JUDGMENT : Sanjib Banerjee, J. The petitioner's estranged wife is not represented despite due notice. 2. The grievance of the petitioner is that though the petitioner is getting subsistence allowance since March, 2013, an order passed in proceedings under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, has been taken into account by the employer to deduct a sum of Rs. 6,000/- from the paltry monthly allowance of about Rs. 24,000/- received by the petitioner. 3. The petitioner refers to the West Bengal Service Rules, Part-I. Rule 71(4) in Chapter 9 of the said Rules pertaining to dismissal, removal and suspension of Government employees deals with when any recovery may be made from the subsistence allowance. Such provision mandates that certain amounts may be recovered from the subsistence allowance paid to a Government employee "with his written consent and to the extent agreed upon ....". The four clauses of sub-rule (4) relate to subscription to a provident fund; premium due on postal life insurance; dues of any co-operative society; and "amount due on the Court attachment." 4. The petitioner is a judicial officer against whom disciplinary proceedings have been instituted for the perceived acts of insubordination in the petitioner, inter alia, not recording statements under Section 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. The petitioner, however, claims that since the petitioner was also discharging the duties of a Civil Judge at the relevant point of time, the 2 additional power conferred on the petitioner as a Magistrate ought to have been under Section 11(3) of the Code and not under Section 11(2) of the Code as had been erroneously provided. The disciplinary proceedings are of no relevance in the present context, except that it is a matter of concern and deep anguish that the petitioner remains suspended for nearly two years without the disciplinary proceedings being concluded within such time. The parties report that the proceedings are still at the inquiry stage and the petitioner claims that on the last date that the matter was fixed before the inquiry officer on February 27, 2015, the petitioner attended this Court only to discover that the inquiry officer was out of station on work. 5. The parties report that the proceedings are still at the inquiry stage and the petitioner claims that on the last date that the matter was fixed before the inquiry officer on February 27, 2015, the petitioner attended this Court only to discover that the inquiry officer was out of station on work. 5. The High Court administration submits that since the 2005 Act has to be regarded as a social welfare legislation to protect the interests of a marginalised section in the society or the oppressed and deprived gender, an order passed under such provision cannot be seen to yield to the service conditions of an employee. The respondents suggest that since the order passed in the proceedings under the 2005 Act is for the benefit of the wife and the minor child, the employee cannot withhold his consent and resist such order being implemented against any subsistence allowance drawn by the employee. In other words, it is the submission of the respondent authorities that the expression "wages and salaries" appearing in Section 20(6) of the 2005 Act has to be interpreted to include the subsistence allowance paid to an employee while he remains suspended and his wages and salaries are not paid to him. 6. Common sense commands that an order of Court ought not to be trifled with and, at any rate, no service conditions can be seen to affect an order of Court, particularly an order of or in the nature of attachment. But it has also to be appreciated that it is the subsistence allowance that is insulated to some extent by Rule 71(4) of the said Rules and the purpose thereof is to ensure that the employee can survive or subsist on the meagre allowance without such amount being further depleted by reason of, inter alia, an order of attachment passed by Court. 7. An order for payment passed by any judicial forum is never absolute in the strict sense. The order for payment is subject to the executability thereof; whether on account of the financial condition of the judgment-debtor or by reason of the other rules as to excecutability that govern an order of such nature or that apply to the judgment-debtor. 7. An order for payment passed by any judicial forum is never absolute in the strict sense. The order for payment is subject to the executability thereof; whether on account of the financial condition of the judgment-debtor or by reason of the other rules as to excecutability that govern an order of such nature or that apply to the judgment-debtor. Indeed, even the Civil Procedure Code does not provide for the civil detention of a judgment-debtor if he fails to satisfy a money decree, unless the failure is seen to be willful and deliberate. Given the very nature of an order for the payment of money or an order in the nature of attachment, the excecutability thereof is often subjected to equitable considerations. Ordinarily, when an order of deduction or attachment is made in respect of any salary, the Court would have in mind the quantum thereof and the extent to which an order of deduction or attachment may operate. The considerations would not be identical if the person suffering the order of deduction or attachment were being paid a subsistence allowance. 8. The problem that this matter throws up has two aspects: the primacy of an order of Court; and, the right of an employee facing disciplinary proceedings to survive on the subsistence allowance that is afforded to him during the time. The object of the relevant provision in the said Rules cannot be seen to be making the order of a Court subject to the consent of the concerned employee. The object of the rule is to afford the employee an opportunity to agree to have his subsistence allowance deducted - and the extent of deduction - consequent upon any order of attachment being applicable to him. If the employee does not consent to the deduction being made despite the order of Court, the rule does not make the employee immune to the measures that may be taken by the Court for the disobedience or violation of its order. Further, the Rule or more precisely, Clause (d) of Rule 71(4) of the said Rules does not refer to an order of Court which specifically provides for the entirety or a part of the subsistence allowance to be attached; it pertains to a general order of attachment being made against the concerned employee without any specific mention being made of the subsistence allowance. If the order of Court specifically refers to the subsistence allowance being attached or deducted in part or full, the option is not available to the employee to agree to the deduction or the attachment. 9. The process for executing money decrees or orders of payment does not require blood to be drawn from stone. Even when a fine is imposed in criminal law in some cases, a person has the choice of not paying the fine and suffering imprisonment in lieu thereof. Orders for payment of money are executable to the extent that the money is available with the judgment-debtor and the elaborate process of discovering the assets of a judgment-debtor in execution recognises the same. 10. The subsistence allowance which is given to a person facing disciplinary proceedings permits him to survive thereon. It is in such light that the consent referred to in Rule 71(4) of the said Rules has to be seen. The Rule cannot be a panacea for the disobedience of an order by the concerned employee. 11. In the instant case, the order under the said Act of 2005 on the application of the petitioner's wife was passed on February 16, 2013. It is evident, therefore, that the relevant Court could not take into account the fact that the petitioner was being afforded a meagre subsistence allowance as such was not the case when the order was passed. In the circumstances, the petitioner should have been afforded the opportunity to agree to the deduction or the extent thereof and upon the petitioner's agreement falling short of the quantum as directed to be paid by the order of February 16, 2013, the beneficiary thereunder could approach the relevant Court for appropriate steps - whether for the execution of the order or the modification thereof or even a specific direction that the entirety of the amount should come out of the subsistence allowance paid to the petitioner. 12. The issue here is as to whether the petitioner's employers were justified in denying the option that was available to the petitioner under Rule 71(4) of the said Rules. Notwithstanding the order of February 16, 2013, since such order did not specifically require the subsistence allowance to be attached to the full extent of the quantum recorded therein, the petitioner ought to have been permitted to exercise his option and face the consequences thereof. Notwithstanding the order of February 16, 2013, since such order did not specifically require the subsistence allowance to be attached to the full extent of the quantum recorded therein, the petitioner ought to have been permitted to exercise his option and face the consequences thereof. To such limited extent, the petitioner's stand appears to be justified. 13. The deductions made from the petitioner's subsistence allowance on the basis of the order dated February 16, 2013 need not immediately be refunded, but no future deduction should be made from the monthly subsistence allowance afforded to the petitioner with effect from April, 2015 without the petitioner's previous consent regarding the same, including the quantum thereof. Nothing in this order will prevent the appropriate Court in seisin of the proceedings under the said Act, 2005 to pass appropriate orders. 14. The other aspect of the matter which cannot be missed is that the petitioner has remained suspended for nearly two years and is earning a subsistence allowance which makes life inconvenient for him while, at the same time, the money paid to him is a needless loss to the public exchequer since his services cannot be availed of by the State. It is necessary to not miss the woods for the trees and issue an appropriate direction. 15. The disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner should be concluded within a period of two months from date without granting any adjournment to the petitioner. If no order of punishment is passed against the petitioner within a period of eight weeks from date, the order of suspension passed against the petitioner on March 12, 2013 will stand revoked and the petitioner will be entitled to get full payment of his monthly salary and emoluments irrespective of the continuation of the disciplinary proceedings. 16. There is a further matter that has engaged the attention of the Court. In several service matters instituted by the members of the larger judicial fraternity, it is noticed that the High Court administration or the relevant Judgeship is not always represented. An order has been recently passed for the State to represent the High Court administration and the District Judgeships, unless there is any conflict of interest in a particular matter between the judiciary and the executive. An order has been recently passed for the State to represent the High Court administration and the District Judgeships, unless there is any conflict of interest in a particular matter between the judiciary and the executive. Neither the High Court nor the District Judgeships have the requisite funds to ensure representation in the many matters that are now filed since the judiciary is substantial employer these days. 17. It is also necessary that the appropriate authorities consider the desirability of setting up a department with an administrative officer or a registrar at its helm for the purpose of attending to Court matters and their attendant demands; as the other duties of the Registrar-General may not permit him to give adequate attention to every Court matter and the judiciary cannot be regarded as a favoured litigant. A copy of this order should be placed by the Registrar-General before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice for appropriate steps being taken, if considered fit. 18. W.P.143(W) of 2015 is allowed as above without any order as to costs. Certified website copies of the order, if applied for, be urgently made available to the parties, subject to compliance with all requisite formalities.