ORDER : Sudhanshu Dhulia, J. Since all the matters are primarily the same, they are being disposed of together. However, for the sake of convenience the particular facts which are stated here relate to WPMS No. 632 of 2015 and are related to workman - Par-mender Singh. In any case, apart from minor differences of dates there is absolutely no difference in any of these four matters. Hence they are being adjudicated together. This is an employer's writ petition. The order impugned dated 23.02.2015 passed by the Presiding Officer/Labour Court whereby it has been held that the enquiry proceedings against the workmen were in violation of principle of natural justice and fair play, and thereafter ordered that the adjudication in the matter will now be on the basis of evidence lead by the employer, on the validity of a fair enquiry. 2. All the respondents before this Court are workmen, which is an industry, namely, Napino Auto and Electronics Ltd. (from hereinafter referred to as “employer”). Consequent to a disciplinary proceeding initiated against the workman, the services of the workman have been terminated vide order dated 11.03.2010. The aggrieved workman raised an industrial dispute and the matter was subsequently referred under Section 4K of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act. Under the established procedure and in accordance with the settled law labour court had to first frame the issues. The preliminary issue framed by the labour court was to the effect as to whether the enquiry against the workman was in accordance with the principle of natural justice or fair play or not. The labour court after making it a preliminary issue and asking both the parties to lead evidence on this aspect came to the conclusion that there has not been a fair enquiry in the matter. This conclusion is based upon the fact that the entire evidences, of the employer as well as the workman, were concluded on two dates i.e. 04.01.2010 and 05.01.2010. Moreover, the entire list of witnesses produced by the employer were not examined and even such witnesses were examined whose names did not figure in the list. 3. There was a list of seven witnesses out of which only two were examined. Moreover certain other witnesses were examined on 05.01.2010, the list of which was not provided to the workman before hand, and they were the surprise witnesses. 3. There was a list of seven witnesses out of which only two were examined. Moreover certain other witnesses were examined on 05.01.2010, the list of which was not provided to the workman before hand, and they were the surprise witnesses. The other reasoning, however, given by the labour court that in the charge-sheet dated 02.12.2009, the name of the Enquiry Officer was not mentioned, and therefore, this too suffers from an illegality. 4. All the same the standing orders applicable in the present case have also been perused whereas as a first step only charge-sheet has to be given, an Enquiry Officer is only appointed if the employer finds the workman's reply to the charge sheet unsatisfactory. It is for the second time charge-sheet is given afresh when the name of the Enquiry Officer is to be mentioned. Therefore, to that extent the labour court is wrong. 5. Nevertheless, the enquiry is flawed for the reason stated already above. Moreover by holding that the enquiry is not proper, no prejudice has been caused to the employer, inasmuch as, it would be given a fresh opportunity to lead evidence and show that there was enough material for the employer and come to the conclusion that the services have been rightly dispensed with. In other words a full appreciation of the evidence produced by the employer is yet to be appreciated by the labour court. Moreover, as to whether disciplinary enquiry suffers from principle of natural justice and fair play and that to be decided as a preliminary issue was done on the application of the employer itself. In the written statement it has been stated that this should be made a preliminary issue. This has been the procedure which is being followed right in The Cooper Engineering Limited Vs. Shri P.P. Mundhe, AIR 1975 SC 1900 . The relevant paragraph 22 of the said judgment reads as under: “We are, therefore, clearly of opinion that when a case of dismissal or discharge of an employee is referred for industrial adjudication the labour court should first decide as a preliminary issue whether the domestic enquiry has violated the principles of natural justice. When there is no domestic enquiry or defective enquiry is admitted by the employer, there will be no difficulty. But when the matter is in controversy between the parties that question must be decided as a preliminary issue. When there is no domestic enquiry or defective enquiry is admitted by the employer, there will be no difficulty. But when the matter is in controversy between the parties that question must be decided as a preliminary issue. On that decision being pronounced it will be for the management to decide whether it will adduce any evidence before the labour court. If it chooses not to adduce any evidence, it will not be thereafter permissible in any proceeding to raise the issue. We should also make it clear that there will be no justification for any party to stall the final adjudication of the dispute by the labour court by questioning its decision with regard to the preliminary issue when the matter, if worthy, can be agitated even after the final award. It will be also legitimate for the High Court to refuse to intervene at this stage. We are making these observations in our anxiety that there is no undue delay in industrial adjudication.” 6. Much prior to this, the Hon'ble Apex Court in another case in the The Workmen of Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. of India (Pvt.) Ltd. Vs. The Management and Others, AIR 1973 SC 1227 , has held follows: “32. From those decisions, the following principles broadly emerge: 1. The right to take disciplinary action and to decide upon the quantum of punishment are mainly managerial functions, but if a dispute is referred to a Tribunal, the later has power to see if action of the employer is justified. 2. Before imposing the punishment, an employer is expected to conduct a proper enquiry in accordance with the provisions of the Standing Orders, if applicable, and principles of natural justice. The enquiry should not be an empty formality. 3. When a proper enquiry has been held by an employer, and the finding of misconduct is a plausible conclusion flowing from the evidence, adduced at the said enquiry, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to sit in judgment over the decision of the employer as an appellate body. The interference with the decision of the employer will be justified only when the findings arrived at in the enquiry are perverse or the management is guilty of victimization, unfair labour practice or mala fide. 4. The interference with the decision of the employer will be justified only when the findings arrived at in the enquiry are perverse or the management is guilty of victimization, unfair labour practice or mala fide. 4. Even if no enquiry has been held by an employer or if the enquiry held by him is found to be defective, the Tribunal in order to satisfy itself about the legality and validity of the order, had to give an opportunity to the employer and employee to adduce evidence before it. It is open to the employer to adduce evidence for the first time justifying his action, and it is open to the employee to adduce evidence contra. 5. The effect of an employer not holding an enquiry is that the Tribunal would not have to consider only whether there was a prima facie case. On the other hand, the issue about the merits of the impugned order of dismissal or discharge is at large before the Tribunal and the latter, on the evidence adduced before it, has to decide for itself whether the misconduct alleged is proved. In such cases, the point about the exercise of managerial functions does not arise at all. A case of defective enquiry stands on the same footing as no enquiry. 6. The Tribunal gets jurisdiction to consider the evidence placed before it for the first time in justification of the action taken only, if no enquiry has been held or after the enquiry conducted by an employer is found to be defective. 7. It has never been recognised that the Tribunal should straight-away, without anything more, direct reinstatement of a dismissed or discharged employee, once it is found that no domestic enquiry has been held or the said enquiry is found to be defective. 8. An employer, who wants to avail himself of the opportunity of adducing evidence for the first time before the Tribunal to justify his action, should ask for it at the appropriate stage. If such an opportunity is asked for, the Tribunal has no power to refuse. The giving of an opportunity to an employer to adduce evidence for the first time before the Tribunal is in the interest of both the management and the employee and to enable the Tribunal itself to be satisfied about the alleged misconduct. 9. If such an opportunity is asked for, the Tribunal has no power to refuse. The giving of an opportunity to an employer to adduce evidence for the first time before the Tribunal is in the interest of both the management and the employee and to enable the Tribunal itself to be satisfied about the alleged misconduct. 9. Once the misconduct is proved either in the enquiry conducted by an employer or by the evidence placed before a Tribunal for the first time, punishment imposed cannot be interfered with by the Tribunal except in cases where the punishment is so harsh as to suggest victimization. 10. In a particular case, after setting aside the order of dismissal, whether a workman should be reinstated or paid compensation is, as held by this Court in the Management of Panitole Tea Estate v. Workmen, within the judicial decision of a Labour Court or Tribunal. 32-A The above was the law as laid down by this Court as on December 15, 1971, applicable to all industrial adjudications arising out of orders of dismissal or discharge.” 7. In fact this has been a standing practice before all the labour courts in order to cut short the time. Such issues are normally made as a preliminary issue and even if such an issue goes against the employer, in a given case the employer still gets an opportunity to lead evidence further. 8. In a Constitution Bench of Hon'ble Apex Court in Karnataka State Road Transport Corpn. Vs. Smt. Lakshmidevamma and Another, AIR 2001 SC 2090 , has held in its para 15 and 16, which reads as under: “75. The question again arose in the case of Shambhu Nath Goyal Vs. Bank of Baroda and Others, AIR 1984 SC 289 as to the propriety of waiting till the preliminary issue was decided to give an opportunity to the management to adduce evidence, because after the decision in the preliminary issue on the validity of the domestic enquiry, either way, there was nothing much left to be decided thereafter. Therefore, in Shambu Nath Goyals case this Court once again considered the said question in a different perspective. In this judgment, the Court after discussing the earlier cases including that of Shankar Chakravarti Vs. Britannia Biscuit Co. Therefore, in Shambu Nath Goyals case this Court once again considered the said question in a different perspective. In this judgment, the Court after discussing the earlier cases including that of Shankar Chakravarti Vs. Britannia Biscuit Co. Ltd. and Another, AIR 1979 SC 1652 , which was a judgment of this Court subsequent to that of Cooper Engineering Ltd. v. P.P. Mundhe (supra), the following principles were laid down: “We think that the application of the management to seek the permission of the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal for availing the right to adduce further evidence to substantiate the charge or charges framed against the workman referred to in the above passage in the application which may be filed by the management during the pendency of its application made before the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal seeking its permission under section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 to take a certain action or grant approval of the action taken by it. The management is made aware of the workman's contention regarding the defeat in the domestic enquiry by the written statement of defence filed by him in the application filed by the management under section 33 of the Act. Then, if the management chooses to exercise its right it must make up its mind at the earliest stage and file the application for that purpose without any unreasonable delay. But when the question arises in a reference under S. 10 of the Act after the workman had been punished pursuant to a finding of guilt recorded against him in the domestic enquiry there is no question of the management filing any application for permission to lead further evidence in support of the charge or charges framed against the workman, for the defeat in the domestic enquiry is pointed out by the workman in his written claim statement filed in the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal after the reference had been received and the management has the opportunity to look into that statement before it files its written statement of defence in the enquiry before the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal and could make the request for the opportunity in the written statement itself. If it does not choose to do so at that stage it cannot be allowed to do it at any later stage of the proceedings by filing any application for the purpose which may result in delay which may lead to wrecking the morale of the workman and compel him to surrender which he may not otherwise do.” 16. While considering the decision in Shambu Nath Goyals case, we should bear in mind that the judgment of Vardarajan, J. therein does not refer to the case of Cooper Engineering Ltd. v. P.P. Mundhe (supra). However, the concurring judgment of D.A. Desai, J. specifically considers this case. By the judgment in Goyal's case the management was given the right to adduce evidence to justify its domestic enquiry only if it had reserved its right to do so in the application made by it under section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 or in the objection that the management had to file to the reference made under section 10 of the Act, meaning thereby the management had to exercise its right of leading fresh evidence at the first available opportunity and not at any time thereafter during the proceedings before the Tribunal/Labour Court.” 9. Therefore, this Court is of the view that no prejudice has been caused to the employer. The conclusion of the labour court that the departmental enquiry did not proceed in accordance with the principle of natural justice and fair play is a correct finding and not liable to be interfered with by means of the present writ petition. Moreover, in any case no prejudice is ultimately caused to the employer as he will get an opportunity to lead evidence. With the aforesaid observation, the writ petition stands disposed. No order as to costs.