Judgment 1. This Second Appeal is preferred against the Judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Appeal No. 312 of 2000 by the learned Principal District Judge, Amravati on 4.8.2014 whereby the Judgment and decree passed by Joint Civil Judge (Sr. Dn.), Amravati for specific performance of agreement to sell in Special Civil Suit No.136 of 1987 was confirmed. 2. The brief facts are as under : Original plaintiff (respondent) had instituted Special Civil Suit No.136 of 1987 against the present appellants (original defendants) on the ground that the first defendant for himself and on behalf of defendant nos. 2 to 4 had purchased the immovable property known as Old Milan Hotel building, Opposite Government Polytechnic Compound, Gadge Nagar and undertook construction of Shopping Complex of 60 ft. x 66 ft. of field bearing Survey No. 28, mouza Shegaon, Pragane Nandgaonpeth, Tq. And Distt. Amravati. Construction was of five shops and one room, out of which one shop premises admeasuring 10 ft. x 17 ft. was agreed to be sold by defendant no.1 for himself and other defendant nos. 2 to 4 to the plaintiff for a consideration of Rs.77,000/-. Earnest amount in the sum of Rs.50,000/- was paid by the plaintiff. The defendants were supposed to inform the plaintiff about the exact area and the sale deed to be executed on 21.9.1987 pursuant to agreement to sell dt.19.7.1987. But the defendants did not complete the transaction as agreed and sought extension till 5.10.1987. It is the case of the plaintiff that he was all along ready and willing to perform his part of contract. The plaintiff had issued notices and telegrams calling upon the first defendant to execute the sale deed. He had also issued public notice in Newspaper dt. 4.10.1987. But the defendant failed to execute the sale deed as promised. The plaintiff had, thus, filed suit for specific performance of agreement to sell in respect of the suit shop, alternatively claiming damages with refund of earnest money. 3. The defendants by Written Statement (Exh.25) resisted the suit on the ground that the plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform his part of contract and that extension was sought by the plaintiff for execution of sale deed. The appellants (original defendants) contended that here was no evidence that defendant nos. 3. The defendants by Written Statement (Exh.25) resisted the suit on the ground that the plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform his part of contract and that extension was sought by the plaintiff for execution of sale deed. The appellants (original defendants) contended that here was no evidence that defendant nos. 2 to 4 were bound by act of defendant no.1 and secondly that the plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform his part of contract. 4. The learned first Appellate Judge found that defendant nos. 2 to 4 were bound to concur with defendant no.1 to execute sale deed in favour of the plaintiff. It was held by the first Appellate Court that the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of contract and therefore, no interference was required in the decree passed by the trial Court. 5. The defendants contended that the plaintiff had examined power of attorney and he could not have deposed on behalf of the plaintiff to adduce evidence regarding readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff to comply with the agreement to sell. 6. The learned first Appellate Judge, on appreciation of the evidence, found that the power of attorney was none other than father of plaintiff who was personally aware of the facts and was also present at the time of transaction. It is also found that documentary evidence was produced on behalf of the plaintiff such as copy of notice sent to the defendant (Exh.63), copy of telegram dt.2.10.1987 (Exh.55) and copy of telegram dt.3.10.1987 (Exh.56) and copy of telegram dt.7.10.1987 (Exh.59) and stamp papers purchased by plaintiff on 5.10.1987 (Exh. Nos.57 and 58) to show that the plaintiff was all along interested not only to insist upon execution of sale deed but he had attended the Sub-Registrar's Office in order to get the sale deed executed pursuant to agreement to sell (Exh.53). The defendants had agreed to specify the area of suit shop before accepting balance consideration and to execute the sale deed on 25.9.1987 or earlier. 7. The learned first Appellate Judge considered the documentary evidence in the form of copy of notice, telegrams, stamp papers purchased as also the circumstances which revealed that defendant nos. 1 to 4 had appeared and engaged common Advocate. They had defended the suit and were represented by one Advocate. 7. The learned first Appellate Judge considered the documentary evidence in the form of copy of notice, telegrams, stamp papers purchased as also the circumstances which revealed that defendant nos. 1 to 4 had appeared and engaged common Advocate. They had defended the suit and were represented by one Advocate. Thus, the learned first Appellate Judge was satisfied that defendant no.1 was acting on behalf of himself and defendant nos. 2 to 4. The defendants, therefore, could not have disputed the fact that defendant no.1 was representing all the defendants. Therefore, defendant nos. 2 to 4 were held bound u/s.13(a) and (b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 to concur and to execute conveyance in favour of the plaintiff pursuant to agreement to sell executed by first defendant in favour of plaintiff. Thus, an agreement is entered into by one person on behalf of several persons to execute the sale deed. The person entering into agreement to sell on behalf of others and for himself is bound to get concurrence of such other persons in order to execute the sale deed. When there are strong equities in favour of the plaintiff, there would be no justification on the part of joint promisors to deny their obligation created under the agreement to sell the immovable property particularly where their share would not be affected. There is no dispute regarding terms of agreement to sell and also payment of earnest money made to the defendants under the agreement to sell. Therefore, in view of ruling in the case of Prakash Chandra vs. Angadlal and Others reported in AIR 1979 SC 1241 , the ordinary rule that specific performance of the agreement should be granted must be borne in mind. Specific performance of contract can be denied only when equitable considerations points to its refusal and circumstances show that damages would constitute adequate relief. At the same time, one cannot overlook the fact that the agreement to sell the immovable property creates equitable obligation on the part of the vendor to execute the sale deed as promised. Particularly, agreement to sell a shop in a shopping complex creates an enforceable obligation in favour of the plaintiff to insist upon execution of sale deed from the vendors who promised to sell the suit property especially when the plaintiff was all along ready and willing to get the sale deed executed. Particularly, agreement to sell a shop in a shopping complex creates an enforceable obligation in favour of the plaintiff to insist upon execution of sale deed from the vendors who promised to sell the suit property especially when the plaintiff was all along ready and willing to get the sale deed executed. It is true that grant of decree for specific performance of agreement is purely discretionary relief. But such discretion to grant or refuse the decree for specific performance of agreement to sell must be based upon sound judicial choice after a trial Judge applies his mind to the facts and circumstances disclosed in the evidence led before him. 8. In the present case, the defendants were admittedly joint owners in respect of the suit property. They had purchased the property jointly from one Mulchand Natthulalji Nagaria on 9.6.1987. Registered sale deed produced on record at Exh.54 indicates clearly that Mohan Ramchandra Ghode, Murlidhar Annasaheb Amle, Sahebrao Pundlikrao Vidhale and Narendra Jagatrao Ubhad had jointly purchased the suit property. Thus, they were admittedly joint owners. The sale deed transaction would indicate that Sahebrao Pundlikrao Vidhale had acted on behalf of the purchaser who purchased the stamp paper for getting the sale deed executed. None of other joint vendors figured as participating in that transaction of sale deed. Under these circumstances, submission made on behalf of the appellants with reference to the ruling in the case of Pemmada Prabhakar and Others vs. Youngmen's Vysya Association and Others reported in (2015) 5 SCC 355 that when vendors are not having complete title over the suit property, agreement not executed by all the co-sharers cannot be enforced by plaintiff/vendee is not convincing as the facts and circumstances in the case of Pemmada Prabhakar and Others were different. In that case, undisputed fact was that the suit property was a self acquired property of Pemmada Venkateswara Rao and he died intestate leaving behind his wife, three sons and three daughters as legal heirs. In the facts and circumstances of that case, Hon'ble Supreme Court held that defendant no.1 and 2 in that case had no absolute right to property in question. Therefore, plaintiffs in that case were held not entitled to grant of a decree for specific performance of agreement of sale in their favour. In the facts and circumstances of that case, Hon'ble Supreme Court held that defendant no.1 and 2 in that case had no absolute right to property in question. Therefore, plaintiffs in that case were held not entitled to grant of a decree for specific performance of agreement of sale in their favour. In that case, Section 17 of the Specific Relief Act in the light of Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act was considered. The facts and circumstances in the present case are substantially different. Here, the suit property was sold by such a vendor who had acquired title to the suit property under registered sale deed acting for himself and on behalf of other co-owners and had complete good title to the suit property for himself and co-vendors to convey the same. The ruling, therefore is not attracted. 9. In the same manner, the ruling in the case of Kashinath Rajaram Kasabe and Others vs. Ramchandra Tukaram Kasabe (deceased) as per L.Rs. and Others (Judgment delivered by the Single Judge of this Court) reported in 2015 (1) Mh.L.J. 748 is not attracted as, in that case, defendant alone had put thumb impression on the agreement. Nobody else from the family agreed to sell the suit property. In the facts and circumstances of that case, decree for specific performance of contract was rightly refused as held by this Court. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the rulings cited would not apply. 10. Another submission advanced on behalf of the appellants is that the plaintiff himself had not entered into witness box to insist upon specific performance of agreement to sell. He relied upon the ruling in the case of Man Kaur (Dead) by L.Rs. vs. Hartar Singh Sangha reported in 2010 (10) SCC 512 to argue that it was duty of the plaintiff to enter into witness box and to depose so that opportunity could have been given to the defendants to cross-examine the plaintiff. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, the father of the plaintiff had deposed, who was fully and personally aware of the facts. He was present at the time of transaction and he acted as representative of the plaintiff having personal knowledge in respect of the suit transaction. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, the father of the plaintiff had deposed, who was fully and personally aware of the facts. He was present at the time of transaction and he acted as representative of the plaintiff having personal knowledge in respect of the suit transaction. Therefore, it cannot be held in the facts of this case that the father of the plaintiff as a power of attorney holder on behalf of the plaintiff was incapable of proving the suit transaction. Nothing prevented the defendants from making an application to the trial Court or first appellate Court to allow them to cross-examine the plaintiff in respect of the suit transaction. Therefore, the submission at the belated stage of Second Appeal that the plaintiff should have entered in the witness box in the trial Court is neither acceptable nor convincing. No assistance can be sought by the appellants from the ruling in the case of Man Kaur's case (supra). 11. Mr. R.L. Khapre, learned Counsel for the respondent, in order to oppose the submissions advanced on behalf of the appellants, cited ruling in the case of Kartar Singh vs. Harjinder Singh and Others reported in AIR 1990 SC 854 to argue that specific performance can be granted in respect of shares of co-sharers. Mr. Khapre, learned Counsel argued that “power of attorney holder” can transfer the immovable property by executing document on behalf of all. It is further submitted that subject matter of the suit is only one shop admeasuring about 17 ft. x 10 ft. and the executant who signed on behalf of joint owners was one of the four joint owners with atleast 25 % share in the joint property which comes to around 1150 sq.ft. That being so, the shop sold was admeasuring only 170 sq.ft. It is submitted that, in any case, the agreement to sell was binding on the signatory vendor who was bound to execute sale deed of atleast his share in joint property pursuant to agreement to sell executed by him. Therefore, the decree passed by both the Courts below ought to be confirmed in the facts and circumstances of the case. 12. Therefore, the decree passed by both the Courts below ought to be confirmed in the facts and circumstances of the case. 12. Considering the normal rule that specific performance of agreement to sell ought to be granted and refusal is an exception and after considering the evidence on record with concurrent findings by both the Courts below granting decree for specific performance of the agreement to sell, the question raised by the appellants is as follows : Is it necessary for the plaintiff to prove his case on its own merits; whereas, in the present case when Issarnote (Exh.53) is without signatures of the defendants and there is no power of attorney to signatory defendant no.1 on behalf of defendant nos. 2 to 4, is it not perverse on the part of both the Courts below to take out right in the immovable property of defendant nos. 2 to 4 while granting specific performance of contract and also is it not erroneous perverse judgment given by the trial Court by way of dismissal of the First Appeal ? 13. The above composite question of law must be answered against the appellant in the facts and circumstances of the case. In my opinion, it cannot be termed as appropriate formulation of substantial question of law so as to entertain the Second Appeal in respect of decree dt. 26.2.1993 in Special Civil Suit No.136 of 1987 confirmed by the impugned Judgment and Order. In my considered opinion, in the facts and circumstances of this case, the agreement to sell in question was fully binding upon the signatory who was joint owner having own share in respect of the shopping complex to the extent of 1150 sq. ft. while suit shop agreed to be sold was admeasuring only 170 sq.ft. Therefore, there cannot be any escape for the executor of agreement to sell from to complete sale particularly when vendor Mr. Sahebrao Pundlik Vidhale who admittedly purchased stamp papers when entire land in question was acquired under registered sale deed on which shopping complex was constructed at the premises known as Old Milan Hotel, Opposite Government Polytechnic, Amravati. The trial Court had dealt with facts in detail and found that the first defendant had represented that, for himself and along with defendant nos. 2 to 4, he had agreed to sell the property i.e. shopping premises admeasuring 170 sq. ft. to the plaintiff. The trial Court had dealt with facts in detail and found that the first defendant had represented that, for himself and along with defendant nos. 2 to 4, he had agreed to sell the property i.e. shopping premises admeasuring 170 sq. ft. to the plaintiff. It is undisputed fact that original defendant no.1 Sahebrao Pundlikrao Vidhale had purchased the property for himself and other defendants from Mulchand Nagaria posing as joint owners of the suit property. The plaintiff was found ready and willing all along to pay balance consideration and to get the sale deed duly executed. Therefore, the decree was passed in favour of the plaintiff for specific performance of agreement to sell. Under these circumstances, the ordinary rule that specific performance of the agreement to sell should be granted operates and unless exceptional case is made out on behalf of the defendants for refusal of relief of specific performance, there would be no justification to deny relief of specific performance of such an agreement to sell as proved in the present case when substantial consideration amount in the sum of Rs.50,000/- was already paid as part consideration within time as agreed in the suit agreement to sell. 14. Even otherwise, in the Second Appeal preferred u/s.100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the concurrent findings of facts recorded by the trial Court and the first Appellate Court need not be disturbed unless exceptional case is made out on the basis of substantial question of law. I do not find any substantial question of law so as to entertain the Second Appeal and hence, question of law raised by the appellants herein must be answered against them. Therefore, for all the above reasons, the appeal deserves to be dismissed. The appeal is dismissed accordingly. No order as to costs.