JUDGMENT : 1. In this writ application, the common order dated 21.04.1998 passed by the learned 2nd Addl. District Judge, Cuttack in Civil Revision Nos. 105 of 1995 and 112 of 1995 are under challenge. 2. By the impugned order dated 21.04.1998, the revisional court when has allowed Civil Revision NO.1 05 of 1995, has dismissed Civil Revision No. 112 of 1995 and has passed an order for abatement of the suit in respect of the properties of Mouzas-Baharana and Olas modifying the order dated 20.07.1995 passed by the Civil Judge (Senior Division) 2M Court, Cuttack in T.S. NO.96 of 1973 holding the suit to have abated in respect of the properties situated in Mouza-Baharana only and keeping it alive for the properties of mouza-Olas. 3. Facts necessary for the purpose are as under: The Opp.party no. 2 as the plaintiff filed the suit against the petitioners-defendants and others for partition. The following pedigree table will be helpful for understanding the facts of the case: Bhagaban Das Kelu Bhima Arjuna Ankura = Keli(W) Babaji (plaintiff as claimed by him) = Keli(W) Babaji (As asserted by the defendants) The dispute centers rounds the fact that when the plaintiff claims to be the son of Kelu through Keli, the defendants claim that the plaintiff is the son of Arjuna through Keli, who had married Arjuna after the death of Kelu. So, the dispute is not on the point that the plaintiff is a member of family but it is with regard to his sonship be of Kelu or Arjuna which has impact over the allotment of share that if the plaintiff would be held to be the son of Kalu through Keli then he would be getting 1/4th share and if it is held the other way accepting the case of defendants, then there would be substantial reduction in his share. 4. The trial court decreed the suit on 27.10..76 holding the plaintiff to be the son of Kelu through Keli and allotted him 1/4th share that is the whole interest of Kelu over the properties declining the claim of the defendants as regards plaintiff's entitlement to 1/6th share. The judgment and decree were assailed in First Appeal No. 18 of 1977 before this Court. The judgment and decree were assailed in First Appeal No. 18 of 1977 before this Court. By judgment dated 11.04.1990, this Court remanded the matter for fresh adjudication giving necessary observations to set at rest the above controversy by taking into consideration some vital documents which were found to have remained unconsidered. When the matters stood thus the Mousas were brought under Consolidation operation by due notification under section 3(1) of the OCH & PFL Act, 1972. So the application was filed by the plaintiff under Section 4(4) of OCH & PFL Act for abatement of the suit, which was resisted by the petitioner. The trial court by order dated 20.07.1995 held the suit to have abated, so far as the land under mouza Baharana is concerned. Therefore two revisions were preferred and the revisional court passed order of abatement of the suit in entirety for the suit land both in Mouza-Olas and Baharana. Hence, the present writ applications. 5. It is pertinent to state here that subsequent to filing of the writ applications, the plaintiff filed an application in the trial court under Order 23, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure that he abandoned his claim in respect of the properties in Mouza-Purbakhanda and he having prayed for withdrawal of the suit to that extent in part, the same has been allowed. So the suit continues for the properties in Mouza-Olas and Baharana. One more development in the meanwhile which is required to be taken note of is that by notification dated 04.01.2011 under section 5( 1) of the Act as placed at the Bar, the State Govt. cancelled the earlier notification dated 23.12.1993 under section 3(1) of the Act so far as the land under Mouza-Olas is concerned. 6. The points now emerge out for consideration are the followings: (i) When the suit for partition and determination of share of the parties depends upon the status of the plaintiff as to whether he is the son of Keli through Kelu or through Arjuna, whether the Consolidation Authorities have the jurisdiction to decide the dispute and it would be justified in directing abatement of the suit? (ii) In view of the subsequent notification dated 04.01.2011 under section 5(1) of the Act when the mouza Olas has ceased to be under the consolidation operation and the Civil Court has assumed the jurisdiction to try the suit and determine the status of the plaintiff to decide his share in Mouza-Olas; whether the suit in respect of properties in Mouza-Baharana, shall only abate and it will be left open for the consolidation authorities to decide the same issue or not? 7. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the legislative intention is in conformity with the well recognized principle that two forums for the same reliefs should not deal with the matter as that would give rise to inconsistent consequences. When the special statute does not provide adequate remedy, which the Civil Court can grant the settled position of law is that jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not ousted by necessary implication. Thus, he submits that it would not justified in the eye of law to leave the matter in controversy to be decided by the Consolidation Authorities so far as the land in Mouza-Baharana is concerned when the Civil Court would be deciding the dispute concerning the other Mouzaalas in view of the fact that the subject matter of controversy remains the same as already stated in the forgoing para. He next contends that in view of the nature of controversy and the issue to be answered on the rival case of the parties i.e. the sonship of the plaintiff which concerns with his status, the consolidation authorities lacks the jurisdiction to decide the question. According to him, the case in hand is not the one where the status of the plaintiff is required to be gone into as ancillary or incidental to the main issue but here that itself is the main issue. Thus, comes his final round of submission that the suit is not to abate under Section 4(4) of the Act. He has placed reliance on the decision of this Court in 'Pranabandhu @ Panu Ojha vrs. Bhikari Maharana @ Ojha, 57 (1984) CLT 65. 8. Learned counsel for the opp. parties contends with vehemence in support of the order of the revisional court. He has placed reliance on the decision of this Court in 'Pranabandhu @ Panu Ojha vrs. Bhikari Maharana @ Ojha, 57 (1984) CLT 65. 8. Learned counsel for the opp. parties contends with vehemence in support of the order of the revisional court. According to him, the legal position is well settled that a suit for partition necessarily abates when the area where the subject matters of the suit situate comes under the notification under Section 3(1) of the Act for Consolidation operation. 9. Section 4(4) of the Act provides that every suit or proceeding for declaration of any right or interest in any land situate within the consolidation area in regard to which proceeding could be or ought to be started under the Act, which is pending before any Civil Court whether of the first instance' or appeal, reference or revision shall on an order being passed in that behalf by the Court before which such suit for proceedin3 stand abated. 9. Coming to the first submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner and in order to address the same as well as the written note of submission, I begin with a shocking note that in support of the contention when strong reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner in case of Pranabandhu alias Panu Ojha (supra) same stands directly overruled in case of Jairam Samantray v. Baikuntha Samantaray and others, 70 (1990) CLT 439. While expressing deep concern over the matter, I refrain from further elaboration as regards the same. However, this Court puts a stop to it here with a hope that this should no more recur. In view of above, I do not feel any necessity to refer to the said overruled decision. There is no dispute over the proposition that the Consolidation Authorities are not conferred with the power of adjudication in deciding the status of a party. Yet while deciding the question of right, title and interest in land in the consolidation area, the same can be decided as ancillary and incidental thereto if the decision on the question of right, title and interest on the land is dependent and based on the question of status. At this stage, it would be profitable to refer to that Division Bench decision of this Court in case of Jairam Samantray (supra). "... At this stage, it would be profitable to refer to that Division Bench decision of this Court in case of Jairam Samantray (supra). "... Having regard to the objects and the purpose of the enactment and the unambiguous words of wide amplitude, it is not open to constrict the field of operation by any pre-conceived notions. Questions relating to right, title, interest and liability in any land are to be decided by the consolidation authorities except those which can be decided only by the Civil Court and are, therefore, out of bounds to them. I n deciding questions of right, title and interest and liability' in land, questions land issues relatable thereto arise for decision. The decisions on the question of right, title, interest and liability depend and hinge on the decision on the connected questions, the questions which have to be decided ancillary and incidentally. Sometimes, in order to secure the relief the suitor has to clear hurdles and impediments standing on the way. Those hurdles may be judgment or order of the Court or a document. So long as the hurdles stand on the way, grant of relief is not possible and permissible. It has to be removed. The Civil Court alone has jurisdiction to set aside judgment or order or a document of transfer. A distinction has been drawn between documents of transfer which are void land those which are voidable. Void documents or transactions being ab initio void, they are nonest and, therefore, can be ignored. They being not-existent are not really hurdles on the way. But documents, transactions, judgments or orders, which are not void ab initio, are to be avoided. The jurisdiction to set aside such documents, transactions, judgments or decrees which are voidable and need avoidance, vests in the Civil Court but not in the consolidation authorities. The questions which do not necessitate interpretation of the Civil Court for the removal of the obstacle and can be ancillary and incidentally decided land on the resolution of which would depend the decision as to right, title, interest and liability in law, are within the jurisdiction of the consolidation authorities. Seeking a declaration simpliciter as to legal character as contemplated by Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Civil Court and not within the competence of the consolidation authorities. Seeking a declaration simpliciter as to legal character as contemplated by Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Civil Court and not within the competence of the consolidation authorities. Except in case where title is claimed on the basis of transactions inter vivos in most cases title is claimed on the basis of relationship, say as son, father, mother, husband or wife etc. each such question of relationship is a question pertaining to legal character or status. Don't the consolidation authorities decide such question of legal character in cases after cases day in and day out? If then the consolidation authorities have jurisdiction to decide the question as to whether a person is son by birth, by what logic or law are they denied jurisdiction to decide if a person is son by way of adoption? Sonship is acquired either by birth or by way of adoption. They are the different modes of acquisition. If title to property as son by birth can be adjudicated upon by the consolidation authorities, we fail to understand why adjudication of claim to title as son by way of adoption should be out of bounds to them. We are, therefore, of the view that the statement of law that the consolidation authorities have no jurisdiction to decide the question of adoption, that being a question of status, is not correct. In almost every case, consolidation authorities are deciding the question of status but a declaration of the law to the effect that the consolidation authorities have no jurisdiction to decide the question of adoption, if such question arises ancillary or incidentally for adjudication of right, title and interest in property, is insupportable. The same decision has been followed in case of Basanta Kumar Sahu v. Bhikari Charan Sahu and ors, 1995(1) OLR 516 as also in case of Panchei Bewa v. Iswar Chandra Sahu, 1996(1) OLR 17 and also recently in the case of Sri Bhakta Prasad Sahu vrs. Additional Commissioner and others; 2014 (II) OLR 1008 . 10. The same decision has been followed in case of Basanta Kumar Sahu v. Bhikari Charan Sahu and ors, 1995(1) OLR 516 as also in case of Panchei Bewa v. Iswar Chandra Sahu, 1996(1) OLR 17 and also recently in the case of Sri Bhakta Prasad Sahu vrs. Additional Commissioner and others; 2014 (II) OLR 1008 . 10. Adverting to the instant case, let me first quote the gist of the submission as given in the written note:- "So far as the present case concerned on a close scrutiny of the pleadings of the parties as well as the order of remand passed by this Hon'ble Court a clear conclusion can be drawn that the pivotal issue to be decided in the present case is the status of the plaintiff as to whether the plaintiff is the son of Keli through Kelu or through Arjuna and the share of the plaintiff is dependent upon the decision on the said issue. Therefore, the status of the plaintiff being the main issue for consideration, the consolidation authorities lacks the jurisdiction to decide the question Ordinarily in a suit for partition the legal heirship and status of the parties becomes relevant to decide their inheritance to the joint family property and in those cases the status .of the parties being ancillary and incidental to be gone into, the consolidation authorities have jurisdiction to decide such question. But the facts of the present case is quite different and it is also very much clear from the order of the remanding Court that the status of the plaintiff is the main question for determination and the suit for partition is dependent upon the adjudication of the status of the plaintiff. Therefore the consolidation authorities have no jurisdiction to decide the status and the civil court is only competent to decide such question. REF: 57 (1984) CLT 65 (Para 5 & 6)" On a plain reading of the above, I think that this entire submission rests on the principle set out in the case of Pranabandhu alias Panu Ojha (supra). The same needs no further answer by this Court in view of the fact that it has long since been overruled by the Division Bench which has been time and again cited. A few of which had already been quoted. 12. The same needs no further answer by this Court in view of the fact that it has long since been overruled by the Division Bench which has been time and again cited. A few of which had already been quoted. 12. There is no quarrel over the proposition that the consolidation authorities have the power to effect partition and looking to the scheme and provisions of the Act, if it is said that said power does not remain with the authorities, the purpose of scheme would be frustrated. In fact the Act gives power to the Consolidation Authorities to effect partition of a joint family property on application of any party. Section 51 of the Act ousts the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in all matters which an officer or authority empowered under this Act is competent to decide. So, in order to effect said partition, this issue as regards the sonship of Babaji would stand to be decided incidentally. Such a view is wholly inconsonance with the ratio of the decision in case of Jairam (supra). Therefore, the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner has to be turned down, firstly being based on an overruled decision and secondly being meritless. 13. Now this Court is faced a peculiar situation which was not there before the trial court as also before the revisional court. Earlier situations have been addressed by this Court where if there are two relief claimed in the suit and one fails with the domain of the consolidation authorities and the grant of other relief remains with the Civil Court, which is dependant on the grant of first one, then the suit has been stayed awaiting of the decision of the consolidation authorities and thereafter the suit has been jirected to be disposed of accordingly so far as the relief coming within its power and competence. This court in the case of Netrananda Behera v. Khetrabasi Behera, 2010 (II) OLR 379 ; Prafulla Kumar Behera v. Mangalu Samat; 1990(1) OLR 511, Budhi Dei v. Kalu Muduli and others, 1991 (II) OLR 158 and in case of Sadhu Charan Das v. Sri Raghaba Mallik and others; 1987 (I) OLR 403 have chalked out said proper course. In case of Budhi Dei vrs. In case of Budhi Dei vrs. Kalu Muduli and others, 1991 (I) OLR 158 where the suit being for partition and permanent injunction, the above course has also been directed to be carried out. Following the above and in the interest of justice, while quashing the orders of the courts below, it is directed that the T.S. No. 96 of 1973 shall remain stayed so far as the subject matter of the property of Olas is concerned till the decision of the Consolidation Authorities comes effecting the partition with regard to the properties of mouza Baharana. The suit thereafter with the subject matter of properties of Olas would be decided by the Civil Court as per law taking into consideration the finding of the Consolidation Authority. . 14. The Commissioner, consolidation and the Director, Consolidation are hereby directed to make necessary arrangements for early disposal of the competing claims of the parties and decision in the matter of the prayer for partition in respect of the property of the mouza Baharana in accordance with law and transmit the decision to the court of learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Second Court, Cuttack for further progress of the suit in respect of residue subject matter for its disposal as per law. 15. Accordingly, both the writ applications are disposed of. No order as to costs. Application dismissed.