JUDGMENT 1. - This petition under Articles 226 & 227 of Constitution of India at the behest of petitioner-defendant is laid to assail the impugned order dated 25.08.2015 passed by Additional District & Sessions Judge No. 1 Bhilwara (for short 'the learned court below") whereby learned court below has rejected the application of the petitioner under Order 8, Rule 1A (3) CPC. Besides that, the conjoint prayer of the petitioner under Order 13, Rule 10 CPC in the application is also not entertained by learned court below with the observation that if need be, the record of earlier decided case may be summoned by the court at the time of final arguments. 2. The facts apposite for the purpose of this petition are that respondent-plaintiff instituted a suit for partition, possession and rendition of accounts in respect of immovable property measuring 40" x 60" situated at Laxmi Narain Mandir Road, Bhilwara pleading specifically therein that the said property is joint Hindu Family Property of late Shri Kanhaiyalal having three sons and two daughters namely Shri Ram Prasad, Shri Madanlal, Shri Prem Narain, Smt. Jasoda Bai and Smt. Sohan Bai respectively. It is also averred in the plaint that Shri Ram Prasad expired in the year 1993 leaving behind his descendants who were arrayed as defendant Nos. 1 to 9 in the suit. The suit is contested by the petitioner and written statement was filed on his behalf on 23.10.2002 with specific plea that in addition to the suit property, several other properties were purchased by the income of Joint Hindu Family and details thereof were also mentioned in paragraph-5 of the written statement. That apart, some other facts are also incorporated in the written statement and factum of execution of Release Deed and Will in favour of respondent-plaintiff were also repudiated. Besides the petitioner, other defendants also filed their written statement separately. 3. In the written statement, the petitioner has not only contested the claim of the respondent-plaintiff but has also laid a counter claim. The counter claim aforesaid is replied by the respondent-plaintiff. Thereafter on the basis of pleadings of rival parties, learned court below initially settled six issues for determination on 28.08.2004. Later on, learned court below framed additional issue No. 5A on 12.04.2006, No. 5B on 18.01.2010 and No. 5C on 21.11.2014. The counter claim aforesaid is replied by the respondent-plaintiff. Thereafter on the basis of pleadings of rival parties, learned court below initially settled six issues for determination on 28.08.2004. Later on, learned court below framed additional issue No. 5A on 12.04.2006, No. 5B on 18.01.2010 and No. 5C on 21.11.2014. In order to substantiate his case, the respondent-plaintiff examined seven witnesses and his evidence was concluded on 22.04.2011 and the matter was thereafter posted for evidence of the defendants on 23.05.2011. In the : interregnum, defendant No. 13 Smt. Sohan Bai breathed last and, therefore, her legal representatives were brought on record by order dated 03.04.2012. Be that as it may, the petitioners evidence was completed on 10.04.2014 and the matter was posted for evidence of plaintiff's rebuttal on 22.04.2015. As no evidence was tendered by the respondent-plaintiff in rebuttal, his evidence was closed and the matter was posted for final arguments on 28.04.2015. When the evidence of the rival parties was going on, the petitioner submitted certified copies of earlier plaint No. 20/1977 (12/1973) filed by Shri Madanlal, father of the plaintiff against Shri Ram Prasad father of petitioner, written statement and judgement dated 31.05.1980 as well as judgement dated 12.09.2001 passed by this Court in first appeal. Although these documents were tendered in evidence by the petitioner but statements of Shri Madanlal which were recorded in the aforesaid suit were not produced by the petitioner and, therefore, at his instance, an endeavour was made to place on record statement of Shri Madanlal and further prayer was made to send for the record of earlier aforementioned suit. Therefore, for craving twin reliefs, the petitioner submitted an application under Order 8, Rule 1A (3) as well as Order 13, Rule 10 CPC. in his application, the petitioner has averred that certified copy of plaint in suit No. 20/1977 and written statement are available on record but statements of Madanlal are not on record. Therefore, the court may send for the record of case No. 20/1977 and take on record certified copy of statement of Madanlal recorded in the aforesaid suit. The petitioner has also craved in the application that sending for the record of the case and taking certified copy of statement of Madanlal on record is necessary for just decision of additional issue No. 5C. In support of the argument, affidavit of the petitioner is also tendered. 4. The petitioner has also craved in the application that sending for the record of the case and taking certified copy of statement of Madanlal on record is necessary for just decision of additional issue No. 5C. In support of the argument, affidavit of the petitioner is also tendered. 4. The respondent-plaintiff contested the application and submitted his detailed reply. In the reply, it is submitted that endeavour made by the petitioner earlier by submitting an application for summoning of record of suit No. 20/1977 was not entertained by the court and, therefore, now the petitioner cannot be permitted to re-agitate the same issue. It is also stated in the reply that statements of Madanlal recorded in the earlier suit were within knowledge of the petitioner but he has not produced those statements at the earlier point of time. Therefore, at such a belated stage, when the matter is posted for final arguments, such a prayer cannot be countenanced and merits rejection. It is also pleaded in the reply that after framing of issues, twice the petitioner has made endeavour to place on record additional documents but for the statements of Madanlal and, therefore, the application filed by the petitioner in this behalf is mala fide just to prolong the proceedings. Taking dig at the conduct of the petitioner and doubting his bona fide, the respondent- plaintiff has also pleaded in the return that at the fag end of the trial such application is not tenable. A further attempt is made by the respondent-plaintiff to resist the prayer by urging that when the 40 petitioner has produced copy of plaint of the earlier suit, written statement as well as judgement why he has not produced statements of Madanlal is a very relevant consideration which creates doubt about bona fides of the petitioner. 5. After considering the rival arguments, learned court below by its impugned order declined the prayer of the petitioner under Order 8, Rule 45 1-A(3) and left the prayer under Order 13, Rule 10 CPC at its own discretion. 6. Mr. Jagdish Vyas, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that statements of Madanlal are very much relevant and necessary for adjudication of issue No. 5A and 5C and, therefore, learned court below has committed grave and serious jurisdictional error in declining the prayer of the so petitioner. Mr. 6. Mr. Jagdish Vyas, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that statements of Madanlal are very much relevant and necessary for adjudication of issue No. 5A and 5C and, therefore, learned court below has committed grave and serious jurisdictional error in declining the prayer of the so petitioner. Mr. Vyas, learned counsel would contend that the legislature in its wisdom has engrafted provision like Order 8, Rule 1A (3) CPC to farther the interest of justice at any stage of the proceedings in the suit but this vital aspect has been completely overlooked by learned court below while declining the prayer of the petitioner. Mr. Vyas has strenuously urged that endeavour of the petitioner is only to place on record certified copy of statements of Madanlal in earlier suit and no further evidence is required to be tendered on his behalf was a relevant consideration which ought to have been taken into consideration by learned court below while examining the application of the petitioner. Lastly, Mr. Vyas has urged that even the alternative prayer of the petitioner under Order 13, Rule 10 CPC has not been acceded to by learned court below is sufficient to vitiate the impugned order. 7. Per contra, Mr. Bheem Arora, learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiff submits that suit filed by the respondent-plaintiff is languishing since 2002 and it has been prolonged by the petitioner by submitting applications after applications, therefore, no interference with the impugned order is warranted. Mr. Arora submits that whole endeavour of the petitioner is to re-open the case in the guise of submitting additional document in the form of statement of Madanlal in previous suit which cannot be countenanced within the four corners of Order 8, Rule 1A (3) CPC. While referring to the averments contained in the application of the petitioner (Annex.6), learned counsel for the respondent would contend that petitioner : has craved leave of the court for production of document to facilitate effective decision of additional issue No. 5C and admittedly on the touchstone of additional issue No. 5C, these submissions are of no relevance. Elaborating his submissions in this behalf, Mr. Arora would urge that additional issue No. 5C is for consideration of impact of the decision in suit No. 20/1977 in the present suit and for which copy of judgement of earlier suit is already on record, and, therefore, the order impugned warrants no interference. Elaborating his submissions in this behalf, Mr. Arora would urge that additional issue No. 5C is for consideration of impact of the decision in suit No. 20/1977 in the present suit and for which copy of judgement of earlier suit is already on record, and, therefore, the order impugned warrants no interference. Lastly, Mr. Arora has vehemently argued that petitioner's whole attempt is to prolong the proceedings of suit which is at the fag end and, therefore, no induglence can be granted to the petitioner under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. In support of his contention, Mr. Arora has placed reliance on a decision of this Court in Smt. Kusum Babbar v. Addl. District Judge (FT) No. 1, Jaipur & Ors., 2013 WLC (Raj.) UC 258. The learned Single Judge of this Court in this verdict while considering the order rejecting the application under Order 8, Rule 1 - A(3) CPC made it clear that powers under the aforesaid provision are discretionary and not to be exercised in routine manner. The Court has further declined to interfere with the discretionary order of the court below. The Court held,- "7. In my considered opinion, the leave of the court under Order 8, Rule 1 -A (3) CPC is discretionary and the discretion has to be exercised on the 40 facts and circumstances obtaining in the case. Routine grant of leave under Order 8, Rule 1A (3) CPC is not countenanced in law. In my considered opinion, in the facts of the case no reason was/ is set up by the defendant for belated filing the photographs in the year 2012 pertaining to the disputed property for which the suit was filed in the year 2005. Aside of aforesaid, as found by the trial court and submitted by counsel for the plaintiff there was no material before the trial court to hold that the photographs in issue related to property in dispute. Neither date nor time of taking of the said photographs for that matter or the name and signature of the Photographer was appended on the photographs. It so is also not disputed that said photographs were sought to be produced subsequent to closure of evidence of plaintiff and at the time of commencement of evidence of the defendant. Neither date nor time of taking of the said photographs for that matter or the name and signature of the Photographer was appended on the photographs. It so is also not disputed that said photographs were sought to be produced subsequent to closure of evidence of plaintiff and at the time of commencement of evidence of the defendant. The dominant purpose of Order 8, Rule 1A CPC and requirement of filing of document along with the pleadings of parties is to expedite adjudication of the dispute and have acrystalised dispute before the trial court at the earliest and cannot be overlooked by taking an overtly liberal view of the provision of Order 8, Rule 1A (3) CPC. The discretion of the trial court as evident in the impugned order cannot be overturned by this court merely being the superior court. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Subodh Kumar Gupta v. Alpana Gupta [ (2005) 11 SCC 578 ] has held that discretionary orders of the trial court in the course of proceeding of a case ought not to be interfered with where such orders are supported by good grounds and reasons. This situation obtains in the present case." 8. Mr. Arora has also placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in Sameer Suresh Gupta v. Rahul Kumar Agarwal, (2013) 9 SCC 374 wherein parameters for exercise of power of this Court under Article 227 are emphasised and principles laid down in this behalf by earlier decision are reiterated. Reiterating the principles laid down in Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil, 2010(2) WLC (SC) Civil 457 : (2010) 8 SCC 329 , the Court held,- "(a) A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is different from a petition under Article 227. The mode of exercise of power by the High Court under these two articles is also different. (b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 cannot be called a writ petition. The history of the conferment of writ jurisdiction on High Courts is substantially different from the history of conferment of the power of superintendence on the High Courts under Article 227 and have been discussed above. (c) High Courts cannot, at the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the orders of tribunals or courts inferior to it. (c) High Courts cannot, at the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the orders of tribunals or courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a court of appeal over the orders of the court or tribunal subordinate to it. In cases where an alternative statutory mode of redressal has been provided, that would also operate as a restrain on the exercise of this power by the High Court. (d) The parameters of interference by High Courts in exercise of their power of superintendence have been repeatedly laid down by this Court. In this regard the High Court must be guided by the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh and the principles in Waryam Singh have been repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and various other decisions of this Court. (e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh, followed in subsequent cases, the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence can interfere in order only to keep the tribunals and courts subordinate to it, 'within the bounds of their authority'. (f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such tribunals and courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and by not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them. (g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f), High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of tribunals and courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. (h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the tribunals or Courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised. (i) The High Court's power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. It has been declared a part of the basic structure of the Constitution by the Constitution Bench of this Court in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India and therefore abridgement by a constitutional amendment is also very doubtful. (i) The High Court's power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. It has been declared a part of the basic structure of the Constitution by the Constitution Bench of this Court in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India and therefore abridgement by a constitutional amendment is also very doubtful. (j) It may be true that a statutory amendment of a rather cognate provision, like Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999 does not and cannot cut down the ambit of High Court's power under Article 227. At the same time, it must be remembered that such statutory amendment does not correspondingly expand the High Court's jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227. (k) The power is discretionary and has to be exercised on equitable principle. In an appropriate case, the power can be exercised suo motu. (l) On a proper appreciation of the wide and unfettered power of the High Court under Article 227, it transpires that the main object of this Article is to keep strict administrative and judicial control by the High Court on the administration of justice within its territory. (m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under this article is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and courts subordinate to High Court. (n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in the administration of justice in the larger public interest whereas Article 226 is meant for protection of individual grievance. Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out above. (o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counter productive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality." 9. Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out above. (o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counter productive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality." 9. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the impugned order and available materials. 10. The first and foremost consideration in the instant case is the stage of the pending suit when application (Annex.6) is laid by the petitioner. As per petitioners own admission, the application was filed when the suit was posted for final arguments. As a matter of fact, the proceedings in the suit are going on for final arguments since 28.04.2015 and application (Annex.6) was submitted by the petitioner on 07.08.2015. There remains no quarrel that suit is pending since 2002 and the statements of Madanlal which were recorded in the earlier suit No. 20/1977 are sought to be produced by the petitioner at the fag end of the trial whereas those statements were recorded anterior to 1980. The earlier suit No. 20/1977 was finally decided in the year 1980 and the said judgement is also affirmed by this Court as early as on 12.09.2001 i.e. before institution of the present suit. When the petitioner has considered relevance of the earlier suit insofar as lis involved in the present suit is concerned, he has placed on record copy of plaint, written statement as well as judgement. In such a situation, it is unthinkable as to why, he has not made endeavour to place on record the statements of Madanlal, if at all in his opinion, those statements were relevant having ramification on the issues involved in the present suit. 11. The Legislature in its wisdom has engrafted provision like Order 8, Rule 1A (3) CPC to give some latitude to the defendant to produce document at the later stage of the trial but then such alatitude cannot be claimed by a litigant as a matter of right. It is absolutely within discretion of the court to allow a defendant to produce some documents at the later stage of the proceedings of the suit if the court thinks that there were genuine reasons available with the defendant for not producing the document within time. It is absolutely within discretion of the court to allow a defendant to produce some documents at the later stage of the proceedings of the suit if the court thinks that there were genuine reasons available with the defendant for not producing the document within time. If the facts of the instant case are examined threadbare, then it would ipso facto reveal that petitioner has already made endeavour earlier to place on record certain other documents at the later stage of the suit but at that point of time, he has not craved leave of the court for producing statements of Madanlal. This sort of action oh the part of petitioner pre-supposes that his bona fides are under cloud and the learned court below has rightly observed that he is trying to prolong the proceedings in the matter. 12. One more redeeming fact is that earlier suit was decided in the year 1980 and appeal against the said judgement was also decided by this Court in the year 2001. Therefore, in these circumstances, the cause for non-production of statements of Madanlal within time by the petitioner, more particularly when he has produced the pleadings and judgement of the earlier suit appears to be illusory. In totality, in the considered opinion of this Court, the discretion exercised by learned court below in declining leave to the petitioner under Order 8, Rule 1 A(3) CPC cannot be categorised as infirm or dehors the law warranting interference in the limited scope of judicial review under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. In that background, if the application (Annex.6) submitted by the petitioner is examined threadbare, then it would ipso facto reveal that application is conspicuously silent for belated filing of the statements of Madanlal. While considering the prayer of the petitioner, learned court below has examined the matter thoroughly and after discussing the legal precedents and the conduct of petitioner in submitting the documents in piece-meal has exercised its discretion judiciously to decline the prayer of the petitioner which requires no interference. 13. It is trite that supervisory jurisdiction of this Court is to be exercised with great care and circumspection and the same is not akin to that of appellate jurisdiction. Any discretionary order passed by learned court below is not liable to be upset by this Court while exercising its supervisory jurisdiction even if other view is possible. 13. It is trite that supervisory jurisdiction of this Court is to be exercised with great care and circumspection and the same is not akin to that of appellate jurisdiction. Any discretionary order passed by learned court below is not liable to be upset by this Court while exercising its supervisory jurisdiction even if other view is possible. There is apparently no reason to infer that learned court below has committed any procedural irregularity or has acted in dereliction of its duty or the impugned order has resulted in miscarriage of justice. 14. Therefore, viewed from any angle, I am not persuaded to interfere with the impugned order. 15. Resultantly, the petition fails and the same is hereby dismissed.Writ Petition Dismissed. *******