which led to the passing of the compromise decree, whereas, the respondents have violated and flouted the judgment and decree thereby showing scant regard to the majesty of this Court. 4. Only respondent No. 2 has chosen to file reply wherein he has stated that he has not violated any direction/order passed by this Court, but is still tendering unconditional and unqualified apology. It is further averred that in the civil suit, the defendants No. 1 and 3 were the original parties, whereas, respondent No. 2 was added as one of the party only at the time of signing of the compromise. It is further averred that in the civil suit, the defendants No. 1 and 3 were the original parties, whereas, respondent No. 2 was added as one of the party only at the time of signing of the compromise. It is further averred that in case the decree holder/petitioner wants, it could proceed to execute the decree that too against the assets of the society but could not maintain this petition as the compromise decree was not conditional one giving liberty to the petitioner to initiate contempt proceedings in the event of the respondents not paying the decretal amount. 5. Mr. Amrinder Singh Rana, learned counsel for the respondent No. 1/defendant No. 1 too has taken the stand that the petition is not maintainable as the petitioner was free to execute the judgment and decree. Original defendant No. 3 was not made a party as it was averred that he has already paid the decretal amount in terms of the compromise decree. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the records of the case. 6. Section 2(b) of the Act defines civil contempt as meaning willful disobedience to any judgment decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a Court or willful breach of an undertaking given to Court. 7. A compromise decree is as much a decree as a decree passed on adjudication. In passing the decree by consent, the Court adds its mandate to the consent. A consent decree is composed of both a command and a contract. A consent decree is a contract with the imprimatur of the Court. Imprimatur means authorized or approved. In other words by passing a decree in terms of a consent order the Court authorizes and approves the course of action consented to. 8. All decrees and orders are executable under the Code of Civil Procedure. Consent decrees or orders are of course also executable. But merely because an order or decree is executable, would not take away the Courts jurisdiction to deal with a matter under the Act provided the Court is satisfied that the violation of the order or decree is such, that if proved, it would warrant punishment under Section 13 of the Act on the ground that the contempt substantially interferes or tends substantially to interfere with the due course of justice. 9. 9. An undertaking entered into or given to the Court by a party or his counsel is equivalent and has the effect of an order of the Court and its infringement may be made the subject of an application to the Court to punish for its breach. In that the contemnor by making a false representation to the Court obtains a benefit for himself and he fails to honour the undertaking, he plays a serious fraud on the Courts itself and thereby obstructs the course of justice and brings into disrepute the judicial institution. 10. An Hon’ble three Judges Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Chhaganbhai Norsinbhai vs. Soni Chandubhai Gordhanbhai and Others, AIR 1976 SC 1909 , held that a deliberate violation of an undertaking given to the Court has the same effect as that of breach of an injunction and therefore, amounts to contempt of Court. 11. In Rosnan Sam Boyce vs. B.R. Cotton Mills Ltd. and Others, (1990) 2 SCC 636 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that not complying with an undertaking given before the Court amounts to deceiving the Court and the other party. Therefore, such a person is guilty of committing contempt of Court. 12. In Mohd. Aslam alias Bhure vs. Union of India, AIR 1995 SC 548 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that undertaking given to the Court by a party requires compliance, otherwise this violation amounts to contempt of Court and in the event of the party which has given an undertaking failing to satisfy the Court by placing sufficient material as to why the undertaking could not be complied with, he is bound to be punished. The logic behind is that a party after giving an undertaking before the Court cannot be permitted to take a somersault as the undertaking cannot be permitted to be employed to subterfuge the contempt. 13. In Bank of Baroda vs. Sadruddin Hasan Daya and Another, AIR 2004 SC 942, the Hon’ble Supreme Court categorically held that in a case of consent decree passed in a money suit, the fact that in case of breach of consent terms the plaintiff has remedy of executing the decree has no bearing on the contempt committed by the defendant. 14. 14. In yet another decision rendered by the Hon’ble three Judges Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rama Narang vs. Ramesh Narang and Another, (2006) 11 SCC 114 , it was held that willful disobedience/non-compliance with the consent decree passed under Order 23 Rule 3 CPC amounts to civil contempt and the mere fact that a consent decree is executable like all other decrees or orders executable under CPC would not take away the Court’s contempt jurisdiction in case of willful disobedience/non-compliance with it. 15. It is manifest from the records that the respondents had compromised the matter and given an undertaking to pay the amount within a stipulated time. It is more than settled that the undertaking is given to the Court and not to the opposite side and its breach has the same effect as the breach of injunction. The respondents by not adhering to the undertaking have deceived the Court. The respondents are, therefore, held guilty of contempt of Court and are directed to purge the contempt by paying the decretal amount alongwith up-to-date interest to the petitioner within a period of four weeks from today. In case of their failure to do so, the respondents shall remain present before this Court on 8.1.2016 to show cause as to why rule be not made absolute and they be punished for the contempt of Court.