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2015 DIGILAW 1931 (RAJ)

Suresh Chand Pandey v. The State of Rajasthan

2015-11-23

AJIT SINGH, ANUPINDER SINGH GREWAL

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JUDGMENT 1. - The appellant has challenged the judgment of the Single Bench dated 03.08.2015 whereby his writ petition challenging the orders of imposition of penalty has been dismissed. 2. The appellant was appointed as Stenographer on 22.11.1983 and posted at Bhim. On his request he was transferred to Jaipur Judgeship. On 13.04.2010, the appellant was posted as Stenographer in the Court of Civil Judge (Senior Division) and Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kotputli, District Jaipur. He had been granted voluntary retirement vide order dated 21.07.2012. In the writ petition, he had challenged the orders dated 16.09.2010 and 12.01.2012 whereby he was censured and imposed penalty of stoppage of one grade increment without cumulative effect respectively. 3. Learned counsel for the appellant has contended that the Single Bench has erroneously dismissed the writ petition on the ground of delay even though he had promptly challenged the orders after his voluntary retirement from service. Earlier he had preferred revision before the High Court on administrative side challenging the orders imposing penalty and he had waited for considerable period and when no action had been taken thereon, he had preferred the instant petition. In support of his submission, he has placed reliance upon the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the cases of M/s Tilokchand Motichand and others v. H.B. Munshi, Commissioner of Sales Tax, Bombay and another, AIR 1970 SC 898 , and Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. and another v. Dolly Das- (1999)4 SCC 450 . 4. We have heard learned counsel for the appellant. 5. It deserves to be noticed that the appellant had preferred the writ petition on 07.05.2015 while challenging the orders passed in the years 2010 and 2012. The appellant had voluntarily retired on 21.07.2012. The appellant had, thus, challenged the impugned orders after having voluntarily retired from service. There is no satisfactory explanation which has been put forth about the delay in preferring the writ petition. The mere fact of filing revision or pendency thereof cannot be a sufficient cause to explain the delay in filing the petition. In case the appellant was serious in challenging the impugned orders, he should have filed the writ petition during his service and not have waited till his retirement. 6. The judgments cited by the learned counsel for the appellant are distinguishable on facts and not applicable to the instant case. 7. In case the appellant was serious in challenging the impugned orders, he should have filed the writ petition during his service and not have waited till his retirement. 6. The judgments cited by the learned counsel for the appellant are distinguishable on facts and not applicable to the instant case. 7. The judgment in the case of M/s Tilokchand Motichand (supra) pertains to the scope of the petition preferred before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. Although it was held that mere delay should not defeat the fundamental rights, it was also held that each case will have to be considered on its own facts. It was further held that the aggrieved party must approach the court at the earliest possible time and explain satisfactorily all semblance of delay. 8. In the case of Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. and another (supra), the question which had arisen for adjudication was renewal of lease of land with a service station standing thereon. The lease had been in operation for over 20 years and the appellant therein had sought further renewal of the lease vide letter dated 13.09.1989 and challenged the lease of renewal by preferring the writ petition in 1993. The Hon'ble Supreme Court did not accept the plea of delay as the same had not been raised before the High Court. 9. Therefore, the appellant cannot derive any benefit from the ratio of these judgments. As already noticed herein above, the appellant has preferred the petition three to five years of the passing of the impugned orders and after having voluntarily retired from service. 10. We cannot lose sight of the settled law that the court does not help the slumberer and the lethargic. Those who are not vigilant about their rights and fail to raise their grievance or assail the order at appropriate time are not entitled to any relief which would be barred by delay and laches. The legal maxim vigilantibus et non dormientibus jura subveniunt, which means that equity aids only the vigilant and not the ones who sleep over their rights would be fully applicable to the appellants. The legal maxim vigilantibus et non dormientibus jura subveniunt, which means that equity aids only the vigilant and not the ones who sleep over their rights would be fully applicable to the appellants. Although there is no prescribed period of limitation for approaching this court by preferring writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India yet those agitating stale claims or attempting to unsettle the settled position deserve to be ousted at the very threshold. Therefore, the writ petition had been rightly dismissed by the Single Bench on the ground of delay itself. 11. In view of above, we do not find any infirmity in the judgment of the Single Bench warranting interference in special appeal.In the result, the appeal is dismissed.Appeal Dismissed. *******