ORDER M.S. Ramachandra Rao, J. 1. This appeal is filed challenging the judgment dt. 04.05.2005 in S.C. No. 448 of 2003 on the file of Assistant Sessions Judge, Adilabad, acquitting respondents of having committed offences punishable under Sections 398, 307, 120-B IPC and Section 25(1)(a) and 27 of Indian Arms Act. Crl.A.M.P.(S.R.) No. 33574 of 2012 is filed under Section 378(3) & (1) Cr.P.C. to grant special leave to file the appeal. 2. The case of prosecution is that respondents 1 to 3 are armed reserve police personnel, who were dismissed from service and the 4th respondent is a private auto electrician. PW.1 is a Doctor having a maternity nursing home, by name, 'Srinivasa Maternity Nursing Home' at Station Road, Adilabad. PW.2 is the husband of PW.1 and he is working as a Civil Assistant Surgeon in the Government Hospital at Adilabad. The allegation against the accused is that the respondents/accused hatched up a plan in the shop of one Y. Ramesh under the leadership of the 1st respondent and they conspired together to terrorise PW.1 and PW.2 who were having a flourishing medical practice and was constructing a posh house. It is alleged that A.1 to A.4 posed themselves as action team members of banned Peoples War Group and telephoned to the landline and cell phone of PWs. 1 and 2 to extract ` 3,00,000/- in the name of party fund for their wrongful gain. It is alleged that the respondents had threatened PWs. 1 and 2 on telephone from 15.08.2002 onwards. It is further alleged that A.1 parted with two rounds from his service ammunition issued to him; that A.1 and A.2 made fake phone calls to PW. 1 as if they needed the services of PW.2; they went rear side of grill gate of PW.1 and fired a bullet from 9 mm. pistol on the rear side of the car at parallel level of the person in the driving seat and that the accused threatened PWs. 1 and 2 to extract money. 3. On a complaint lodged by PW.1, Crime No. 192 of 2002 was registered by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, who investigated into the case and examined PW.1. Thereafter, the accused were arrested. 4. The Judicial First Class Magistrate, Adilabad, committed the matter to the Court of Sessions, which was numbered as S.C. No. 448 of 2003. 5. 3. On a complaint lodged by PW.1, Crime No. 192 of 2002 was registered by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, who investigated into the case and examined PW.1. Thereafter, the accused were arrested. 4. The Judicial First Class Magistrate, Adilabad, committed the matter to the Court of Sessions, which was numbered as S.C. No. 448 of 2003. 5. Charges under Sections 398, 307, 120-B IPC and Sections 25(1)(a) and 27 of Indian Arms Act were framed against the accused and they were read over and explained to accused, but they denied the same and pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 6. The prosecution examined PWs. 1 to 20 and marked Exs. P.1 to P. 18 apart from MOs. 1 to 4. 7. After closure of prosecution evidence, the accused were examined under Section 313Cr.P.C. and the incriminating material in evidence of prosecution witnesses was put to them but they denied the same. The accused examined DW.1 and marked Exs. D1 and D2. 8. By judgment dt. 04.05.2005, the court below acquitted the accused of the above charges. 9. Questioning the same, the present Appeal is filed. 10. PWs. 1 and 2 supported the prosecution case and spoke about receipt of phone calls on the land line and cell phone belonging to them from a person, who stated that his name is Raju and claimed to be a member of the action team stating that Lalithakka sent him and her husband to cut the telephone. She spoke about the demand for about ` 3,00,000/- and that the person on phone asked them to bring the said amount to Chanda Bridge on 04.09.2002 and they went to Chanda Bridge along with police but nobody came there. PW.1 stated that subsequently also phone calls were received from a STD booth, near Collector Chowrastha. She claimed that she telephoned to the STD booth owner, who informed her that some black person with whiskers telephoned to her. When she asked the STD telephone booth owner to call the person to speak with her she was informed that the said person was not willing to speak to her. PW.3 is the said STD telephone booth owner. She further stated that subsequently another phone call on 21.09.2002 came from one Mohan Rao who told her that they put a bullet underneath her from the telephone booth of PW.3. PW.3 is the said STD telephone booth owner. She further stated that subsequently another phone call on 21.09.2002 came from one Mohan Rao who told her that they put a bullet underneath her from the telephone booth of PW.3. Again she claimed to have received a telephone call from the telephone booth of PW.4 and PW.4 told her that some tall person telephoned her. She deposed that on 21.09.2002 there was a big sound in the ground floor of the hospital but nobody was found and when they searched, they found a bullet cap and there was a damage to the car. 11. DW.1 examined by the respondents, stated in his evidence that he worked as security guard to DCCP President, Ramakrishna Reddy along with A1 and A1, who went on rest on 17.09.2002 handed over his weapon and 30 rounds to him. 12. Under Section 25 of the Indian Arms Act, whoever manufactures, sells, transfers, converts, repairs, tests or proves, or exposes or offers for sale or transfer, or has in his possession for sale, transfer, conversion, repair, test or proof, any arms or ammunition in contravention of Sections 5, 6 and 11 of the Arms Act is liable for punishment. Although the prosecution case was that A.1 took away his weapon with 30 rounds when he went on rest on 17.09.2002, DW.1's evidence clearly shows that A1 handed over his weapon and 30 rounds to him when he went on rest. Therefore, the prosecution case that A1 did not hand over two rounds, when he went on leave is not correct. 13. MO.4 is the pistol said to have been seized from A.1 and A.3 through PW.6, panch witness. PW.6 admitted that he had good relationship with PWs. 1 and 2 and also with the D.S.P. and S.P. Although there were other panch witnesses, they were not examined by the prosecution. In my opinion, PW.6, therefore, is an interested witness. 14. PW.5 is a panch witness with regard to seizure of MO.1, empty bullet and MO.2, live bullet along with one Srinivas. But he stated that he has been working under PW.1 for the previous five years and the other mediators are also working under PW.1 prior to him. So, the evidence of PW.5 is also interested one since he is employed under PW.1. 15. But he stated that he has been working under PW.1 for the previous five years and the other mediators are also working under PW.1 prior to him. So, the evidence of PW.5 is also interested one since he is employed under PW.1. 15. As per the prosecution case, PW.9 brought the pistol MO.4 from PW.11 as per the advise of A2 for repairs and it was the said pistol which was used by A.2. It is further case of the prosecution that PW.11 gave his pistol to A2 through PW.9. PW.20 is the investigating officer, who seized the ammunition register copy under Ex. P18. PW.20 in his cross examination stated that pistol No. 16021985 was entrusted to PW.11. But he did not mention in Ex. P18 that pistol No. 16289426 was entrusted to PW.11. MO.4 pistol bears No. 16289426 and Ex. P4 panchnama also shows the same pistol number. In view of the discrepancy in the pistol numbers, the handing over of MO.4 by PW.11 to PW.9 is doubtful since the pistol entrusted to PW.11 was not the one which was seized by the police as MO.4, Therefore, the charge under Section 25(1)(a) of the Arms Act is not established. 16. Section 27 of the Indian Arms Act makes using of fire arms a punishable offence. But in view of the discrepancy in the prosecution case with regard to MO.4 weapon it cannot be said that the accused used the fire arm. So they are entitled to acquittal under Section 27of the Arms Act. 17. Coming to the charge under Section 307 I.P.C., the said provision deals with punishment for attempt to murder. It requires that the accused must have an intention to commit the murder and pursuant to that intention they must have done an act towards its commission irrespective of the fact whether the act is the penultimate act or not. In the present case, the prosecution case is that on 29.02.2009 the accused fired the car of PW. 1 with the pistol. There is no direct or circumstantial evidence to show that the accused had attempted to kill PWs.1 and 2 and opened fire. Although prosecution sought to rely on the confession statements of A1 to A3, the said confessions having been made to the police, are inadmissible in evidence. Therefore, the charge under Section 307 I.P.C. is not made out. 18. There is no direct or circumstantial evidence to show that the accused had attempted to kill PWs.1 and 2 and opened fire. Although prosecution sought to rely on the confession statements of A1 to A3, the said confessions having been made to the police, are inadmissible in evidence. Therefore, the charge under Section 307 I.P.C. is not made out. 18. Coming to the charge under Section 398 I.P.C, the said provision makes it an offence to attempt to commit robbery or dacoity when armed with deadly weapons. In the present case, no money was paid by PWs. 1 and 2. There is also no evidence of any theft of the same. Since the offence under Section 398 I.P.C. requires an attempt to commit robbery or dacoity and Section 390 I.P.C defines 'robbery' as theft or extortion, and since, there is no evidence of any theft or extortion of money, ingredients of offence under Section 390 I.P.C. are also not established. 19. Coming to the charge under Section 120-B I.P.C, there is no direct evidence or circumstantial evidence to show that a conspiracy was entered into by A.1 to A.4 in the shop of Y. Ramesh as alleged by the prosecution and the said Y. Ramesh was also not examined by the prosecution. Even PW.20, investigating officer did not state anything about the criminal conspiracy to extract money from PWs. 1 and 2 by A.1 to A.4. Thus even this is not established by the prosecution. 20. The scope of interference in an appeal against order of acquittal under Section 378Cr.P.C. was laid down succinctly in Chandrappa and others v. State of Karnataka: 2007 (2) ALT (Crl.) 284 (SC) : 2007 (5) SCJ 230 : (2007) 4 SCC 415 , as under: "(1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, 'substantial and compelling reasons', 'good and sufficient grounds', 'very strong circumstances', 'distorted conclusions', 'glaring mistakes', etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. (3) Various expressions, such as, 'substantial and compelling reasons', 'good and sufficient grounds', 'very strong circumstances', 'distorted conclusions', 'glaring mistakes', etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of 'flourishes of language' to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court." The above principle was reiterated in State of Rajasthan v. Mohan Lal (2009) 12 SCC 515 and recently in Satvir Singh v. State of Delhi : 2014 (3) ALT (Crl.) 477 (SC): 2014 (8) SCJ 479: (2014) 13 SCC 143 ." 21. Since the judgment of the trial Court is passed on appreciation of evidence, and its conclusion appears to be a reasonable conclusion, I feel that it is not a fit case for interference in appeal. 22. Having regard to these circumstances, I am of the opinion that the Court below had rightly acquitted the accused. Therefore, Crl.A.M.P.(S.R.) No. 33574 of 2012 in Crl.A.(SR). No. 20118 of 2005 is dismissed. Consequently, Crl.A.(SR). No. 20118 of 2005 is also dismissed. Miscellaneous applications, pending if any in this Appeal, shall stand closed.