JUDGMENT 1. - The present Revision Petition has been filed by the defendant/petitioner, Uttam Kumar, aggrieved by the Order dated 16.4.2014 passed by learned Trial Court of Civil Judge (Junior Division) Bagidora, District-Banswara (Shri Shiv Kumar), granting leave to plaintiffs/respondents, namely, Mr. Sunil Acharya, Advocate and Sh. Sunil Harijan, to institute suit under Section, 91 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (for short, hereinafter referred to as 'C.P.C.'). 2. The suit was instituted by the respondents/plaintiffs on the ground that the 'defendant/petitioner had raised construction of a building comprising residential flats on his own plot of land at Banswara, even, though after obtaining due permission from the concerned authority, i.e. the Municipal Council, Banswara, in accordance with Section 194 of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 2009 (Act 2009) but, it was not only causing public nuisance but was also a wrongful act having adverse effect on the plaintiffs/respondents, and therefore, a leaver institute such representative suit was sought by the plaintiffs in accordance wit Section 91 of the C.P.C., which came to be allowed by the learned Trial Court vide the impugned order. 3. Aggrieved by the same, the defendant/petitioner has approached this Com by way of present Revision Petition, in which while issuing notices to the respondents, a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court had stayed the effect and operation of the impugned Order dated 16.4.2014 passed by the learned civil Judge on 15.5.2014. Thereafter, the case came up for admission before this Co; today. 4. Mr. Rajat Dave, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of petition defendant submitted that the suit instituted by the plaintiffs/respondents is mala fides reasons and the leave to institute and maintain such suit, has won; been granted by the learned Trial Court in view of the fact that the construct, the residential flats has already been raised and completed by the defendant his private land, after obtaining due permission for raising such construe] from the Competent Authority in the Municipal Council, Banswara, and it car.: nor does it amount to any "public nuisance" nor a wrongful act having: adverse effect on the public or the plaintiffs. Therefore, the basic condition: Section 91 of the C.P.C. were not available in the present case. He also submitted that the Plaintiff No. 1, Mr. Therefore, the basic condition: Section 91 of the C.P.C. were not available in the present case. He also submitted that the Plaintiff No. 1, Mr. Sunil Acharya, is a practising Advocate at Banswara, taking another person, namely, Shri Sonu Harijan, with him, who is nothing ta shadow colleague, he has instituted this suit allegedly for public cause and sought the leave of Court under Section 91 of the C.P.C. for actually exerting an the pressure by causing harassment to the defendant/petitioner. He also Submitted that the defendant had hotly contested the said leave application of the plaintiffs by filing a suitable reply thereto before the learned Trial Court and bringing it to the notice of the Trial Court the fact that if the plaintiffs had felt aggrieved for the said permission for raising construction given by the Municipal council, they could have but had never approached the Municipal Council, banswara, for so-called wrongful permission to the defendant/petitioner for raising such construction of residential flats. The plaintiffs did not file any appeal against such permission under Section 194(12) of the Rajasthan Municipalities of 2009 and the construction having been already completed, there was no question of any public nuisance or adverse effect caused to the plaintiffs/respondents in the present case, but surprisingly and quite erroneously the learned Trial Court has granted such leave to maintain this suit under Section 91 the C.P.C. vide the impugned order under the pressure of the local Advocate, Mr. Sunil Acharya, the Plaintiff No. 1. 5. Mr. Rajat Dave, also brought to the notice of the Court a threatening legal slice dead 18.4.2014 was sent by the Plaintiff No. 1, Mr. Sunil Acharya, Advocate under Section 19 of the C.P.C. read with Sections 499 and 500 of I.P.C., liming special damages of Rs. 28 Lacs from the defendant for the alleged loss of his reputation and damage caused by the defendant on account of his averments made in the reply filed to the application seeking leave under Section 91 of the P.C., and by the said notice, the Plaintiff No. 1, Mr. Sunil Acharya, Advocate, not only brought to the notice of the defendant the fact of passing of this impugned order by the Trial Court on 16.4.2001 but also claimed damages of Rs. Sunil Acharya, Advocate, not only brought to the notice of the defendant the fact of passing of this impugned order by the Trial Court on 16.4.2001 but also claimed damages of Rs. 28 Lacs but the body of the said notice, indirectly he has also indicated that he never anted to have a deal with defendant for getting a residential flat in the said building, or to get a plot of land in another scheme developed by the defendant town as "Colours Lake County" in Banswara. He also indicated that he has filed other suits of similar nature under Section 91 of the C.P.C. and in which similar leave has been granted to him and he is also going to file a public interest litigation before the Hon'ble Supreme Court for the alleged illegal construction ed by the defendant in Banswara and various other persons. 6. Mr. Rajat Dave, learned Counsel for the defendant/petitioner, therefore, id that the Plaintiff No. 1, Mr. Sunil Acharya, Advocate not only sought to blackmail the defendant but also sought to create a spectrum of various threats t him, obviously for extraneous reasons and objects, by instituting such frivolous suit and also threatening him with the criminal action by issuing notice [alleged defamation, which he (Plaintiff No. 1) had sent just two days after the impugned order was passed by the learned Trial Court on 16.4.2014, which was ought to the notice of this Court during the course of arguments. 7. On the other hand, Mr. I.R. Choudhary, learned Counsel appearing for the Defendant No. 2 - Municipal Council, Banswara, supported the case of the Petitioner/defendant and urged that the due permission for raising such construction was given by the Municipal Counsel in the present case and the construction in question has been fully raised in accordance with approved map. He further argued that the Plaintiff No. 1 or the Plaintiff No. 2 never approval the respondent Municipal Council, for raising any grievance with regard to permission for construction and approval of the map, nor they have filed appeal under Section 194(12) of the Act of 2009 before the Competent Authority of the Municipal Council. He also submitted that the Defendant No. 2, Municipal Council, Banswara, has also filed similar reply as filed by to Defendant it before the learned Trial Court and had opposed the grant of leave to the plaintiff. 8. Mr. He also submitted that the Defendant No. 2, Municipal Council, Banswara, has also filed similar reply as filed by to Defendant it before the learned Trial Court and had opposed the grant of leave to the plaintiff. 8. Mr. Parikshit Nayak, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of Respondent No. 1 and 2/plaintiffs and the Plaintiff No. 1, Advocate Sunil Acharya, preset Court, contended before this Court while admitting the factual aspects of matter that the plaintiffs did not approach the Municipal Council, Banswan way of any Appeal or any representation they sought to however support impugned order of leave to maintain the present suit under Section 91 of C.P.C. to the extent, it has been given by the Court below in the impugned order He also submitted that the learned Trial Court in the impugned order while finding that a case of public nuisance was not made out by the plaintiffs under Section 91 of the C.P.C., but a wrongful act having adverse effect on them, the ground, on which such leave was granted by the learned Trial Count therefore, the suit deserves to be tried on merits. 9. Having heard the learned Counsel for the parties and having perused relevant provisions of the Act and the impugned order, this Court is satisfied the impugned order cannot be sustained and the present Revision Petition of petitioner/defendant deserves to be allowed with additional directions given herein after. The reasons are as follows. 10. Section 91 in Part-V of the C.P.C. dealing with the "Special Proceed: comprising of Sections 89 to 93, is quoted herein below for ready reference. "Section 91. Public nuisance.(1) In the case of a public nuisance to other wrongful act affecting, or likely to affect, the public, a suit fora declaration and injunction or for such other relief as may be appropriate in the circumstances of the case, may be instituted,- (a) by the Advocate-General, or (b) with the leave of the Court, by two or more persons, even though no special damage has been caused to such person by reason of such public nuisance or other wrongful act. (2) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect any right of suit which may exist independently of its provisions." 11. (2) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect any right of suit which may exist independently of its provisions." 11. While Section 89 of Part-V of the C.P.C. deals with arbitration alternative dispute redressal mechanism, Section 90 provides for a special cat be instituted for opinion of the Court, where such opinion is sought by person. Section 91 empowers the advocate General or two or more persons, leave of the Court, to institute such suit in case of public nuisance or; wrongful act affecting or likely to affect the public to institute a suit for such declaration and injunction. Section 92 of the C.P.C. deals with public authority and Section 93 of this Part-V of the C.P.C. deals with exercise of power of Advocate General outside the presidency towns. However, this Court is present concerned only with interpretation of Section 91 of the C.P.C. and, therefore, has been quoted above. 12. A bare perusal of said provisions contained in Part-V of the C.P.C. On closer and harmonious reading would reveal that the locus has been provide institute such suits to the Advocate General on the one hand and two or more persons on the other hand in case of grave public nuisance or wrongful acts adversely affecting the large public interest, to maintain and institute such suits. Since, normally a Civil Court under Section 9 of the C.P.C. gives the locus to the person concerned, who is aggrieved and as a cause of action, as defined in Section 20 of the C.P.C. has arisen to him to approach a Civil Court, the exceptions are provided in Order 1, Rule 8 of the Code, where a representative suit can be filed by one or more persons on behalf of others and Section 91 of the C.P.C. provides an exceptional locus to the person even tough not directly having any cause in the matter and no special damages have been caused to themselves, but want to espouse the cause of a group of public or public at large in the specified areas of public nuisance and wrongful acts effecting such public or group of people at large. Clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 91 of the C.P.C. cannot be read in a disjuncted manner, even though they are separated by word "Or" in sub-section (1) of Section 91 of the C.P.C. 13. Clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 91 of the C.P.C. cannot be read in a disjuncted manner, even though they are separated by word "Or" in sub-section (1) of Section 91 of the C.P.C. 13. The fact that Clause (a) empowers the highest law officer of the State, namely, Advocate General to institute such suits, is indicative of the fact that Clause (b) permitting leave to be granted by the Court in the cases of public nuisance and wrongful act is of such a gravity affecting the public at large adversely, that instead of the suit to the maintained by the Advocate General of the State, it can be permitted to be maintained even by two or more persons, in such representative capacity on behalf of others even though they did not suffer any special damages themselves. Clause (b) of Section 91 of the Act, therefore, has to necessarily draw its colour from Clause (a) of Section 91 of the C.P.C. and with the same amount of seriousness, with which the Advocate General of the State could be expected to consider it expedient to institute such suit in the Civil Court for redressal of public nuisance or a wrongful act adversely effecting public at large, and if the same amount of seriousness is not reflected in the plaint by two or more individuals making out a case of public nuisance and wrongful act effecting the public at large adversely, such leave cannot be granted by the Trial Court. The Trial Judge in such cases should act with a great amount of circumspection and reservation, while considering such applications seeking leave to institute such representative suits by private individuals raising a facade of public cause in such suits under Section 91 of C.P.C., lest such suits become tools in the hands of unscrupulous plaintiffs, blackmailers or so-called self-assumed social activists. 14. 14. Sub-section (2) of Section 91 of the C.P.C. provides a way-out for private individuals or two or more persons seeking such leave by providing that nothing in this section shall be deemed to limit or otherwise effect any right of suit which may exist independently of the provisions of Section 91 of the C.P.C. Therefore, the Trial Court ought to have normally directed the private individuals avail their independent remedy, if they can establish their own cause of action arising in the matter instead of liberally granting them the leave to maintain such representative suits under Section 91 of the C.P.C. in the cases of public nuisance wrongful acts adversely affecting the public, unless the plaint discloses a grave and genuine public nuisance' or wrongful act causing adverse effect on public at large. 15. Section 91 of the C.P.C., which permits the Advocate General to institute also such suits can always take care of such public nuisance or wrongful acts adversely affecting public at large, through the office of Advocate General and the State administration authority at all levels, can certainly bring any such public nuisance or wrongful acts to the notice of the office of the Advocate General who upon appreciation of such relevant facts, can institute such a suit under Section 91 of the C.P.C., if so considered necessary and it may be noted here that leave of the Court is not required to be granted in case such suit is instituted by the Advocate General. Since, the leave of the Court is required only for the private individuals or two or more persons, who otherwise and no locus-standi to maintain such suit having not suffered any special damages to themselves, they can be permitted to maintain such suits, only in a very narrow scope and upon Trial Court coming to a prima-facie conclusion that the plaint averments with evidence whatever is produced at that stage with the suit, ex-Jacie or prima-facie make out a strong case, deserving the attention and intervention of the Court and trial requiring the defendant or the persons, causing such public nuisance or adverse public effect on account of wrongful acts of them, which is required to be redressed by the Court concerned to answer the plaint and fact the trial. 16. In the present case, the purported grounds set up by the Plaintiff No. 1, Mr. 16. In the present case, the purported grounds set up by the Plaintiff No. 1, Mr. Sunil Acharya, Advocate and Plaintiff No. 2, Sonu Harijan, for invoking Section 91 of the C.P.C., in essence challenged the grant of permission by the Municipal authorities to raise the construction by the petitioner/defendant. The entire burden of their complaint in the plaint was that the Municipal authorities have granted permission wrongly beyond the Rules, without proper conversion land use and since the residential fiats to be constructed by the defendant were not to be used for his own residence, therefore, the impugned acts and wrong permission amounted to such wrongful acts which would cause public nuisance and will have adverse effect on the public at large. The relevant extract of t impugned order throwing light on these aspects dealt with by the learned Trial Judge are quoted herein below for ready reference. The relevant extract of t impugned order throwing light on these aspects dealt with by the learned Trial Judge are quoted herein below for ready reference. " yksd ij izHkko Mkyus okys vU; nks"kiw.kZ dk;ksZa ds laca/k esa foospu&mYys[kuh; gS fd dk;kZy; uxj ifj"kn ckalokM+k jktLFkku }kjk mtjnkjh lwpuk la[;k 10 dzekad% rkehj@12&13@3585&89 fnukad 13-7-2012 ds tfj;s loZ lk/kkj.k ls vkifRr;ka rYc dh xbZ FkhA mDr mtjnkjh lwpuk ds dze la[;k 6 ij oknxzLr Hkw[k.M ij izfroknh la[;k 1 mRre dqekj dks vkoklh; Hkw[k.M ckcr~ vkifRr;ka ryc dh xbZ FkhA oknhx.k@izkFkhZx.k us vius okn&i= ,oa izLrqr nLrkostksa ls ;g crk;k gS fd oknxzLr Hkw[k.M ij cgqeaftyk Q~ysV~l Hkou dk fuekZ.k dj Q~ysV~l dk cspku dj O;olk; fd;k tk jgk gSA tcfd mtjnkjh lwpuk vkoklh; fuekZ.k gsrq FkhA oknhx.k izkFkhZx.k dh vksj ls lekpkj i= jktLFkku if=dk fnukad 25-1-2014 esa izdkf'kr foKkiu Hkh is'k fd;k gSA ftlesa oknxzLr Hkw[k.M ij 'kqHk jsthMsalh uked Hkou esa Q~ysV~l dh cqfdax gsrq foKkiu fn;k tkuk izdV gksrk gSA dk;kZy; uxj ifj"kn ckalokM+k jktLFkku dh mtjnkjh lwpuk la[;k 10 dzekad% rkehj@12&13@3585&89 fnukad 13-7-2012 ds voyksdu ls Li"V gS fd Hkw[k.M fodzsrk Jherh ghuk esgrk ,oa Jh jkds'k esgrk }kjk mDr vkoklh; Hkw[k.M Jh mRre dqekj ds uke gLrkUrj.k fd;s tkus ckcr~ mtjnkjh lwpuk vkifRr;ka vkeaf=r fd;k tkuk izdV ugha gSA izdj.k dh LVst ij is'k fd;s x;s nLrkost ds voyksdu ls ;g fu"d"kZ fudkyk tkuk mfpr gS fd izfroknh la[;k 2 }kjk izfroknh la[;k 1 dks gLrkUrfjr vkoklh Hkw[.M dk mi;ksx ml iz;kstu ls fHkUu djus dh vuqefr nh xbZ] ftl iz;kstu ds fy;s mls mDr Hkwfe gLrkUrfjr dh xbZ FkhA tks fd /kkjk 182 ( 1 ) jktLFkku uxjikfydk vf/kfu;e] 2009 dk mYya?ku izrhr gksrk gSA /kkjk 182 ( 3 ) jktLFkku uxjikfydk vf/kfu;e] 2009 ds rgr jkT; ljdkj ;k izkf/kd`r vf/kdkjh }kjk mDr vkoklh; Hkw[k.M ds mi;ksx esa ifjorZu dh vuqKk dk jkti= esa izdk'ku Hkh i=koyh ij is'k ugha fd;k x;k gSA fcuk mDr vuqKk ds dksbZ Hkh vkoklh; Hkw[k.M okf.kfT;d vFkok vU; dksbZ Hkh iz;kstu ds fy;s mi;ksx esa ugha yk;k tk ldrk gSA gLrxr izdj.k esa bl ckcr~ dksbZ ;qfDr;qDr laxr dFku izfroknh i{k }kjk ugha fd;s x;s gSaA /kkjk 194 ( 8 ) jktLFkku uxjikfydk vf/kfu;e] 2009 ds voyksdu ls izFke n`"V;k ,slk izrhr gksrk gS fd oknxzLr Hkw[k.M ij Q~ysV~l fuekZ.k dh Lohd`fr tks uxjikfydk ckalokM+k }kjk fn;k tkuk crk;k x;k Hkh uxjikfydk ds {ks=kf/kdkj ls ckgj gSA mDr /kkjk ds vuqlkj uxjikfydk ,sls fdlh vkosnu dks fofuf'pr ugha dj ldrh gS rFkk vkosnd dks lwpuk nsrs gq;s vkSj mls dk;Z izkjaHk ugha djus ds funsZ'k ds lkFk jkT; ljdkj dks ,sls vkosnu izsf"kr djsxhA lEiw.kZ i=koyh ij bl ckcr~ Hkh dksbZ nLrkosth lk{; is'k ugha dh xbZ gSA fo}ku vf/koDrk oknhx.k us ;g Hkh fuosnu fd;k gS fd uxj ifj"kn ckalokM+k ls feyh fuekZ.k Lohd`fr ls vf/kd mapkbZ dh bekjr cukbZ tk jgh gSA rhu eafty ds ctk; pkj eafty cukbZ tk jgh gSA cxSj Lohd`fr ds cksfjax dh xbZ gSA U;k;ky; ds er esa bl laca/k esa ewy okn esa lk{; ds mijksDr gh fofu'p; fd;k tk ldsxkA fu"d"kZ% 1- oknhx.k dk mDr nkok vUrxZr /kkjk 91 nh0iz0la0 oknhx.k dks yksd U;wlsal dh lhek rd iks"k.kh; ugha ik;k x;kA 2- oknhx.k dk mDr nkok vUrxZr /kkjk 91 nh0iz0la0 izfroknhx.k ds vU; ,sls nks"kiw.kZ dk;Z dh n'kk esa ftlls yksd ij izHkko iM+rk gS] ds rgr iks"k.kh; ik;k x;kA 3- ;fn bl okn esa vU; dksbZ O;fDr fdlh Hkh i{k dh vksj ls i{kdkj cuuk pkgs rks mls bl okn dh lwpuk gsrq fof/k vuqlkj yksd foKkiu ds tfj;s lwfpr fd;k tkuk mfpr gSA 4- mDr okn vkns'k 1 fu;e 8 nh0iz0la0 ds rgr vkuk izdj.k dh bl LVst ij izdV ugha gqvk gSA 5- /kkjk 194@2 jktLFkku uxjikfydk vf/kfu;e] 2009 flfoy U;k;ky;ksa ds {ks=kf/kdkj dk vfHkO;Dr ;k foof{kr :i ls otZu ugha djrh gSA vr% /kkjk 9 nh0iz0la0 ds rgr ;g okn bl U;k;ky; ds Jo.kkf/kdkj dk ik;k x;kA vkns'k vr% oknhx.k@izkFkhZx.k dh vksj ls izLrqr izkFkZuk&i= fnukad 21-12-2013 vUrxZr /kkjk 91 lifBr vkns'k 1 fu;e 8 ,oa /kkjk 151 nhokuh izfdz;k lafgrk dk fuLrkj.k djrs gq;s jkrh rykbZ {ks= ds xjhc@x`gghu yksxksa dh vkoklh; ;kstuk ds yksxksa] oknxzLr Hkw[k.M ds vM+kSl&iM+kSl] eksgYysokfl;ksa rFkk oknxzLr cgqeaftyk Hkou esa Q~ysV~l cqd djokdj vius vewY; /ku dk fuos'k djus okys yksxksa dks U;k; ds mn~ns'; dh iwfrZ gsrq oknhx.k izkFkhZx.k dks izfroknhx.k ds yksd ij izHkko Mkyus okys vU; nks"kiw.kZ dk;ksZa gsrq /kkjk 91 nh0i0la0 lifBr /kkjk 151 nh0iz0la0 ds rgr okni= is'k djus dh vuqefr nh tkrh gSA izdj.k iwoZ ls nhokuh okn uEcj 02@2014 ij ntZ gS] tks mlh uEcj ij ;Fkkor ntZ jgdj lquokbZ dh tk;sA lkFk gh U;k; fgr esa /kkjk 151 nh0ia0la0 ds rgr oknh i{k dks vkns'k fn;k tkrk gS fd bl vkns'k dh fnukad 16-4-2014 ls ,d ekg dh vof/k esa bl okn esa vU; dksbZ O;fDr fdlh Hkh i{k dh vksj ls i{kdkj cuuk pkgs rks mls bl okn dh lwpuk gsrq lekpkj i=ksa] nSfud HkkLdj o jktLFkku if=dk esa bl okn dh lwpuk@yksd foKkiu vius [kpsZ ij izdkf'kr djokdj mDr lekpkj i=ksa dh ewy izfr;ka] fcy oxSjg U;k;ky; esa is'k djsaA lkFk gh oknh i{k lekpkj i=ksa dh ewy izfr;ka] fcy oxSjg U;k;ky; esa is'k djsaA lkFk gh oknh i{k vius Lrj ij mDr yksd foKkiu dh Li"V nf'kZr izfr;ka oknxzLr Hkw[k.M@Hkou ds eksgYys] fudV ds lkoZtfud n'kZuh; LFky ij pLik djokdj muds QksVksxzkQ~l] fcy oxSjg U;k;ky; esa is'k djsaA Sd/- ( f'ko dqekj ) flfoy U;k;k/kh'k ( d0[k0 ) ckxhnkSjk] ftyk&ckalokM+k jktLFkku 17. The intention and the real hidden purpose of these plaintiffs for invoking Section 91 of the C.P.C. and filing the present suit purportedly espousing the public cause, to some extent can be gathered from the notice served by the Plaintiff No. 1, Mr. Sunil Acharya, Advocate upon the petitioner/defendant, two days after the impugned Order on 18.4.2014. The intention and the real hidden purpose of these plaintiffs for invoking Section 91 of the C.P.C. and filing the present suit purportedly espousing the public cause, to some extent can be gathered from the notice served by the Plaintiff No. 1, Mr. Sunil Acharya, Advocate upon the petitioner/defendant, two days after the impugned Order on 18.4.2014. In Para 1 of the said notice, he claims himself to be the champion of public cause for cleansing the society and rid it of the corruption in public life; and in subsequent paras, he narrates the various such complaints and litigations lodged by him at the local level for various lands against, various other persons and the present defendant/petitioner but his real intentions reflect with a thin sheen of his innocence in the following extracted paras in the said notice:- " izkFkhZ us vkt fnukad rd vkils vkids dk;kZy; ls fdlh izdkj dh voS/k ;k oS/k ncko cukdj pkSFk olwyh ugha dh gS u gh vkxs Hkh fdlh Hkh izdkj dk dksbZ bjknk gSA izkFkhZ dk vki }kjk Msoyi dh tk jgh dkWyksuh;ksa esa lLrs nj ij ;k fu%'kqYd fdlh Hkh izdkj dk dksbZ Hkw[k.M ;k Q~ysV u rks pkfg;s ,oa u gh ,slh Hkkouk izkFkhZ j[krk gS ,oa u gh vkils bl laca/k esa dHkh dksbZ okrkZ ;k O;kolkf;d Mhy dh gksA vkidks ;g Hkh Kkr gks fd vki }kjk 'kgj esa vU; LFkkuksa ij Hkh IykWfVax Q~ysV~l fuekZ.k] ekWy vkfn dk dk;Z fd;k tk jgk gS ftldh Lohd`fr;ka i=koyh;ka] dUolZls'ku dh dkWfi;ka bR;kfn izkFkhZ us izkIr dh gSA ftuesa gq, ?kiys] Hkz"Vkpkj vkfn dks mtkxj djuk o vkidks n.M fnykuk izkFkhZ dk uSfrd nkf;Ro o dRrZO; gSA ftlds ihNs fdlh Hkh izdkj ls dksbZ jde ,saBuk ;k CySdeSfyax djuk izkFkhZ dk u rks mn~ns'; Fkk vkSj u gh vkxs dHkh Hkh ,slk jgsxkA vki }kjk fnukad 6-4-2014 dks ykap dh x;h dylZ ysd dkmUVh esa Hkh vkius tks 'kgj dh ouHkwfe ds lkFk tks vU;k; fd;k gS ml lEcU/k esa Hkh izkFkhZ }kjk loksZPp U;k;ky; esa ,d tufgr ;kfpdk nk;j dh tk jgh gS ftlesa Hkh izkFkhZ dk ;g drbZ mn~ns'; ugha gS fd vki vius mDr Lof.kZe ;kstuk esa ls ,d NksVk lk Hkw[k.M Hkh izkFkhZ dks miyC/k djk nsaA izkFkhZ o vkids e/; fdlh Hkh izdkj dk dksbZ lkekftd] jktdh;] O;kolkf;d] futh O;ogkjh] jktuhfrd cdk;k ysu nsu] m/kkjh ugha gS ftls olwy djus ds fy;s nqHkkZouko'k o O;fDRxr ykHk dks izkIr djus ds fy;s vkidks csotg ijs'kku djus ds mn~ns'; ls oknh la[;k 1 us vkids fo:) U;k;ky; esa okn yxk;k gksA 6- ;g fd] tfj;s vkids odhy ds vkids mDr dFku ls izkFkhZ oknh la[;k 1 ekufld] O;ogkfjd] O;kolkf;d o 'kkjhfjd :i ls O;fFkr gks x;k gSA bl uksfVl ds tfj;s vkidks eSa izkFkhZ lwfpr djrk gwa fd vki U;kf;d tokcksa izkFkZuk&i=ksa bR;kfn esa O;fDrxr ykHk o nqHkkZouko'k 'kCn dk mi;ksx djus ls ckt vkosa] D;ksafd vki ,sls 'kCn fy[kdj ekufld o O;kolkf;d :i ls cnuke djus dh dqps"Bk dj jgs gSaA 7- ;g fd] vkids mDr dFku ls izkFkhZ ( oknh la[;k 1 ) U;k;ky; ifjlj esa] vius lkfFk;ksa odhy] fj'rsnkjksa] U;kf;d vf/kdkjh oxZ] U;kf;d deZpkjh oxZ] dk;Zjr lgk;dksa] VkbZfiLVksa] U;kf;d ifjlj esa dk;Z djus okys vU; yksxksa vkfn dh utjksa esa vkids mDr fyf[kr dFkuksa ls izkFkhZ oknh la[;k 1 dh Nfo /kwfey gqbZ gSA mDr lHkh tu izkFkhZ dks ?kwl[kksj] Hkz"Vkpkjh] ykyph] QthZ] lsfVaxckt u tkus fdu fdu miukeksa ls ns[kuk] le>uk o rkus dluk vkjEHk dj fn;k gSA tcfd izkFkhZ oknh la[;k 1 dk ewy mn~ns'; Hkz"Vkpkj eqDr Hkkjr fuekZ.k dk LoIu gS] Fkk o jgsxkA 8- ;g fd] vkids mDr dFku ;g fd ( oknh la[;k 1 ) us izfroknh la[;k 2 ds fo:) blh fo"k; oLrq ls lEcfU/kr vU; okn&i= U;k;ky; esa is'k fd;s gSaA ( oknh la[;k 1 ) us nqHkkZouko'k ,oa O;fDrxr ykHk izkIr djus gsrq ;g okn&i= is'k fd;k gSA vki Jheku ds mDr fyf[kr dFku ls izkFkhZ ( oknh la[;k 1 ) vius lkFk oknh la[;k 2 dh utjksa esa Hkh viuh ekugkfu djok pqdk gSA bruk gh ugha vkids mDr fyf[kr dFku ls izkFkhZ oknh la[;k 1 dh Nfo izfroknh la[;k 1 dh fuxkg esa Hkh lsfVaxckt o CySdeSyj tSlh cu x;h gS ftl dkj.k vkidks mDr fyf[kr dFku ls izkFkhZ oknh la[;k 1 dkQh O;fFkr gSA vr% tfj;s uksfVl vkt fnukad 18-4-2014 dks vki foi{kh Jh mRre dqekj tSu firk Jh ckcqyky tSu] tkfr tSu] vk;q o;Ld] fuoklh edku uEcj 171] jkrhrykbZ] xyh uEcj 6] ckalokM+k 'kgj] rglhy o ftyk ckalokM+k jktLFkku dks lwfpr gks fd izkFkhZ@oknh la[;k 1 tks fd is'ks ls ,d ln~Hkkoh vfHkHkk"kd gSA lkFk gh lekt lsod gSaA vkids mDr fyf[kr dFku ls mldh ekugkfu {ks=Hkj ds vketu esa gqbZ gSA crkSj vfHkHkk"kd ( O;olk; ) izkFkhZ@oknh la[;k 1 :i;s 25]00]000@& iPphl yk[k :i;s viuh O;fDr ekugkfu ds vkadrk gS o izkFkhZ@oknh la[;k 1 dks vkids mDr vU;kf;d fyf[kr dFku ls ekufld vk?kkr igqapk gS vkSj izkFkhZ mPp jDrpki o gzn;?kkr tSlh tkuysok chekjh ls xzflr gks pqdk gSA ftldh HkjikbZ ds fy;s 3]00]000@& rhu yk[k :i;s vkadrk gSA vr% vkt fnukad 18-4-2014 ls vkxkeh 8 fnuksa ds Hkhrj dqy :i;k 28]00]000@& v{kjs vV~BkbZl yk[k :i;s eq> izkFkhZ@oknh la[;k 1 dks mldh gqbZ ekugkfu ds ,sot esa pqdrk dj jlhn izkIr dj ysosa vU;Fkk fo:) vkids l{ke U;k;ky; esa flfoy okn o ekugkfu lEcU/k izkFkfedh l{ke Fkkus esa ntZ djokuh iM+sxhA izkFkhZ ds mDr dne ls ;fn vkidh ekugkfu ;k fdlh Hkh izdkj dk dksbZ O;; gksrk gS rks mldh leLr ftEesnkjh vkidh O;fDrxr gksxhA lks vki vizkFkhZ dks lwfpr gksosA Sd/- vkidk ln~Hkkoh 'kqHksPNq lquhy vkpk;Z ,MoksdsV izkFkhZ@oknh la[;k 1 " 18. From the above extracted portion of the notice for defamation served by Plaintiff No. 1, Mr. Sunil Acharya, Advocate upon the defendant and the tenor of the plaint itself, it is very clear that the Plaintiff No. 1, Mr. Sunil Achar using the Plaintiff No. 2 as his shadow, to complete the number of minimum persons, as required in Section 91(l)(b) of the C.P.C., lodged a tirade of litigation and further intended to threaten him with lot many consequences unless he bows down to his demands, some of which were indirectly indicated in the said no : He conceals his desires to have any commercial deal with defendant for taking flat in the building or a plot of land in another scheme developed by petitioner/defendant. Otherwise why any Advocate himself turned plaint complainant, would use such a language and indicate the uncalled for things his so-called legal notice. But, while doing so he says that in the reply filed to leave application, since the defendant stated that the plaint was filed mala fidely therefore, his reputation was damaged beyond repair, as an Advocate a therefore, he claimed the compensation to the tune of 25 Lacs with specifying as to how a normal reply or pleading filed in the Court against him a: plaintiff caused any damage to his reputation as an Advocate. While this Coin fully convinced that the Plaintiff No. 1, Mr. Sunil Acharya, Advocate, sought abuse the process of Court, plain and simple, for his own corrupt and oblique motives and if at all a practising advocate, he could be deemed to even have little sense of law, he should have first approached the Municipal authority raising his objections against the permission granted for such construction even file a regular Appeal provided for in Section 194(12) of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act of 2009. But, he does not do any of these normal lawful thin but invokes a most serious and guarded provision of the C.P.C. to file presents under Section 91 of the C.P.C., fully knowing that he need not prove or even allege any special damage caused to him or his shadow colleague. 19. But, he does not do any of these normal lawful thin but invokes a most serious and guarded provision of the C.P.C. to file presents under Section 91 of the C.P.C., fully knowing that he need not prove or even allege any special damage caused to him or his shadow colleague. 19. This Court is more so concerned, at the slipshod manner in which the Trial Judge has appreciated the provisions of Section 91 of the C.P.C. and I granted such leave to the plaintiffs for wholly unfounded and erroneous reason The so-called reasons assigned by the learned Trial Judge in the above extract portion of the order clearly indicates that the learned Trial Judge himself was not sure as to whether such leave could be granted to the plaintiffs or not, and while saying on the one hand that no case of "public nuisance" was made out, he easily fell into the trap of leave application of an Advocate turned plaintiff holding that the wrongful act of so-called illegal municipal permission to defendant' having adverse public effect and, therefore, leave is granted, completely forgetting that the statutory authorities in exercise of their statutory powers under; Rajasthan Municipalities Act of 2009, had granted the due permission accordance with law to the defendant/petitioner to raise such construction residential flats on his private land, and it is essentially their duty and obligati to see that the terms of the permission and approval of map are complied with the person, to whom such permission is given and while such permission its could be subject to an Appeal to the higher authorities under the provisions Section 194(12) of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 2009 itself. It is this overreaching and overstepping of limits, while considering the parameters Section 91(b) of the C.P.C. by the learned Trial Judge, which is more the cause of concern for this Court. How could learned Trial Judge even prima-facie, take legally granted permission of construction so raised as wrongful act causing adverse effect to the public. 20. In the present era of litigation, misusing the process of law and Courts so-called R.T.I. activists, social activists, invoking the jurisdiction of High Com under the label of "Public Interest Litigation" and so under Section 91 of the C.P.C. before Civil Courts is not unknown to this Court. 20. In the present era of litigation, misusing the process of law and Courts so-called R.T.I. activists, social activists, invoking the jurisdiction of High Com under the label of "Public Interest Litigation" and so under Section 91 of the C.P.C. before Civil Courts is not unknown to this Court. For curbing and effectively putting down such trend of frivolous public interest litigations, the constitutional Courts have started imposing exemplary costs on such litigants, who have sought to misuse the process of the Courts meant for achieving the ends of justice for poor people who otherwise did not have access to justice upon relaxation the rule of locus-standi, even though-those who are espousing the cause of others, and not to allow such process of Courts open to the persons coming to the Courts with oblique motives and ulterior considerations to settle personal scores. 21. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Kachrulal Bhagirath Agarwal & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., reported in (2005) 9 SCC 36 , in Para 10 dealing with civil remedies for redressal of public nuisance cautioned against the possible misuse of Section 91 of C.P.C. in the following words. " The provisions of Chapter X of the Code should be so worked as not to become themselves a nuisance to the community at large. Although every person is bound to so use his property that it may not work legal damage or harm to his neighbour yet on the other hand, no one has a right to interfere with the free and full enjoyment by such person of his property except on clear and absolute proof that such use of it by him is producing such legal damage or harm. Therefore, a lawful and necessary trade ought not to be interfered with unless it is proved to be injurious to the health or physical comfort of the community." 22. For nipping in bud such frivolous litigation, the Apex Court through justice Krishna Iyer in his inimitable style, spoke in following words in T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal & Anr., reported in AIR 1977 SC 2421 "The pathology of litigative addiction ruins the poor of this country and the Bar has a role to cure this deleterious tendency of parties to launch frivolous and vexatious cases. XXX XXX XXX 5. XXX XXX XXX 5. We have not the slightest hesitation in condemning the petitioner for the gross abuse of the process of the Court repeatedly and unrepentantly resorted to. From the statement of the facts found in the judgment of the High Court, it is perfectly plain that the suit now, pending before the First Munsifs Court, Bangalore, is a flagrant misuse of the mercies of the law in receiving plaints. The learned Munsif must remember that if on a meaningful-not formal-reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious, and meritless, in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, be should exercise his power under Order 7, Rule 11 C.P.C. taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. And, if clever, drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action, nip it in the bud at the first hearing by examining the party searchingly under Order 10 C.P.C. An activist Judge is the answer to irresponsible law suits. The Trial Court should insist imperatively on examining the party at the first hearing so that bogus litigation can be shot down at the earliest stage. The Penal Code (Ch. XI) is also resourceful enough to meet such men, and must be triggered against them. In this case, the learned Judge to his cost realised what George Bernard Shaw remarked on the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi "It is dangerous to be too good." 6. The Trial Court in this case will remind itself of Section 35-A C.P.C. and take deterrent action if it is satisfied that the litigation was inspired by vexatious motives and altogether groundless. In any view, that suit has no survival value and should be disposed of forthwith after giving an immediate hearing to the parties concerned. 7. We regret the infliction of the ordeal upon the learned Judge of the High Court by a callous party. We more than regret the circumstance that the party concerned has been able to prevail upon one lawyer or the other to present to the Court a case which was disingenuous or worse. It may be a valuable contribution to the cause of justice if counsel screen wholly fraudulent and frivolous litigation refusing to be beguiled by dubious clients. And remembering that an Advocate is an Officer of justice he owes it to society not to collaborate in shady actions. It may be a valuable contribution to the cause of justice if counsel screen wholly fraudulent and frivolous litigation refusing to be beguiled by dubious clients. And remembering that an Advocate is an Officer of justice he owes it to society not to collaborate in shady actions. The Bar Council of India, we hope will activate this obligation. We are constrained to make these observations and hope that the cooperation of the Bar will be readily forthcoming to the Bench for spending judicial time on worthwhile disputes and avoiding the distraction of sham litigation such as the one we are disposing of. Another moral of this unrighteous chain litigation is the gullible grant of ex-parte orders tempts gamblers in litigation into easy Courts. A Judge who succumbs to ex-parte pressure in unmerited cases helps devalue the judicial process." 23. This Court in the case of Rajasthan Medicare Relief Society, Bikaner v. Rajesh Gulati & Ors., reported in (2013) 1 RLW 77, in a suit filed under Section 91 of C.P.C., challenging the levy of entry fees in Hospitals, allowed the Second Appeal of defendant, Rajasthan Medicare Relief Society with the following observations, holding that such levy of entry fees could not amount to 'public nuisance under Section 91 of C.P.C. "Section 91 of Civil Procedure Code provides that in the case of a public nuisance or other wrongful act affecting, or likely to affect the public, a suit for a declaration and injunction can be filed by the Advocate General or with the leave of the Court, by two or more persons. The term "Public Nuisance" is further defined in Section 268 of Indian Penal Code that a person is guilty of a public nuisance who does any act or is guilty of an illegal omission which causes any common injury, danger or annoyance to the public or to the people in general who dwell or occupy property in the vicinity, or which must necessarily cause injury, obstruction, danger or annoyance to persons who may have occasion to use any public right. A common nuisance is not excused on the ground that it causes some convenience or advantage. 18. A levy of registration fees from the indoor and outdoor patients in Government Hospitals,firstly, cannot be said to be an act or an illegal omission which causes any common injury. A common nuisance is not excused on the ground that it causes some convenience or advantage. 18. A levy of registration fees from the indoor and outdoor patients in Government Hospitals,firstly, cannot be said to be an act or an illegal omission which causes any common injury. As aforesaid, the levy of fees is to recoup the deficit of the concession provided by the defendant. Society in the diagnostic facilities availed by the patients. Neither the members of the public can be said to dwell or occupy the Government Hospitals nor the levy of such registration fees can be said to be causing any injury or danger or annoyance to the persons, who may have occasion to use any public right. The citizens and patients have a right to visit Government Hospitals for treatment, but their entry can I always be checked and made subject to registration fees or entry fees. 19. Such entry fees and registration fees may be even justified to recoup the administrative or maintenance cost or to avoid frivolous and unnecessary elements to enter such public premises. It may be good for security reasons also. In this context, it may also be observed that these days extra and unnecessary flow of people in the Government Hospitals for allegedly looking after one patient has caused unsavoury incidents like beating up of doctors and nursing staff on various occasions on such visitors perceived notion of lack of care on the part of doctors and nurses. They cannot wait to sue hospital administration for damages or for criminal offence but would take the law in their hands and beat Doctors and Nurses and damage hospital and other public property. While in private hospitals, not more than one or more than two attendants would be allowed that too subject to payment of entry fees, large number of relatives and friends visiting for one patient in Government Hospitals, is the order of the day. Such visitors, whose presence is not really and essentially required there, not only crowd these places unduly and over burden the infrastructure but several practical problems arise in the administration of the Government Hospitals and that's why the poor sanitation condition and cleanliness in such Government Hospitals, has even become causes to be driven to the Courts of law in Public Interest Litigations. In the context of these kind of situations. In the context of these kind of situations. The imposition of nominal registration fees from indoor and outdoor patients and even visitors for regulating entry, cannot be held to be unjustified, unreasonable or illegal levy, much less a public nuisance requiring redressal at the hands of the Courts of law." 24. Another Bench of this Court in the case of Anil Kumar Shrivastava v. Mukesh Chand Saxena & Ors., reported in 2014(2) WLC (Raj.) 404, relying upon i another case of this Court held that suit under Section 91 C.P.C. cannot be id to settle personal scores with the defendant. The relevant extract is quoted rein below:- "13. From a bare perusal of the above provisions it is abundantly clear that a person who seeks remedy for an alleged public wrong may approach the Advocate General to initiate proper legal proceeding or may himself pursue appropriate legal proceedings with the leave of the Court. The respondent has not sought any leave of the Court prior to the institution of the suit as may lated by Section 91 of the C.P.C. As such the suit is hit by Section 91 of the C.P.C. This Court in Kanti & Ors. v. U.I.T. Bikaner & Ors., RLW 1988 (1) Raj. 536, held as under:- "12. There is no manner of doubt from the averments made in the plaint and also from the evidence adduced from the side of plaintiff-Respondent No. 3 that the present suit was filed for removal of public nuisance created by way of wrongful act of defendant-appellants' predecessor in possession, affecting the public way, therefore, in the case on hand, it does not involve determination of any right independent under sub-section (2) of Section 91 of C.P.C. In such a situation it is held that plaintiff-Respondent No. 3 was not entitled to file the suit on his own and he ought to have invoked the assistance of Advocate-General so that either he ought to have filed the suit himself or ought to have given permission to two or more persons aggrieved to bring the suit for removal of public nuisance affecting the public way. 13 to 16........... 17. 13 to 16........... 17. Be that as it may, in the present case, precise question would be who is the true owner of the land in dispute and secondly who can file a suit for recovery of possession or in the alternatively for mandatory and perpetual injunction against a person in possession. It is admitted by plaintiff-Respondent No. 3 as well as by defendant-Respondents No. 1 and 2 that defendant-appellant is in possession over the disputed land. The factum of admitted possession of defendant-appellants is evident from the averments made in the plaint as well as from the written statements of defendant-Respondents No. 1 and 2. Exclusive possession of defendant-appellants is also established from the depositions made by PW-1 and PW-2 and from the statements on oath from DW-1 to DW-4." 14. The instant case is squarely covered by the legal proposition enshrined in the above judgment. The plaintiff does not claim himself to be the owner of the plot or emided to allotment of such plot. He himself has not sought recovery of possession but demands that the allotment be cancelled and possession be delivered to the Urban Development Trust. By the suit averments, it is amply clear that he is agitating an alleged wrongful act affecting public. The suit does not involve determination of his independent/personal right and hence it was mandatory for him to comply with the provisions of Section 91 C.P.C. The plaintiff has neither sought leave of the Court under Order 1, Rule 8 C.P.C. 15. Failure on part of the plaintiff to comply with the mandatory requirements of law renders his suit to be barred by law and from the suit averments it also emerges that the plaint does not disclose cause of action. From the application under Order 7, Rule 11 an interesting fact has also emerged that the plaintiff is brother in-law (Sister's husband) of the defendant revisionist and there are other litigations pending in between the two. This fact is not denied before this Court also. In such fact situation it appears that the plaintiff in the garb of agitating public right is trying to settle personal scores with the defendant revisionist. The suit is a device to achieve such purpose and as such is also liable to be rejected under the inherent powers of the Court under Section 151 C.P.C." 25. In such fact situation it appears that the plaintiff in the garb of agitating public right is trying to settle personal scores with the defendant revisionist. The suit is a device to achieve such purpose and as such is also liable to be rejected under the inherent powers of the Court under Section 151 C.P.C." 25. Thus, it is well settled that the suit under Section 91 of C.P.C. cannot personal cause allowed to be espoused under the garb of a public cause. In c present case, it is clearly a case of gross abuse of law by an officer of Court. Advocate to wreak personal and vengeance, and he filed the presents, on wholly unfounded premises. 26. Plaintiff No. 1, Mr. Sunil Acharya, Advocate is a practising lawyer Banswara Courts, and therefore, is supposed to know the basic provisions oft but the tenor of his plaint and notice subsequently served upon the petitioner/defendant, as extracted above, clearly reflects this kind of legal acumen, but the purpose and the motive for which present suit was filed by him along with plaintiff No. 2, specially after the building having been completed under the due mission given by the Municipal Council, can only be said to be ulterior purpose d uncalled for suit under Section 91 of C.P.C. Even if he was to be believed for a moment to be a person espousing the rightful cause to eradicate the corruption, as claimed by him, he could not be permitted to shoot arrows in the dark against 1 and sundry and that is what has been done by him in the present case, respective of the fact that the construction was completed with the due mission from the Competent Authority under the Municipal law. This Court raid not have taken such a serious view against the plaintiff, had the subsequent notice served after two days of the leave granted by the petitioner had not been given by him to the defendant, in which discreetly he disclosed his true tours and intentions. This clearly indicates that with what motive he might have pursued the trial against the defendant/petitioner and the Municipal authorities, if such leave of Trial Court was to be sustained by this Court and the trial was allowed to be carried on, by dismissing the present Revision Petition of the petitioner/defendant. 27. This clearly indicates that with what motive he might have pursued the trial against the defendant/petitioner and the Municipal authorities, if such leave of Trial Court was to be sustained by this Court and the trial was allowed to be carried on, by dismissing the present Revision Petition of the petitioner/defendant. 27. This Court is fully satisfied that the plaintiffs/respondents in the present case had approached the Trial Court with oblique and ulterior motive against the defendant and without following the due procedure in law, a practising lawyer of lanswara, himself became a litigant in the present suit as Plaintiff No. 1, this itself in the opinion of this Court, has demanded the high standards of this pious Lid noble legal profession in the eyes of this Court. 28. This brings this Court to the conclusive part of this order and the directions which deserve to be issued in this case. (1) The present Revision Petition filed by the petitioner/defendant deserves to be allowed, and the same is, accordingly, allowed and the impugned Order dated 16.4.2014 passed by learned Trial Court of Civil Judge (Junior Division), Bagidaura, District Banswara, granting leave to the plaintiffs under Section 91 of the Civil Procedure Code, is quashed and set aside. (2) The Suit No. 2/2014 Sunil Acharya and Sonu Harijan v. Uttam Kumar Jain and Municipal Council, Banswara is dismissed as not maintainable under Section 91 of the Civil Procedure Code. (3) An exemplary cost of Rs. 50,000/- is imposed on the plaintiffs/ respondents for abuse of process of Court to be deposited by them in learned Trial Court within a period of one month from today, failing which they will under go simple imprisonment of one month and the Trial Court will report such non-compliance to the Secretary of the Bar Council of Rajasthan. Upon the costs being deposited by the plaintiffs-respondents, half of it will be made over to the local Bar Association of Banswara and remaining half will be paid to the petitioner/defendant. (4) The Bar Council of Rajasthan its Disciplinary Committee, should initiate enquiry against the Plaintiff No. 1, Mr. Sunil Acharya, Advocate of Banswara for his aforesaid misconduct and submit its report to this Court within a period of one year from today. (4) The Bar Council of Rajasthan its Disciplinary Committee, should initiate enquiry against the Plaintiff No. 1, Mr. Sunil Acharya, Advocate of Banswara for his aforesaid misconduct and submit its report to this Court within a period of one year from today. (5) A copy of this order be sent to the District Judge, Banswara, for his perusal and for giving the needful advisory to the concerned Presiding Officer (Mr. Shiv Kumar) A copy of this order be sent to the concerned parties, the Secretary, B; Council of Rajasthan and the Trial Court below forthwith. Revision allowed. *******