Research › Search › Judgment

Himachal Pradesh High Court · body

2015 DIGILAW 2001 (HP)

High Court of Himachal Pradesh v. P. D. Goel

2015-12-31

MANSOOR AHMAD MIR, TARLOK SINGH CHAUHAN

body2015
JUDGMENT : Tarlok Singh Chauhan, Judge This Letters Patent Appeal is directed against the judgment passed by the learned writ Court on 09.01.2009 whereby the petition filed by the writ petitioner (respondent herein) for the grant of following reliefs came to be allowed: (i) Quash the entry in column 13 of the Annual Confidential Record of the petitioner for the year 2003-2004 (Annexure P-4) which is to the effect that ‘does not enjoy good general reputation. (ii) Quash the order Annexure P-15 vide which it was conveyed to the petitioner that his representation against the above entry was rejected. (iii) Quash the notification/order dated 20.4.2005 (Annexure P-16) vide which it has been ordered that the petitioner shall stand retired from service on and with effect from 31st July, 2005 i.e. the last day of the month in which he attains the age of 58 years under Rule 14 of the Himachal Pradesh Judicial Service Rules, 2004. (iv) Direct the respondent to permit the petitioner to serve as member of Himachal Higher Judicial Service till the age of superannuation i.e. 60 years. 2. The parties to the lis shall be referred to as the writ petitioner and writ respondent. The facts, in brief, may be noticed. (i) The writ petitioner joined the Himachal Judicial Service as Sub Judge on 14.1.1975 and was thereafter inducted into the Himachal Higher Judicial Service on 19.4.1995. He was granted selection grade on 20.11.2003. Vide letter dated 30.10.2004 the writ petitioner was informed that the following advisory / adverse remarks had been recorded in his Confidential Report for the year 2003-2004 (ending March 31, 2004) for future guidance. “13. General Reputation: Does not enjoy good general reputation. 14. Net Result : Average.” (ii) The writ petitioner sought a clarification from the writ respondent as to whether the aforesaid remarks were advisory or adverse in nature. The writ respondent vide letter dated 1.12.2004 conveyed that the remarks “Does not enjoy good general reputation” against column No. 13 was “adverse” whereas the remarks in column No. 14 “Average” was advisory in nature. The writ petitioner thereafter, requested the Registrar (Vigilance) to make available the relevant record on the basis of which this entry/remark had been made so as to enable him to make a proper representation. The writ petitioner thereafter, requested the Registrar (Vigilance) to make available the relevant record on the basis of which this entry/remark had been made so as to enable him to make a proper representation. (iii) After prolonged correspondence, the writ petitioner vide letter dated 5.3.2005 was conveyed that upon consideration of the entire matter the Hon’ble Full Court felt that the adverse entry “Does not enjoy good general reputation” in column No. 13 was not specifically relatable as such to any particular record nor it had any specific genesis to any particular record of his service. Such an adverse entry as it often happens normally came to be recorded on the basis of the perception that the Hon’ble Members of the Full Court might have been having about the writ petitioner’s functioning and the reputation that he had been enjoying as a Judicial Officer. (iv) As per the gradation list of officers of the Himachal Pradesh Judicial Service as it stood on 1.1.2005, the date of retirement of the writ petitioner was shown as 31.7.2007 which was consistent with Rule 14 of the Himachal Pradesh Judicial Service Rules, 2004 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Rules’) wherein the age of superannuation was fixed at 60 years. The writ petitioner was however shocked to receive the order/notification dated 20.4.2005 wherein it was stated that Hon’ble the Chief Justice and the Hon’ble Judges of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh were pleased to order that the writ petitioner shall stand retired from service on and w.e.f. the afternoon of 31st July, 2005 i.e. the last day of the month in which he attains the age of superannuation i.e. 58 years under Rule 14 of the Rules. (v) This action according to the writ petitioner had been prompted and preempted because of the adverse entry in the Annual Confidential Report for the year 2003-2004 (ibid). It was further alleged that the writ petitioner had been granted annual increment vide office order dated 18.11.2004, which was sufficient proof of the fact that his records was satisfactory or otherwise this increment could have been stopped. It was also alleged that the judicial officers who had inferior records than the writ petitioner had been permitted to serve upto 60 years, whereas the writ petitioner had been singled out for discriminatory treatment in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. 3. It was also alleged that the judicial officers who had inferior records than the writ petitioner had been permitted to serve upto 60 years, whereas the writ petitioner had been singled out for discriminatory treatment in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. 3. The writ respondent opposed the petition by filing reply wherein it was averred that the decision to retire the writ petitioner on completion of 58 years (Annexure P-16) was not issued just on the basis of one adverse entry in the ACR of the writ petitioner for the year 2003- 2004 but his entire record was considered by the Hon’ble Full Court for forming the opinion with regard to his potential for continued useful service. It was after considering the entire record that the Hon’ble Full Court decided not to grant an extension to the writ petitioner beyond 58 years of age and to retire him at the age of 58 years. It was further averred that the remarks in the ACRs of the writ petitioner for the year 2003-04 had been recorded on the basis of the perception of the Hon’ble Full Court vis-à-vis the reputation of the writ petitioner during the relevant period and did not relate to any particular service record of the writ petitioner. 4. Insofar as the grant of selection grade is concerned, it was averred that just because due selection grade is granted to an officer or annual increment due is released in his favour, the same does not mean that the judicial officer has earned the right to extended age of superannuation. The grant of extension in service is not a vested right and is governed by Rule 14. 5. The grant of extension in service is not a vested right and is governed by Rule 14. 5. Based on the pleadings and argument of the parties, the learned writ Court allowed the writ petition by holding: (i) That the retirement age of judicial officer is 60 years and any retirement prior to this age, amounts to compulsory retirement ; (ii) It is only the Governor and not the High Court, who could have issued the notification regarding retirement ; (iii) That the consideration by the Full Court in not granting extension was violative of Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution as the petitioner was singled out, whereas the extension was granted to other similarly situated judicial officers; (iv) That there was no material available whereby the petitioner could be denied extension upto the age of 60 years ; (v) That the adverse remarks regarding reputation of the petitioner was subjective and had no basis whatsoever ; (vi) That the representation against the adverse remarks could not have been summarily rejected without communicating any reasons ; and (vii) Once selection grade had been granted to the petitioner it proved that there was nothing adverse against him as the same could be granted only pursuant to the recommendation of the Committee after assessing the merit/combined seniority of the petitioner and other similarly situated persons. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the records of the case carefully. 6. At the outset, it may be observed that Mr. Arjun Lall, learned counsel for the writ respondent has fairly submitted that the writ petitioner does not press the ground regarding discrimination in matters of extension granted to the other judicial officers. 7. The learned counsel for the writ respondent while assailing the judgment passed by the learned writ Court has mainly raised the following arguments:- (i) That the learned writ Court erred in concluding that since the services of the writ petitioner were not continued beyond 58 years of age, therefore, he was compulsorily retired from service. (ii) That the writ Court had no power to review the decision passed by the Full Court. (iii) Mere granting of selection grade in favour of the writ petitioner did not prove that there was nothing adverse against him. (ii) That the writ Court had no power to review the decision passed by the Full Court. (iii) Mere granting of selection grade in favour of the writ petitioner did not prove that there was nothing adverse against him. (iv) That the writ Court erred in holding that it was the Governor alone and not the High Court which could have issued the notification regarding the retirement of the writ petitioner. 8. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the writ petitioner has vehemently argued that the order passed by the learned writ Court is perfectly in tune with the law and, therefore, deserves to be upheld. 9. What emerges from the arguments of the respective parties is that it would be necessary for this Court to formulate the following questions which arise for consideration:- (i) Whether the retirement age of 60 years was automatically available to the writ petitioner irrespective of his past record of service and evidence of his continued utility to the judicial system? (ii) Whether the decision of the Full Court in not granting the extension to the writ petitioner beyond 58 years of age based upon his entire service record with regard to his potential for continued useful service was open to judicial review except on well settled principles? (iii) Whether mere granting of selection grade would itself prove that there was nothing adverse against the petitioner? (iv) Whether it was the High Court or the Governor, who was competent to have passed the final order of the retirement of the writ petitioner w.e.f. 31st July, 2005? Question No.1. 10. It is not in dispute that the service of the writ petitioner is governed by the Himachal Pradesh Judicial Service Rules, 2004 (for short ‘2004 Rules’). The Rules relevant for the purpose are the Rules 14 and 15, which read thus: “Rule -14. Age of superannuation. – The age of superannuation of a member of the service shall be sixty years. Provided that before the completion of fifty eight years of service, the High Court with reference to the record of the Officer, quality of his judgments and his potential of utility in service, shall decide either to retire the Officer on completion of fifty eight years of service or grant him extension upto sixty years. Rule – 15. Retirement in public interest. Rule – 15. Retirement in public interest. – (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in these rules, the Governor shall on the recommendations of the High Court, if he is of the opinion that it is in the public interest so to do, have the absolute right to retire any member of the service who has attained their age of fifty years by giving him notice of not less than three months, in writing, or three months pay and allowances in lieu of such notice. (2). Whether a member of the service should be retired in public interest under sub-rule (1) shall be considered at least three times, that is, when he is about to attain the age of 50 years, 55 years and 58 years. Provided that nothing in sub-rule (2) shall be construed as preventing the consideration of question of retirement of a member of the service in the public interest at any time other than those mentioned therein.” 11. The specific stand of the writ respondent(appellant herein) in its reply to the writ petition was that as per the mandatory requirement of proviso to Rule 14 of the 2004 Rules, the Hon’ble Full Court had considered the entire service record of the writ petitioner for forming the opinion with regard to his potential for continued useful service and it is only after considering the entire record that the Full Court decided not to grant an extension to the writ petitioner beyond 58 years of age and retired him at the age of 58 years. The order passed on the basis of such decision, reads thus: “Hon’ble the Chief Justice and Hon’ble Judges of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh are pleased to order that Shri P.D. Goel, District and Sessions Judge, Chamba (a Member of Himachal Pradesh Judicial Service), shall stand retired from service on and with effect from the afternoon of 31st July, 2005 i.e. last day of the month in which he attains the age of superannuation, that is, 58 years, under Rule 14 of the Himachal Pradesh Judicial Service Rules, 2004.” 12. It would also be noticed that insofar as the compulsory retirement is concerned, the same is specifically dealt with under Rule 15 (supra) and has apparently not been invoked in the case of the writ petitioner. 13. It would also be noticed that insofar as the compulsory retirement is concerned, the same is specifically dealt with under Rule 15 (supra) and has apparently not been invoked in the case of the writ petitioner. 13. The learned writ Court by placing reliance upon Rule 14 has held that once the age of retirement is 60 years, then the action of the writ respondent to retire the writ petitioner at 58 years, amounts to compulsory retirement and since the procedure for the same had not been followed, therefore, the order retiring the writ petitioner at the age of 58 years was liable to be set-aside. 14. The aforesaid view of the learned writ Court cannot be legally sustained in view of the fact that once the High Court had formed an opinion that the writ petitioner does not have utility for continued service so as to be retained beyond 58 years of age, then the writ petitioner cannot be said to have been compulsorily retired under Rule 15, but in fact ordered to be retired at the age of 58 years by invoking Rule 14 and, therefore, the procedure as envisaged for compulsory retirement under Rule 15 was inapplicable and was thus not required to be followed. 15. The mere fact that the writ petitioner was retired at the age of 58 years would not bring his case under Rule 15 for the simple reason that in so far Rule 14 is concerned, the High Court would in reference to the record of the officer, quality of his judgment and his potential of utility in service, decide either to retire the officer on completion of 58 years of service or grant him extension upto 60 years. Whereas, in terms of Rule 15 the High Court was to form an opinion that it was in the public interest to retire a judicial officer on his attaining the age of 50 years, 55 years and 58 years by giving him notice not less than three months, in writing, or three months pay and allowances in lieu of such notice and then make the recommendation to the Governor to compulsory retire the incumbent. 16. 16. In All India Judges’ Association vs. Union of India and others (1992) 1 SCC 119 the Hon’ble Supreme Court passed various directions for betterment of service conditions of subordinate judiciary which included the increase of retirement age of judicial officers to 60 years. The matter was thereafter brought before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in All India Judges’ Association and others vs. Union of India and others (1993) 4 SCC 288 wherein again the Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated that the age of retirement of judicial officers should be increased to 60 years. However, it was made clear that the increase of the retirement age would not be available automatically to all the judicial officers irrespective of their past record of service and evidence of their continued utility to the judicial system. It is apt to reproduce paras 30 and 31 of the judgment which reads thus: “30. There is, however, one aspect we should emphasise here. To that extent the direction contained in the main judgment under review shall stand modified. The benefit of the increase of the retirement age to 60 years, shall not be available automatically to all judicial officers irrespective of their past record of service and evidence of their continued utility to the judicial system. The benefit will be available to those who, in the opinion of the respective High Courts, have a potential for continued useful service. It is not intended as a windfall for the indolent, the infirm and those of doubtful integrity, reputation and utility. The potential for continued utility shall be assessed and evaluated by appropriate Committees of Judges of the respective High Courts constituted and headed by the Chief Justices of the High Courts and the evaluation shall be made on the basis of the judicial officers' past record of service, character rolls, quality of judgments and other relevant matters. 31. The High Court should undertake and complete the exercise in case of officers about to attain the age of 58 years well within time by following the procedure for compulsory retirement as laid down in the respective Service Rules applicable to the judicial officers. Those who will not be found fit and eligible by this standard should not be given the benefit of the higher retirement age and should be compulsorily retired at the age of 58 by following the said procedure for compulsory retirement. Those who will not be found fit and eligible by this standard should not be given the benefit of the higher retirement age and should be compulsorily retired at the age of 58 by following the said procedure for compulsory retirement. The exercise should be undertaken before the attainment of the age of 58 years even in cases where earlier the age of superannuation was less than 58 years. It is necessary to make it clear that this assessment is for the purpose of finding out the suitability of the concerned officers for the entitlement of the benefit of the increased age of superannuation from 58 years to 60 years. It is in addition to the assessment to be undertaken for compulsory retirement and the compulsory retirement at the earlier stage/s under the respective Service Rules.” 17. In Ramesh Chandra Acharya vs. Registrar, High Court of Orissa (2000) 6 SCC 332 it was again reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the benefit of increase in the retirement age to 60 years shall not be available automatically to all judicial officers irrespective of their past record of service and there must be evidence of their continued utility to the judicial system in case they are to be continued. 18. In Biswanath Prasad Singh vs. State of Bihar (2001) 2 SCC 305 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court took note of the expression “compulsory retirement” used in paragraph 31 of the All India Judges’ Association case (supra) and then drew a clear distinction between “compulsory retirement” and “continued utility in service” and it was held as under: “11. The use of the words compulsory retirement for the judicial officers allowed to superannuate at the age of 58 years and the expressions such as compulsory retirement on attaining the age of 58 years according to the procedure for compulsory retirement under the rules have emboldened the petitioner to raise the plea that subsequent to the judgment of this court in 1993 case, the retirement of a judicial officer at the age of 58 years is not retirement in ordinary course but compulsory retirement and therefore the procedure for compulsory retirement has to be followed. In our opinion such a submission cannot be entertained on an overall reading of the judgment of this court in 1993 case. 15. In our opinion such a submission cannot be entertained on an overall reading of the judgment of this court in 1993 case. 15. In the first case, the only follow-up action required by the High Court is to inform the Government of its decision so that the Government knows that the officer which, according to its records, was going to retire on completing the age of 58 years would be continuing upto the age of 60 years. The officer concerned may also be informed so as to feel assured that he has to serve upto the age of 60 years and also feel encouraged that his performance in office, honesty, uprightness and hard work have earned him the benefit of holding the post for another two years beyond the normal age of superannuation; the judicial system acknowledges his utility for continuing the association ahead. In the second case, the High Court, having followed the statutory procedure applicable to compulsory retirement in public interest, shall communicate its finding by way of recommendation to the State Government and the State Government shall act on the recommendation as required by Article 235 of the Constitution and pass the consequential order of compulsory retirement whereupon the compulsory retirement shall take effect. In the third case, no order is required to be passed or communicated either to the State Government or to the officer concerned. The officer would be retiring on his reaching the normal superannuation age. The State Government and the officer both know as soon as the officer enters the service as to what his date of retirement is. However, for the sake of convenience and by way of courtesy, the High Court may inform the officer that he was not being given the benefit of extended age of superannuation under the 1993 case. 16. The word compulsory retirement is not a very appropriate expression to be employed in the cases covered by category (iii) because the officer has neither been given the benefit of extended age of superannuation nor was being retired prematurely nor was being compulsorily retired in the sense the expression is known to service jurisprudence but was being allowed to retire simplicitor at the age of superannuation appointed by the service rules governing him. His length of service was neither being extended nor snapped mid-way. His length of service was neither being extended nor snapped mid-way. In this third category of cases, the employment of words compulsory retirement denotes only this much that the High Court having undertaken the exercise of evaluation in the terms of 1993 case and having formed the opinion that the officer was not entitled to benefit of extension, there was no other option left available except to allow the officer concerned to retire at the normal age of his superannuation. Even assuming, without conceding that the retirement at the normal age of superannuation, viz. 58 years, has been consciously called compulsory retirement in the 1993 case, the same would at the most be a compulsory retirement in public interest and certainly not by way of penalty casting any stigma. But in any case other than the exercise of evaluation undertaken by the High Court, an order of so called compulsory retirement would not need to be passed by the State Government in as much as such retirement was not under the service rules but only in terms of the judgment of the Supreme Court which judgment does not require an order by the State Government to be passed for its validity or efficacy. Thus, there is no scope for raising the pleas sought to be raised by the petitioner herein.” 19. In N.C.Das vs. Gauhati High Court through Registrar and others (2012) 2 SCC 321 the question posed before the Hon’ble Supreme Court was whether the amendment to the Rules made in the year 2006 in enhancing the age of superannuation from 58 to 60 years would be automatically available to the members of the Tripura Judicial Service, who had otherwise been retired at the age of 58 years and it was held as under: “13. A bare perusal of clause (B) of amended Rule 20 leaves no manner of doubt that the High Court is empowered to assess and evaluate the record of a judicial officer for continued utility in service up to 60 years. Clause (B) has overriding effect over clause (A) of Rule 20. This is clear from the expression ‘Notwithstanding anything contained in clause (A)’ with which clause (B) begins. The mode and manner of assessment and evaluation of the potential of continued utility is prescribed in Rule 20 (B) (i) of the 2003 rules. Clause (B) has overriding effect over clause (A) of Rule 20. This is clear from the expression ‘Notwithstanding anything contained in clause (A)’ with which clause (B) begins. The mode and manner of assessment and evaluation of the potential of continued utility is prescribed in Rule 20 (B) (i) of the 2003 rules. No legal flaw has been pointed out to the exercise undertaken by the High Court in respect of the assessment and evaluation for the petitioner’s service for continued utility in service up to 60 years. We are satisfied that the petitioner’s service for continue utility in service up to 60 years. We are satisfied that the petitioner is not entitled to the relief claimed in the Interlocutory Application No. 5 of 2006. Interlocutory Application No.5 of 2006, is accordingly, dismissed.” 20. From the aforesaid exposition of law, it can safely be concluded that the order passed under Rule 14 thereby retiring a person at the age of 58 years is not an order of compulsory retirement because there is no right of the judicial officer to continue beyond the age of 58 years unless the High Court on the administrative side finds him suitable to continue. If the judicial officer is not found suitable to be continued in service, he retires. The order is neither stigmatic nor can be said to be passed by way of punishment. The Court only looks at the utility and suitability of retaining the officer in service. Therefore, the findings recorded by the learned writ Court that the writ petitioner had been compulsorily retired only on account of his having not been allowed to continue to 60 years is unsustainable. Question No.2. 21. It was vehemently argued by learned senior counsel for the writ respondent that the findings of the learned writ Court that the adverse remarks regarding reputation of the writ petitioner were subjective and had no basis or that the representation against the adverse remarks could not have been summarily rejected without communicating any reasons, is contrary to the law and was otherwise beyond the scope of judicial review. It is further argued that the only adverse entry communicated to the petitioner was regarding his reputation and there was no requirement of law that before arriving at such a conclusion there should have been written material and it was also not necessary to communicate the reasons. 22. It is further argued that the only adverse entry communicated to the petitioner was regarding his reputation and there was no requirement of law that before arriving at such a conclusion there should have been written material and it was also not necessary to communicate the reasons. 22. On the other hand, learned counsel for the writ petitioner would argue that before forming an opinion to be adverse, the Reporting Officer should have shared the opinion which admittedly was not part of the record with the other officers concerned and if this was not done, then the adverse entry had to be quashed. That apart, the opinion at best could be a perception which in any case could not have been made the basis of an adverse entry as the same was required to be founded on facts and material. 23. It would be noticed that the learned writ Court has itself sat in appeal over the decision made by the Hon’ble Full Court by concluding that the remarks made by the members of the Hon’ble Full Court were based on their perception and that such an opinion could only be formed objectively and not subjectively and the writ petitioner was required to be confronted with the material, if any, available on record and only thereafter the entries could have been incorporated. 24. The mandate of Article 235 of the Constitution is that the High Court has to maintain constant vigil on its subordinate judiciary. For that the judicial service is not a service in the sense of an employment as is commonly understood. Judges are discharging their functions while exercising the sovereign judicial power of the State and their honesty and integrity is expected to be beyond doubt. It should be reflected in their overall reputation. The nature of judicial service is such that it cannot afford to suffer continuance in service of persons of doubtful integrity or who have lost their utility. Article 235 enables the High Court to assess the performance of any judicial officer at any point of time with a view to discipline the black sheep or weed out the dead wood, and this constitutional power of the High Court cannot be circumscribed by any rule or order. This was so held in Rajendra Singh Verma vs. Lt. Article 235 enables the High Court to assess the performance of any judicial officer at any point of time with a view to discipline the black sheep or weed out the dead wood, and this constitutional power of the High Court cannot be circumscribed by any rule or order. This was so held in Rajendra Singh Verma vs. Lt. Governor (NCT of Delhi) and others (2011) 10 SCC 1 ( in paras 80, 81 & 82) which are quoted below:- “80. The mandate of Article 235 of the Constitution is that the High Court has to maintain constant vigil on its subordinate judiciary as laid down by this Court in High Court of Judicature at Bombay through its Registrars Vs. Shirishkumar Rangrao Patil and Another (1997) 6 SCC 339 . In the said case, this Court has explained that the lymph nodes (cancerous cells) of corruption constantly keep creeping into the vital veins of the judiciary and need to stem it out by judicial surgery lies on the judiciary itself by its self- imposed or corrective measures or disciplinary action under the doctrine of control enshrined in Articles 235, 124(6) of the Constitution, and therefore, it would be necessary that there should be constant vigil by the High Court concerned on its subordinate judiciary and self introspection. 81. Judicial service is not a service in the sense of an employment as is commonly understood. Judges are discharging their functions while exercising the sovereign judicial power of the State. Their honesty and integrity is expected to be beyond doubt. It should be reflected in their overall reputation. There is no manner of doubt that the nature of judicial service is such that it cannot afford to suffer continuance in service of persons of doubtful integrity or who have lost their utility. 82. As explained by this Court in Chandra Singh and others Vs. State of Rajasthan & another (2003) 6 SCC 545 , the power of compulsory retirement can be exercised at any time and that the power under Article 235 in this regard is not in any manner circumscribed by any rule or order. 82. As explained by this Court in Chandra Singh and others Vs. State of Rajasthan & another (2003) 6 SCC 545 , the power of compulsory retirement can be exercised at any time and that the power under Article 235 in this regard is not in any manner circumscribed by any rule or order. What is explained in the said decision by this Court is that Article 235 of the Constitution of India enables the High Court to assess the performance of any judicial officer at any time with a view to discipline the black sheep or weed out the deadwood, and this constitutional power of the High Court cannot be circumscribed by any rule or order.” 25. While considering the case of an officer as to whether he should be continued in service or not, his entire service record up to that date on which consideration is made has to be taken into account. The mere fact that even after an earlier adverse entry an officer was promoted or given selection grade etc. by itself would not preclude the authority from considering the earlier adverse entry. The order not to grant extension beyond 58 years would be based on the material which means substance, material, stuff, something etc. While considering the case of a judicial officer, it is not necessary to limit the “material” only to written complaints or “tangible” evidence pointing finger at the integrity of the judicial officer. Such an evidence may not be forthcoming in such cases. After all making an adverse entry is not equivalent to imposition of a penalty which would necessitate an enquiry or the giving of a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the Government servant concerned. Further, in case where the Full Court of the High Court recommends compulsory retirement of an officer or non-extension of service beyond 58 years, the High Court on the judicial side has to exercise great caution and circumspection in setting aside that order because it is a complement of all the Judges of the High Court who go into the question and it is possible that in all cases evidence would not be forthcoming about the reputation of the judicial officer. The Full Court acts on the collective wisdom of all the Judges and if the general reputation of an employee is not good, though there may not be any tangible material against him, he may either be compulsory retired or granted extension and judicial review of such order is permissible only on a limited ground. Normally, the adverse entry reflecting on the integrity or reputation would be based on formulations of impressions which would be the result of multiple factors. Therefore, if the authority bona fide forms an opinion about the reputation of a particular officer, the correctness of that opinion cannot be challenged before the Court as held in Rajendra Singh Verma case supra and it is apt to reproduce paras 183, 189, 190, 191 and 192 of judgment which read as under: “183. It is well settled by a catena of decisions of this Court that while considering the case of an officer as to whether he should be continued in service or compulsorily retired, his entire service record upto that date on which consideration is made has to be taken into account. What weight should be attached to earlier entries as compared to recent entries is a matter of evaluation, but there is no manner of doubt that consideration has to be of the entire service record. The fact that an officer, after an earlier adverse entry, was promoted does not wipe out earlier adverse entry at all. It would be wrong to contend that merely for the reason that after an earlier adverse entry an officer was promoted that by itself would preclude the authority from considering the earlier adverse entry. When the law says that the entire service record has to be taken into consideration, the earlier adverse entry, which forms a part of the service record, would also be relevant irrespective of the fact whether officer concerned was promoted to higher position or whether he was granted certain benefits like increments etc. “189. The argument that material was not supplied on the basis of which "`C' Doubtful Integrity" was awarded to the appellants and, therefore, the order of compulsory retirement is liable to be set aside has no substance. Normally and contextually word `material' means substance, matter, stuff, something, materiality, medium, data, facts, information, figures, notes etc. “189. The argument that material was not supplied on the basis of which "`C' Doubtful Integrity" was awarded to the appellants and, therefore, the order of compulsory retirement is liable to be set aside has no substance. Normally and contextually word `material' means substance, matter, stuff, something, materiality, medium, data, facts, information, figures, notes etc. When this Court is examining as to whether there was any `material' before the High Court on the basis of which adverse remarks were recorded in the confidential reports of the appellants, this `material' relates to substance, matter, data, information etc. While considering the case of a judicial officer it is not necessary to limit the `material' only to written complaints or `tangible' evidence pointing finger at the integrity of the judicial officer. Such an evidence may not be forthcoming in such cases. 190. As observed by this Court in R.L. Butail Vs. Union of India and Others, (1970) 2 SCC 876 , it is not necessary that an opportunity of being heard before recording adverse entry should be afforded to the officer concerned. In the said case, the contention that an inquiry would be necessary before an adverse entry is made was rejected as suffering from a misapprehension that such an entry amounts to the penalty of censure. It is explained by this Court in the said decision that : (SCC p. 876) “(ii)…making of an adverse entry is not equivalent to imposition of a penalty which would necessitate an enquiry or giving of a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the Government servant concerned.” 191. Further in case where the Full Court of the High Court recommends compulsory retirement of an officer, the High Court on the judicial side has to exercise great caution and circumspection in setting aside that order because it is a complement of all the judges of the High Court who go into the question and it is possible that in all cases evidence would not be forth coming about doubtful integrity of a Judicial Officer. As observed by this Court in High Court of Punjab & Haryana through R.G. Vs. As observed by this Court in High Court of Punjab & Haryana through R.G. Vs. Ishwar Chand Jain and Another, (1999) 4 SCC 579 , at times, the Full Court has to act on the collective wisdom of all the Judges and if the general reputation of an employee is not good, though there may not be any tangible material against him, he may be given compulsory retirement in public interest and judicial review of such order is permissible only on limited grounds. The reputation of being corrupt would gather thick and unchaseable clouds around the conduct of an officer and gain notoriety much faster than the smoke. Sometimes there may not be concrete or material evidence to make it part of the record. It would, therefore, be impracticable for the reporting officer or the competent controlling officer writing the confidential report to give specific instances of shortfalls, supported by evidence. 192. Normally, the adverse entry reflecting on the integrity would be based on formulations of impressions which would be result of multiple factors simultaneously playing in the mind. Though the perceptions may differ in the very nature of things there is a difficulty nearing an impossibility in subjecting the entries in the confidential rolls to judicial review. Sometimes, if the general reputation of an employee is not good though there may not be any tangible material against him, he may be compulsorily retired in public interest. The duty conferred on the appropriate authority to consider the question of continuance of a judicial officer beyond a particular age is an absolute one. If that authority bona fide forms an opinion that the integrity of a particular officer is doubtful, the correctness of that opinion cannot be challenged before courts. When such a constitutional function is exercised on the administrative side of the High Court, any judicial review thereon should be made only with great care and circumspection and it must be confined strictly to the parameters set by this Court in several reported decisions. When the appropriate authority forms bona fide opinion that compulsory retirement of a judicial officer is in public interest, the writ Court under Article 226 or this Court under Article 32 would not interfere with the order.” 26. The Hon’ble Supreme Court further held that the exercise undertaken by the Full Court is not ordinarily amenable to judicial review except under extraordinary circumstances. The Hon’ble Supreme Court further held that the exercise undertaken by the Full Court is not ordinarily amenable to judicial review except under extraordinary circumstances. The relevant observation reads thus: “218…..In cases of such assessment, evaluation and formulation of opinions, a vast range of multiple factors play a vital and important role and no one factor should be allowed to be blown out of proportion either to decry or deify an issue to be resolved or claims sought to be considered or asserted. In the very nature of things, it would be difficult, nearing almost an impossibility to subject such exercise undertaken by the Full Court to judicial review except in an extraordinary case when the Court is convinced that some real injustice, which ought not to have taken place, has really happened and not merely because there could be another possible view or someone has some grievance about the exercise undertaken by the Committee/Full Court.” 27. The scope of judicial review of an order passed by the High Court on administrative side came up for consideration of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Syed T.A. Naqshbandi and others vs. State of Jammu and Kashmir and others (2003) 9 SCC 592 wherein it was inter alia held thus: “10.. ….Neither the High Court nor this Court, in exercise of its powers of judicial review, could or would at any rate substitute themselves in the place of the Committee/Full Court of the High Court concerned, to make an independent reassessment of the same, as if sitting on an appeal. On a careful consideration of the entire materials brought to our notice by learned counsel on either side, we are satisfied that the evaluation made by the Committee/Full Court forming their unanimous opinions is neither so arbitrary or capricious nor can be said to be so irrational as to shock the conscience of the Court to warrant or justify any interference. In cases of such assessment, evaluation and formulation of opinions a vast range of multiple factors play a vital and important role and no one factor should be allowed to be overblown out of proportion either to decry or deify an issue to be resolved or claims sought to be considered or asserted. In cases of such assessment, evaluation and formulation of opinions a vast range of multiple factors play a vital and important role and no one factor should be allowed to be overblown out of proportion either to decry or deify an issue to be resolved or claims sought to be considered or asserted. In the very nature of things it would be difficult, nearing almost an impossibility to subject such exercise undertaken by the Full Court, to judicial review except in an extraordinary case when the Court is convinced that some monstrous thing which ought not to have taken place has really happened and not merely because there could be another possible view or someone has some grievance about the exercise undertaken by the Committee/Full Court. Viewed thus, and considered in the background of the factual details and materials on record, there is absolutely no need or justification for this Court to interfere in the matter, with the impugned proceedings. 28. In High Court of Judicature, Patna vs. Shiveshwar Narayan and another (2011) 15 SCC 317 the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that once the Full Court had unanimously accepted and approved the view of the Evaluation Committee in not extending the benefit of increase of retirement age to 60 years, then the High Court on the judicial side could not sit in appeal over the decision to go into the correctness of the decision itself taken by the High Court on the administrative side and would go only into the decision making process. It is apt to reproduce para 18 of the judgment which reads thus: “18. In the backdrop of the above material, if the Evaluation Committee formed an opinion that Judicial Officer did not have potential for continued service and that decision has been accepted and approved by the Full Court unanimously, can it be said that the decision of the Full Court in not extending benefit of increase of retirement age to 60 years is based on irrelevant considerations or not material? In our view, the answer has to be no. The use of the expression by the Evaluation Committee in its resolution viz; further continuance in service will not be in public interest has to be read in the context of the subsequent expression immediately following i.e. ‘as he does not have the potential for continued useful service’. In our view, the answer has to be no. The use of the expression by the Evaluation Committee in its resolution viz; further continuance in service will not be in public interest has to be read in the context of the subsequent expression immediately following i.e. ‘as he does not have the potential for continued useful service’. The Evaluation Committee evaluated and assessed the case of the Judicial Officer with a primary object to find out as to whether Judicial Officer has potential for continued useful service and having regard to the entire service record, character rolls, quality of judgments and other relevant factors, concluded that he does not have potential for continued useful service. The Full Court unanimously accepted and approved the view of the Evaluation Committee. The decision making process is, thus, not at all flawed.” 29. In Registrar General, Patna HighCourt vs. Pandey Gajendra Prasad and others AIR 2012 SC 2319 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court after reviewing the entire case law reiterated the principles laid down from time to time with regard to the scope of judicial review in such like cases and held that when the report of the Administrative Committee was put up before the Full Court which takes a conscious decision to award the punishment/dismissal from service then it would be very difficult rather almost impossible to subject such an exercise to judicial review except in extraordinary cases. 30. Yet again in recent decision in High Court of Judicature of Patna, through Registrar General vs. Shyam Deo Singh and others (2014) 4 SCC 773 after referring to the earlier decision in Syed T.A. Naqshbandi vs. State of Jammu and Kashmir, (2003) 9 SCC 592 , the limited judicial review that is permissible was reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in para 8 of the judgment which reads thus: “8. The importance of the issue can hardly be gainsaid. The evaluation of the service record of a judicial officer for the purpose of formation of an opinion as to his/her potential for continued useful service is required to be made by the High Court which obviously means the Full Court on the administrative side. In all High Courts such evaluation, in the first instance, is made by a committee of senior Judges. In all High Courts such evaluation, in the first instance, is made by a committee of senior Judges. The decision of the Committee is placed before the Full Court to decide whether the recommendation of the Committee should be accepted or not. The ultimate decision is always preceded by an elaborate consideration of the matter by the Hon’ble Judges of the High Court who are familiar with the qualities and attributes of the judicial officer under consideration. This is also what had happened in the present case. The very process by which the decision is eventually arrived at, in our view, should permit a limited judicial review and it is only in a rare case where the decision taken is unsupported by any material or the same reflects a conclusion which, on the face of it, cannot be sustained that judicial review would be permissible.” 31. What would emerge from the aforesaid exposition of law is that where the Full Court of the High Court recommends the retirement of an Officer, the High Court on the judicial side has to exercise with great caution and circumspection in setting aside that order because it’s a complement of all the High Court Judges, who act on their collective wisdom and if the general reputation of an employee is not good, though there may not be any tangible material against him, he may be retired and judicial review of such order is permissible only on limited grounds. Sometimes, there may not be concrete or material evidence to make it a part of record. It would, therefore, be impracticable for the reporting Officer or the competent controlling Officer writing the confidential report to give specific instances of shortfalls, supported by evidence. Though, the perception may differ in the very nature of things, there is a difficulty nearing an impossibility in subjecting the entries in the confidential rolls to judicial review. Sometimes, if the general reputation of an employee is not good, though there may not be any tangible material against him, he may be ordered to be retired. The duty conferred upon the appropriate authority to consider the question of continuance of a Judicial Officer beyond a particular age is an absolute one. Sometimes, if the general reputation of an employee is not good, though there may not be any tangible material against him, he may be ordered to be retired. The duty conferred upon the appropriate authority to consider the question of continuance of a Judicial Officer beyond a particular age is an absolute one. When the Full Court exercises its constitutional opinion on the administrative side, any judicial review thereon should be made with great care and circumspection and it must be strictly confined to the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid cited cases. But, in no circumstance, can the High Court on the judicial side in exercise of its powers of judicial review substitute itself in the place of the Committee/Full Court of the High Court to make an independent assessment of the same as if sitting in appeal over the same. 32. As observed earlier, the learned writ Court in exercise of its powers of judicial review has substituted itself in the place of the Full Court of the High Court and made an independent reassessment of the same which is impermissible in law. Question No. 3. 33. It is vehemently argued by learned counsel for the writ respondent that just because selection grade due is granted to the Officer or an annual increment is released in his favour, the same does not mean that the Officer has attained or acquired the extended age of superannuation. It is further argued that evaluation of service record of a Judicial Officer for the purpose of formation of an opinion as to his potential for continued useful service is required to be made by the High Court which obviously means the Full Court on the administrative side. The evaluation is first done by the Committee of Judges and the decision taken by this Committee is thereafter placed before the Full Court to decide whether the recommendations of the Committee should be accepted or not. The ultimate decision is always preceded by an elaborate consideration of the matter by the Hon’ble Judges of the High Court, who were familiar with the qualities and attributes of the Judicial Officer under consideration. The ultimate decision is always preceded by an elaborate consideration of the matter by the Hon’ble Judges of the High Court, who were familiar with the qualities and attributes of the Judicial Officer under consideration. This entitlement to continuation/extension of service of a Judicial Officer is not determined on the basis of one factor alone but on the basis of the entire service record of the petitioner and not on a comparative assessment with the record of the other Officer. 34. We find a great deal of force in the submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioner because this is what was precisely said in Shyam Deo Singh (supra) wherein it was categorically held that the entitlement to continuation/extension of service of a Judicial Officer beyond the age of 58 years has to be determined on the basis of the service record of a particular Officer and not on a comparative assessment with the record of other Officers. Therefore, even if, ACRs of another Officer were far interior to that of the Officer under consideration, the same, at best, may have relevance to grant of extension to the aforesaid Officer without conferring any right or entitlement to the Officer under consideration for a similar extension. 35. In S.D. Singh vs. Jharkhand High Court through Registrar General and others (2005) 13 SCC 737 it was observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that merely because the judicial officer has been promoted superseding others did not establish that the petitioner was fit to be continued in service. 36. Thus, it can safely be concluded that the mere fact that selection grade had been granted to the writ petitioner could only be considered to be a single instance in his favour, but that itself alone could not lead to an inference that there was nothing adverse against him. It is after evaluation of the entire service record of the writ petitioner that an opinion as to his potential of continued useful service was made by the High Court which obviously means Full Court on the administrative side. There can be no doubt that the ultimate decision taken by the Hon’ble Judges of the Full Court was preceded by an elaborate consideration on the matter by the Hon’ble Judges, who were familiar with the qualities and attributes of the writ petitioner. There can be no doubt that the ultimate decision taken by the Hon’ble Judges of the Full Court was preceded by an elaborate consideration on the matter by the Hon’ble Judges, who were familiar with the qualities and attributes of the writ petitioner. The decision was a collective one and was not to be determined on the basis of one factor alone, but on the basis of the entire service record of the writ petitioner, that too without any comparative assessment with the record of the other Judicial Officers. Having observed so, the findings recorded by the learned writ Court that since one selection grade had been granted to the writ petitioner, it proved that there was nothing adverse against him, cannot be sustained. Question No.4. 37. It is vehemently argued by learned counsel for the petitioner that under Article 235 of the Constitution, it is the Governor alone, who could have passed the order of retirement. While on the other hand, learned counsel for the writ respondent would argue that since the Constitution vests in the High Court administrative, judicial and disciplinary control over the members of the judicial service and its decision in this regard are binding on the State Government and, therefore, if the impugned order of retirement is passed by the High Court, the recommendations of the High Court to the Governor is just an empty formality. 38. Article 235 of the Constitution of India reads thus:- “235. Control over subordinate Courts.- The control over district Courts and Courts subordinate thereto including the posting and promotion of, and the grant of leave to, persons belonging to the judicial service of a State and holding any post inferior to the post of district Judge shall be vested in the High Court, but nothing in this article shall be construed as taking away from any such person any right of appeal which he may have under the law regulating the conditions of his service or as authorizing the High Court to deal with him otherwise than in accordance with the conditions of his service prescribed under such law.” 39. In T. Lakshmi Narasimha Chari vs. High Court of A.P. and another (1996) 5 SCC 90 the Hon’ble Supreme Court was seized of a case of judicial officers holding substantive rank of District Munsiff at the time of issuance of order of removal from service by the High Court itself and not by the Governor. After setting aside the order of removal made by the High Court, the Hon’ble Supreme Court treated the order passed by the High Court as a recommendation of the High Court to the Governor for removal from service by holding that the control over these judicial officers vested in the High Court by virtue of Article 235 of the Constitution of India and the Governor was bound in each of the case to act in accordance with the recommendation of the High Court and each of them has to be removed from service. It is apt to reproduce para 18 of the judgment which reads thus: “18. The question now is of the kind of final order to be made in these cases. In the cases of both these officers, namely, T. Lakshmi Narasimha Chari and K. David Wilson, the order of removal made by the High Court is set aside for the reasons already given. However, the action of the High Court against both these judicial officers who held the substantive rank of District Munsiff, is to be treated as the recommendation of the High Court to the Governor for their removal from service. In view of the control over them vested in the High Court by virtue of Article 235 of the Constitution, the Governor is bound, in each case, to act in accordance with the recommendation of the High Court and each of them has to be removed from service for the misconduct found proved by the High Court against them. The Governor of the State of Andhra Pradesh is to proceed and make the necessary consequential orders in accordance with the recommendation of the High Court in each came, in accordance with law. It was submitted by learned counsel for T. Lakshmi Narasimha Chari that he has attained the age of superannuation in the meantime. The Governor of the State of Andhra Pradesh is to proceed and make the necessary consequential orders in accordance with the recommendation of the High Court in each came, in accordance with law. It was submitted by learned counsel for T. Lakshmi Narasimha Chari that he has attained the age of superannuation in the meantime. Any such subsequent event is to be brought to the notice of the High Court and it is for the High court to consider and decide the effect thereof in making any further recommendation to the Governor. In formulating its recommendation, the High Court is to keep in view the relevant rules and the decisions relating to this aspect. No such question arises for consideration by us in this appeal and, therefore, we need not deal with this aspect any further. All consequential actions are to be considered and taken by the High Court in accordance with law.” 40. In Registrar (Admn.) High Court of Orissa, Cuttack vs. Sisir Kanta Satapathy (dead) by LRs and another (1999) 7 SCC 725 , the Hon’ble Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that though the absolute and exclusive control over the subordinate Courts vests with the High Court including the power to initiate disciplinary proceedings against judicial officers, place them under suspension and to impose punishment, but, when it comes down to question of dismissal, removal, reduction in rank or termination of services of a judicial officer, on any count whatsoever, the High Court becomes only a recommendatory body and formal order can only be issued by the Governor and not by the High Court itself. However, it was clarified that the recommendation of the High Court was binding on the State Government/Governor. It would be relevant to quote the following observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in paras 15, 16, 17 and 24 of the judgment which read thus: “15. On going through the judgments of this Court right from Shyam Lai v. State of U.P., [1955] 1 SCR 26 down to High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan v. Ramesh Chand Paliwal & Anr, [1998] 3 SCC 72, one cannot but reach one conclusion regarding the power of the High Court in the matter of ordering compulsory retirement. On going through the judgments of this Court right from Shyam Lai v. State of U.P., [1955] 1 SCR 26 down to High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan v. Ramesh Chand Paliwal & Anr, [1998] 3 SCC 72, one cannot but reach one conclusion regarding the power of the High Court in the matter of ordering compulsory retirement. That conclusion is that the High Courts are vested with the disciplinary control as well as administrative control over the Members of the Judicial Service exclusively, but that does not mean that they can also pass orders of dismissal, removal, reduction in rank or termination from service while exercising administrative and disciplinary control over the Members of Judicial Service. Undoubtedly, the High Courts alone are entitled to initiate, to hold enquiry and to take a decision in respect of dismissal, removal, reduction in rank or termination from service, but the formal order to give effect to such a decision has to be passed only by the State Governor on the recommendation of the High Court. It is well settled again by a catena of decisions of this Court that the recommendation of the High Court is binding on the State Government/Governor [vide para 18 in Inder Prakash Anand's case (supra)]. 16. We are clearly of the view that while the High Court retains the power of disciplinary control over the subordinate judiciary, including the power to initiate disciplinary proceedings, suspend them pending enquiries and impose punishment on them but when it comes to the question of dismissal, removal, reduction in rank or termination of the services of the judicial officer, on any count whatsoever, the High Court becomes only the recommending authority and cannot itself pass such an order [vide Inder Prakash Anand's case and Rajiah's case (supra)]. 17. In the instant case, the decision of the Orissa High Court dated 4.2.87 (on the Administrative Side) was required to be forwarded to the Governor for passing an order of cornpulsorily retirement. That was not done. It was wrong for the High Court to have passed the order of compulsory retirement itself. The judicial side of the High Court rightly decided the Writ Petition in favour of the judicial officers and held the order dated 5.2.87 to be bad. That was not done. It was wrong for the High Court to have passed the order of compulsory retirement itself. The judicial side of the High Court rightly decided the Writ Petition in favour of the judicial officers and held the order dated 5.2.87 to be bad. In the words of the Division Bench of the High Court : "There is a stronger constitutional objection to accept the submission of Shri Nayak for regarding the High Court as the appointing authority of the Chief Judicial Magistrate on the basis of what has been provided in rule 10 of the Orissa Superior Judicial Service Rules, 1963, inasmuch as it has been laid down in Article 234 of the Constitution that appointments of persons other than District Judges to the judicial service of a State shall be made by the Governor of the State in accordance with the rules made by him in that behalf. The aforesaid rules are one set of such rules. So, no provision in the rules could have altered the constitutional position that the Governor of the State is the appointing authority of persons other than District Judges also. Conferment of this power on the High Court by virtue of what is stated in rule 10 of the Orissa Superior Judicial Service Rules would have clashed with the constitutional mandate. We would therefore, not accept because of what is stated in rule 10 that the High Court is the appointing authority of a Chief Judicial Magistrate." * * * In view of all that is stated above, we would hold that the High Court is not the appointing authority of Chief Judicial Magistrates to clothe it with the power of compulsory retirement conferred by the First proviso to rule 71 (a) of the Orissa Service Code. In this connection, may we also point out that it would be really incongruous where, though the High Court cannot retire a Munsif, or for that matter a District Judge, as fairly conceded by Shri Nayak it would be in a position to retire a Chief Judicial Magistrate. We do not think if the concerned provisions permit us to take this view. We do not think if the concerned provisions permit us to take this view. Before closing this aspect of the discussion, we may say that we are conscious of the legal position that passing of an order of compulsory retirement by the Governor is a formal matter as stated in Rajiah 's case (supra) because, according to this decision, the Governor in such cases merely acts on the recommendation of the High Court by signing an order in that regard; but the procedure of the Governor formally passing an order of retirement has to be complied with. So long as there is no formal order of the Governor, the compulsory retirement as directed by the High Court cannot take effect, as opined in Rajiah's case itself. Having come to the aforesaid conclusion, it is not necessary to deal with the second submission of Shri Ray that there were no materials in the present case to order for the compulsory retirement of the petitioner........” 24. Mr. Jayant Das, learned Advocate General, appearing for the State Government, as well as learned counsel appearing for the High Court rightly agreed with the suggestion made on behalf of the Judicial Officers that on the basis of the recommendation made by the Full Court of the High Court on 7.11.91, the Governor of State be requested to pass a formal order of compulsory retirement of Judicial Officers with effect from the date when the recommendation was received by the Government, i.e. 2.12.91. The Judicial Officers (which would include legal representatives in the case of deceased 1st respondent in C.A. No. 4751/92) would, thus, be entitled to their salary, allowances and all other consequential benefits till 2.12.91. This suggestion appeals to us also as it will balance the equities between the parties and set at naught a controversy which has unnecessarily remained pending for so long. The arrears as per the above terms shall be paid to the Judicial Officers within three months from the date of receipt of this judgment.” 41. In view of the aforesaid exposition of law, it can safely be concluded that it is the Governor who alone has the power to pass an order of dismissal, removal or termination on the recommendations of the High Court which is made in exercise of powers of control vested in the High Court. In view of the aforesaid exposition of law, it can safely be concluded that it is the Governor who alone has the power to pass an order of dismissal, removal or termination on the recommendations of the High Court which is made in exercise of powers of control vested in the High Court. However, the High Court under this control of its own cannot dismiss or remove, terminate the services of the District Judge. Here, it still needs to be clarified that where the High Court on the administrative side recommends compulsory retirement of an Officer, those recommendations are binding on the Government. 42. Admittedly, the order of retirement dated 20.04.2005 (Annexure P-16) has been passed by the respondent-High Court and not by the Governor and, therefore, the same cannot be sustained. However, taking cue from the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in judgments cited above, the order/notification passed by the High Court dated 20.04.2005 (Annexure P-16) is to be treated as a recommendation of the High Court to the Governor for removal of the services of the writ petitioner. The Governor of the State of Himachal Pradesh is to proceed and make necessary consequential orders in accordance with the recommendations of the High Court in accordance with law. 43. In light of the aforesaid discussion, we find merit in this appeal and accordingly the same is allowed and the judgment passed by the learned writ Court on 09.01.2009, except in so far as it quashes the order of retirement dated 20.04.2005 (Annexure P-16) on the ground that the same was not passed by the competent authority, is set aside. However, even these findings shall stand substituted in the manner indicated above. Resultantly, the writ petition filed by the writ petitioner is ordered to be dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs. Pending application, if any, also stands disposed of.