JUDGMENT : Rajiv Sharma, J. - This appeal has been instituted against Judgment dated 14.9.2015 rendered by learned District Judge, Sirmaur District at Nahan, Himachal Pradesh in HMA Petition No. 11-HMA/3 of 2013. 2. Marriage between the parties was solemnised at village Dharbhech/Kelopab, Tehsil Rajgarh, District Sirmaur, Himachal Pradesh about 16 years back. Two children namely Prem Singh (son) and Dropti Devi (daughter) were born. Respondent remained at matrimonial home for about 1 1/2 years. Thereafter she started creating hue and cry and used to leave the company of appellant. She used to leave the house without informing the appellant. Respondent used to stay for longer period with her parents and appellant and his family members have tied their best to call her back and join the company of the appellant. Respondent left the matrimonial home on 4.11.2004 alongwith minor children. Thereafter, she did not return. Appellant tried to settle the matter by visiting 10-11 times the parental house of the respondent. Behaviour of the respondent towards the appellant was cruel. There is no co-habitation since 4.11.2004. It is also alleged that the respondent after leaving the company of the appellant developed illicit relations with a person of her parental village after leaving company of appellant. Respondent has also instituted maintenance proceedings against the appellant in which Court tried to reconcile the matter but the same could not be reconciled. Acts of respondent have caused physical and mental cruelty to him. 3. Petition was contested by the respondent. She has denied that she left the matrimonial house without informing the appellant or in-laws. She denied that she used to stay at parental house for longer period and that she refused to join the company of appellant. In fact, according to her, atmosphere of hostility was created by the appellant and his family members to force her to take shelter in her parents' house. Appellant used to consume liquor and under the influence of liquor used to give beatings to the respondent and her children appellant was forcing her to agree to his second marriage with one Ms. Kavita, resident of Gehnog with whom he developed relations. She was ousted from the house in the first week of November 2004. It was denied that appellant has visited her parents' house 10-11 times. Appellant has leveled wild and scandalous allegations without any substance. Third child was born in March 2005. Kavita, resident of Gehnog with whom he developed relations. She was ousted from the house in the first week of November 2004. It was denied that appellant has visited her parents' house 10-11 times. Appellant has leveled wild and scandalous allegations without any substance. Third child was born in March 2005. His birth was recorded in Gram Panchayat Kotla Bangi. She has admitted filing of maintenance proceedings against the appellant. However, appellant was not paying maintenance as per orders of the Court. 4. Learned District Judge framed issues on 22.12.2013 and dismissed the appeal on 14.9.2015. 5. Appellant has appeared as PW-1. He has led his evidence by filing affidavit Ext. PW-1/A. According to him, respondent left the matrimonial house on 4.11.2004 and thereafter she never came back. He could not tell whether Yashpal was his son. However, he subsequently stated that Yashpal was registered in Gram Panchayat as his son. He did not know whether Yashpal was born on 11.3.2005, he has admitted filing of maintenance proceedings against him. He has denied that he has married Kavita of Rajgarh some 10-12 years back and having two children from her. 6. PW-2 Jagat Ram has led evidence by filing affidavit Ext. PW-2/A. In his cross-examination, he has admitted that his wife is sister of mother of appellant. His house was 4 kms from the house of the appellant. He has admitted that appellant is having three children though appellant himself has feigned ignorance about third child. He has denied the suggestion that appellant married Kavita from Gehnog though claimed that she used to come to the house of the appellant occasionally. He did not know whether appellant was having children from Kavita. 7. Respondent has appeared as RW-1. She led evidence by filing affidavit Ext. RW-1/A. She has stated that she never left the company of appellant and claimed that it was appellant who used to maltreat her and her children. She was turned out of the house. Appellant has developed illicit relations with one Kavita. The appellant has maltreated her since he intended to marry Kavita. She was turned out of the house in November 2004. She was carrying pregnancy of 7 months at that time. She delivered the child. She tried to come back to her in-laws' but was not permitted to do so. She was constrained to file maintenance proceedings at Rajgarh Court. The appellant has maltreated her since he intended to marry Kavita. She was turned out of the house in November 2004. She was carrying pregnancy of 7 months at that time. She delivered the child. She tried to come back to her in-laws' but was not permitted to do so. She was constrained to file maintenance proceedings at Rajgarh Court. She has denied the suggestion that Yashpal was not born out of loins of the appellant. 8. RW-2 Roop Ram has also led evidence by filing affidavit Ext. RW-2/A. According to him, appellant has kept one Kavita from whom he is having two children. He has admitted that Bhoop Singh had come with family Panchayat but he deposed that he wanted to create evidence since he was interested for mutual divorce. 9. What emerges from the evidence discussed herein above is that marriage between the parties was solemnised 16 years back. It is the appellant who has treated the respondent with cruelty. She was turned out of the house on 4.11.2004. He has developed illicit relations with Kavita. He subsequently married her. Two children were born from second marriage. Appellant has the audacity to even disown his third child tough, subsequently he has admitted that his son's name was entered in the Panchayat register as his son. He has leveled scandalous allegations against his wife that she has developed illicit relations with a person of her parental village. He has not led any evidence to prove this allegation against respondent. Respondent and her three children were not maintained by him. Respondent had no other alternative than to file the petition before the Court at Rajgarh seeking maintenance. It has come in the statement of RW-1 Smt. Sumjho Devi that the appellant was not even paying maintenance regularly. Appellant can not be allowed to take advantage of his own wrongs by creating hostility which has forced the respondent to live at her parents' house. In order to prove animus deserendi, appellant has not led any evidence. Appellant has also not led any evidence that the acts of the respondent have caused physical and mental cruelty to him. 10. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bipin Chander Jaisinghbhai Shah Vs. In order to prove animus deserendi, appellant has not led any evidence. Appellant has also not led any evidence that the acts of the respondent have caused physical and mental cruelty to him. 10. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bipin Chander Jaisinghbhai Shah Vs. Prabhawati, AIR 1957 SC 176 , have held that two essential conditions must be there to prove the desertion: (1) the factum of separation, and (2) the intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end (animus deserendi). Their Lordships have held that desertion is a matter of interference to be drawn from the facts and circumstances of each case. Their Lordships have held as under: at is desertion? "Rayden on Divorce" which is a standard work on the subject at p. 128 (6th Edn.) has summarized the case-law on the subject in these terms:- "Desertion is the separation of one spouse from the other, with an intention on the part of the deserting spouse of bringing cohabitation permanently to an end without reasonable cause and without the consent of the other spouse; but the physical act of departure by one spouse does not necessarily make that spouse the deserting party". The legal position has been admirably summarized in paras 453 and 454 at pp. 241, to 243 of Halsbury's Laws of England (3rd Edn.), Vol. 12, in the following words:- "In its essence desertion means the intentional permanent forsaking and abandonment of one spouse by the other without that other's consent and without reasonable cause. It is a total repudiation of the obligations of marriage. In view of the large variety of circumstances and of modes of life involved, the Court has discouraged attempts at defining desertion, there being no general principle applicable to all cases. Desertion is not the withdrawal from a place but from the state of things, for what the law seeks to enforce is the recognition and discharge of the common obligations of the married state; the state of things may usually be termed, for short, 'the home'. There can be desertion without previous cohabitation by the parties, or without the marriage having been consummated. The person who actually withdraws from cohabitation is not necessarily the deserting party. The fact that a husband makes an allowance to a wife whom he has abandoned is no answer to a charge of desertion. There can be desertion without previous cohabitation by the parties, or without the marriage having been consummated. The person who actually withdraws from cohabitation is not necessarily the deserting party. The fact that a husband makes an allowance to a wife whom he has abandoned is no answer to a charge of desertion. The offence of desertion is a course of conduct which exists independently of its duration, but as a ground for divorce it must exist for a period of at least three years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition where the offence appears as a cross-charge, of the answer. Desertion as a ground of divorce differs from the statutory grounds of adultery and cruelty in that the offence founding the cause of action of desertion is not complete, but is inchoate, until the suit is constituted. Desertion is a continuing offence". Thus the quality of permanence is one of the essential elements which differentiates desertion from willful separation. If a spouse abandons the other spouse in a state of temporary passion, for example anger or disgust, without intending permanently to cease cohabitation, it will not amount to desertion. For the offence of desertion, so far as the deserting spouse is concerned, two essential conditions must be there namely, (1) the factum of separation, and (2) the intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end (animus deserendi). Similarly two elements are essential so far as the deserted spouse is concerned: (1) the absence of consent, and (2) absence of conduct giving reasonable cause to the spouse leaving the matrimonial home to form the necessary intention aforesaid. The petitioner for divorce bears the burden of proving those elements in the two spouses respectively. Here a difference between the English law and the law as enacted by the Bombay Legislature may be pointed out. Whereas under the English law those essential conditions must continue throughout the course of the three years immediately preceding the institution of the suit for divorce, under the Act, the period is four years without specifying that it should immediately precede the commencement of proceedings for divorce. Whether the omission of the last clause has any practical result need not detain us, as it does not call for decision in the present case. Desertion is a matter of inference to be drawn from the facts and circumstances to each case. Whether the omission of the last clause has any practical result need not detain us, as it does not call for decision in the present case. Desertion is a matter of inference to be drawn from the facts and circumstances to each case. The inference may be drawn from certain facts which may not in another case be capable of leading to the same inference; that is to say, the facts have to be viewed as to the purpose which is revealed by those acts or by conduct and expression of intention, both anterior and subsequent to the actual acts of separation. If in fact, there has been a separation, the essential question always is whether that act could be attributable to an animus deserendi. The offence of desertion commences when the fact of separation and the animus deserendi co-exist. But it is not necessary that they should commence at the same time. The de facto separation may have commenced without the necessary animus or it may be that the separation and the (animus deserendi) coincide in point of time; for example, when the separating spouse abandons the marital home with the intention, express or implied of bringing cohabitation permanently to a close. The law in England has prescribed a three years period and the Bombay Act prescribed a period of four years as a continuous period during which the two elements must subsist. Hence, if a deserting spouse takes advantage of the locus poenitentiae thus provided by law and decides to come back to the deserted spouse by a bona fide offer of resuming the matrimonial home with all the implications of marital life, before the statutory period is out or even after the lapse of that period, unless proceedings for divorce have been commenced, desertion comes to an end, and if the deserted spouse unreasonably refuses to offer, the latter may be in desertion and not the former. Hence it is necessary that during all the period that there has been a desertion, the deserted spouse must affirm the marriage and be ready and willing to resume married life on such conditions as may be reasonable. It is also well settled that in proceedings for divorce the plaintiff must prove the offence of desertion, like and other matrimonial offence, beyond all reasonable doubt. It is also well settled that in proceedings for divorce the plaintiff must prove the offence of desertion, like and other matrimonial offence, beyond all reasonable doubt. Hence, though corroboration is not required as an absolute rule of law the courts insist upon corroborative evidence, unless its absence is accounted for to the satisfaction of the court. In this connection the following observations of Lord Goddard C.J. in the case of Lawson v. Lawson, 1955-1 All E.R. 341 at p. 342(A), may be referred to:- "These cases are not cases in which corroboration is required as a matter of law. It is required as a matter of precaution......." With these preliminary observations we now proceed to examine the evidence led on behalf of the parties to find out whether desertion has been proved in this case and, if so, whether there was a bona fide offer by the wife to return to her matrimonial home with a view to discharging marital duties and, if so, whether there was an unreasonable refusal on the part of the husband to take her back." 11. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Manisha Tyagi Vs. Deepak Kumar, (2010) 4 SCC 339 , have explained the term 'cruelty' as under: "24. This is no longer the required standard. Now it would be sufficient to show that the conduct of one of the spouses is so abnormal and below the accepted norm that the other spouse could not reasonable be expected to put up with it. The conduct is no longer required to be so atrociously abominable which would cause a reasonable apprehension that would be harmful or injurious to continue the cohabitation with the other spouse. Therefore, to establish cruelty it is not necessary that physical violence should be used. However, continued ill-treatment cessation of marital intercourse, studied neglect, indifference of one spouse to the other may lead to an inference of cruelty. However, in this case even with aforesaid standard both the Trial Court and the Appellate Court had accepted that the conduct of the wife did not amount to cruelty of such a nature to enable the husband to obtain a decree of divorce." 12. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ravi Kumar Vs. Julmi Devi, (2010) 4 SCC 476 , have explained the term 'cruelty' as under: "19. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ravi Kumar Vs. Julmi Devi, (2010) 4 SCC 476 , have explained the term 'cruelty' as under: "19. It may be true that there is no definition of cruelty under the said Act. Actually such a definition is not possible. In matrimonial relationship, cruelty would obviously mean absence of mutual respect and understanding between the spouses which embitters the relationship and often leads to various outbursts of behaviour which can be termed as cruelty. Sometime cruelty in a matrimonial relationship may take the form of violence, sometime it may take a different form. At times, it ma be just an attitude or an approach. Silence in some situations may amount to cruelty. 20. Therefore, cruelty in matrimonial behaviour defies any definition and its categories can never be closed. Whether the husband is cruel to his wife or the wife is cruel to her husband has to be ascertained and judged by taking into account the entire facts and circumstances of the given case and not by any predetermined rigid formula. Cruelty in matrimonial case can be of infinite variety - it may be subtle or even brutal and may be by gestures and word. That possible explains why Lord Denning in Sheldon v. Sheldon held that categories of cruelty in matrimonial case are never closed. 21. This Court is reminded of what was said by Lord Reid in Gollins v. Gollins about judging cruelty in matrimonial cases. The pertinent observations are (AC p. 660) ".. In matrimonial cases we are not concerned with the reasonable man as we are in cases of negligence. We are dealing with this man and this woman and the fewer a priori assumptions we make about them the better. In cruelty cases one can hardly ever even start with a presumption that the parties are reasonable people, because it is hard to imagine any cruelty case ever arising if both the spouses think and behave as reasonable people." 22. "About the changing perception of cruelty in matrimonial cases, this Court observed in Shobha Rani v. Madhukar Reddi at AIR p. 123, para 5 of the report: (SCC p. 108, para 5) "5. It will be necessary to bear in mind that there has been (a) marked change in the life around us. In matrimonial duties and responsibilities in particular, we find a sea change. It will be necessary to bear in mind that there has been (a) marked change in the life around us. In matrimonial duties and responsibilities in particular, we find a sea change. They are of varying degrees from house to house or person to person. Therefore, when a spouse makes complaint about the treatment of cruelty by the partner in life or relations, the court should not search for standard in life. A set of facts stigmatized as cruelty in one case may not be so in another case. The cruelty alleged may largely depend upon the type of life the parties are accustomed to or their economic and social conditions. It may also depend upon their culture and human values to which they attach importance. We, the Judges and lawyers, therefore, should not import our own notions of life. We may not go in parallel with them. There may be a generation gap between us and the parties." 13. In view of the discussion and analysis made herein above, there is no merit in the appeal and the same is dismissed. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of. No costs.