ORDER : 1. By the impugned order dated 03.03.2011, the learned trial court of the Additional District Judge (Fast Track) No.2, Bhilwara has rejected the application of the defendant No.2-Union of India in the present suit for specific performance, which was filed by the plaintiff-Sohan Lal s/o Shankar Lal against the vendor-Om Prakash s/o Motilal in respect of a suit property situated at Plot No.3, Ashok Nagar, Bhilwara. 2. The defendant No.1-Om Prakash s/o Motilal was declared an absconder in the trial under the NDPS Act and the proceedings for attachment of his property were undertaken by the Union of India under Chapter VI Part C – Proclamation and Attachment containing the provisions from Section 82 to Section 86 in Cr.P.C. The objections against such attachment were raised by the plaintiff-Sohan Lal before the concerned Chief Judicial Magistrate, but before such objections could be decided, the plaintiff-Sohan Lal also filed the present suit for specific performance against the vendor-Om Prakash impleading the Union of India and the State Government also as defendants No.2 & 3 respectively in the said suit. 3. The Union of India filed an application under Order 7 Rule 11 read with Section 151 CPC seeking rejection of the said plaint. 3. The Union of India filed an application under Order 7 Rule 11 read with Section 151 CPC seeking rejection of the said plaint. Their objections were rejected by the learned trial court of the Additional District Judge (Fast Track) No.2, Bhilwara by the impugned order dated 03.03.2011 with the following reasons:- ^^9- fl-iz-l- dh /kkjk 9 ds vuqlkj nhokuh U;k;ky; dks lHkh izdkj ds nhokuh izd`fr ds ekeyks es fopkj.k djus dk {ks=kf/kdkj jgrk gS tc rd fd mls fdlh fof/k }kjk laKku ysus ls oftZr ugh fd;k x;k gksA ekuuh; loksZPp U;k;ky; }kjk ikfjr fu.kZ; Jh xaxk@fot;dqekj] , vkbZ vkj 1974 ,l lh 1126 ,oa , vkbZ vkj 1718 vCnqy oghn [kku@Fkkojh esa ekuuh; loksZPp U;k;ky; }kjk izfrikfnr fd;k x;k gS fd ,d eqofDdy dks ;fn nhokuh izd`fr ds ekeys ds f’kdk;r (Grievance) gS tks mls Lora= :Ik ls nhokuh okn lafLFkr djus dk vf/kdkj jgrk gS tc rd fd og U;k;ky; fof/k }kjk vfHkO;Dr ;k foof{kr :Ik ls laKku ysus ds fy, oftZr u gks vFkkZr fof/k }kjk oftZr u gksA bl izdj.k esa Hkh /kkjk 84 na-i-la- okn otZu ugha djrh vfirq oknh dks /kkjk 84¼4½ ds rgr vkifŸk;ka izLrqr djus dk vf/kdkj iznŸk djrh gS ,o /kkjk 84¼4½ ds rgr okn izLrqr djus dk Hkh vf/kdkj jgrk gS vr% /kkjk 84 ds rgr dh tkus okyh dk;Zokgh ,d oSdfYid vuqrks”k gS tks oknh dks okn izLrqr djus ls oftZr ugh djrh gSA 10- pwafd izzkFkhZ@izfroknh dk dFku jgk gS fd oknh dh vkifŸk;ka varxZr /kkjk 84 na-iz-la- ds rgr U;k;ky; eq[; U;kf;d eftLVªsV] HkhyokM+k ds le{k fopkjk/khu jgrs gq, okn izLrqr fd;k gS blfy, bl izØe ij U;k;ky; dks Jo.kkf/kdkj ugh jgrkA U;k;ky; fo}ku vf/koDrk izfroknh ds bu rdksZ ls lger ugha gS D;ksfd okn ds fizesP;;ksj dks fLFkfr esa izLrqr gksus ls U;k;ky; dk Jo.kkf/kdkj lekIr ugha gks tkrkA U;k;ky; ds bl er dh i`f”V ekuuh; loksZPp U;k;ky; }kjk ikfjr fu.kZ; foëyHkkbZ@Hkkjr la?k Mh ,u ts 2005 ,l lh ist 543 ls gksrh gSA 11- ekuuh; loksZPp U;k;ky; }kjk mijksDr izdj.k esa ;g izfrikfnr fd;k gS fd %& “The question of suit being premature does not go to the root of jurisdiction of the court.” 12- izfroknh@izkFkhZ dh vksj ls izLRkqr fd;s x;s lEekuuh; U;kf;d n`”Vkar 1997 fØ-ykW-tu- ist 843 ¼dsjy½ dk llEeku voyksdu fd;kA ekuuh; mPp U;k;ky; }kjk ;g izfrikfnr fd;k x;k gS fd na-iz-la- dh /kkjk 84 ds rgr m)ksf”kr ¼Qjkj½ O;fDr dh laifŸk dqdZ gksus ls r`rh; i{kdkj ds }kjk nhokuh okn izLRkqr djus ls /kkjk 84¼4½ oftZr ugh djrhA /kkjk 84 dk vuqrks”k vuqKs; gS] vuuU;r% ughA 13- izfroknh@izkFkhZ dh vksj ls izLrqr vU; lEekuh; U;kf;d n`”VkaRk 2009¼1½ M+h ,u ts ¼jkt-½ ist 197 dk lEeku voyksdu fd;kA mDr izdj.k fofufn”V vuqrks”k vf/k-dh /kkjk 6¼2½ ls lacf/kr Fkk] tcfd ;g okn /kkjk 6 fofufnZ”V vuqrks”k vf/kfu;e ls lacf/kr ugha gS vr% bl izdj.k ds RkF; mDr izdj.k ds rF;ks ls iw.kZr% fHkUu gksus ls bl ij ykxw ugha jgrs gSaA 14- izfroknh@izkFkhZ dh vksj ls izLrqr vU; lEekuuh; U;kf;d n`”Vkar 2008¼1½ MCY;w ,y lh ¼,l lh½ flfoy ist 39&40 ,oa , vkbZ vkj 1996 ,l lh ist 1089 dk llEeku voyksdu fd;k mDr nksuks izdj.kks ds rF; bl izdj.k ls iw.kZr% fHkUu gksus ls bl ij ykxw ugh jgrs Gsa 15- vr% mi;qDRk foospukuqlkj U;k;ky; bl fu”d”kZ ij igqprk gS fd na-iz-la- dh /kkjk 84 bl U;k;ky; dks okn ds Jo.kkf/kdkj ls oftZr ugh djrhA vr% izzkFkhZ@izfroknh la-2 dh vksj ls izLrqr izkFkZuk i= vLohdkj dj [kkfjt fd;s tkus ;ksX; gSA 16- vr% izkFkhZ@izfroknh la-2 dh vksj ls izLrqr izkFkZuk i= varxZr vkns’k 7 fu;e 11 ,oa /kkjk 151 fl-iz-l- vLohdkj dj [kkfjt fd;k tkrk gSaA a Sd/- ¼dey Naxk.kh½ vij ftyk U;k;k/kh’k ¼QkLV Vsªd½ la-2] HkhyokM+k^^ 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner-Union of India in the present revision petition, Mr. N.K. Rai contended that Section 84(4) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 permits the person, who has raised an objection under Section 84(1) of the Cr.P.C. to institute such suit only after a period of one year of filing of such claim/objection, which may either be allowed or disallowed by the competent court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, and therefore, since the present suit for specific performance was instituted by the plaintiff-Sohan Lal prematurely without the stipulated period of one year in Section 84(4) Cr.P.C., therefore it was not maintainable and liable to be rejected. He therefore, urged that the present revision petition of the Union of India deserves to be allowed and the impugned order dated 03.03.2011 passed by the learned trial court deserves to be set aside. 5. On the other hand, Mr. Muktesh Maheshwari and Mr. Aakash Kukkar urged that Section 84(4) of the Cr.P.C, nowhere bars the institution of the civil suit for specific performance, therefore, the suit could not have been rejected on the anvil of Order 7 Rule 11 CPC, and therefore, the learned trial court was justified in rejecting the application of the Union of India by the impugned order dated 03.03.2011. He further submitted that the plaintiff raised the objections before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate also, in which proceedings a criminal misc. petition, namely, S.B. Criminal Misc. Petition No.1017/2012 – Sohan Lal Vs. Central Narcotics Bureau also came to be filed by the plaintiff-Sohan Lal, and a coordinate Bench of this Court on 13.09.2012, while disposing of the same, directed that if the Agreement in question between the private parties may be got registered within sixteen weeks of the date of the said order i.e.13.09.2012, which was the opportunity given by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, the same can be admitted in evidence by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, otherwise not. The relevant portion of the order dated 13.09.2012 passed by a coordinate Bench of this Court is quoted below for ready reference:- “On the strength of the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Dina Ji's case (supra) and upon a consideration of relevant provisions of law (Registration Act) and keeping in view the fact that as the document in question is prepared for the transfer of the property by the accused to the petitioner, the same cannot be admitted in evidence and thus, the learned trial court has rightly rejected the prayer of the petitioner to have the document exhibited in evidence. However, the petitioner is given an opportunity that if by adopting legal means, he is in a position to get the document registered in his favour within a period of sixteen (16) weeks from the date of this order, he shall be at liberty to request the trial court to permit the document to be exhibited and upon such prayer being made, the trial court shall consider and decide the same in accordance with law. With the aforesaid observations and directions, the instant misc. petition is disposed of. Stay petition also stands disposed of. Sd/- (SANDEEP MEHTA), J.” 6. Mr. Muktesh Maheshwari and Mr. Aakash Kukkar also submitted that against the said order of the High Court dated 13.09.2012, the Union of India has preferred an Special Leave Petition, which is pending before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, and thus obviously, the objections raised by the plaintiff under Section 84(4) of the Cr.P.C. have not yet been decided by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate. They however, submitted that the plaint or suit for specific performance was still maintainable and the trial on merits deserves to proceed, in the absence of any stay of such proceedings by the Apex Court. Independent of Section 84 of the Cr.P.C., the trial in a suit for specific performance can proceed on merits. 7. Having heard the learned counsels for the parties, this Court is of the considered opinion that the impugned order dated 03.03.2011 is justified in law and does not call for any interference by this Court in the present revision petition filed by the Union of India. The civil rights of the plaintiff-Sohan Lal in the present suit for specific performance are yet to be tried by the competent civil court. The civil rights of the plaintiff-Sohan Lal in the present suit for specific performance are yet to be tried by the competent civil court. Section 84 of the Cr.P.C. does not bar the jurisdiction of the civil court nor does it bar the institution of such suit in any manner. The said provisions are quoted below for ready reference:- “84. Claims and objections to attachment.- (1) If any claim is preferred to, or objection made to the attachment of any property attached under section 83 within six months from the date of such attachment, by any person other than the proclaimed person, on the ground that the claimant or objector has an interest in such property, and that such interest is not liable to attachment under section 83, the claim or objection shall be inquired into, and may be allowed or disallowed in whole or in part: Provided that any claim preferred or objection made within the period allowed by this sub-section may, in the event of the death of the claimant or objector, be continued by his legal representative. (2) Claims or objections under sub-section (1) may be preferred or made in the Court by which the order of attachment is issued, or, if the claim or objection is in respect of property attached under an order endorsed under sub-section (2) of section 83, in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate of the district in which the attachment is made. (3) Every such claim or objection shall be inquired into by the Court in which it is preferred or made:- Provided that, if it is preferred or made in the Court of a Chief Judicial Magistrate, he may make it over for disposal to any Magistrate subordinate to him. (4) Any person whose claim or objection has been disallowed in whose or in part by an order under sub-section (1) may, within a period of one year from the date of such order, institute a suit to establish the right which he claims in respect of the property in dispute; but subject to the result of such suit, if any, the order shall be conclusive.” 8. A bare perusal of the said provisions would reveal that the period of one year, within which such suit is to be instituted to establish the rights, which he claims only starts after the objections against the attachment of the property of an absconder are decided. It cannot be said that this would impliedly bar the institution of the suit prior to decision of the objections under Section 84(4) of the Cr.P.C. The decision of the objections under Section 84(4) of the Cr.P.C is a off-shoot litigation in the present case and the plaintiff, irrespective of the decision on the objections raised by him can institute a civil suit for establishing his rights in a suit for specific performance, and therefore, unless the suit was barred by some clear and specific provision of law, Order 7 Rule 11 CPC cannot be invoked to reject the plaint. The reasoning given by the trial court in the impugned order is therefore justified. 9. It is true that the final relief even in the civil suit for specific performance pertaining to the same property may also remain subject to the final decision of the objections under Section 84 of the Cr.P.C. as stipulated in Section 84(4) of Cr.P.C. and the rights of the Union of India of attachment and even confiscation of that property may prevail over the rights of the plaintiff in the present suit for specific performance, but that does not per se bar the trial itself of such civil suit for specific performance. Both the proceedings therefore, can proceed simultaneously in law. A suit even if premature can be allowed to proceed on its own merits. 10. On the basis of the aforesaid, the present suit instituted by the plaintiff-respondent-Sohanlal cannot be said to be barred by law, even though the fate of the said property may ultimately depend upon the conclusion of both the proceedings. 11. In this view of the matter, the rejection of the application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC by the learned trial court in the present case cannot be said to be erroneous. 11. In this view of the matter, the rejection of the application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC by the learned trial court in the present case cannot be said to be erroneous. This Court does not find any force in the present revision petition filed by the defendant-Union of India, who can only be an objector against grant of final relief in the suit or in the execution of decree, if so granted by the civil court, if the objections under Section 84(1) of the plaintiff are ultimately rejected by the competent court. 12. Accordingly, the present revision petition filed by the defendant-Union of India is dismissed. No costs. Copy of this order may be sent to the concerned parties as well as the learned court below forthwith.