JUDGMENT : P. K. Lohra, J. Petitioner-plaintiff has laid this writ petition to challenge impugned order dated 3rd of October, 2015 passed by learned Additional District Judge No. 2, Hanumangarh (for short, learned-appellate Court'), whereby learned appellate Court has reversed order dated 11th of September, 2015 passed by Civil Judge, Pilibanga, District Hanumangarh (for short, 'learned trial Court') granting temporary injunction in favour of petitioner-plaintiff in a suit for partition. 2. Bare necessary facts of the case are that petitioner-plaintiff filed a suit for partition of property and perpetual injunction against respondent and some other defendants. It is averred in the plaint that Teluram father of petitioner and other co-owners Sohan Lal and Charandas purchased the suit property by a registered sale-deed dated 17th of February, 1967 and since then the said property is in joint occupation of all the three co-sharers. Alleging overt act on the part of respondent - defendant, the petitioner has averred in the plaint that respondent has made an attempt to grab the entire land just to deprive him from his share in the property and that has necessitated filing of suit for partition as well as permanent injunction. In final relief, the petitioner-plaintiff has claimed ½th share in the suit property and a partition by metes and bounds of the entire property. Along with the plaint, application under Order 39 Rules 1 & 2 CPC is also laid by the petitioner. The learned trial Court, after hearing rival parties, considered the matter threadbare and taking into account the fact that property was jointly owned by the ancestors of the rival parties and as it has not been partitioned, it is desirable that its position may not be altered without lawful partition. Finally, the Court has found that there is strong prima facie case in favour of petitioner-plaintiff. The learned trial Court has also considered the other two ingredients necessary for grant of temporary injunction and found that petitioner has been able to prove balance of convenience in his favour and further if temporary injunction is not granted, he will suffer irreparable loss. The learned trial Court has also considered the other two ingredients necessary for grant of temporary injunction and found that petitioner has been able to prove balance of convenience in his favour and further if temporary injunction is not granted, he will suffer irreparable loss. In that background, while allowing the application for temporary injunction, learned trial Court has passed following order: ^^ifj.kker% izkFkhZ v'kksd dqekj dh vksj ls izLrqr izkFkZuk&i= vLFkk;h fu"ks/kkKk vkns'k 39 fu;e 1 o 2 lh0ih0lh0 fo:) vizkFkhZ iou dqekj Lohdkj dj ,rn~}kjk vizkFkhZ dks rkQSlyk ewy okn bl vk'k; dh vLFkk;h fu"ks/kkKk ls oftZr fd;k tkrk gS fd og izkFkZuk&i= vLFkk;h fu"ks/kkKk esa of.kZr fookfnr Hkw[k.M ftldk vklk&iklk o uki 80x120 oxZQqV gS] ds fdlh Hkkx o va'k ij fof/klEer foHkktu gksus rd dksbZ fuekZ.k vFkok uofuekZ.k ugha djs ,oa izkFkhZ ds la;qDr LokfeRo ds fookfnr Hkw[k.M ds mi;ksx&miHkksx esa dksbZ ck/kk dkfjr ugha djsA^^ 3. Feeling aggrieved by the order of learned trial Court, respondent-defendant preferred an appeal and the learned appellate Court by the order impugned has reversed the order passed by learned trial Court. The learned appellate Court has examined the findings on prima facie case in an absolutely casual and cursory manner. Interestingly, the appellate Court has also recorded a very unusual finding that respondent has been able to prove prima facie case in his favour. In all no finding is recorded by the appellate Court for reversing the finding of learned trial court on that particular aspect of the matter. As regards other two ingredients i.e. balance of convenience & irreparable loss, learned appellate Court has decided these issues in an absolutely casual and cavalier manner. 4. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the impugned order. 5. Legal position is no more res-integra that in the matter of grant or refusal of temporary injunction, the court of first instance is having full discretion to decide the matter. If the court of first instance comes to the conclusion that there is prima facie case and other two ingredients are available for grant of temporary injunction, it may grant temporary injunction, and in the other eventuality, may refuse to grant temporary injunction. Finding of learned trial court on temporary injunction is assailable before the appellate court but the appellate court, while exercising its powers, is required to act with great care and circumspection. Finding of learned trial court on temporary injunction is assailable before the appellate court but the appellate court, while exercising its powers, is required to act with great care and circumspection. Order on temporary injunction is not to be interfered with in a routine manner unless and until it is noticed by the appellate court that the impugned order is perverse or contrary to the sound legal principles governing the province of grant of temporary injunction. This Court in authoritative pronouncement in case of Smt. Vimla Devi v. Jang Bahadur (1977 RLW 326) examining the powers of appellate Court threadbare has observed: 10. I have given my earnest consideration to the contentions raised on behalf of the defendant- petitioner. The order refusing temporary injunction is of a discretionary character. Ordinarily Court of appeal will not interfere with the exercise of discretion passed by the trial Court and substitute for it its own discretion. The interference with the discretionary order, however, may be justified if the lower Court acts arbitrarily or perversely, capriciously or in disregard of sound legal principles or without considering all the relevant records. 11. In the light of the above observations, I have now to see whether it was open to the learned District Judge to interfere with the order of the learned trial Court. It is well settled that the grant of temporary injunction is a discretionary order and the decision of the first Court could not be easily interfered with by the appellate Court vide Musa v. Badri Prasad, ILR (1953) 3 Raj 257. The mere possibility of the appellate Court coming to a different conclusion on the same facts and evidence will also not justify interference vide Wazir Sundar Singh v. Mst. Farida Khanam, AIR 1920 PC 132 . Another well established principle while disposing of the application under 0. 39, Rules. 1 and 2, C.RC. is that when the Court while dealing with the case for grant of temporary injunction decides the question of prima facie case, it should apply its judicial mind to the materials which are placed on the record and if it does not do so then it commits illegality in the exercise of jurisdiction and in that case the High Court is competent to interfere in revision in such a case vide Musa v. Badri Prasad (supra). The view taken in Musa v. Badri Prasad (supra) has been followed by Kan Singh J. in Girdhari Lal v. Mahadevi Sharma, AIR 1958 Raj 237 . It has been held in this case that the appellate Court should be slow in upsetting a decision of a trial Court in a matter relating to grant of temporary injunction unless the decision of the trial Court is arbitrary, perverse or is not based on sound legal principles. It has been further observed in that case that when the appellate Court does not apply its judicial mind on all the materials brought on the record then in that case the approach of an Appellate Court would be wrong and contrary to the well established principles laid down by the High Court, more so when the appellate Court does not deal with the reasoning that has prevailed with the trial Court and further when it does not apply its judicial mind on the materials placed on the record. 6. In Wander Ltd. & Anr. v. Antox India Pvt. Ltd. [1990 (Suppl.) SCC 727], Hon'ble Apex Court, while examining the powers of the appellate Court to interfere in case of interlocutory injunction, which is discretionary in character, has held: 14. The appeals before the Division Bench were against the exercise of discretion by the Single Judge. In such appeals, the Appellate Court will not interfere with the exercise of discretion of the court of first instance and substitute its own discretion except where the discretion has been shown to have been exercised arbitrarily, or capriciously or perversely or where the court had ignored the settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions. An appeal against exercise of discretion is said to be an appeal on principle. Appellate Court will not reassess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the court below if the one reached by the court was reasonably possible on the material. The appellate court would normally not be justified in interfering with the exercise of discretion under appeal solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial stage it would have come to a contrary conclusion. The appellate court would normally not be justified in interfering with the exercise of discretion under appeal solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial stage it would have come to a contrary conclusion. If the discretion has been exercised by the Trial Court reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact that the appellate court would have taken a different view may not justify interference with the trial court's exercise of discretion. After referring to these principles Gajendragadkar, J. in Printers (Mysore) Private Ltd. v. Pothan Joseph : (SCR721) ..... These principles are well established, but as has been observed by Viscount Simon in Charles Osention & Co. v. Johnston the law as to the reversal by a court of appeal of an order made by a judge below in the exercise of his discretion is well established, and any difficulty that arises is due only to the application of well settled principles in an individual case. The appellate judgement does not seem to defer to this principle. 7. In totality, in my considered opinion, the learned appellate Court has overstepped its jurisdiction in reversing the discretionary order passed by learned trial court. It is may also be noticed here that in a suit for partition of immovable property, normal practise is to preserve the property as it is, so that at the time of final decision of the suit it may not result in complication and multiplicity of proceedings. Therefore, in my opinion, the discretion, which was legally exercised by the trial court has wrongly been upset by the appellate Court while passing the impugned order and allowing the appeal. Appellate Court has, therefore, exercised its jurisdiction without appreciating the lis involved in the matter and as such impugned order cannot be sustained. 8. Resultantly, the petition is allowed. Impugned order dated 3rd of October, 2015 passed by the appellate Court is quashed and set aside and the order of temporary injunction granted by the learned trial Court is restored. 9. Looking to nature of the suit, it is expected of the learned trial Court to proceed with trial of the case as expeditiously as possible and decide it at the earliest. No order as to costs. Writ Petition Allowed.