JUDGMENT : N. Paul Vasantha Kumar, J. 1. This appeal is preferred by the Life Insurance Corporation of India against the order of learned Single Judge made in SWP No. 146/1999 dated 20.08.2001, in which the learned Single Judge has allowed the writ petition filed by the respondent and set aside the order of dismissal with liberty to the appellants to pass fresh orders with a further direction that respondent would be entitled to all consequential benefits minus monetary benefits. The case of the respondent before the learned Single Judge was that he was appointed as Development Officer of Life Insurance Corporation of India on 22.11.1984, stating that he will be on probation for one year. On 04.07.1985 the probation was extended up to 03.10.1985, which was further extended up to 03.12.1985 and his services were confirmed with effect from 04.12.1985; The performance of the respondent was assessed and for one year his performance was less by 127%, for which three reverse increments was imposed. From 01.01.1987 to 31.12.1987 his performance was less by 59.36%. A show cause notice was issued on 09.02.1988 stating that the performance of the respondent is not up to the mark and he was called upon to submit his reply. On 17.03.1988 the respondent submitted his reply stating the reason for his low performance. He again submitted a reply on 12.04.1988 stating the circumstances under which he could not show much performance. On 23.08.1988 a show cause notice of termination was issued, for which he submitted his reply. In the reply to the show cause notice respondent has stated that for the appraisal year 1987 his elder brother was admitted in T.B. Hospital in critical condition due to lung ailment and he passed away on 27.09.1987 and even before he could recover from the said great loss his grandmother passed away on 16.10.1987. Due to the said two deaths his father could not reconcile mentally and he developed heart attack and remained on bed for a long time, who later on also developed kidney trouble and due to the said reason he could not show improvement in the LIC business. He also stated that from 01.01.1988 to February, 1988 he has given FYPI of Rs. 40,000/- and he assured that he will improve his performance and procure more business, if opportunity is given. He also stated that from 01.01.1988 to February, 1988 he has given FYPI of Rs. 40,000/- and he assured that he will improve his performance and procure more business, if opportunity is given. According to the respondent, without considering the said plight and personal difficulties faced by the respondent, order of termination was passed. The respondent stated that ever, if the performance was not upto the mark, Regulation 9(2) of the LIC of India (Staff Regulations, 1960) contemplates giving of Class-III administrative work and the respondent was not offered the said alternative post. The learned Single Judge taking note of the said fact set aside the order of termination and passed the order as stated supra. 2. Mr. S.C. Gupta contended that as per the amended Regulations, 1978, for alternative posting i.e. Class III, one has to apply within thirty days of termination and if no application is submitted the management is not obliged to consider the alternate post and the respondent being at fault he cannot blame the appellants and the learned Single Judge was not right in setting aside the order. Learned counsel relied on the regulations in support of his contention. 3. Mr. Meharban Singh, learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand argued that the respondent was facing difficult situation due to death of his brother, grant mother and the illness of his father and he having not accepted the order of termination, he has not opted for Class-III post in the explanation and as per the regulation the same should have been offered by the management and only if the offer was declined by the respondent the alternative post can be denied and prayed for upholding the order of the learned Single Judge. 4. We have considered the rival submissions. 5. On the date when the order of the learned Single Judge was passed setting aside the order of the termination without monetary benefits that was on 20.08.2001, the respondent's age on that date was 51 years and the age of retirement of the officers of the LIC is 58 years. The Division Bench while entertaining the appeal has granted stay of the order of the learned Single Judge, hence the respondent was not reinstated. The respondent has reached the age of superannuation in the year 2008. Thus there is no scope for reinstating the appellant at this stage in either of the post. The Division Bench while entertaining the appeal has granted stay of the order of the learned Single Judge, hence the respondent was not reinstated. The respondent has reached the age of superannuation in the year 2008. Thus there is no scope for reinstating the appellant at this stage in either of the post. However, if the appeal is decided in favour of the respondent he will be entitled to get salary at least from the order of the learned Single Judge till the date of his retirement and only for this purpose the appeal has to be considered on merits. 6. It is not in dispute that the respondent was employed as a Development Officer by order-dated 22.11.1984 and his probation was also confirmed with effect from 04.12.1985 by an order of Life Insurance Corporation. For two years his performance was not satisfactory and on review of the performance the management issued a show cause notice calling for explanation as to why he should not be terminated from service. The respondent has stated genuine reasons for his low performance of two years and the same was not considered by the appellants properly, which has been noted by the learned Single Judge in his order. Even assuming that due to low performance the appellants are entitled to pass the order of termination, in terms of Regulation 9(2) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960 an alternate post is bound to be offered to the respondent in Class-III category. Admittedly the same was not offered and the stand taken by the appellant before the learned Single Judge as well as in this appeal is that the respondent has failed to make a request in writing within thirty days from the order of termination, therefore, the appointment in a post in Class-III was not granted to him. Regulation 9(2) of the LIC Regulations reads as follows:-- "9. Promotion of Development Officer:-- (1)........................ (2) Any Development Officer whose services are liable to be terminated under this Schedule, may, with his consent, be appointed to do administrative work in Class III on such terms as may be decided by the Corporation." 7. Regulation 9(2) of the LIC Regulations reads as follows:-- "9. Promotion of Development Officer:-- (1)........................ (2) Any Development Officer whose services are liable to be terminated under this Schedule, may, with his consent, be appointed to do administrative work in Class III on such terms as may be decided by the Corporation." 7. It is the contention of the appellants that amendment was issued to the said Regulation in the year 1978 which mandates a request to be made in writing within 30 days of receipt of the termination order and only then the management is obliged to consider the appointment in the post of Class III. The amended regulations reads as follows:-- "..............that any Development Officer whose services are liable to be terminated may with his consent be appointed to do administrative work in Class III on such terms as may be decided by the Corporation. In a case where the Zonal Manager issues the order of termination giving three months notice as per para 12.4 above, the Development Officer may make a request in writing if he wishes to be considered for appointment in a post in Class III on such terms as may be decided by the Corporation. Such a request should be made within thirty days of receipt of the notice of termination so that a decision thereon can be taken before the notice period expires and termination takes effect. Guidelines regarding procedure to be followed for considering such requests and taking decision thereon and the basis for fixation of salary etc., in case of those appointed on the administrative side will be issued separately." 8. The amended Regulations nowhere states that if no request is made in writing within 30 days of the receipt of order of termination, an officer shall not be considered for appointment in a post in Class III. Therefore, submitting an application within 30 days is only directory and not mandatory. It is well settled proposition of law that unless failure to do certain procedures mentioned in the rule refers to some penal consequences the same is to be treated as directory. In the decision reported in (2011) 6 SCC 321 (Mahadev Govind Gharge and Ors. v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Upper Krishna Project) similar point as to whether the procedural law fixing time limit without penal consequences is mandatory or directory was considered by Hon'ble the Supreme Court. In the decision reported in (2011) 6 SCC 321 (Mahadev Govind Gharge and Ors. v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Upper Krishna Project) similar point as to whether the procedural law fixing time limit without penal consequences is mandatory or directory was considered by Hon'ble the Supreme Court. Hon'ble the Supreme Court held that time limit mentioned is only directory and not mandatory and requires liberal construction. In paragraph No. 37, Hon'ble the Supreme Court held thus:-- "37......................The provisions of procedural law which do not provide for penal consequences in default of their compliance should normally be construed as directory in nature and should receive liberal construction. The Court should always keep in mind the object of the statute and adopt an interpretation which would further such cause in light of attendant circumstances. To put it simply, the procedural law must act as a linchpin to keep the wheel of expeditious and effective determination of dispute moving in its place. The procedural checks must achieve its end object of just, fair and expeditious justice to parties without seriously prejudicing the rights of any of them." This Court in the decision reported in 1991 KLJ 204 : JKJ Soft JKJ/11757 (Rajbir Singh Dogra v. University of Jammu and ors) also considered a similar issue as to whether in the absence of penal provisions, conditions prescribed in the Rule or Regulations has to be strictly used. This Court held thus:-- "As already pointed out, there is no Rule or Regulation regulating the admission to M.B.A. course which mandate that a candidate must lay claim to the reserved category in the prescribed application Form and must append a certificate in support thereof alongwith, nor is there any University statutes or Regulations referable to the course in question, which impose a bar on the candidate to lay claim to the reserved category after the submission of the application Form and disentitle him from consideration in the relevant reserved category. There is also no Rule or Regulation which postulates rejection of a candidate's request for admission in the event he fails to lay claim to the reserved category in the application Form and does not attached the requisite certificate along with at the time of the submission of the application Form." 9. There is also no Rule or Regulation which postulates rejection of a candidate's request for admission in the event he fails to lay claim to the reserved category in the application Form and does not attached the requisite certificate along with at the time of the submission of the application Form." 9. It is an admitted fact that there is a provision for giving appointment in a post in Class III to a person terminated from the category of Development Officers. Such being the service Regulation, in the termination order itself the appellants are bound to state that if the respondent is willing to serve in a post in Class III, he may join in Class III post and only if within one month no willingness was given, such alternate post can be denied. The said procedure having not been followed which is one of the grounds mentioned in the order of the learned Single Judge. In such circumstances we are of the view that termination order passed against the respondent though valid, the failure on the part of the appellants to give alternate post in Class III cadre is a serious error committed by the appellants. 10. It is contended by the learned counsel appearing for the appellants that there was unreasonable delay in challenging the order of termination that is for about 10 years and even assuming that the respondent is entitled to get any relief. The submission can be considered by this Court while moulding the relief. 11. Considering the facts in this case, particularly the failure of the appellants in not offering the alternate post in Class III and having regard to the fact that respondent kept quiet for more than 10 years in moving this Court and having regard to the fact that the learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition ordering reinstatement at the age of 51 years and respondent having reached the age of superannuation even if reinstatement was given in the year 2008, the interest of justice will be met by directing the appellants to treat the respondent in service in Class III post from 07.11.1988 without any monetary benefits, and salary payable shall be calculated for the period from the date of the judgment of the learned Single Judge i.e., 20.08.2001 till the respondent attained the age of 58 years. The arrears of salary from 20.08.2001 to the date of superannuation of the respondent in the year 2008 and other retiral benefits shall be calculated by the appellants and paid to the respondent within a period of six weeks from the date of receipt of this order. The appeal stands disposed of.