JUDGMENT Mrs. Sunita Agarwal, J. Heard Sri Swapnil Kumar and Sri Uma Nath Pandey, learned counsels for the petitioners and Sri Prakash Padia, learned counsel for respondents. 2. The writ petition is directed against the orders passed in the proceedings under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971. The case of the petitioners is that the petitioner no. 1 was tenant of Shop No. 7 and 21 existing in the building known as Jeevan Vikas Building, Mahatma Gandhi Marg, Kanpur Nagar since 1.6.1978 owned by respondent no. 1. On 8.6.2001, a notice has been issued to the petitioners by respondent no. 1 asking for enhancement of rent. Thereafter, respondent no. 1 set up a case of eviction on the basis of subsequent notice dated 4.10.2001 alleged to have been sent under the provisions of Section 106 of the Transfer of the Property Act. On the basis of said notice, proceedings under Sections 5 and 6 of the Public Premises Act have been initiated against the petitioners and a registered notice dated 27.2.2002 was issued by the Estate Officer under the Public Premises Act, 1971. The petitioners submitted a reply to the said notice and had categorically pleaded therein that the alleged notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of the Property Act dated 4.10.2001 was never served upon them. The petitioners being lawful tenant of the premises for more than 30 years and have been regularly paying rent cannot be evicted by an illegal notice of termination of tenancy. The Estate Officer treating the notice as invalid passed the order dated 29.4.2004 declaring the petitioner as unauthorised occupant and directed the petitioner to vacate the premises and hand over vacant possession to the respondent. Further direction was given to pay a sum of Rs. 7,40,000/- and odd to the respondents towards arrears of rent and damages. Future damages of Rs. 24,345/- was calculated from 30.4.2004, till the date of vacation and handing over possession of the premises in question. A simple interest of 12% per annum was also awarded. Aggrieved the petitioners filed appeal under Section 9 of the Act, 1971 before the District Judge, Kanpur Nagar. The appeal was dismissed on 16.12.2014 and hence this writ petition. 3. 24,345/- was calculated from 30.4.2004, till the date of vacation and handing over possession of the premises in question. A simple interest of 12% per annum was also awarded. Aggrieved the petitioners filed appeal under Section 9 of the Act, 1971 before the District Judge, Kanpur Nagar. The appeal was dismissed on 16.12.2014 and hence this writ petition. 3. Challenging the orders of eviction, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the petitioners have been illegally evicted from the premises in question on the ground of non-payment of rent and that the premises was required by the Corporation for its own use and occupation. An objection was taken regarding applicability of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 on the ground that the premises is not covered within the definition of "Public Premises" under the Act, 1971. Further ground of challenge is that the notice under Section 106 of Transfer of the Property Act was never served upon the petitioners as there was no documentary evidence to prove the service of notice. The presumption regarding service of notice by the Estate Officer is patently illegal. Respondent no. 1 has accepted the rent and water tax of the premises in dispute after the alleged notice of determination of tenancy which was tendered by the petitioner to respondent no. 1 and rent receipts dated 30.3.2002, 4.4.2002 and 21.1.2003 have been issued. Thus, with the acceptance of rent, the notice of termination of tenancy, if any, stands waived. Neither the Estate Officer nor the lower appellate court had appreciated the documentary evidences namely the rent receipts filed by the petitioner before arriving at a finding regarding validity of the notice. Even the witness produced by respondent no. 1 to prove the service of notice did not support the case of respondents in the cross examination. The witness could not establish that the counsel who had sent the notice, was instructed by respondent no. 1. He had failed to disclose in the cross examination as to who had instructed the counsel to give notice of termination of tenancy. The finding recorded by the Estate Officer regarding the unauthorised occupancy is absolutely illegal. The petitioner being bona fide tenant of the premises in question have wrongly been termed as unauthorised occupant and the proceedings under the Public Premises Act, 1971, therefore, are liable to be quashed. 4. The finding recorded by the Estate Officer regarding the unauthorised occupancy is absolutely illegal. The petitioner being bona fide tenant of the premises in question have wrongly been termed as unauthorised occupant and the proceedings under the Public Premises Act, 1971, therefore, are liable to be quashed. 4. Lastly, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the guidelines have been issued by the Central Government under the Act and instructions have been issued that the bona fide tenants cannot be made victim of the Public Premises Act. The guidelines issued under the Act and the administrative instructions have the force of law. The Estate Officer and the lower appellate court had committed an error in law in ignoring these guidelines on the ground they are merely administrative instructions and cannot be said to be mandatory. 5. Sri Prakash Padia, learned counsel for respondents Corporation on the other hand submits that there is no infirmity in the order passed by the Estate Office and the lower appellate court. The service of notice was established by cogent evidence and the petitioners were in arrears of rent and with the notice dated 4.10.2001, the tenancy was determined. The petitioners being unauthorised occupants could not have continued in possession of the premises after 30 days of the service of notice and as such the damages have been imposed and computation was done as per Rule 8 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Rules, 1971. After proper assessment of the damages by the Estate Officer in accordance with the Rules, it was imposed with effect from 10.11.2001. The possession of the premises in question was handed over to respondents only on 23.10.2009 and hence apart from a sum of Rs. 7,32,151.70/-, respondent no. 1 is also entitled for future damages at the rate of Rs. 24,345/- per month from 30.4.2004 till 23.10.2009, i.e. from the date of eviction order till the date of delivery of possession. 6. In rejoinder affidavit, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the damages have been calculated at an imaginary rate arrived at by the Estate Officer. The petitioners had vacated the premises on 23.10.2009 and are not liable to pay the damages, as there was a relationship of landlord and tenant existed between them till the date of handing over possession to respondent no. 1. 7. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. The petitioners had vacated the premises on 23.10.2009 and are not liable to pay the damages, as there was a relationship of landlord and tenant existed between them till the date of handing over possession to respondent no. 1. 7. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. So far as the first contention of learned counsel for the petitioner regarding applicability of the Act, it is not in dispute that respondent no. 1 Corporation is the owner and landlord of the property known as Jeevan Vikas Building. The premises was taken on rent on 1.6.1978 after coming into operation of the Public Premises Act, 1971. Respondent no. 1 is a Corporation established under a Central Act and is owned and controlled by the Central Government. 8. The Constitutional validity of the 1971 Act has been upheld by the Apex Court in Hari Singh and Others vs. The Military Estate Officer and Another reported in 1972 (2) SCC 239 . The appointment of one of the officers of the statutory authority as an Estate Officer and thereby challenge to the validity of the Act was also negatived by the Apex Court in Accountant and Secretarial Services Pvt. Ltd. And Another vs. Union of India and Others reported in 1988 (4) SCC 324 . 9. In Ashoka Marketing Ltd. and Another vs. Punjab National Bank and Others reported in 1990 (4) SCC 406 , the question arose was as to whether the provisions of the Public Premises Act would override the provisions of the Rent Control Act in relation to the premises which falls within the ambit of both the enactments. 10. In paragraphs 63' to 66', the Apex Court noticing the Statement of object and reasons of the Public Premises Act, 1971 has held that the provisions of the Public Premises Act have to be construed as overriding the provisions contained in the Rent Control Act. The observations of the Apex Court are as under: - "63. As mentioned earlier, the Public Premises Act has been enacted with a view to provide for eviction of unauthorised occupants from public premises. The observations of the Apex Court are as under: - "63. As mentioned earlier, the Public Premises Act has been enacted with a view to provide for eviction of unauthorised occupants from public premises. In the statement of objects and reasons for this enactment reference has been made to the judicial decisions whereby by the 1958 Act was declared as unconstitutional and it has been mentioned: "The court decisions, referred to above, have created serious difficulties for the Government inasmuch as the proceedings taken by the various Estate Officers appointed under the Act either for the eviction of persons who are in unauthorised occupation of public premises or for the recovery of rent or damages from such persons stand null and void. It has become impossible for Government to take expeditious action even in flagrant cases of unauthorised occupation of public premises and recovery of rent or damages for such unauthorised occupation. It is, therefore, considered imperative to restore a speedy machinery for the eviction of persons who are in unauthorised occupation 690 of public premises keeping in view at the same time the necessity of complying with the provision of the Constitution and the judicial pronouncements, referred to above." This shows that the Public Premises Act has been enacted to deal with the mischief of rampant unauthorised occupation of public premises by providing a speedy machinery for the eviction of persons in unauthorised occupation. In order to secure this object the said Act prescribes the time period for the various steps which are enquired to be taken for securing eviction of the persons in unauthorised occupation. The object underlying the enactment is to safeguard public interest by making available for public use premises belonging to Central Government, Companies in which the Central Government has substantial interest, Corporations owned or controlled by the Central Government and certain autonomous bodies and to prevent misuse of such premises. 64. It would thus appear that, while the Rent Control Act is intended to deal with the general relationship of landlords and tenants in respect of premises other than government premises, the Public Premises Act is intended to deal with speedy recovery of possession of premises of public nature, i.e. property belonging to the Central Government, or Companies in which the Central Government has substantial interest or Corporations owned or controlled by the Central Government and certain corporations, institutions, autonomous bodies and local authorities. The effect of giving overriding effect to the provisions of the Pubic Premises Act over the Rent Control Act, would be that buildings belonging to Companies Corporations and Autonomous bodies referred to in Section 2(e) of the Public Premises Act would be excluded from the ambit of the Rent Control Act in the same manner as properties belonging to the Central Government. The reason underlying the exclusion of property be- longing to the Government from the ambit of the Rent Control Act, is that Government while dealing with the citizens in respect of property belonging to it would not act for its own purpose as a private landlord but would act in public interest. What can be said with regard to Government in relation to property belonging to it can also be said with regard to companies, corporations and other statutory bodies mentioned in Section 2(e) of the Public Premises Act. In our opinion, therefore, keeping in view the object and purpose underlying both the enactments viz., the Rent Control Act and the Public Premises Act, the provisions of the Public Premises Act have to be construed as overriding the provisions contained in the Rent Control Act. 65. As regards the non-obstante clauses contained in Sections 14 and 22 and the provisions contained in Sections 50 and 54 of the Rent Control Act, it may be stated that Parliament was aware of these provisions when it enacted the Public Premises Act contained a specific provision in Section 15 barring jurisdiction of all courts (which would include the Rent Controller under the Rent Control Act). This indicates that Parliament intended that the provisions of the Public Premises Act would prevail over the provisions of the Rent Control Act in spite of the above mentioned provisions contained in the Rent Control Act. 66. It has been urged by the learned counsel for petitioner that there is no conflict between the provisions of the Rent Control Act and the Public Premises Act and that both the provisions can be given effect to without one overriding the other. 66. It has been urged by the learned counsel for petitioner that there is no conflict between the provisions of the Rent Control Act and the Public Premises Act and that both the provisions can be given effect to without one overriding the other. In this regard, it has been pointed out that since no provisions has been made in the Public Premises Act for the termination of the lease, the provisions of the Rent Control Act can be held applicable upto the stage of termination of the lease, and thereafter, proceedings can be initiated for eviction under the provisions of the Public Premises Act. In support of this submission, reliance has been placed on Dhanpal Chettiar's case (supra), wherein it has been held that in view of the special provisions contained in the State Rent Control Acts, it is no longer necessary to issue a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act to terminate the tenancy because in spite of the said notice the tenant is entitled to continue in occupation by virtue of the provisions of the said Acts. In the said case, it has been further laid down that the relationship between the landlord and tenant continues till the passing of the order of eviction in accordance with the provisions of the Rent act, and therefore, for the eviction of the tenant in accordance with the law, an order of the competent Court under the Rent Control Act is necessary. This would mean that in order to evict a person who is continuing in occupation after the expiration or termination of his contractual tenancy in accordance with law, two proceedings will have to be initiated. First, there will be proceedings under Rent Control Act before the Rent Controller followed by appeal before the Rent Control Tribunal and revision before the High Court. After these proceedings have ended they would be followed by proceedings under the Public Premises Act, before the Estate Officer and the Appellate Authority. In other words, persons in occupation of public premises would receive greater protection than tenants in premises owned by private persons. It could not be the intention of Parliament to confer this dual benefit on persons in occupation of public premises." 11. In other words, persons in occupation of public premises would receive greater protection than tenants in premises owned by private persons. It could not be the intention of Parliament to confer this dual benefit on persons in occupation of public premises." 11. In paragraph 70' of "Ashoka Marketing", the Apex Court has concluded that the provisions of the Public Premises Act to the extent they cover premises falling within the ambit of the Rent Control Act, override the provisions of the Rent Control Act and a person in unauthorised occupation of the public premises under Section 2(e) of the Act cannot invoke the protection of the Rent Control Act. It was held that the properties belonging to the Central Government, Government Companies or Corporations would be excluded from the application of the Rent Control Act. 12. In the instant case, there is no dispute about the fact that the premises in question belongs to Life Insurance Corporation which is a Corporation owned and controlled by the Central Government. 13. Thus, the premises in-question will fall in the definition of the "Public Premises" provided under Section 2(e) of the 1971, Act. The dispute regarding applicability of the Act raised by learned counsel for the petitioner is without any substance. 14. The second challenge is with regard to the service and validity of the notice dated 4.10.2001 under Section 106 of Transfer of the Property Act. The notice was signed and issued by the respondent's Advocate Sri Onkar Nath Seth. The carbon copy of the notice has been filed before the Estate Officer with the acknowledgement signed on 10.10.2001 by/on behalf of M/s Singer India Ltd, Jeevan Vikas Building, Kanpur. The said notice was also affixed on the suit premises on 8.10.2001 by the peon of the applicant in the presence of the officers of the Corporation. These facts were proved by respondent's witness Sri Mahendra Pal, A.A.O. (Estate). 15. The statement of Sri Mahendra Pal witness of respondent Corporation has been brought on record with the supplementary affidavit. In his examination-in-chief, he has categorically stated that the notice was sent by registered post and was signed by Sri Onkar Nath Seth, Advocate of the Corporation. The witness had also proved the signatures of the Advocate on the notice. He has also proved the acknowledgement card of the registered post which shows that the notice was served upon the petitioners on 10.10.2001. The witness had also proved the signatures of the Advocate on the notice. He has also proved the acknowledgement card of the registered post which shows that the notice was served upon the petitioners on 10.10.2001. He has also proved the pasting of noting on the suit premises on 8.10.2001. Merely because in the cross-examination, he could not name the person before whom the signature was put by the Advocate on the notice or the person who had gone to post-office to post the notice through registered post, it cannot be said that he had failed to prove the service of notice. There were sufficient documents on record to prove that the notice was sent through registered post and it was received by the petitioners. 16. With the service of notice of termination of tenancy on 10.10.2001, the petitioners were required to prove that they had paid rent in default within the period mentioned in the notice. As the petitioners have failed to prove the payment of rent in default, their tenancy stood terminated on valid grounds. After termination of the tenancy, the petitioners became unauthorised occupants of the disputed shop no. 7 and 21 with effect from 10.11.2001 i.e. 30 days after the service of notice upon them. 17. The plea of waiver of notice on the ground of subsequent tendering and receipt of rent dated 30.3.2002 on the strength of the rent receipts dated 3.4.2002, 4.4.2002 is not tenable in absence of the circumstance indicating intention of the landlord to treat the lease as subsisting. Admittedly the eviction suit was filed on 27.2.2007 by the landlord, thus the rent receipts issued for the rent tendered thereafter, from 30.3.2002 onwards, would not amount to intention of the landlord to continue the tenancy. 18. In Anish Ahmad vs. Special/Additional District Judge, Saharanpur and Others reported in 1997 (30) ALR 616 (SC), it was held that acceptance of rent for a period subsequent to the determination of tenancy would not amount to waiver of notice in absence of the circumstances indicating intention of the landlord to treat the lease as subsisting. 19. Moreover, the notice was followed by eviction suit which makes the intention of the landlord clear not to continue the petitioners as tenant. 20. This submission of learned counsel for the petitioners thus fails. 21. 19. Moreover, the notice was followed by eviction suit which makes the intention of the landlord clear not to continue the petitioners as tenant. 20. This submission of learned counsel for the petitioners thus fails. 21. Now the last question regarding the protection sought by the petitioners on the basis of guidelines issued by the Central Government. This question came up for consideration before the Apex Court in New India Assurance Company Ltd. vs. Nusli Neville Wadia and Another reported in 2008 (3) SCC 279 : 2008 (1) ARC 569 and in a later judgement in Suhas H. Pophale vs. Oriental Insurance Company Ltd and its Estate Officer reported in 2014 (4) SCC 657 : 2014 (1) ARC 756. It was held in paragraph 58' in Suhas H. Pophale (supra) as under: - "50. The instructions contained in this Resolution are undoubtedly guidelines, and are advisory in character and do not confer any rights on the tenants as held in para 23 of New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Nusli Neville Wadia. At the same time, the intention behind the guidelines cannot be ignored by the public undertakings which are expected to follow the same. When it comes to the interpretation of the provisions of the statute, the guidelines have been referred herein for the limited purpose of indicating the intention in making the statutory provision, since the guidelines are issued to effectuate the statutory provision. The guidelines do throw some light on the intention behind the statute. The guidelines are issued with good intention to stop arbitrary use of the powers under the Public Premises Act. The powers are given to act for specified reasons, and are expected to be used only in justified circumstances and not otherwise." 22. The challenge to the computation of damages for unauthorised use and occupation of the premises after 30 days of notice could not be substantiated by learned counsel for the petitioners on the basis of any cogent material. The Estate Officer has assessed the damages as per Rule 8 of the Rules, 1971 framed under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971. The rent has been determined on the basis of exemplars produced by the Corporation keeping in view the factors enumerated under Rule 8 of Rules 1971. The Estate Officer has assessed the damages as per Rule 8 of the Rules, 1971 framed under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971. The rent has been determined on the basis of exemplars produced by the Corporation keeping in view the factors enumerated under Rule 8 of Rules 1971. Merely because the damages have been computed at a higher rate of rent from what was being tendered by the petitioners, it cannot be a ground to interfere in the computation made by the Estate Officer. The appellate authority has also considered all these aspects of the matter and dismissed the appeal by a reasoned and speaking order. 23. In view of the above discussion, no interference is required in the judgment and order dated 16.12.2014 passed by the Additional District Judge, Court no. 8 Kanpur Nagar as also the order dated 29.4.1984 passed by the Estate Officer under Section 5(1) of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971. 24. The writ petition is devoid of merits and hence dismissed.