JUDGMENT 1. - Challenge in this writ petition under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, at the behest of defendant-petitioner, is given to impugned order dated 22nd of April 2015 (Annex.5) passed by Civil Judge (Junior Division) - cum - Judicial Magistrate, Sri Dungargarh, District Bikaner (for short, 'learned Court below'). The learned Court below, by the order impugned, has allowed the application of second respondent, Vimal Kumar, under Order 22, Rule 10 CPC for impleading him as plaintiff in a suit for eviction, recovery of arrears of rent and mesne profit laid by his predecessor in title of the suit property. 2. The facts, in brief, are that first respondent, original landlord, instituted a suit for eviction, recovery of arrears of rent and mesne profit against the petitioner-tenant after serving notice under Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (for short, 'Act of 1882') terminating his tenancy. The petitioner filed written statement denying averments contained in the plaint. During pendency of the suit, second respondent laid an application under Order 22, Rule 10 read with Section 151 CPC for allowing him to continue the suit precisely on the ground that he has purchased the shop in question from first respondent, Kamal Kumar, by registered sale-deed dated 27th November, 2013. The aforesaid application is contested by the petitioner by filing reply. After hearing rival submissions, learned Court below allowed the application by the impugned order. In the writ petition, the impugned order is assailed, inter alia, on the ground that, while passing the impugned order, the learned Court below has exercised its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. It is also averred that reasonable and bona fide necessity of the original landlord, Kamal Kumar, has come to an end, and therefore, the respondent-applicant cannot be allowed to continue proceedings of suit on the strength of grounds set out in the suit for eviction. A further ground is urged that the respondent-plaintiff has not divulged requisite information about sale transaction to the petitioner, and therefore, the learned Court below has committed an error apparent on the face of record in allowing the application. 3. Mr. A further ground is urged that the respondent-plaintiff has not divulged requisite information about sale transaction to the petitioner, and therefore, the learned Court below has committed an error apparent on the face of record in allowing the application. 3. Mr. A.K. Rajvanshy, learned counsel for the petitioner, submits that the grounds for eviction set out in the plaint by the original plaintiff, first respondent, are not available to the applicant, second respondent, and therefore, the learned Court below has committed serious jurisdictional error in allowing the application under Order 22, Rule 10 read with Section 151 CPC. Learned counsel would contend that bona fide requirements of the original plaintiff, first respondent, pleaded in the plaint are not available to second respondent, and therefore, his impleadment as plaintiff to the suit is contrary to the mandate of Order 22, Rule 10 CPC. Lastly, learned counsel has urged that order impugned suffers from vice of an error apparent on the face of record, therefore, it is vulnerable. In support of his contentions, learned counsel has placed reliance on following legal precedents: * Shantilal Thakordas & Ors. v. Chimanlal Maganlal Telwala [AIR SC 2358(1)] * Sheikh Jehangir v. Smt. S. Kaushilyabai & Ors. [1987 (Supp) SCC 630] * WG. Com. H.K.Lal v. Dr. Satish Chand & Ors. [1996 WLC (Raj.) UC 3)] 4. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent submits that the learned Court below has considered lis involved in the suit and thereafter, taking note of the fact of assignment, creation or devolution of any interest about suit property, during the pendency of a suit in favour of respondent-applicant, has allowed the applicant to be impleaded as plaintiff, which is a just order and calls for no interference. Mr. Bhaiya would contend that ground for eviction namely reasonable and bona fide necessity is having no significance in the present suit inasmuch as it is a suit based on the Act of 1882, and therefore, the discretion exercised by the learned Court below for impleading second respondent as plaintiff warrants no interference. Learned counsel has urged that second respondent has purchased the suit property during pendency of the suit, and therefore, the learned Court below has rightly exercised its jurisdiction under Order 22, Rule 10 CPC, which is not liable to be interfered with in exercise of supervisory jurisdiction of this Court. 5. Learned counsel has urged that second respondent has purchased the suit property during pendency of the suit, and therefore, the learned Court below has rightly exercised its jurisdiction under Order 22, Rule 10 CPC, which is not liable to be interfered with in exercise of supervisory jurisdiction of this Court. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the impugned order. 6. Crucial issue involved in the matter is nature of suit filed by the original plaintiff first respondent. There remains no quarrel that the suit for eviction of shop, recovery of arrears of rent and mesne profit was filed after serving notice under Section 106 of the Act of 1882. In a suit instituted by a landlord under the general law i.e. Act of 1882, he is not required to plead and prove bona fide necessity and concern of the court is to examine legality of notice terminating tenancy. A bare perusal of the plaint clearly and unequivocally reveals that there is no pleading about reasonable and bona fide necessity and the same is also not required to be pleaded. There is yet another aspect of the matter that second respondent has made endeavour for being impleaded as plaintiff with a positive assertion that he has purchased the disputed shop by a registered saledeed. In that background, the learned Court below has exercised its discretion and allowed the application of second respondent. 7. In Shantilal Thakordas (supra), Supreme Court considered the provisions of Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, in the backdrop of facts and circumstances of the case, and opined that requirement of landlord for bona fide occupation under Section 13(1)(g) of the Act after death of the landlord is not available to new firm constituted with some outsiders as partners. The Court held: But even so the appellants cannot succeed in this appeal. Firstly it is doubtful whether the requirement of the premises by the landlord for occupation by the partnership firm in which he is a partner will be tantamount to "occupation by himself" i.e. by the landlord. Certain decisions of some High Courts were brought to our notice taking the view that it is so. We refrain from expressing our opinion in that regard. Certain decisions of some High Courts were brought to our notice taking the view that it is so. We refrain from expressing our opinion in that regard. We assume, as seems to have been the view of the High Court in this case, that the requirement of the premises for the use of a partnership firm by the landlord in which he is a partner is covered by Section 13(1)(g) of the Bombay Act. Yet on the facts of this case there is an insurmountable difficulty in the way of the appellants. From the judgment dated March 31, 1970 of the First Appellate Court it would appear that on the death of Thakordas in June, 1965 a new partnership was constituted. One of his sons Shantilal who was a partner from before was taken as a partner in the new partnership along with Thakordas's another son Dhanvantlal Thakordas, appellant No. 2. There were some outsider partners. Harish Thakordas, appellant No. 3, a minor son of Thakordas had not been admitted to the benefits of the partnership. He had, therefore, no interest in the partnership firm Jai Hind Silk Weaving Works. The Appellate Court took the view that the substituted plaintiffs wanted to use the suit premises for the purpose of godown for keeping the yarn clothes and machinery articles and also for a retail shop and showroom of the partnership. This in no sense could be the requirement of appellant Harish even assuming that it could be said to be the requirement of his two cider brothers appellants 1 and 2. In that view of the matter we have got to dismiss the appeal although Mr. Dholakia, learned counsel for the appellants succeeded in persuading us to differ from the ratio of Phul Rani's case ( AIR 1973 SC 2110 ). 8. In Sheikh Jehangir (supra), which was a case under A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960, Supreme Court held that bona fide requirement of landlord cannot survive after selling the demised premises by the plaintiff. 9. In WG. Com. H.K. Lal (supra), a coordinate Bench of this Court has considered the provisions contained under Section 13(1)(h) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1950 and held that bona fide necessity of the previous owners stand washed off after selling the property. 9. In WG. Com. H.K. Lal (supra), a coordinate Bench of this Court has considered the provisions contained under Section 13(1)(h) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1950 and held that bona fide necessity of the previous owners stand washed off after selling the property. Therefore, in the backdrop of these facts, the Court dismissed the application for impleadment of the subsequent purchaser of the property in question as necessary party. The Court held: In my considered opinion the ratio of the aforesaid judgment of the Apex Court is squarely applicable to the instant case. I am of the view that the trial court should have dismissed the application for impleadment of the subsequent purchasers of the property in question as necessary parties instead of allowing the amendment on the ground of their personal and bona fide requirement which was not created automatically soon after their purchase of property from the previous owners and the same had to be objectively considered by the trial court as against the existing tenant i.e. the petitioner herein. It is accordingly directed that the suit for eviction pending before the trial court will stand dismissed in so far as the ground of bona fide and personal requirement is concerned but/the dismissal of the suit will not preclude the subsequent purchasers from instituting a fresh suit against the petitioner on the ground of their personal and bona fide requirement on a fresh cause of action. 10. Upon consideration of ratio decidendi of these judgments, in my opinion, these legal precedents are clearly distinguishable. 11. Here, in the instant case, the tenancy was terminated by the landlord-plaintiff by issuing notice under Section 106 of the Act of 1882 for which there is no requirement to plead reasonable and bona fide necessity. The crucial question that requires adjudication in a suit filed under the general law i.e. Act of 1882 is the validity of notice to ascertain whether tenancy has been terminated in accordance with law. 12. Well it is true that in case of Rent Control Acts, the landlord is required to prove the grounds set out under the relevant statute for eviction of a tenant but the said position is not available in case of eviction of a tenant after terminating tenancy by issuing notice under Section 106 of the Act of 1882. 12. Well it is true that in case of Rent Control Acts, the landlord is required to prove the grounds set out under the relevant statute for eviction of a tenant but the said position is not available in case of eviction of a tenant after terminating tenancy by issuing notice under Section 106 of the Act of 1882. Therefore, in that background, in all these judgments it was rightly held that bona fide necessity of the previous landlord cannot furnish a valid ground for eviction to the subsequent purchaser; this is obviously not the position here in the instant case. 13. The law is also no more fluid that where provisions of State Rent Acts are applicable, notice to quit under Section 106 of the Act of 1882 is not necessary. A larger Bench of Supreme Court in V. Dhanapal Chettiar v. Yesodai Ammal [ 1979 (4) SCC 214 ] , has held: Lastly our attention was drawn to the decision of this Court in Firm Sardarilal Vishwanath and Ors v. Pritam Singh . The lease in that case had come to an end by efflux of time. A tenant continued in possession and became a so-called statutory tenant. The argument put forward before this Court that a fresh notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was necessary was rejected on the ground: (SCC p.10, para 18) "Having examined the matter on authority and precedent it must be frankly confessed that no other conclusion is possible on the first principle. Lease of urban immovable property represents a contract between the lessor and the lessee. If the contract is to be put to an end it has to be terminated by a notice to quit as envisaged under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. But it is equally clear as provided by Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act that the lease of immovable property determines by various modes therein prescribed. Now, if the lease of immovable property determines in any one of the modes prescribed under Section 111, the contract of lease comes to an end, and the landlord can exercise his right of reentry. This right of re-entry is further restricted and fettered by the provisions of the Rent Restriction Act. Now, if the lease of immovable property determines in any one of the modes prescribed under Section 111, the contract of lease comes to an end, and the landlord can exercise his right of reentry. This right of re-entry is further restricted and fettered by the provisions of the Rent Restriction Act. Nonetheless the contract of lease had expired and the tenant lessee continues in possession under the protective wing of the Rent Restriction Act until the lessee loses protection. But there is no question of terminating the contract because the contract comes to an end once the lease determines in any one of the modes prescribed under Section 111. There is, therefore, no question of giving a notice to quit to such a lessee who continued in possession after the determination of the lease, i.e. after the contract came to an end under the protection of the Rent Restriction Act. If the contract once came to an end there was no question of terminating the contract over again by a fresh notice." If we were to agree with the view that determination of lease in accordance with the Transfer of Property Act is a condition precedent to the starting of a proceeding under the State Rent Act for eviction of the tenant, we could have said so with respect that the view expressed in the above passage is quite correct because there was no question of determination of the lease again once it was determined by efflux of time. But on the first assumption we have taken a different view of the matter and have come to the conclusion that determination of a lease in accordance with the Transfer of Property Act is unnecessary and a mere surplusage because the landlord cannot get eviction of the tenant even after such determination. The tenant continues to be so even thereafter. That being so, making out a case under the Rent Act for eviction of the tenant by itself is sufficient and it is not obligatory to found the proceeding on the basis of the determination of the lease by issue of notice in accordance with section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. That being so, making out a case under the Rent Act for eviction of the tenant by itself is sufficient and it is not obligatory to found the proceeding on the basis of the determination of the lease by issue of notice in accordance with section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. For the reasons stated above we hold that the High Court was right in its view that no notice to quit was necessary under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act in order to enable the landlady-respondent to get an order of eviction against the tenant-appellant. But we were told by learned Counsel for the appellant that he had some more points to urge before the High Court to challenge the order of eviction. We do not find from the judgment of the High Court that the appellant was prevented from supporting the orders of the courts below in his favour by urging any other point. No point of substance could be indicated before us which was worth consideration after a clear and definite finding by the Appellate Court that the respondent required the premises bona fide for a personal necessity. We do not think it advisable to delay the proceeding any further and send back the case to the High Court on this account. We accordingly dismiss the appeal but in the circumstances direct the parties to bear their own costs throughout. 14. The legal position is no more res-integra that powers of the Court under Order 22, Rule 10 CPC are very wide and the Court in its discretion may allow an incumbent, in whose favour any interest has been created or devolved during the pendency of the suit, as a proper party if his interest in the subject-matter of the property is substantial and not peripheral. It is also settled law that, while passing order under Order 22, Rule 10 CPC, no detailed inquiry is contemplated at the stage of granting such leave. The discretion of the Court is so wide that, even at the appellate stage, application can be allowed even though devolution of interest occurred at the trial stage. 15. Besides legality and propriety of the impugned order on merits, it is also noteworthy that petitioner's endeavour is to question a discretionary order under the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court. The discretion of the Court is so wide that, even at the appellate stage, application can be allowed even though devolution of interest occurred at the trial stage. 15. Besides legality and propriety of the impugned order on merits, it is also noteworthy that petitioner's endeavour is to question a discretionary order under the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court. The supervisory jurisdiction of this Court is to be exercised with great care and circumspection and the same is not akin to appellate jurisdiction. Supreme Court in Shalini Shyam Shetty & Anr. v. Rajendra Shankar Patil [ (2010) 8 SCC 329 ] has laid down guidelines and parameters for exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. The Court held: "49. On an analysis of the aforesaid decisions of this Court, the following principles on the exercise of High Court's jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution may be formulated: (a) A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is different from a petition under Article 227.The mode of exercise of power by the High Court under these two articles is also different. (b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 cannot be called a writ petition. The history of the conferment of writ jurisdiction on High Courts is substantially different from the history of conferment of the power of superintendence on the High Courts under Article 227 and have been discussed above. (c) High Courts cannot, at the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the orders of tribunals or courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a court of appeal over the orders of the court or tribunal subordinate to it. In cases where an alternative statutory mode of redressal has been provided, that would also operate as a restrain on the exercise of this power by the High Court. (d) The parameters of interference by High Courts in exercise of their power of superintendence have been repeatedly laid down by this Court. In this regard the High Court must be guided by the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh and the principles in Waryam Singh have been repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and various other decisions of this Court. In this regard the High Court must be guided by the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh and the principles in Waryam Singh have been repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and various other decisions of this Court. (e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh, followed in subsequent cases, the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence can interfere in order only to keep the tribunals and courts subordinate to it, `within the bounds of their authority'. (f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such tribunals and courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and by not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them. (g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f), High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of tribunals and courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. (h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the tribunals or Courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised. (i) The High Court's power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. It has been declared a part of the basic structure of the Constitution by the Constitution Bench of this Court in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India and therefore abridgement by a constitutional amendment is also very doubtful. (j) It may be true that a statutory amendment of a rather cognate provision, like Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999 does not and cannot cut down the ambit of High Court's power under Article 227. At the same time, it must be remembered that such statutory amendment does not correspondingly expand the High Court's jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227. (k) The power is discretionary and has to be exercised on equitable principle. In an appropriate case, the power can be exercised suo motu. At the same time, it must be remembered that such statutory amendment does not correspondingly expand the High Court's jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227. (k) The power is discretionary and has to be exercised on equitable principle. In an appropriate case, the power can be exercised suo motu. (l) On a proper appreciation of the wide and unfettered power of the High Court under Article 227, it transpires that the main object of this Article is to keep strict administrative and judicial control by the High Court on the administration of justice within its territory. (m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under this article is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and courts subordinate to High Court. (n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in the administration of justice in the larger public interest whereas Article 226 is meant for protection of individual grievance. Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out above. (o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counter productive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality." 16. The Court has also deprecated the practice of entertaining petitions under Article 227 of the Constitution of India in routine manner by treating them as writ petitions. The Court further held: " 64.However, this Court unfortunately discerns that of late there is a growing trend amongst several High Courts to entertain writ petition in cases of pure property disputes. Disputes relating to partition suits, matters relating to execution of a decree, in cases of dispute between landlord and tenant and also in a case of money decree and in various other cases where disputed questions of property are involved, writ courts are entertaining such disputes. Disputes relating to partition suits, matters relating to execution of a decree, in cases of dispute between landlord and tenant and also in a case of money decree and in various other cases where disputed questions of property are involved, writ courts are entertaining such disputes. In some cases the High Courts, in a routine manner, entertain petitions under Article 227 over such disputes and such petitions are treated as writ petitions. 65. We would like to make it clear that in view of the law referred to above in cases of property rights and in disputes between private individuals writ court should not interfere unless there is any infraction of statute or it can be shown that a private individual is acting in collusion with a statutory authority. 66. We may also observe that in some High Courts there is a tendency of entertaining petitions under Article 227 of the Constitution by terming them as writ petitions. This is sought to be justified on an erroneous appreciation of the ratio in Surya Dev and in view of the recent amendment to Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999. It is urged that as a result of the amendment, scope of Section 115 CPC has been curtailed. In our view, even if the scope of Section 115 CPC is curtailed that has not resulted in expanding the High Court's power of superintendence. It is too well known to be reiterated that in exercising its jurisdiction, High Court must follow the regime of law. 67. As a result of frequent interference by the Hon'ble High Court either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution with pending civil and at times criminal cases, the disposal of cases by the civil and criminal courts gets further impeded and thus causing serious problems in the administration of justice. This Court hopes and trusts that in exercising its power either under Article 226 or 227, the Hon'ble High Court will follow the time honoured principles discussed above. Those principles have been formulated by this Court for ends of justice and the High Courts as the highest courts of justice within their jurisdiction will adhere to them strictly." 17. In view of foregoing discussions, I feel dissuaded to interfere with the impugned order. Consequently petition fails and same is, hereby, dismissed.Writ Petition Dismissed. *******