JUDGMENT 1. - Petitioner/judgment-debtor has preferred this writ petition under Article 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India to assail impugned order dated 29th April, 2013 (Annex.9) passed by District Judge, Churu (Appellate Court) dismissing appeal of the petitioner as not maintainable, thereby upholding the order dated 23rd August, 2012 (Annex.5) passed by learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Churu (Executing Court) and so also the order (Annex.5). 2. The facts, apposite for the purpose of this writ petition, are that respondent/decree-holder Trust instituted a civil suit for cancellation of sale-deeds dated 16th April 1979 and 21st June 1979 and for recovery of possession against petitioner, his wife, mother and two others. The suit filed by the Trust is decreed by Civil Judge, Churu by its judgment and decree dated 28th August, 1993 cancelling both the sale-deeds and for restoration of possession of the suit property to the respondent-Trust. 3. For executing decree, the respondents moved execution petition before the learned Executing Court on 8th of November, 2005 seeking possession of the land measuring 16,500 sq. yards described as 'Bari Ki Zameen' (adjacent to Chatri) as well as land measuring 450 sq. yards of Dharmshala and one shop constructed on the land measuring 3871 sq. mtrs. allegedly transferred pursuant to two sale-deeds dated 16th April, 1979 and 21st June, 1979 respectively. 4. In the execution petition, petitioner submitted objection/application under Order 21, Rule 11 (2), 17 read with Sections 151 & 153 CPC. Precisely, in his objection, the petitioner raised a plea that respondent/decree-holder is trying to enlarge the scope of decree, which is not permissible while executing a decree. In substance, the objection was raised that execution petition laid by the respondent/decree-holder is beyond the terms of the decree with a specific averment that there is no measurement and specification of the land mentioned in the plaint and the decree itself. With these assertions, petitioner craved that respondent/decree-holder cannot be permitted to dispossess the petitioner from land in his possession in the garb of decree dated 28th August, 1993 and as such respondent/decree-holder be directed to make necessary amendment in the execution petition, or in the alternative, execution petition be dismissed. A specific case is set out that land in possession of the petitioner is not part of the decree as well as the plaint, and therefore, the decree against him is not executable. 5. A specific case is set out that land in possession of the petitioner is not part of the decree as well as the plaint, and therefore, the decree against him is not executable. 5. The objection submitted by the petitioner was contested by the respondent/decree-holder by submitting reply wherein it was averred that the execution has been filed as per the decree passed by the Court and, therefore, the same merits execution in accordance with law. The learned Executing Court, after considering the objection submitted by the petitioner by its order (Annex.5) rejected the objection with cost of Rs.5000/-. Being aggrieved by the said order, petitioner preferred appeal before the learned appellate Court and the learned appellate Court by the order impugned (Annex.9) dismissed the appeal as not maintainable. It is, in that background, petitioner has approached this Court by invoking supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. B.S. Sandhu, has vehemently argued that execution of a decree is not permissible beyond the decree was a question of vital importance, which has not been addressed by the learned executing Court, while rejecting the objections of the petitioner. Learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. B.S. Sandhu, would contend that a bare perusal of the plaint and judgment & decree clearly and unequivocally reveals that land measuring 16,500 sq. yards has not been demarcated and there is no measurement and specification of the said land in both plaint as well as the decree. He, therefore, submits that the petitioner cannot be dispossessed from the land in question, which is in his possession. Learned counsel further submits that execution petition contains recitals about the land which is not part of the plaint as well as the decree, and therefore, substance and significance of petitioner's objection ought to have been examined by the leaned executing Court within the four corners of sub-rule (2) of Rule 11 & 17 of Order 21 CPC. 7. Per contra, Mr. Manish Sisodia, learned counsel for the respondents/decree-holders submits that objections submitted by the petitioner/judgment-debtor are not sustainable and the learned executing Court has rightly brushed aside these objections by the impugned order. 7. Per contra, Mr. Manish Sisodia, learned counsel for the respondents/decree-holders submits that objections submitted by the petitioner/judgment-debtor are not sustainable and the learned executing Court has rightly brushed aside these objections by the impugned order. Learned counsel would contend that execution petition laid by the respondents/decree-holders is in consonance and conformity with the decree passed by the Court, which is clearly evident from the decree-sheet inasmuch as the suit for dispossessing the judgment-debtors is decreed in terms of para 2 of the plaint, which also forms part of the annexed site plan, a part of the plaint, containing the total measurement of the land. Elaborating his submission, in this behalf, Mr. Sisodia has further urged that these objections of the petitioner/judgment-debtor have been repelled by this Court in second appeal No.169/2000, and therefore, no interference with the impugned order is warranted. Lastly, Mr. Sisodia has argued that petitioner is a judgment-debtor and not a stranger, therefore, all these objections, at his behest, are not at all tenable and the learned trial Court has rightly non-suited him by rejecting his objections. 8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused materials available on record. 9. There is a checkered history of the litigation and this second inning is at the instance of petitioner/judgment-debtor. At the threshold, the suit filed by the respondents-plaintiffs was decreed in toto by the learned trial Court on 28th August, 1993. Against the judgment and decree of the learned trial court, first appeal was preferred by the petitioner as well as other defendants and the first appellate Court dismissed the appeal vide its judgment and decree dated 1st of April, 2000. Subsequently, legal representatives of Salma preferred second appeal before this Court, which was registered as S.B. Civil Second Appeal No.169/2000 and the appeal preferred by the present petitioner and others was registered as S.B. Civil Second Appeal No.189/2000. Both these appeals were heard together and this Court, and by its judgment dated 20th March, 2000 dismissed both the appeals. Interestingly, in the second appeal preferred on behalf of the petitioner, same argument was raised that the decree passed by the learned trial Court without giving any description of the property in the judgment and decree is not executable. Both these appeals were heard together and this Court, and by its judgment dated 20th March, 2000 dismissed both the appeals. Interestingly, in the second appeal preferred on behalf of the petitioner, same argument was raised that the decree passed by the learned trial Court without giving any description of the property in the judgment and decree is not executable. The said argument did not find favour of this Court and consequently in the considered opinion of this Court now it is not open for the petitioner to raise same issue which has already been adjudicated up to second appeal level upholding the judgment of learned trial Court. There is yet another aspect of the matter that the contention of the petitioner about non-description of the land measuring 16500 sq. yards in relation to which decree is passed in favour of respondents/decree-holders, suffice it to observe that the recitals contained in the decree sheet are clear and unequivocal. In the decree-sheet it is mentioned with clarity and precision that suit is decreed for dispossession of the defendants from the land in question, particulars of which are mentioned in para 2 of the plaint. In that background, if the averments contained in para 2 of the plaint are properly construed, then there remains no room of doubt that these averments are in consonance and conformity with the annexed site plan containing description of the land measuring 16,500 sq. yards. Therefore, in this view of the matter, prayer of the petitioner for amending the execution petition and objection under Order 21, Rule 11 (2), 17 read with Section 151 CPC were more or less ceremonial and not of substance and as such rightly turned down by the learned executing Court. 10. The legal proposition canvassed by the learned counsel for the petitioner that executing Court cannot travel beyond the terms of the decree and the same has to be executed in terms thereof. On this proposition of law, which is undeniably founded on the sound legal principles, there are some relevant considerations in relation to entertaining the objections. Objection, in this behalf at the behest of a judgment-debtor and a third party, allegedly in possession of the immovable property, obviously stands on different footings. On this proposition of law, which is undeniably founded on the sound legal principles, there are some relevant considerations in relation to entertaining the objections. Objection, in this behalf at the behest of a judgment-debtor and a third party, allegedly in possession of the immovable property, obviously stands on different footings. Normally, a judgment-debtor is bound by a decree of a civil court which has attained finality and the executing Court is not obliged to give credence to such judgment-debtor's every objection to thwart execution of a decree. True, it is that a third party, who is in possession of immovable property, may have a cause of grievance by asserting that it is not bound by the decree and as such it has got every right to resist execution of decree which dispossesses him from the immovable property. In such an eventuality, the Legislature has also provided remedy under Order 22, Rule 97 and such resistance or obstruction to possession of immovable property is required to be adjudicated by the executing Court. Here, in the instant case, petitioner himself is a judgment-debtor and his objection about executability of the decree in want of so called discrepancy about demarcation and measurement of the land in question having been adjudicated finally by this Court in second appeal, the objections are superfluous. 11. The judgment in case of Judgalkishore Saraf v. M/s. Raw Cotton Co. Ltd. [ AIR 1955 SC 376 ] , on which learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance, in the considered opinion of this Court, cannot render any assistance to the cause of the petitioner. In that case, the suit as such was filed by two persons; namely, Mahomedali Habib and Sakerkhanoo Mahomedali Habib, and same was decreed in their favour but the execution was laid by M/s. Rao Cotton Co., Ltd., alleging that they are assignees of the decree and as such the decretal debt of the alleged original plaintiff can be recovered by it. There were certain disputes about assigning of decree by original plaintiff/judgment-debtor and that was a case of money decree, therefore, the ratio of that judgment cannot have any ramification on the lis involved in the present petition. 12. Supreme Court in case of Silverline Forum Pvt. Ltd. v. Rajiv Trust & Anr. There were certain disputes about assigning of decree by original plaintiff/judgment-debtor and that was a case of money decree, therefore, the ratio of that judgment cannot have any ramification on the lis involved in the present petition. 12. Supreme Court in case of Silverline Forum Pvt. Ltd. v. Rajiv Trust & Anr. [ (1998) 3 SCC 723 ] , while construing the provisions under Order 21, Rule 97 , 101, 102 read with Section 35(1) CPC, has interpreted the words 'any person' who can put resistance or obstruction to delivery of possession in execution of decree for ejectment. The Court found that a third party to the decree including transferree pendente lite can offer resistance or obstruction, and observed that in case of a judgment-debtor, the adjudication of the objections are not required to be subjected to a detailed inquiry or collection of evidence. The Court held: When a decree-holder complains of resistance to the execution of a decree it is incumbent on the execution court to adjudicate upon it. But while making adjudication, the court is obliged to determine only such question as may be arising between the parties to a proceeding on such complaint and that such questions must be relevant to the adjudication of the complaint. The words "all questions arising between the parties to a proceeding on an application under Rule 97" would envelop only such questions as would legally arise for determination between those parties. In other words, the court is not obliged to determine a question merely because the resistor raised it. The questions which executing court is obliged to determine under Rule 101, must possess two adjuncts. First is that such questions should have legally arisen between the parties, and the second is, such questions must be relevant for consideration and determination between the parties, e.g. if the obstructor admits that he is a transferee pendente lite it is not necessary to determine a question raised by him that he was unaware of the litigation when he purchased the property. Similarly, a third party, who questions the validity of a transfer made by a decree-holder to an assignee, cannot claim that the question regarding its validity should be decided during execution proceedings. Hence, it is necessary that the questions raised by the resistor or the obstructor must legally arise between him and the decree holder. Similarly, a third party, who questions the validity of a transfer made by a decree-holder to an assignee, cannot claim that the question regarding its validity should be decided during execution proceedings. Hence, it is necessary that the questions raised by the resistor or the obstructor must legally arise between him and the decree holder. In the adjudication process envisaged in Order 21, Rule 97 (2) of the Code, the execution court can decide whether the question raised by a resistor or obstructor legally arises between the parties. An answer to the said question also would be the result of the adjudication contemplated in the subsection. In the above context we may refer to Order 21, Rule 35 (1) which reads thus: "35.(1) Where a decree is for the delivery of any immovable property, possession thereof shall be delivered to the party to whom it has been adjudged, or to such person as he may appoint to receive delivery on his behalf, and, if necessary, by removing any person bound by the decree who refuses to vacate the property." It is clear that executing court can decide whether the resistor or obstructor is a person bound by the decree and he refuses to vacate the property. That question also squarely falls within the adjudicatory process contemplated in Order 21, Rule 97 (2) of the Code. The adjudication mentioned therein need not necessarily involve a detailed enquiry or collection of evidence. The court can make the adjudication on admitted facts or even on the averments made by the resistor. Of course the Court can direct the parties to adduce evidence for such determination if the Court deems it necessary. 13. In Narinder Singh & Ors. v. Kishan Singh (Dead) by LRs. & Ors. [2002 DNJ (SC) 501] , Supreme Court has deprecated such practice of judgment-debtors in execution of a decree, which has attained finality. The Court held: We have perused relevant records. We have also considered the contentions raised by learned senior counsel appearing for both the parties. The Executing Court has given clear and cogent reasons for not accepting the objections taken by the appellants in the petition filed under section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Even so, we have perused the relevant documents on record to satisfy ourselves that there is no erroneous statement of fact in the order passed by the Executing Court. The Executing Court has given clear and cogent reasons for not accepting the objections taken by the appellants in the petition filed under section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Even so, we have perused the relevant documents on record to satisfy ourselves that there is no erroneous statement of fact in the order passed by the Executing Court. We are satisfied that the approach of the Executing Court in the matter is legal and proper. It is clear to us that the judgment-debtors are making a last ditch effort to prevent the decree-holders from getting full benefit of the decree passed in their favour. As noted earlier the plea that Karam Singh had no liability to pay any part of the mortgage debt and his property having been released from the mortgage in 1956 could not be a part of the suit property in the present case, was neither taken at trial of the suit nor before the Court in the final decree proceeding. Though in the order passed on the petition filed under Order 34, Rule 8 r/w Section 151 of the CPC to make the decree final the fact that Sarbans Singh was declared an insolvent person in the proceeding under the Provincial Insolvency Act was noted, no plea that the preliminary decree did not cover the land of Karam Singh or his share in the suit land appears to have been taken. In the facts and circumstances, the Executing Court rightly rejected the objections raised by the appellants against execution of the decree. The High Court was, therefore, justified in declining to interfere with the order of the Executing Court. 14. Upon thorough evaluation of the materials available on record and law governing the province of execution, there remains no quarrel that objections submitted by the petitioner cannot withstand the test of valid objections within the four corners of Order 21, Rule 11 (2) & 17 CPC and the efforts made by the petitioner/judgment-debtor are in the nature of prolonging the execution of decree which has attained finality. While accepting the proposition without any demur that genuine objections against execution of a decree are required to be entertained by the executing Court, but then it is also trite that executing Court is duty bound to give effect to the decree in its substance and should not pass any order rendering the judgment as a futile attempt. 15. In this view of the matter, I am unable to find any substance in this writ petition. 16. Admittedly, the present petition is filed by the petitioner under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, which is a supervisory jurisdiction of this Court and this Court is confined only to see whether an inferior court or tribunal has proceeded within its parameters, and not to correct an error apparent on the face of record, much less of an error of law. The power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is restricted to interference in cases of grave miscarriage of justice, dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of law by the subordinate court and has to be exercised most sparingly as it cannot be used as an appellate or revisional power. 17. In totality, impugned order has been passed by the learned executing Court while exercising its jurisdiction appropriately, and there is nothing on record to show that it has acted in flagrant violation of law, or the order impugned as such has resulted in miscarriage of justice. Therefore, even on the anvil of limited scope of judicial review also, I do not feel inclined to interfere in the matter. 18. The upshot of above discussion is that the instant writ petition fails and same is, hereby, dismissed.Writ Petition Dismissed. *******