Judgment R.S. Jha, J. 1. The petitioners have filed this petition being aggrieved by the acquisition proceedings undertaken by the respondent authorities. 2. The petition was filed by the petitioners alleging that they had purchased 0.080 Acres of land comprising of Khasra No. 1217/1 by registered sale deed dated 6.6.1988 and 0.053 Acres of land comprising of Khasra No. 1218/1 vide sale deed dated 15.12.1988. 3. It is submitted that subsequently the petitioners applied for registration with the Industries Department for the purposes of setting up an industry and to the revenue authorities for mutation of their name on the land in question and consequently the petitioners' name were mutated in the revenue records as is evident from the Khasra entries of the year 1990-91, copies of which have been filed as Annexure P-3. It is stated that the petitioners' application was processed by the Industries Department and the petitioners were granted provisional registration certificate on 22.9.1989, on the basis of which the petitioners got an amount of Rs. 2,70,000/- sanctioned as loan from a Nationalized Bank. Subsequently, the petitioners' application for permanent registration was rejected by the respondent authorities by the impugned communication dated 6.3.1992 wherein the petitioners were informed that permanent registration cannot be given to the petitioners on account of the fact that the land had been acquired by the Town Improvement Trust. The respondent Town Improvement Trust, thereafter proceeded to take over possession of the land in question, pursuant to which the cost of buldozer, etc., which was used for removing the petitioners' structure, was sought to be recovered from the petitioners, vide Annexure P-21, which has also been challenged by the petitioners in the present petition. 4. On 14.3.1992 the petitioners sought 15 days time to vacate the premises. The petitioners thereafter filed the present petition challenging the rejection of the petitioners' application for permanent registration, Annexure P-20, dated 6.3.1992; the recovery of Rs. 5,000/- as cost for removal of the encroachment Annexure P-21 and the communication dated 13.3.1992 issued by the Town Improvement Trust, Chhatarpur directing the Assistant Engineer of the Electricity Board to disconnect the electricity connection of the petitioners for the purposes of taking over possession. 5. 5,000/- as cost for removal of the encroachment Annexure P-21 and the communication dated 13.3.1992 issued by the Town Improvement Trust, Chhatarpur directing the Assistant Engineer of the Electricity Board to disconnect the electricity connection of the petitioners for the purposes of taking over possession. 5. The petitioners thereafter filed an application for amendment of the petition on 2.2.1996 which has been allowed by order dated 7.2.2013, whereby the petitioners have also challenged the notifications issued under sections 4, 6 & 17 of the Act, as well as the award passed in the acquisition proceedings dated 12.10.1990, Annexure P-26, on the ground that the notification issued by the respondent authorities under sections 4 & 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') is bad in law as it was issued on the same date; that the invocation of the emergency clause under section 17 of the Act, was and is erroneous as no emergency existed or has been demonstrated by the authorities which is also evident from the fact that after initiating proceedings and passing of the award in the year 1990 the said Transport Nagar was not established immediately thereafter. 6. It is submitted that the authorities while passing the award for determining compensation has never issued any notice to the petitioner No. 2 and, therefore, the award having been passed without following the procedure prescribed by law, deserves to be quashed. The learned counsel for the petitioners also submits that the possession of the land has also not been taken over in accordance with law and, therefore, the entire acquisition proceedings initiated by the respondents deserves to be quashed. The petitioners have also contended that the notice which is required to be published in two daily newspapers having local circulation has also not been done as is evident from a perusal of the award itself and, therefore, in view of the non-compliance of the mandatory provision of law, the petition filed by the petitioners deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the authorities under the Act deserves to be quashed. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the acquisition proceedings taken up by the respondent authorities are patently illegal as no notice was given to the petitioners for the same. 7. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the acquisition proceedings taken up by the respondent authorities are patently illegal as no notice was given to the petitioners for the same. 7. The respondents have filed a return and have stated that the petition, as filed by the petitioners, is totally misconceived and have taken a preliminary objection to the effect that the petition has been filed after passing of the award and also suffers from delay and laches. It is submitted that the scheme for preparation of the Transport Nagar was well within the knowledge of all concerned. It is further submitted that the notification under section 4 as well as section 17 of the Act, was published by the authorities on 14.10.1988 whereas the notification under section 6 of the Act, was published on 21.10.1988 and, therefore, the contention of the petitioners that they were published on the same date is factually incorrect and, therefore, this ground of challenge raised by the petitioners does not survive as it is based on incorrect appreciation of facts. 8. It is further alleged and stated that in view of the urgency clause invoked by the respondent authorities, possession of the land in question had already been handed over to the Town Improvement Trust vide document Annexure R-3 on 9.10.1990. It is further stated that the award was passed by the Land Acquisition Authorities on 12.10.1990 which fact was well within the knowledge of the petitioners as petitioner Govind Prasad was noticed and had filed objections before the authority inspite of which they chose not to challenge the award while filing the petition in the year 1992 though they had knowledge of the award and had also been informed on 6.3.1992 vide annexure P-23. It is stated that the amount of compensation of Rs. 1,76,350/- has already been deposited on 19.9.1991 and has also been disbursed. 9. It is stated that the amount of compensation of Rs. 1,76,350/- has already been deposited on 19.9.1991 and has also been disbursed. 9. It is submitted that apart from the above, the fact of passing of the award was also brought to the notice of this Court by the respondents by filing a return in the year 1992 itself and, thereafter again in the year 1993 but the petitioners, inspite of knowledge, chose not to assail or challenge the award immediately thereafter but have moved an application for amendment of the petition only in the year 1996 which, after restoration of the petition which had been dismissed on merits on account of non-appearance of the petitioners, has been allowed in the year 2013. It is submitted that in such circumstances, in view of the fact that the award had already been passed prior to filing of the petition and the petitioners have filed this petition after a considerable delay, the petition deserves to be dismissed. 10. The learned counsel for the respondents further pointed out that initially this Court had granted stay to the petitioners vide interim order dated 27.3.1992, however when all the facts were placed by the respondents, before this Court by filing I.A. No. 10525/1993 for vacating stay, this Court taking note of all the aforesaid facts, vacated the interim order on 13.12.1993. It is submitted that subsequent thereto the respondent authorities have taken steps to undertake construction and have also allotted plots and shops and the Transport Nagar has become fully generational and is functioning on the land which has been acquired since 2013 and, therefore, the petition filed by the petitioners at this belated stage, deserves to be dismissed. 11. It is further pointed out that the respondent authorities have in fact acquired a little more than 17 Acres of land for construction of the Transport Nagar from various individuals which has become fully functional whereas the petitioners in the present petition, are agitating only in respect of a small portion of the land acquired i.e. 0.30 and 0.22 acres of land comprising of Khasra Nos. 1217/1 and 1218/1. 1217/1 and 1218/1. It is submitted that none of the persons whose land was acquired have objected to the acquisition of the land for the Transport Nagar which has already been constructed and is functional and is for the benefit of the public at large and in such circumstances the petition filed by the petitioners deserves to be dismissed. 12. The learned counsel for the respondents has pointed out that the sale deed, Annexure P-1, which relates to Khasra No. 1217/1, was registered on 6.6.1988 whereas the second sale deed in respect of Khasra No. 1218/1 was executed on 15.12.1988, that is after the issuance of the notification under sections 4 & 17 of the Act, on 14.10.1988 and in such circumstances the challenge to the acquisition proceedings based on the second sale deed, Exhibit P-2, which was executed subsequent to the issuance of notification under section 4 of the Act, is totally misconceived as the petitioners have no right to claim any benefit in respect of the sale deed that was executed subsequent to issuance of the notification under sections 4 & 17 of the Act. 13. The learned counsel for the respondents in support of their submissions regarding maintainability and delay have relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court rendered in the case of Municipal Council, Ahmed Nagar v. Shah Hyder Beig, (2000) 2 SCC 48 . 14. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, at the very outset, I propose to first examine the contention of the respondents with regard to the objection raised by the respondents to the effect that the petition filed by the petitioners deserves to be dismissed as it has been filed after passing of the award and also suffers from the vice of delay and laches. 15. In the case of Municipal Council, Ahmed Nagar v. Shah Hyder Beig (supra), the Supreme Court while dealing with the said issue has held as under in paragraphs 17 and 18:- "17. In any event, after the award is passed no writ petition can be filed challenging the acquisition notice or against any proceeding thereunder. This has been the consistent view taken by this Court and in one of the recent cases C. Padma v. Dy. Secretary to the Govt. In any event, after the award is passed no writ petition can be filed challenging the acquisition notice or against any proceeding thereunder. This has been the consistent view taken by this Court and in one of the recent cases C. Padma v. Dy. Secretary to the Govt. of T.N., (1997) 2 SCC 627 , this court observed as below (SCC p. 628, para-4):- "The admitted position is that pursuant to the notification published under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short "the Act") in GOR No. 1392 Industries dated 17.10.1962, total extent of 6 acres 41 cents of land in Madhavaram Village, Saidapet Taluk, Chengalpattu District in Tamil Nadu was acquired under Chapter VII of the Act for the manufacture of Synthetic Rasina by Tvl. Reichold Chemicals India Ltd., Madras. The acquisition proceedings had become final and possession of the land was taken on 30.4.1964. Pursuant to the agreement executed by the company, it was handed over to Tvl. Simpson and General Finance Co. which is a subsidiary of Reichold Chemicals India Ltd., It would appear that at a request made by the said company, 66 cents of land out of one acre 37 cents in respect of which the appellants originally had ownership, was transferred in GOMs No. 816 Industries dated 24.3.1971 in favour of another subsidiary company. Shri Rama Vilas Service Ltd., the 5th respondent Which is also another subsidiary of the company had requested for two acres 75 cents of land; the same came to be assigned on leasehold basis by the Government after resumption in terms of the agreement in GOMs No. 439 Industries dated 10.5.1985. In GOMs No. 546 Industries dated 30.3.1986, the same came to be approved of. Then the appellants challenged the original GOMs No. 1392 Industries dated 17.10.1962 contending that since the original purpose for which the land was acquired had ceased to be in operation, the appellants are entitled to restitution of the possession taken from them. The learned Single Judge and the Division Bench have held that the acquired land having already vested in the State, after receipt of the compensation by the predecessor-in-title of the appellants, they have no right to challenge the notification. Thus the writ petition and the writ appeal came to be dismissed." 18. The learned Single Judge and the Division Bench have held that the acquired land having already vested in the State, after receipt of the compensation by the predecessor-in-title of the appellants, they have no right to challenge the notification. Thus the writ petition and the writ appeal came to be dismissed." 18. Similar is the view in an earlier decision of this Court in the case of Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Industrial Development Investment Co. (P) Ltd., (1996) 11 SCC 501 . Incidentally, the decision last noted was also on land acquisition and requisition under the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 and in paragraph 29 of the Report, this Court observed (SCC p. 520):- "It is thus well settled law that when there is inordinate delay in filing the writ petition and when all steps taken in the acquisition proceedings have become final, the Court should be loath to quash the notifications. The High Court has, no doubt, discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution to quash the notification under Section 4(1) and declaration under Section 6. But it should be exercised taking all relevant factors into pragmatic consideration. When the award was passed and possession was taken, the Court should not have exercised its power to quash the award which is a material factor to be taken into consideration before exercising the power under Article 226. The fact that no third party rights were created in the case is hardly a ground for interference. The Division Bench of the High Court was not right in interfering with the discretion exercised by the learned Single Judge dismissing the writ petition on the ground of laches." 16. The fact that no third party rights were created in the case is hardly a ground for interference. The Division Bench of the High Court was not right in interfering with the discretion exercised by the learned Single Judge dismissing the writ petition on the ground of laches." 16. In the case of Banda Development Authority, Banda vs. Motilal Agarwal and Others, (2011) 5 SCC 394 , while dealing with a case similar to the present one, where the authority concerned had invoked the provisions of Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act and where the petition had been filed after considerable delay and latches and the petitioners had failed to offer any plausible explanation therefor and the land in question had been utilized for the public purpose either partly or wholly and third party rights had also been created after deposit of the necessary compensation, the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the petition challenging the acquisition proceedings on the technical ground of improper taking over of possession of the land and while doing so culled the following principles in para 37 as under:- "37. The principles which can be culled out from the above noted judgments are: (i) No hard and fast rule can be laid down as to what act would constitute taking of possession of the acquired land. (ii) If the acquired land is vacant, the act of the State authority concerned to go to the spot and prepare a panchnama will ordinarily be treated as sufficient to constitute taking of possession. (iii) If crop is standing on the acquired land or building/structure exists, mere going on the spot by the authority concerned will, by itself, be not sufficient for taking possession. Ordinarily, in such cases, the authority concerned will have to give notice to the occupier of the building/structure or the person who has cultivated the land and take possession in the presence of independent witnesses and get their signatures on the panchnama. Of course, refusal of the owner of the land or building/structure may not lead to an inference that the possession of the acquired land has not been taken. Of course, refusal of the owner of the land or building/structure may not lead to an inference that the possession of the acquired land has not been taken. (iv) If the acquisition is of a large tract of land, it may not be possible for the acquiring/designated authority to take physical possession of each and every parcel of the land and it will be sufficient that symbolic possession is taken by preparing appropriate document in the presence of independent witnesses and getting their signatures on such document. (v) If beneficiary of the acquisition is an agency/instrumentality of the State and 80% of the total compensation is deposited in terms of Section 17(3-A) and substantial portion of the acquired land has been utilised in furtherance of the particular public purpose, then the Court may reasonably presume that possession of the acquired land has been taken." 17. The Supreme Court in the same case has also held that the petition deserves to be dismissed as it suffered from delay and latches in the following terms in paras 20 to 26:- "20. In Ajodhya Bhagat v. State of Bihar (1974) 2 SCC 501 , this Court approved dismissal by the High Court of the writ petition filed by the appellant for quashing the acquisition of his land and observed: (SCC p. 506, para 23) "23. The High Court held that the appellants were guilty of delay and laches. The High Court relied on two important facts. First, that there was delivery of possession. The appellants alleged that it was a paper transaction. The High Court rightly rejected that contention. Secondly, the High Court said that the Trust invested several lakhs of rupees for the construction of roads and material for development purposes. The appellants were in full knowledge of the same. The appellants did not take any steps. The High Court rightly said that to allow this type of challenge to an acquisition of large block of land piecemeal by the owners of some of the plots in succession would not be proper. If this type of challenge is encouraged the various owners of small plots will come up with writ petitions and hold up the acquisition proceedings for more than a generation. The High Court rightly exercised discretion against the appellants. If this type of challenge is encouraged the various owners of small plots will come up with writ petitions and hold up the acquisition proceedings for more than a generation. The High Court rightly exercised discretion against the appellants. We do not see any reason to take a contrary view to the discretion exercised by the High Court." (emphasis supplied) 21. In State of Rajasthan v. D.R. Laxmi, (1996) 6 SCC 445 , this Court referred to Administrative Law by H.W.R. Wade (7th Edn.) at pp. 342-43 and observed: (SCC p. 453, para-10) "10. The order or action, if ultra vires the power, becomes void and it does not confer any right. But the action need not necessarily be set at naught in all events. Though the order may be void, if the party does not approach the Court within reasonable time, which is always a question of fact and have the order invalidated or acquiesced or waived, the discretion of the Court has to be exercised in a reasonable manner. When the discretion has been conferred on the Court, the Court may in appropriate case decline to grant the relief, even if it holds that the order was void. The net result is that extraordinary jurisdiction of the Court may not be exercised in such circumstances........ " 22. In Girdharan Prasad Missir v. State of Bihar, (1980) 2 SCC 83 , the delay of 17 months was considered as a good ground for declining relief to the petitioner. In Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Industrial Development Investment Co. (P.) Ltd., (1996) 11 SCC 501 , this Court held: (SCC p. 452, para 9) "9. It is thus, well-settled law that when there is inordinate delay in filing the writ petition and when all steps taken in the acquisition proceedings have become final, the Court should be loath to quash the notifications. The High Court has, no doubt, discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution to quash the notification under Section 4(1)and declaration under Section 6. But it should be exercised taking all relevant factors into pragmatic consideration. When the award was passed and possession was taken, the Court should not have exercised its power to quash the award which is a material factor to be taken into consideration before exercising the power under Article 226. But it should be exercised taking all relevant factors into pragmatic consideration. When the award was passed and possession was taken, the Court should not have exercised its power to quash the award which is a material factor to be taken into consideration before exercising the power under Article 226. The fact that no third party rights were created in the case, is hardly a ground for interference. The Division Bench of the High Court was not right in interfering with the discretion exercised by the learned Single Judge dismissing the writ petition on the ground of laches." 23. In Urban Improvement Trust, v. Bheru Lal, (2002) 7 SCC 712 , this Court reversed the order of the Rajasthan High Court and held that the writ petition filed for quashing of acquisition of land for a residential scheme framed by the appellant-Urban Improvement Trust was liable to be dismissed on the ground that the same was filed after two years. 24. In Ganpatibai v. State of M.P., (2006) 7 SCC 508 , the delay of 5 years was considered unreasonable and the order passed by the High Court refusing to entertain the writ petition was confirmed. In that case also the petitioner had initially filed a suit challenging the acquisition of land. The suit was dismissed in 2001. Thereafter, the writ petition was filed. This Court referred to an earlier judgment in State of Bihar v. Dhirendra Kumar (1995) 4 SCC 229 and observed: (Ganpatibai cases SCC p. 510 para 9). "9. In State of Bihar v. Dhirendra Kumar this Court had observed that civil suit was not maintainable and the remedy to question notification under Section 4 and the declaration under Section 6 of the Act was by filing a writ petition. Even thereafter the appellant, as noted above, pursued the suit in the civil court. The stand that five years after the filing of the suit, the decision was rendered does not in any way help the appellant. Even after the decision of this Court, the appellant continued to prosecute the suit till 2001, when the decision of this Court in 1995 had held that suit was not maintainable." 25. The stand that five years after the filing of the suit, the decision was rendered does not in any way help the appellant. Even after the decision of this Court, the appellant continued to prosecute the suit till 2001, when the decision of this Court in 1995 had held that suit was not maintainable." 25. In Sawaran Lata v. State of Haryana, (2010) 4 SCC 532 , the dismissal of writ petition filed after seven years of the publication of declaration and five years of the award passed by the Collector was upheld by the Court and it was observed: (SCC p. 535, para-11) "11. In the instant case, it is not the case of the petitioners that they had not been aware of the acquisition proceedings as the only ground taken in the writ petition has been that substance of the notification under Section 4and declaration under Section 6 of the 1894 Act had been published in the newspapers having no wide circulation. Even if the submission made by the petitioners is accepted, it cannot be presumed that they could not be aware of the acquisition proceedings for the reason that a very huge chunk of land belonging to a large number of tenure-holders had been notified for acquisition. Therefore, it should have been the talk of the town. Thus, it cannot be presumed that the petitioners could not have knowledge of the acquisition proceedings." 26. In the instant case, the acquired land was utilized for implementing Tulsi Nagar Residential Scheme inasmuch as after carrying out necessary development i.e. construction of roads, laying electricity, water and sewer lines, etc. BDA carved out plots, constructed flats for economically weaker sections and lower income group, invited applications for allotment of the plots and flats from general as well as reserved categories and allotted the same to eligible persons. In the process, BDA not only incurred huge expenditure but also created third party rights. In this scenario, the delay of nine years from the date of publication of the declaration issued under Section 6(1) and almost six years from the date of passing of award should have been treated by the High Court as more than sufficient for denying equitable relief to Respondent 1." 18. In this scenario, the delay of nine years from the date of publication of the declaration issued under Section 6(1) and almost six years from the date of passing of award should have been treated by the High Court as more than sufficient for denying equitable relief to Respondent 1." 18. Though the learned counsel for the petitioners, to counter the submission of the learned counsel for the respondents, has relied upon decisions of the Supreme Court rendered in the case of Patasi Devi vs. State of Haryana and others, 2012 AIR SCW 5294, to contend that the petition was maintainable even after passing of the award and the petition cannot be dismissed solely on the ground of passing of the award, I am of the considered opinion that the said decision does not render any assistance to the petitioners in the present case in view of the fact that the observations made by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision were made on the basis of the fact that the possession of the land still continued with the owner inspite of completion of the acquisition proceedings and passing of the award whereas in the instant case, apparently and admittedly, after passing of the award the respondents have taken over the possession and have constructed the Transport Nagar which has become fully generational and is functioning on the land in question. In the backdrop of the aforesaid law laid down by the Supreme Court, the facts of the present case are examined. 19. A perusal of the record further indicates that the respondents invoked the provisions of Section 17 of the Act, by mentioning the same in the notification under section 4 of the Act itself, which was published on 14.10.1988 and thereafter an award in the acquisition proceedings have been passed on 12.10.1990. A perusal of the award further indicates that the petitioners were party No. 11/respondent No. 11 in the said acquisition proceedings. The respondents have also filed a typed copy of the notice, Annexure R-9, alleged to have been issued to the petitioners in the acquisition proceedings for their appearance before the Land Acquisition Officer on 17.9.1990. A perusal of the award further indicates that the petitioners were party No. 11/respondent No. 11 in the said acquisition proceedings. The respondents have also filed a typed copy of the notice, Annexure R-9, alleged to have been issued to the petitioners in the acquisition proceedings for their appearance before the Land Acquisition Officer on 17.9.1990. It is observed that the learned counsel for the petitioners has vehemently denied the issuance or the receipt of any such notice to the petitioner No. 2 and has stated that the respondents have not filed any acknowledgment or receipt of the notice to establish the same. No such denial has been made in respect of the petitioner No. 1 who is stated by the respondents to have appeared and raised objections in the acquisition proceedings. A perusal of the petition further indicates that subsequently thereafter when the petitioners' application for permanent registration with the Industries Department was rejected vide impugned order dated 6.3.1992, the petitioners were again informed that the same was being rejected on account of the fact that the Town Improvement Trust had stated that the land had already been acquired by them. Annexure P-21 and P-23 also indicate the fact that pursuant to the award, the respondents were taking steps to construct the Transport Nagar therein and have removed the structure of the petitioners standing on the said land and, therefore, even otherwise it is evident that they were specifically informed about the passing of the award by the authorities vide communication dated 6.3.1992 inspite of which they did not challenge the land acquisition proceedings or the award before this Court at the time of filing of the petition on 20.3.1992. The fact that the respondents had also deposited the compensation long back is also undisputed. 20. It is further clear that the interim order granted by this Court was vacated on an application being filed by the respondents for vacating stay wherein it was again asserted and brought on record by the respondents that they had taken over possession of the land and were in the process of constructing the Transport Nagar pursuant to which the interim order granted by this Court was vacated on 13.12.1993. The record further indicates that inspite of the aforesaid knowledge, the petitioners chose not to challenge the award dated 12.10.1990 and it was for the first time that the petitioners filed an application for amendment of the petition proposing to challenge the award on 2.2.1996. However, as none appeared for the petitioners on 1.7.2004, the petition, as originally filed by the petitioners, stood dismissed without any orders being passed on the application for amendment. Subsequently, the petitioners filed MCC No. 1168/2004 which was ultimately allowed on 16.3.2012 and the petition was restored and thereafter the application for amendment filed by the petitioners was allowed on 7.2.2013. 21. From a perusal of the reply filed by the respondent nos. 1 & 2 in the present petition, it is further clear and apparent that pursuant to the acquisition proceedings, except for the petitioners, no other person has challenged the award or the acquisition of 17 Acres of land and that the petitioners have assailed the validity of the acquisition of only 0.30 Acres of their land for the purposes of construction of the Transport Nagar. From a perusal of the consequential reply filed by the respondents it is further clear that the Transport Nagar has already been constructed and is functional and its map alongwith photographs has also been brought on record by the respondent authorities alongwith the said application. 22. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is clear that the petitioners were aware of the fact that the land in question had already been acquired even prior to filing of the present petition, however they chose not to challenge the acquisition proceedings at the time of filing the proceedings. It is further clear that even after filing of the present petition when all the facts and details were brought on record by the respondent authorities by filing a return in the year 1992 and 1993, the petitioners chose not to assail the award or the acquisition proceedings and did so for the first time by filing an application for amendment of the petition on 2.2.1996 i.e. 6 years after passing of the award and 4 years after filing of the petition. In the circumstances, it is apparent that there is delay and latches on the part of petitioners in challenging the award of the acquisition proceedings which becomes an important aspect of the matter in view of the fact that the land after acquisition is already in the possession of the respondents since long and has been utilized for the purpose for which it was occupied and the Transport Nagar has already become functional in Chhatarpur. It is further apparent that the objection regarding taking over of possession raised by the petitioners are also misconceived and baseless in view of the facts as stated above and the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Banda Development Authority (supra) in para-37 as quoted above. 23. It is also worth observing that the petitioners allege to have purchased 0.30 Acres of land comprising Khasra No. 1217/1 vide registered sale deed dated 6.6.1988 whereas they have claimed right in respect of Khasra No. 1218/1 Area 0.22 Acres on the strength of a sale deed executed on 15.12.1988, Exhibit P-2. A perusal of the notification issued by the respondent authorities under section 4 of the Act, makes it clear that the said notification was published on 14.10.1988. In the circumstances, it is clear and apparent that the second sale deed that was executed by the petitioners was subsequent to the publication of the notification under section 4 of the Act, and, therefore, the contention of the respondents in this regard is correct and factually sustainable as the petitioners have admittedly purchased the land comprising of Khasra No. 1218/1 subsequent to the publication of the notification under section 4 of the Act, and, therefore, the relief sought by them in respect of this Khasra number is misconceived and is, accordingly, held to be not maintainable. 24. 24. In view of the aforesaid and the law laid down by the Supreme Court, it is evident that the present petition filed by the petitioners suffers from delay and latches on the part of the petitioners in challenging the award and also deserves to be dismissed in view of the fact that it was filed after passing of the award without challenging the same though it was within the knowledge of the petitioners and after taking over of possession of the property in question which is evident from the narration of facts made in the preceding paragraphs. 25. In view of the facts and circumstances, I do not find any merit in the petition which is, accordingly, dismissed in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforementioned cases. 26. In the facts of the case there shall be no orders as to costs.