JUDGMENT : Rajiv Sharma, J. This petition is instituted against Order dated 14.8.2014 rendered by learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) Court No. II, in CMA No. 808/2014 in Civil Suit No. 126/2014. 2. “Key facts" necessary for the adjudication of the present petition are that respondent-plaintiff (hereinafter referred to as 'plaintiff' for convenience sake instituted a suit against the petitioner-defendant (hereinafter referred to as 'defendant' for convenience sake), for declaration. According to the plaintiff, she was put in possession of Shop No. 8 in Sub Market Yard Santokhgarh on 2.7.2009. She is coming in possession of the same. Shop in question was allotted after completing all codal formalities as required in law. Plaintiff received a show cause notice from the Secretary, Agriculture Produce Market Committee, Una, wherein it was specifically mentioned that an enquiry was conducted by the Vigilance Department. It was found that the Shop No. 8 allotted to the plaintiff was against Rules and recommended for cancellation of the allotment of Shop No. 8. A detailed reply was filed to the show cause notice through her counsel on 19.4.2014. She has not received any notice from the Vigilance Department to participate in any inquiry proceedings instituted against her. She has requested the defendant to supply documents of the inquiry. Defendant instead of supplying documents, issued cancellation letter of Shop no. 8 vide letter dated 3.7.2014. She was directed to vacate Shop in question and to hand over possession to the defendant within 30 days. Plaintiff also moved an application under Section 80 CPC for permitting to file suit without service of notice under Section 80 read with Section 174 of the Himachal Pradesh Agriculture Produce Markets Act. According to the averments made in the application bearing No. 808/2014, she has filed an application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC for the grant of ad-interim injunction against the defendant for not dispossessing the plaintiff from the Shop premises in suit. Relief sought was imminent and urgent. Application was contested by the defendant. Preliminary objection has taken that the suit was barred under Sections 69 and 70 of the Himachal Pradesh Agriculture and Horticulture Produce Marketing (Development and Regulation) Act, 2005 (hereinafter referred to as Act' for convenience sake). Relief sought was imminent and urgent. Application was contested by the defendant. Preliminary objection has taken that the suit was barred under Sections 69 and 70 of the Himachal Pradesh Agriculture and Horticulture Produce Marketing (Development and Regulation) Act, 2005 (hereinafter referred to as Act' for convenience sake). Learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) allowed the application on 14.8.2014 by holding that matter appeared to be imminent and urgent in nature and if the plaintiff had to serve a notice and wait for expiration of statutory period of two months, defendant might have dispossessed her from the suit premises and purpose of filing the suit would have been defeated. In these circumstances, the application was allowed. Hence, this petition. 3. Mr. Sanjay Ranta has drawn the attention of the Court to Section 70 of the Himachal Pradesh Agriculture and Horticulture Produce Marketing (Development and Regulation) Act, 2005, which reads as under: “70. Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, no suit shall be instituted against the Board or any Committee, until the expiration of two months after notice in writing stating the cause of action, name and place of abode of the intending plaintiff and the relief which he claims has been delivered or left at its office. Every such suit shall be dismissed unless it is instituted within six months from the date of accrual of the alleged cause of action.” 4. He vehemently argued that the in view of bar imposed under Section 70 of the Act, application could not be allowed by learned trial Court. He also argued that the plaintiff had alternative remedy available to her under Section 80 of the Act. 5. I have heard the learned counsel for the defendant and also gone through the record carefully. 6. Shop No. 8 was allotted to the plaintiff on 2.7.2009. She was put in possession. It is stated that some Vigilance inquiry was instituted against the plaintiff qua the allotment of the Shop. Plaintiff was served a notice to vacate the premises. She filed reply to the same. However, fact of the matter is that thereafter she has been served with a letter dated 3.7.2014 whereby allotment of the shop has been cancelled. It is in these circumstances that plaintiff was constrained to file suit. She also moved an application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC for grant of ad-interim injunction. However, fact of the matter is that thereafter she has been served with a letter dated 3.7.2014 whereby allotment of the shop has been cancelled. It is in these circumstances that plaintiff was constrained to file suit. She also moved an application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC for grant of ad-interim injunction. According to the language employed in Section 70, no suit shall be instituted against the Board or any Committee, until the expiration of two months after notice in writing stating the cause of action, name and place of abode of the intending plaintiff and the relief which he claims has been delivered or left at its office. Similar provision also exists in Section 80 CPC. According to Sub Section 1 of Section 80, no suit shall be instituted against the Government or against a public officer in respect of any act purporting to be done by such public officer in his official capacity, until the expiration of two months next after notice in writing has been delivered to, or left at the office of:- (a) in the case of a suit against the Central Government, except where it relates to a railway, a Secretary to that Government; (b) in the case of a suit against the Central Government where it relates to a railway, the General Manager of that railway; (bb) in the case of a suit against the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the Chief Secretary to that Government or any other officer authorised by that Government in this behalf; (c) in the case of a suit against any other State Government, a Secretary to that Government or the Collector of the District. However, there is Sub-section 2 of Section 80 which provides that a suit to obtain an urgent or immediate relief against the Government (including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir) or any public officer in respect of any act purporting to be done by such public officer in his official capacity, may be instituted , with the leave of the court, without serving any notice as required by sub-section (1); but the court shall not grant relief in the suit, whether interim or otherwise, except after giving to the government or public officer, as the case may be, a reasonable opportunity of showing cause in respect of the relief prayed for in the suit. 7. 7. According to the plaint, language of Sub-section 1 and 2 of Section 80, a suit can not be instituted against Government until the expiration of two moths, after notice in writing has been delivered to or left at the office of the officer mentioned therein. However, when an urgent or imminent relief is sought against the Government or any public officer, suit can be instituted with the leave of the Court without serving any notice as required by Subsection 1 with a rider that reasonable opportunity to show cause is to be given to the Government or the public officer. There is specific bar under Section 70 of the Act whereby suit can not be instituted until expiration of two months but there is no provision like Sub-section 2 of Section 80 CPC, whereby suit can be instituted where an urgent or imminent relief is sought for. Though there is no specific provision prescribed what would happen when imminent and urgent relief is sought to be obtained, under Section 70 of the Act, however, in the interest of justice, principles of Section 80 (2) can be read into provision of Section 70 of the Act to make it equitable and practicable. A person can not be left without remedy if imminent / urgent relief is to be obtained. In case, a litigant has to wait for two months, in that eventuality, the very purpose of filing the suit shall be defeated and it may cause irreparable loss and injury to the party concerned. In the instant case, plaintiff, to be on safer side, moved an application on the principles laid down under Sub-section 2 of Section 80, seeking leave of the Court to file suit. Plaintiff has also moved an application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC seeking injunction against the defendant. Plaintiff has been issued letter to vacate the premises. She came into possession of Shop No. 8 after allotment was made in her favour. Case of the plaintiff, as per averments contained in the plaint is that she was not associated during inquiry conducted by the Vigilance Department. Plaintiff would have suffered irreparable loss and injury if leave was not granted by the trial Court to institute the suit. In these circumstances, she could not wait for two months’ period as stipulated under Section 70 to file the suit. Plaintiff would have suffered irreparable loss and injury if leave was not granted by the trial Court to institute the suit. In these circumstances, she could not wait for two months’ period as stipulated under Section 70 to file the suit. Provisions contained in Sub-section 2 of Section 80 CPC are just and fair to avoid injustice to the parties concerned, in case urgent and imminent relief is to be obtained. Trial Court, taking into consideration, principles contained in Section 80 (2), has rightly allowed the application on 14.8.2014. 8. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Devi Singh v. Hyderabad Municipality reported in AIR 1972 SC 2510 , have held that where any suit for injunction against a municipality restraining it from interfering with plaintiff’s peaceful enjoyment and possession of the Bazar in suit, the whole controversy was whether the Bazar was the property of the plaintiff and was in his possession at the time of the institution of the suit, no notice of suit under Section 447 is necessary since the suit had nothing to do with any act done or purported to be done in pursuance of execution or intended execution of any provision of the Corporation Act. Their Lordships have held as under: “12. We may dispose of the legal points. As regards the requirement of a notice under Section 447 of the Corporation Act that section provides that no suit shall be instituted against the Corporation, Commr, Municipal Officer or servant in respect of any act done in or purported to be done pursuance of execution or intended execution of the Act or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of the Act until the expiration of one month next after a notice had been served on the Corporation or Officer concerned in the manner indicated in the section. This is what the High Court said on the point : It cannot be gain said that the acts complained of by the plaintiff were acts done by the Corporation in pursuance of its powers and duties under the Act. Under Section 59 of the Act the Corporation is empowered to make provision for public parks, gardens play grounds and recreation grounds, while under Section 56 of the Act the Corporation is empowered to remove obstructions upon public places. Under Section 59 of the Act the Corporation is empowered to make provision for public parks, gardens play grounds and recreation grounds, while under Section 56 of the Act the Corporation is empowered to remove obstructions upon public places. The question whether a notice under the aforesaid section was necessary has to be decided on the averments made. It was never the case of the plaintiff that the defendant Corporation was acting or purported to act under the provisions of the Act. The dispute raised related to the ownership of the property as also its possession. We have not been shown any provision in the Corporation Act by which the Corporation or its officers were entitled to either take possession of another person's property or retain its possession or dispossess a person who is already in possession without having recourse to the ordinary remedies under the law. We are wholly unable to understand how Section 56 of the Corporation Act could be of any avail to the Corporation in the matter of notice under Section 447 of the Act. The whole controversy between the parties centered on the question whether the Bazaar was the property of the plaintiff and was in his possession at the time of the institution of the suit. That had nothing to do with any act done or purported to be done in pursuance of execution or intended execution of any provision of the Corporation Act. The learned Counsel for the Corporation has not been able to show how the suit as laid and framed attracted the applicability of Section 447 of the Corporation Act. We would, accordingly, hold that under the aforesaid section no notice was necessary any before the institution of the suit.” 9. Purpose contained in Section 70 is similar to that of Section 80 CPC but there is no specific provision contained therein to institute a suit, wherein urgent relief is to be sought for. 10. Plaintiff has also sought prohibitory injunction restraining the defendant from ousting the plaintiff from the Shop in question forcibly and illegally and, in the alternative, decree for restoration of possession of Shop No. 8 to the plaintiff, in case defendant succeeds in forcibly dispossessing the plaintiff from the Shop, during the pendency of the suit, under Section 34 and 38 of the Specific Relief Act. 11. Mr. 11. Mr. Sanjay Ranta has also argued that the plaintiff has alternative remedy available to her, as per Section 80 of the Regulation Act. However, he has not placed on record copy of any agreement for providing/ referring the matter to an Arbitrator. Defendant has also not taken any objection in the reply filed to CMA No. 808/2014 about alternative remedy available to the plaintiff. 12. In view of above discussion and analysis, there is neither any illegality nor perversity in the Order passed by learned trial Court below. There is no merit in the present petition and the same is dismissed, so also the pending applications, if any.