JUDGMENT Mansoor Ahmad Mir, J. 1. Appellant-National Insurance Company has called in question the award, dated 7th March, 2007, made by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (II), Shimla, H.P. (for short "the Tribunal") in M.A.C. Petition No. 44-S/2 of 1996, titled as Smt. Santoshi Devi and Others vs. Sh. Sohan Lal Darfreik and Others, whereby compensation to the tune of Rs. 12,00,000/- with interest @ 7.5% per annum from the date of the petition came to be awarded in favour of the claimants (for short "the impugned award"). Brief facts: 2. The claimants invoked the jurisdiction of the Tribunal in the year 1996 for grant of compensation to the tune of Rs. 15,00,000/- as per the break-ups given in the claim petition on the ground that their sole bread earner became the victim of motor vehicular accident which was allegedly caused by the driver, namely Shri Jagdish Chand, while driving truck bearing registration No. HPS-4766, rashly and negligently on 14th April, 1996 near Balghar, Tehsil Theog. 3. The respondents appeared and resisted the claim petition on the grounds taken in the respective memo of objections. Issues were framed on 29th August, 2000. Thereafter an application under Order 1 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short "CPC") was moved by the claimants for impleading the National Insurance Company Limited as respondent No. 5 in the array of respondents, which was allowed vide order, dated 22nd July, 2002. Additional issues came to be framed vide order, dated 21st February, 2003. 4. Parties have led evidence in support of their case. The Tribunal, after examining the pleadings, oral as well as documentary evidence, held that the claimants are entitled to compensation and accordingly granted the compensation vide the impugned award. 5. The claimants, the driver, the owner-insured and the other respondents in the claim petition, except the appellant herein, have not questioned the impugned award on any count, thus, has attained finality so far it relates to them. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant argued that the Tribunal has fallen in error in saddling the appellant-insurer with liability on the following three grounds: (i) That the offending vehicle was not in the possession of the registered owner at the relevant point of time, i.e. on the date of accident, and he had committed breach. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant argued that the Tribunal has fallen in error in saddling the appellant-insurer with liability on the following three grounds: (i) That the offending vehicle was not in the possession of the registered owner at the relevant point of time, i.e. on the date of accident, and he had committed breach. (ii) That the deceased was a gratuitous passenger, so, the appellant-insurer was not to be asked to satisfy the award and then to effect recovery. (iii) That the appellant-National Insurance Company came to be arrayed as party-respondent in the claim petition in the year 2002, but the interest has been awarded from the date of the claim petition i.e. from the year 1996, should have been awarded from the year 2002. 7. The appellant has not questioned the impugned award on any other ground. 8. I have gone through the pleadings and the issues framed. The appellant has averred that the registered owner has sold the offending vehicle, thus, the insurance agreement was not in force; the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and the owner has committed willful breach, thus, the appellant is not liable. 9. I, while dealing with the issue of the same and similar nature in FAO No. 7 of 2007 titled Ashok Kumar & Another vs. Smt. Kamla Devi & Others, decided on 5.9.2014, in terms of the Apex Court judgments, have held that transfer of a vehicle cannot absolve the insurer from third party liability. It is apt to reproduce paras 15 to 19 of the said judgment herein: “15. Section 157 of the Act reads as under: “Transfer of certificate of insurance. (1) Where a person in whose favour the certificate of insurance has been issued in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter transfers to another person the ownership of the motor vehicle in respect of which such insurance was taken together with the policy of insurance relating thereto, the certificate of insurance and the policy described in the certificate shall be deemed to have been transferred in favour of the person to whom the motor vehicle is transferred with effect from the date of its transfer. [Explanation.—For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that such deemed transfer shall include transfer of rights and liabilities of the said certificate of insurance and policy of insurance.] (2) The transferee shall apply within fourteen days from the date of transfer in the prescribed form to the insurer for making necessary changes in regard to the fact of transfer in the certificate of insurance and the policy described in the certificate in his favour and the insurer shall make the necessary changes in the certificate and the policy of insurance in regard to the transfer of insurance.” While going through the aforesaid provision, one comes to an inescapable conclusion that transfer of a vehicle cannot absolve insurer from third party liability and the insurer has to satisfy the award. 16. Admittedly, on the date of accident, i.e. 05.06.2000, the offending vehicle was not transferred in the name of appellant-Ashok Kumar. It was transferred in his name w.e.f. 17.06.2000. Thereafter, the appellant-respondent No. 1 Ashok Kumar was supposed to give information regarding transfer of the vehicle to the insurer- Insurance Company. The vehicle was not transferred on the date of accident, thus the question of informing the insurer about the transfer of the vehicle does not arise, at all. If the offending vehicle would have been transferred on the date of accident, i.e. 5th June, 2000, that can not be a ground to defeat the rights of the third party. As per the mandate of the Section (supra), the insurance policy shall be deemed to have been issued in favour of the transferee. 17. My this view is fortified by the Apex Court Judgment in case titled as G. Govindan vs. New India Assurance Company Ltd. and Others, AIR 1999 SC 1398 . It is apt to reproduce paras-10, 13 & 15 of the aforesaid judgment herein: “10. This Court in the said judgment held that the provisions under the new Act and the old Act are substantially the same in relation to liability in regard to third party. This Court also recognised the view taken in the separate judgment in Kondaiah's case that the transferee-insured could not be said to be a third party qua the vehicle in question. This Court also recognised the view taken in the separate judgment in Kondaiah's case that the transferee-insured could not be said to be a third party qua the vehicle in question. In other words, a victim or the legal representatives of the victim cannot be denied the compensation by the insurer on the ground that the policy was not transferred in the name of the transferee. 11. …………………… 12. …………………... 13. In our opinion that both under the old Act and under the new Act the Legislature was anxious to protect the third party (victim) interest. It appears that what was implicit in the provisions of the old Act is now made explicit, presumably in view of the conflicting decisions on this aspect among the various High Courts. 14. ……………………. 15. As between the two conflicting views of the Full Bench judgments noticed above, we prefer to approve the ratio laid down by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Kondaiah's case ( AIR 1986 AP 62 ) as it advances the object of the Legislature to protect the third party interest. We hasten to add that the third party here will not include a transferee whose transferor has not followed procedure for transfer of policy. In other words in accord with the well-settled rule of interpretation of statutes we are inclined to hold that the view taken by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Kondaiah's case is preferable to the contrary views taken by the Karnataka and Delhi High Courts (supra) even assuming that two views are possible on the interpretation of relevant sections as it promotes the object of the Legislature in protecting the third party (victim) interest. The ratio laid down in the judgment of Karnataka and Delhi High Courts (AIR 1990 Kant 166 (FB) and AIR 1989 Delhi 88) (FB) (supra) differing from Andhra Pradesh High Court is not the correct one.” 18. The Apex Court in case titled as Rikhi Ram and Another vs. Smt. Sukhrania and Others, AIR 2003 SC 1446 held that in absence of intimation of transfer to Insurance Company, the liability of Insurance Company does not cease. It is apt to reproduce paras 5, 6 & 7 of the judgment, supra, herein:- “5. The aforesaid provision shows that it was intended to cover two legal objectives. It is apt to reproduce paras 5, 6 & 7 of the judgment, supra, herein:- “5. The aforesaid provision shows that it was intended to cover two legal objectives. Firstly, that no one who was not a party to a contract would bring an action on a contract; and secondly, that a person who has no interest in the subject matter of an insurance can claim the benefit of an insurance. Thus, once the vehicle is insured, the owner as well as any other person can use the vehicle with the consent of the owner. Section 94 does not provide that any person who will use the vehicle shall insure the vehicle in respect of his separate use. 6. On an analysis of Ss. 94 and 95, we further find that there are two third parties when a vehicle is transferred by the owner to a purchaser. The purchaser is one of the third parties to the contract and other third party is for whose benefit the vehicle was insured. So far, the transferee who is the third party in the contract, cannot get any personal benefit under the policy unless there is a compliance of the provisions of the Act. However, so far as third party injured or victim is concerned, he can enforce liability undertaken by the insurer. 7. For the aforesaid reasons, we hold that whenever a vehicle which is covered by the insurance policy is transferred to a transferee, the liability of insurer does not ceases so far as the third party/victim is concerned, even if the owner or purchaser does not give any intimation as required under the provisions of the Act.” 19. The Apex Court in latest judgment titled as United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla vs. Tilak Singh and Others, (2006) 4 SCC 404 has held the same principle. It is apt to reproduce paras-12 & 13 of the said judgment herein: “12. In Rikhi Ram vs. Sukhrania, (2003) 3 SCC 97 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 735 a Bench of three learned Judges of this Court had occasion to consider Section 103-A of the 1939 Act. It is apt to reproduce paras-12 & 13 of the said judgment herein: “12. In Rikhi Ram vs. Sukhrania, (2003) 3 SCC 97 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 735 a Bench of three learned Judges of this Court had occasion to consider Section 103-A of the 1939 Act. This Court reaffirmed the decision in G. Govindan case and added that the liability of an insurer does not cease even if the owner or purchaser fails to give intimation of transfer to the Insurance Company, as the purpose of the legislation was to protect the rights and interests of the third party. 13. Thus, in our view, the situation in law which arises from the failure of the transferor to notify the insurer of the fact of transfer of ownership of the insured vehicle is no different, whether under Section 103-A of the 1939 Act or under Section 157 of the 1988 Act insofar as the liability towards a third party is concerned. Thus, whether the old Act applies to the facts before us, or the new Act applies, as far as the deceased third party was concerned, the result would not be different. Hence, the contention of the appellant on the second issue must fail, either way, making a decision on the first contention unnecessary, for deciding the second issue. However, it may be necessary to decide which Act applies for deciding the third contention. In our view, it is not the transfer of the vehicle but the accident which furnishes the cause of action for the application before the Tribunal. Undoubtedly, the accident took place after the 1988 Act had come into force. Hence it is the 1988 Act which would govern the situation.” 10. The same principle has been laid down by this Court in FAO No. 164 of 2007, titled as Sh. Vipan Kumar vs. Naushad Ahmed and another, decided on 28.11.2014. 11. The claimants are third party. It is a fact that the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and the owner-insured has committed a willful breach, that is why right of recovery has been granted to the appellant-insurer. 12. It is beaten law of land that right of third party cannot be defeated and even if owner has committed breach, the insurer has to satisfy the award. 13. Section 146 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short "the MV Act") reads as under: "146. 12. It is beaten law of land that right of third party cannot be defeated and even if owner has committed breach, the insurer has to satisfy the award. 13. Section 146 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short "the MV Act") reads as under: "146. Necessity for insurance against third party risk - (1) No person shall use, except as a passenger, or cause or allow any other person to use, a motor vehicle in a public place, unless there is in force in relation to the use of the vehicle by that person or that other person, as the case may be, a policy of insurance complying with the requirements of this Chapter: Provided that in the case of a vehicle carrying, or meant to carry, dangerous or hazardous goods, there shall also be a policy of insurance under the Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991 (6 of 1991). Explanation - A person driving a motor vehicle merely as a paid employee, while there is in force in relation t the use of the vehicle no such policy as is required by this sub-section, shall not be deemed to act in contravention of the sub-section unless he knows or has reason to believe that there is no such policy in force. (2) Sub-section (1) shall not apply to any vehicle owned by the Central Government or a State Government and used for Government purposes unconnected with any commercial enterprise. (3) The appropriate Government may, by order, exempt from the operation of sub-section (1) any vehicle owned by any of the following authorities, namely:- (a) the Central Government or a State Government, if the vehicle is used for Government purposes connected with any commercial enterprise; (b) any local authority; (c) any State transport undertaking: Provided that no such order shall be made in relation to any such authority unless a fund has been established and is maintained by that authority in accordance with the rules made in that behalf under this Act for meeting any liability arising out of the use of any vehicle of that authority which that authority or any person in its employment may incur to third parties. Explanation - For the purposes of this subsection, "appropriate Government" means the Central Government or a State Government, as the case may be:- (i) in relation to any corporation or company owned by the Central Government or any State Government, means the Central Government or that State Government; (ii) in relation to any corporation or company owned by the Central Government and one or more State Governments, means the Central Government; (iii) in relation to any other State transport undertaking or any local authority, means that Government which has control over that undertaking or authority." 14. The mandate of Sections 146, 147 and 149 of the MV Act is to protect the rights of third parties and that is why, compulsory duty has been imposed on the owners to get the vehicles insured and claim of third parties cannot be defeated. 15. The same question arose before the Apex Court in a case titled as S. Iyyapan versus United India Insurance Company Limited and another, (2013) 7 SCC 62 . It is apt to reproduce para 16 of the judgment herein: "16. The heading "Insurance of Motor Vehicles against Third Party Risks" given in Chapter XI of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (Chapter VIII of 1939 Act) itself shows the intention of the legislature to make third party insurance compulsory and to ensure that the victims of accident arising out of use of motor vehicles would be able to get compensation for the death or injuries suffered. The provision has been inserted in order to protect the persons travelling in vehicles or using the road from the risk attendant upon the user of the motor vehicles on the road. To overcome this ugly situation, the legislature has made it obligatory that no motor vehicle shall be used unless a third party insurance is in force." 16. Viewed thus, the Tribunal has rightly held that the owner has committed breach and directed the insurer to satisfy the award with right of recovery. 17. The argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that the interest was to be awarded from the date when the insurer came to be arrayed as party-respondent in the claim petition is devoid of any force for the reason that cause of action accrued to the claimants on the date of accident. Section 171 of the MV Act deals with the issue. 18. Section 171 of the MV Act deals with the issue. 18. The claimants have been dragged to lis because of the rash and negligent driving of the driver of the offending vehicle. Thus, the Tribunal has rightly awarded interest from the date of the claim petition, as per the mandate of Section 171 of the MV Act. 19. Having said so, I am of the considered view that the Tribunal has not committed any illegality, has not fallen in an error and the impugned award is legal one. 20. Viewed thus, the appeal deserves to be dismissed. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed and the impugned award is upheld, as indicated hereinabove. 21. Registry is directed to release the awarded amount in favour of the claimants strictly as per the terms and conditions contained in the impugned award after proper identification. 22. Send down the record after placing copy of the judgment on Tribunal's file.