JUDGMENT : 1. The present second appeal has been filed by the appellant-defendant-tenant-Shiv Lal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure against the impugned judgment and decree dated 29.10.1996 passed by the learned Additional District Judge No.1, Bikaner in Regular First Appeal No. 69/1994 "Shiv Lal v. Lakha Bai" by which, the learned First Appellate Court has dismissed the appeal of the appellant-defendant and affirmed the judgment and decree dated 26.09.1981 passed by the learned Additional Munsif & Judicial Magistrate (Fast Track) No. 2, Bikaner in Civil Original Suit No.178/1979 "Lakha Bai v. Shiv Lal" by which, the learned Trial Court had decreed the suit of the plaintiff-Lakha Bai and directed eviction of the defendant-Shiv Lal. 2. This Court, while admitting the present second appeal, on 10.01.1997, framed the following substantial questions of law which read as under:- "1. Whether burden of proof and onus of proof are conterminous to each other or its field of occupation is different to each other as burden of proof remains intact whereas onus to prove shifts from plaintiff to defendant and vice-versa ? 2. Whether burden of proof is a question of law and can it be agitated in Second Appeal ? 3. Whether striking off defence of a tenant on his failure to deposit the rent provisionally determined under sub-section (3) of Section 13 by striking out his defence as envisaged under sub-section (5) of the aforesaid Section simply deprived him the benefit so specified under sub-sect. (6) of the said Section but it does not discharge the burden of proof from the shoulder of the plaintiff as envisaged under sub-section (1)(a) of Section 13, making a condition precedent to prove the facts that the tenant has neither paid nor tendered the rent due from his for six months on the date of institution of the suit ?" 3. The learned counsel, Mr. J.K. Bhaiya, appearing for the respondent-plaintiff states that the possession of the suit property has been taken over by the respondent-plaintiff and, therefore, this appeal of the defendant-tenant has become in-fructuous. 4. The learned counsel, Mr. M.R. Singhvi, Senior Advocate with Mr. Hukum Singh, appearing for the appellant-defendant is not in a position to controvert the statement made by the learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiff. 5. 4. The learned counsel, Mr. M.R. Singhvi, Senior Advocate with Mr. Hukum Singh, appearing for the appellant-defendant is not in a position to controvert the statement made by the learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiff. 5. Even otherwise, having perused the record of the case, this Court is satisfied that the controversy involved in the present matter is covered by the various decisions of this Court. 6. In the case of LRs of Late Kishna Ram @ Kishan Lal S/o Moti Ram Prajapat v. Smt. Manju Lata W/o Madan Mohan Chhipa, S.B. Civil Second Appeal No. 292/1994, decided on 29.04.2015 , this Court held as under:- "30. With greatest respects, the distinction found by the Hon'ble Division Bench in Ramesh Chand Pandey's case (supra) from the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme court in Modula India (supra) on the basis of contextual interpretation is not correct, because the striking down of the defence on the same condition of default in payment of rent determined by the trial court are similarly worded in both the enactments and even for such entire striking out of the defence of the tenant, the Hon'ble Supreme Court said that only to the limited extent the tenant can cross examine the plaintiff's evidence to demolish the same, and can address on the basis of plaintiff's case which he has done in the present case but under no circumstances the defendant tenant can lead any positive evidence to establish his own case. 31. It may also be noted here that the words, "with or without any of the other grounds referred to in that sub-section" as employed in sub-section (3) of Section 13 of the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 1950, after the words, "in a suit for eviction on the ground set forth in clause (a) of sub-section (1)" are significant and the determination of rent under Section 13(3) of the Act has to be made even if a single ground of default in payment of rent or default & other grounds of eviction are also raised in the eviction suit. The presence of ground of default as one of the grounds of eviction is necessary to invoke the provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 13 of the Rajasthan Act for determination of rent but the consequence of striking out of defence under Section 13(5) of the Act is not circumscribed by these words in sub-section (3) of Section 13 of the Act. Sub-section (4) of Section 13 mandates that the tenant shall deposit in court or pay to the landlord the amount determined by the court under sub-section (3) within the stipulated time with no extension of time possible or condonation of delay possible as laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Nasiruddin v. Sita Ram, 2003 DNJ SC 180 . Sub-section (5) of Section 13 of the Act providing for striking out the defence against eviction applies and can be invoked, if a tenant fails to deposit or pay the amount as per sub-section (4). On a harmonious reading of plain language of these three provisions quoted above, as per the golden rule of interpretation, there is no scope for holding that the striking out of the defence can only be partial with respect to the ground raised under Section 13(1)(a) of the Act for default in payment of rent by the tenant, since sub-section(3) applies if the ground of default with or without other grounds for evictions are also raised and sub-section (5) permits the striking out of the defence against eviction if order under Section 13(3) of the Act is not complied with by the tenant, there appears to be no justification for striking out the defence only partially and not wholly. The drastic consequences of striking out of the entire defence appears to have been deliberately introduced by the legislature and after the striking out of the defence, the Court shall proceed with the hearing of the suit, leaves no manner of doubt that legislature did not intend to provide any opportunity to the tenant still to lead his own defence, after he commits the default in payment of rent as determined by the Court in terms of Section 13(3) & 13(4) of the Act. Though the word "Shall" has been used in sub-section (5), namely; "the court shall order the defence against eviction to be struck out and shall proceed with the hearing of the suit", which is in mandatory form but the Courts have held that the defence has to be struck with a great circumspection and only if it becomes necessary, since the Act is intended to provide suitable protection to the tenants also and, therefore, the word "shall" may be construed as "may" leaving the judicious discretion with the court concerned to strike out the defence or not. But once the said defence is struck out, there is no manner of doubt that the legislature intended the entire defence to be struck out and not partially, limited to one ground of eviction under Section 13 (1) (a) of the Act. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Modula India (supra), therefore, explained this position of law with respect to West Bengal Act as contained in Section 17(4) and Section 13(5) of the Rajasthan Act, which are pari materia in all respects. However, since the Division Bench of this Court in Ramesh Chand Pandey's case (supra) and the later decisions despite referring to the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Modula India (supra) took a different view of the matter, this court sitting singly , cannot possibly take a different view of the matter finally except for expressing the aforesaid dissent, with great respects. 32. This Court is aware of the judicial discipline and the binding character of the judgment of Division Bench of this Court, therefore, while expressing the aforesaid dissent with greatest respects, this Court still has to follow the ratio of the aforesaid Division Bench judgment in Ramesh Chand Pandey's case (supra). 33. 32. This Court is aware of the judicial discipline and the binding character of the judgment of Division Bench of this Court, therefore, while expressing the aforesaid dissent with greatest respects, this Court still has to follow the ratio of the aforesaid Division Bench judgment in Ramesh Chand Pandey's case (supra). 33. But now coming to that proposition of law that defence will only be partially struck off upon the orders passed under Section 13(5) of the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, the question in the present case arises is as to whether the defendant tenant who has made a default in payment of rent after determination of rent under Section 13 (3) of the Act or not even during the pendency of the proceedings before the trial court as well as the appellate courts, without any condonation of delay possible as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shiv Dutt Jadiya v. Ganga Devi and Nasiruddin v. Sita Ram, 2003 DNJ SC 180 , which have been followed by this Court in large number of cases, the answer on facts as found in the present case is in negative and admittedly the defendant tenant has failed to deposit the rent in the present case after such determination of rent under Section 13 (3) of the Act and, therefore, there is a continuous failure or default by him throughout the trial and pendency of the appeals before the first appellate court and this Court, resulting in breach of Section 13(4) of the Act as well and consequently the eviction decree was bound to be passed against him & has to be upheld by this Court." xxx "38. Therefore, even if the contention of learned counsel for the defendant tenant that defence only to the extent of ground under Section 13(1) (a) of the Act could be struck off is to be accepted, which is so accepted in the light of the judgment of Division Bench of this Court in the case of Ramesh Chand Pandey (supra), no benefit can accrue to the tenant resulting in the reversal of eviction decree because the eviction even on the single ground of default in payment of rent can also be upheld, and that would be sufficient, and the same is upheld by this Court. As far as the other grounds of eviction are concerned, they are also proved by the plaintiff & despite cross examination by the defendant counsel in terms of the Hon'ble Supreme Court decision in the case of Modula India (Supra) & the eviction decree would sustain on all the grounds, but it is well settled that the eviction decree even on a single ground under Section 13 (1) (a) to (l) can be sustained & upheld. 39. For the aforesaid reasons only, this Court also cannot endorse the view earlier taken by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Deshraj v. Om Prakash & anr., 1987 (1) RLR 244 , which was held to be impliedly overruled in view of the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Modula India (Supra), as noticed in para 4 of the judgment by another learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Ramjilal v. Smt. Chandra Bhaga, 1992 (2) RLW 637 . In Inder Chand v. Smt. Lilawati , AIR 1991 Raj. 131 : 1990 (2) RLR 196 , another learned Single Judge of this Court held, following the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Modula India (supra) that once the defence has been struck out under Section 13(5) of the Act & allowing the defendant to lead evidence would amount to reconsideration of that order striking out the defence, which is not permitted in law and in the case of Inder chand (supra), the learned Single Judge also drew support of the decision in the case of Deshraj v. Om Prakash (supra), also. In Ramjilal v. Smt. Chandra Bhaga (supra), the learned Single Judge took the view that once the defence of the defendant tenant is struck out under Section 13(5) of the Act, such striking out of defence is only qua tenant and, therefore, the defendant cannot be deprived of contesting his plea that he is not a tenant. As far as this view is concerned, the same would not apply in the present case, since for declaration of the defendant as owner of the property, such question cannot be determined in the eviction proceedings under the Rent Control Act and secondly for this precise purpose, the defendant Kishna Ram had already filed a civil suit No. 30/2002 claiming his right of repurchase of the suit property, which is still pending trial. Therefore, none of the judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant-defendant tenant enures to the benefit of defendant tenant and the present second appeal is found to be devoid of merit. 40. For the aforesaid reasons also, this Court is of the opinion that rejection of the application filed by the defendant tenant under Order 14, Rule 5 CPC seeking to raise additional issues for proving his title over the suit property in question was also justified, since the question of title could not have been raised in these eviction proceedings and as far as his relationship of tenant of landlady is concerned, that was well proved by the plaintiff by the documentary as well as oral evidence. The defendant having challenged the said order of rejection under Order 14, Rule 5 CPC by way of revision petition no. 712/1991 and having not pressed the same and withdrawn the same from High Court, now cannot be permitted to re-agitate the same issue in the present second appeal. 41. Therefore, the substantial questions of law framed above are answered in favour of the respondent-plaintiff-landlady and against the appellant-defendant-tenant and the present second appeal deserves dismissal. Consequently, the present second appeal of the appellant defendant-tenant is liable to be dismissed and the same is hereby dismissed with costs of Rs. 10,000/-, which may be paid to the respondent-plaintiff." 7. That being the position, the substantial questions of law, as framed in this case, deserves to be answered against the defendant-tenant and in favour of the plaintiff-landlord and the present second appeal is liable to be dismissed. Since, the possession of the suit property has already been taken over by the landlord, this appeal is also liable to be dismissed as infructuous. 8. Accordingly and in view of the above, the present second appeal filed on behalf of the appellant-defendant-tenant-Shiv Lal S/o Pratap Chand stands dismissed as having become infructuous. The substantial questions of law are answered against the appellant-defendant-tenant-Shiv Lal and in favour of the respondent-plaintiff-landlord-Smt. Lakha Bai (Smt. Durga Devi). No costs. A copy of this order be sent to the learned Courts below and to the parties concerned forthwith.Appeal dismissed.