JUDGMENT 1. - Assailing the legality and validity of the office order dated 27th May, 2005, terminating his employment; the petitioner has instituted the instant writ application praying for the following relief(s):- "(i) The order dated 27.5.2005, passed by the respondent No.3 may kindly be quashed and set aside and the respondent corporation be directed to reinstate the petitioner in service with all consequential benefits. The Respondent corporation be further directed that after reinstating the services of the petitioner, he may be declared regular on the post of driver-cum-conductor and give the benefits of the regular pay scale from the date of his entitlement; (ii) Any other order which this Hon'ble Court deems fit in the facts and circumstances of the case may also be passed in favour of the petitioner, (iii) Cost of writ petition may also be awarded in favour of the petitioner." 2. Briefly, the essential skeletal material facts necessary for adjudication of the controversy involved herein are that the petitioner, applied for consideration of his candidature in response to the advertisement bearing number 201/2004-2005, issued by the Deputy General Manager (Administration), Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation (for short 'respondent-Corporation'). On being successful he was appointed on the post of Driver-cum-Conductor and joined his duties on 11th May, 2005. The offer of appointment contemplated his engagement on contract basis vide order dated 11th May, 2005, upto 30th June, 2005. While the petitioner was on duty on the bus of the respondent-Corporation bearing Registration Number RJ-14-26M- 9231; on Jaipur to Alwar route; the vehicle got involved into an accident. As a consequence, two persons, who were riding on a motorcycle died. The employment of the petitioner was put to an end immediately vide impugned order dated 27th May, 2005, for the accident aforesaid while he was driving the bus of the respondent-Corporation on 21st May, 2005. 3. Learned counsel, Mr. Sunil Kumar Singodiya, for the petitioner, reiterating the pleaded facts and grounds of the writ application, emphatically argued that the order terminating the employment of the petitioner is illegal, arbitrary and cannot be sustained being in violation of the principles of natural justice. 3. Learned counsel, Mr. Sunil Kumar Singodiya, for the petitioner, reiterating the pleaded facts and grounds of the writ application, emphatically argued that the order terminating the employment of the petitioner is illegal, arbitrary and cannot be sustained being in violation of the principles of natural justice. Learned counsel further submits that even in the criminal case, which was registered for the same accident; the petitioner has been acquitted and a copy of the judgment and order delivered by the Court of Judicial Magistrate, Jaipur District, Jaipur, dated 23rd July, 2011, has also been placed on record. 4. It is further asserted that the services of the petitioner have been terminated without conducting any inquiry and in gross violation of the principles of natural justice. According to the learned counsel, the impugned order terminating the employment of the petitioner is stigmatic in nature and in fact for it has been passed as a measure of penalty for the alleged accident wherein the petitioner has been acquitted after a full-flagged trial by the competent court of law, and therefore, the action of the respondent-Corporation is bad on that count as well. In support of his submissions, reliance has been placed on the opinion of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Ramraj Gurjar v. Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation & Ors.: 2008 WLC (Raj.) UC 485 , Hari Kishan v. RSRTC & Anr.: S.B. Civil Writ Petition Number 5378 of 2010; decided on 18th July, 2011 , and in the case of Jagdish Prasad Rulaniya v. RSRTC & Ors.: S.B. Civil Writ Petition Number 4624 of 2008; decided on 15th May, 2015 . 5. In response to the notice of the writ application, the respondent-Corporation has filed its counter-affidavit raising preliminary objections for the petitioner's engagement was purely on contract basis for a limited period. It is further pleaded that the services of the petitioner have been terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions stipulated in the offer of appointment. Moreover, the petitioner, who joined duty on 11th May, 2005, by his negligent driving involved the bus of the respondent-Corporation in an accident wherein two persons died and due to the said misconduct committed by the petitioner his services were terminated putting the contract to an end. 6. Moreover, the petitioner, who joined duty on 11th May, 2005, by his negligent driving involved the bus of the respondent-Corporation in an accident wherein two persons died and due to the said misconduct committed by the petitioner his services were terminated putting the contract to an end. 6. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-Corporation, reiterating the stand in the counter affidavit while supporting the impugned order dated 27th May, 2005; emphatically argued that the case at hand is of a category where the services of the petitioner have been terminated by an order strictly as per the terms and conditions of the offer of appointment. 7. It is further contended that a bare perusal of the impugned order dated 27th May, 2005, would reveal that it is an order terminating the employment of the petitioner simpliciter and cannot be construed to be stigmatic. 8. Learned counsel would further submit that if there is a violation of the terms and conditions of the contract, the petitioner ought to have availed of the remedy before the appropriate Forum. Hence, an alternative remedy being available to the petitioner, the writ petition deserves to be dismissed on that count as well. In support of his submissions, reliance has been placed on the opinion in the case of State Bank of India & Ors. v. S.N. Goyal: JT 2008 (6) SC 398 , Mangal Singh v. The Chairman, National Research Development Corporation & Ors.: Writ Petition (Civil) Number 2553 of 2007; decided on 10th August, 2009 , by the Delhi High Court, and Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation & Ors. v. Zakir Hussain: (2005) 7 SCC 447 . 9. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and with their assistance, perused the materials available on record as well as gave my thoughtful consideration to the rival submissions at Bar. 10. The arguments advanced on behalf of the respondent-Corporation that the impugned order is not a stigmatic order and has been issued without attributing any fault to the petitioner, is prima facie misconceived and misleading so much so that in the counter affidavit, the respondent-Corporation has specifically pleaded that the petitioner joined his duty on 11th May, 2005, and due to his negligent driving, on 21st May, 2005, the Corporation's bus was involved in an accident wherein two persons died and due to said misconduct committed, the petitioner's services were terminated. That apart, a glance of the impugned order dated 27th May, 2005, would reveal that it is not only stigmatic, but has been passed in flagrant violation of the cardinal principles of natural justice. A Division Bench of this Court while examining somewhat similar controversy in the case of Ramraj Gurjar (supra), held thus:- "4. We are persuaded to refer to the brief order of the Supreme Court in the case of Hari Ram Maurya v. Union of India and others (2006) 9 SCC 167 , wherein the Supreme Court held thus:- "From the order of termination Annexure P-7, it appears that the same refers to the show cause notice dated 20.8.2002 which is to be found at Annexure P-5. It is stated therein that the appellant demanded kickback with a view to help the complaint to get a favourable order in the pension matter. That being so, there was a clear charge of bribery levelled against the appellant. No doubt, the appellant was a temporary employee, but if he is sought to be removed on the ground that he was guilty of the charge of bribery, it becomes necessary for the respondent Union of India to hold an inquiry and thereafter to act in accordance with law. In this case, admittedly, no inquiry was conducted, and that is obvious even from Annexure P- 7, the latter described as disengagement of casual labour. We, therefore, allow this appeal and set aside the order of the High Court as also the order of termination Annexure P-& dated 30.9.2002. This, however, will not prevent the respondents from taking action in accordance with law." 5. We find no hesitation in holding that the observations made by the Supreme Court in the case of Hari Ram Maurya apply to the fact situation of the present case and that renders the order dated 17th February, 2007 terminating the petitioner's service bad in law. 6. An alternative remedy available to a litigant is not an absolute bar for invocation of High prerogative writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. More so, the Constitution does not hesitate in invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction where an order passed by the State or its functionary or an agency or instrumentality of the State is found to be in utter disregard and flagrant violation of principles of natural justice. More so, the Constitution does not hesitate in invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction where an order passed by the State or its functionary or an agency or instrumentality of the State is found to be in utter disregard and flagrant violation of principles of natural justice. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, therefore, if the petitioner did not avail of the mechanism provided by the Industrial Disputes Act by raising an industrial dispute with regard to his termination, in our view, it cannot be held to have dis entitled the petitioner from invoking extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court. The Single Judge failed to appreciate and consider peculiar fact situation of the case, particularly, that the order of termination dated 17th February, 2007 has been passed without holding any enquiry and on its face that order appears to be not in accord with law." 11. In the case of Ramraj Gurjar (supra), he was appointed as Driver-cum-Conductor for a period from 30th September, 2005 to 31st December, 2005; purely on temporary on terms and conditions detailed out in the office order dated 30th September, 2005. His services were continued and extended from time to time. Further, on February, 2007, a criminal case was registered for offence under Section 279 and 337 IPC, at the instance of one Mohd. Asgar alleging rash and negligent driving. On the basis of the petitioner's (Ramraj Gurjar), statements and the statement of the Conductor, his employment was put to an end on 17th February, 2007. The writ application preferred by the petitioner - Ramraj Gurjar was declined by the Single Judge. In the intra-court appeal, the Division Bench allowed the writ application with a direction to the respondent-Corporation to reinstate the petitioner immediately. 12. In the instant case at hand, the factual matrix is almost identical to the case of Ramraj Gurjar (supra). The issue of alternative remedy has also been dealt with by the Division Bench in the case aforesaid holding that an alternative remedy available to a litigant is not an absolute bar for invocation of high prerogative writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The issue of alternative remedy has also been dealt with by the Division Bench in the case aforesaid holding that an alternative remedy available to a litigant is not an absolute bar for invocation of high prerogative writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. More so, the Constitution does not hesitate in invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction where an order passed by the State or its functionary or an agency or instrumentality of the State is found to be in utter disregard and flagrant violation of principles of the natural justice. 13. For reasons and discussions aforesaid, the writ application succeeds and is hereby allowed. 14. In the result, the impugned order dated 27th May, 2005, is quashed and set aside. The respondent-Corporation is directed to reinstate the petitioner in the same manner as was obtaining prior to the date of order of termination dated 27th May, 2005. 15. However, the respondent-Corporation would be at liberty to hold a disciplinary inquiry against the petitioner, if so advised, and in that eventuality, the disciplinary inquiry shall not be influenced in any manner by this order of the Court. 16. No costs.Petition allowed. *******