JUDGMENT : Hon'ble Vipin Sinha,J. Heard learned A.G.A. for the appellant and learned counsel for the respondent. The present is an appeal arising out of judgement and order dated 07.03.1986 passed by Special Judge, Deoria in Criminal Case No. 85 of 1984 by means of which the accused-respondents Chandrma and Ramji have been acquitted for the charges punishable under Section 3/7 of E.C. Act. As per office report, during the pendency of the appeal before this Court, respondent no. 2 Ramji has already expired and, therefore, the appeal against respondent no. 2 was abated by order of this Court dated 13.07.2015. The case of the prosecution is as under: "A Mini Bus bearing registration no. U.P. Z 6361, driven by accused Chandrama, was apprehended on 26.11.1983 around 5 a.m. while it was carrying 60 bags of rice allegedly to Bihar State. It is contended that as the required levy was not paid on it and, therefore, the accused Ramji, who is said to be the owner of the rice in question, has contravened Clause 3 of the U.P. Rice and Paddy (Levy and Regulation of Trade) order 1981, while the accused Chandrama has abetted the said offence punishable under Section 8 of E.C. Act." Thus, at the very outset, it is clear that the main accused Ramji, who is said to be the owner of the alleged rice in question, has already expired. As far as Chandrama is concerned, he has been assigned the role of abetting only. A perusal of the record shows that the defence has taken a specific plea, which is to the following effect: "The accused persons have admitted that their truck was intercepted on the alleged date, time and place and that 60 bags of rice was loaded on it. It is also admitted that the rice was taken to the Bihar State but it was levy paid. The next contention of the accused persons is that the rice belonged to 8 different persons who has purchased the same from M/s. Sanjay Trader, Ismailpur, Gorakhpur, who are commission agents of the food grains. It is also admitted that the rice was taken to the Bihar State but it was levy paid. The next contention of the accused persons is that the rice belonged to 8 different persons who has purchased the same from M/s. Sanjay Trader, Ismailpur, Gorakhpur, who are commission agents of the food grains. The rice was Mandi tax paid and levy paid and that the documents were shown to the police but they torn it away and falsely challenged the accused persons." The Court below had categorically observed that the accused persons had filed the duplicates of those receipts at the time of disposal of bail application which are on record and have been seen by him in Court. The Court has also recorded a finding that: "The receipt also mentions that the rice sold to the aforesaid 8 persons was Mandi tax paid and levy paid. There is nothing substantial against it from the side of the prosecution which may show that the accused persons have taken up a false case". It has been further recorded by the court below that: "I feel that it was not for the purchaser to lead evidence that the rice was levy paid, because as observed above they were not required to pay levy. If the prosecution contends that the rice was being taken to Bihar without payment of levy on it, they should have produced proprietor of the firm or they would have summoned the documents from that firm but no such step has been taken in this case." In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstance, it cannot be said that the view or stand taken by the Court below is not possible or is not a probable view and thus this Court finds no good ground for interference with the impugned judgement acquitting the accused-respondent. Learned A.G.A. has not been able to point out any illegality or perversity with the findings as recorded by the court below and thus it cannot be said that the view taken by Trial Court is a perverse view. Regard may also be had to the consistent legal position with regard to the scope and interference by the High Court in the judgement and order of acquittal. The Apex Court in the case of Murlidhar @ Gidda & Anr. Vs. Regard may also be had to the consistent legal position with regard to the scope and interference by the High Court in the judgement and order of acquittal. The Apex Court in the case of Murlidhar @ Gidda & Anr. Vs. State of Karnataka decided on 09.04.2014 in Criminal Appeal No. 791 of 2011 has observed as under: "The Supreme Court started by citing Lord Russell in Sheo Swarup highlighted the approach of the High Court as an appellate court hearing the appeal against acquittal. Lord Russell said,....."the High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as: (1) The views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses; (2) The presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial; (3) The right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt; and (4) The slowness of an appellate court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses." The opinion of the Lord Russell has been followed over the years. 11. As early as in 1952, this Court in Surajpal Singh[2] while dealing with the powers of the High Court in an appeal against acquittal under Section 417 of the Criminal Procedure Code observed, "..........the High Court has full power to review the evidence upon which the order of acquittal was founded, but it is equally well settled that the presumption of innocence of the accused is further reinforced by his acquittal by the trial court, and the findings of the trial court which had the advantage of seeing the witnesses and hearing their evidence can be reversed only for very substantial and compelling reasons." 12. The approach of the appellate court in the appeal against acquittal has been dealt with by this Court in Tulsiram Kanu[3], Madan Mohan Singh[4], Atley[5] , Aher Raja Khima[6], Balbir Singh[7], M.G. Agarwal[8], Noor Khan[9], Khedu Mohton[10], Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade[11], Lekha Yadav[12], Khem Karan[13], Bishan Singh[14], Umedbhai Jadavbhai[15], K. Gopal Reddy[16], Tota Singh[17], Ram Kumar[18], Madan Lal[19], Sambasivan[20], Bhagwan Singh[21], Harijana Thirupala[22], C. Antony[23], K. Gopalakrishna[24], Sanjay Thakran[25] and Chandrappa[26]. It is not necessary to deal with these cases individually. It is not necessary to deal with these cases individually. Suffice it to say that this Court has consistently held that in dealing with appeals against acquittal, the appellate court must bear in mind the following: (i) There is presumption of innocence in favour of an accused person and such presumption is strengthened by the order of acquittal passed in his favour by the trial court, (ii) The accused person is entitled to the benefit of reasonable doubt when it deals with the merit of the appeal against acquittal, (iii) Though, the power of the appellate court in considering the appeals against acquittal are as extensive as its powers in appeals against convictions but the appellate court is generally loath in disturbing the finding of fact recorded by the trial court. It is so because the trial court had an advantage of seeing the demeanor of the witnesses. If the trial court takes a reasonable view of the facts of the case, interference by the appellate court with the judgment of acquittal is not justified. Unless, the conclusions reached by the trial court are palpably wrong or based on erroneous view of the law or if such conclusions are allowed to stand, they are likely to result in grave injustice, the reluctance on the part of the appellate court in interfering with such conclusions is fully justified, and (iv) Merely because the appellate court on re-appreciation and re-evaluation of the evidence is inclined to take a different view, interference with the judgment of acquittal is not justified if the view taken by the trial court is a possible view. The evenly balanced views of the evidence must not result in the interference by the appellate court in the judgment of the trial court. Reference may also be made to the case of Basappa Vs. State of Karnataka decided on 27.02.2014 passed in Criminal Appeal No. 512 of 2014, wherein the Apex Court has observed as under: "8. The High Court in an appeal under Section 378 of Cr.PC is entitled to reappraise the evidence and conclusions drawn by the trial court, but the same is permissible only if the judgment of the trial court is perverse, as held by this Court in Gamini Bala Koteswara Rao and Others v. State of Andhra Pradesh through Secretary[1]. To quote: "14. To quote: "14. We have considered the arguments advanced and heard the matter at great length. It is true, as contended by Mr Rao, that interference in an appeal against an acquittal recorded by the trial court should be rare and in exceptional circumstances. It is, however, well settled by now that it is open to the High Court to reappraise the evidence and conclusions drawn by the trial court but only in a case when the judgment of the trial court is stated to be perverse. The word "perverse" in terms as understood in law has been defined to mean "against the weight of evidence". We have to see accordingly as to whether the judgment of the trial court which has been found perverse by the High Court was in fact so." (Emphasis supplied) 9. It is also not the case of the prosecution that the judgment of the trial court is based on no material or that it suffered from any legal infirmity in the sense that there was non-consideration or misappreciation of the evidence on record. Only in such circumstances, reversal of the acquittal by the High Court would be justified. In K. Prakashan v. P.K. Surenderan[2], it has also been affirmed by this Court that the appellate court should not reverse the acquittal merely because another view is possible on the evidence. In T. Subramanian v. State of Tamil Nadu[3], it has further been held by this Court that if two views are reasonably possible on the very same evidence, it cannot be said that the prosecution has proved the case beyond reasonable doubt. 10. In Bhim Singh v. State of Haryana[4], it has been clarified that interference by the appellate court against an order of acquittal would be justified only if the view taken by the trial court is one which no reasonable person would in the given circumstances, take. 11. In Kallu alias Masih and others v. State of Madhya Pradesh[5], it has been held by this Court that if the view taken by the trial court is a plausible view, the High Court will not be justified in reversing it merely because a different view is possible. To quote: "8. While deciding an appeal against acquittal, the power of the appellate court is no less than the power exercised while hearing appeals against conviction. To quote: "8. While deciding an appeal against acquittal, the power of the appellate court is no less than the power exercised while hearing appeals against conviction. In both types of appeals, the power exists to review the entire evidence. However, one significant difference is that an order of acquittal will not be interfered with, by an appellate court, where the judgment of the trial court is based on evidence and the view taken is reasonable and plausible. It will not reverse the decision of the trial court merely because a different view is possible. The appellate court will also bear in mind that there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused and the accused is entitled to get the benefit of any doubt. Further, if it decides to interfere, it should assign reasons for differing with the decision of the trial court." (Emphasis supplied) 12. In Ramesh Babulal Doshi v. State of Gujarat[6], this Court has taken the view that while considering the appeal against acquittal, the appellate court is first required to seek an answer to the question whether the findings of the trial court are palpably wrong, manifestly erroneous or demonstrably unsustainable and if the court answers the above question in negative, the acquittal cannot be disturbed. 14. The exercise of power under Section 378 of Cr.PC by the court is to prevent failure of justice or miscarriage of justice. There is miscarriage of justice if an innocent person is convicted; but there is failure of justice if the guilty is let scot-free. As cautioned by this Court in State of Punjab v. Karnail Singh[8]: "6. There is no embargo on the appellate court reviewing the evidence upon which an order of acquittal is based. Generally, the order of acquittal shall not be interfered with because the presumption of innocence of the accused is further strengthened by acquittal. The golden thread which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. The paramount consideration of the court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is prevented. The paramount consideration of the court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is prevented. A miscarriage of justice which may arise from acquittal of the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent. In a case where admissible evidence is ignored, a duty is cast upon the appellate court to reappreciate the evidence even where the accused has been acquitted, for the purpose of ascertaining as to whether any of the accused committed any offence or not. ..." Last but not the least, reference may also be made to the recent judgement of Supreme Court in the case of Ashok Rai Vs. State of U.P. & Ors. decided on 15.04.2014 in Criminal Appeal No. 1508 of 2005. " 8. Several Judgments of this court have been cited on the principles which should guide the court while dealing with an appeal against order of acquittal. The law is so well settled that it is not necessary to refer to those judgments. Suffice it to say that the appellate court has to be very cautious while reversing an order of acquittal because order of acquittal strengthens the presumption of innocence of the accused. If the view taken by the trial court is a reasonably possible view it should not be disturbed, because the appellate court feels that some other view is also possible. A perverse order of acquittal replete with gross errors of facts and law will have to be set aside to prevent miscarriage of justice, because just as the court has to give due weight to the presumption of innocence and see that innocent person is not sentenced, it is equally the duty of the court to see that the guilty do not escape punishment. Unless the appellate court finds the order of acquittal to be clearly unreasonable and is convinced that there are substantial and compelling reasons to interfere with it, it should not interfere with it." Thus, in view of aforesaid consistent legal position as elaborated above and also in view of the fact that learned A.G.A. has failed to point out any illegality or perversity with the findings so recorded in the impugned order/judgement, no case for interference has been made out. It is an establish position of law that if the court below has taken a view which is a possible and probable view in a reasonable manner, then the same shall not be interfered with and that too when a period of more than 32 years has already elapsed, the incident being of 26.11.1983. Thus, on a bare perusal of the judgement and order dated 07.03.1986, it cannot be said that the view taken by the trial court is not a possible view or a feasible view that could be taken by a reasonable person. Moreover as no illegality or perversity has been pointed out, this Court refuses to grant any indulgence whatsoever to the appellant-State. The court has considered the entire evidence and the document on record and the reasoning given by the trial court for acquitting the accused and the relevant case law has also been considered. In the considered opinion of this Court, the trial court has carefully scrutinized the entire evidence and documents on record and has arrived at a correct conclusion and the judgement of the trial court is in accordance with settled principles of law, which crystallizes from a series of decisions. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstance of the case, the appeal is dismissed. Consequences to follow. Let a copy of this order be certified to the court concerned. ———————