JUDGMENT : Per Hon ble Mr.Ajay Rastogi, J. When the matter came up before the court on 20.11.2015, since the matter was earlier heard on merits, we considered it appropriate to observe that let the matter itself may be finally decided with the application filed u/Sec.17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, which came to be filed at a very belated stage but counsel for respondent insisted that he has instructions to first press the application filed u/Sec.17-B of the Act, 1947 before the appeal may be taken up for hearing and this what we have recorded in our order dt.20.11.2015 and consider it appropriate to dispose of the application filed by the respondent-workman u/Sec.17-B of the Act, 1947 before the matter is to be taken up for final hearing. Heard counsel for the parties. The respondent-workman No.2 Jhabar Mal Saini has filed an application u/Sec.17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 to issue necessary directions against the appellant-employer to pay full wages last pay drawn by him on 18.09.1984, during pendency of this special appeal. The brief facts which are relevant for disposal of the present application are that the respondent No.2/workman was initially appointed on the post of Lower Division Clerk on 04.10.1968. While working on the aforesaid post, he as allegedly submitted his resignation on 18.09.1984 to the Managing Committee. In the aforesaid resignation application, it was specifically requested by him that he wants to be relieved with immediate effect i.e. on 18.09.1984 itself and his resignation was accepted vide a resolution of the Managing Committee and he was relieved on 18.09.1984 itself and all retiral benefits were paid to him except Provident Fund. After eight months of accepting the retiral benefits, a legal notice was served by the respondent-workman to the Trust alleging that he had to submit resignation under duress and finally an industrial dispute was raised and the ld.Labour Court under impugned award dt.30.07.1994, after recording finding of fact, set aside the resignation letter dt.18.09.1984 directing the appellant to reinstate the respondent-workman with continuity in service without back wages. Against the impugned award dt.30.07.1994, writ petition was preferred by the appellant. Before the ld.Single Judge operation & effect of impugned award dt.30.07.1994 remain stayed vide order dt.12.05.1995 till disposal of the writ petition. Against the impugned award dt.30.07.1994, writ petition was preferred by the appellant. Before the ld.Single Judge operation & effect of impugned award dt.30.07.1994 remain stayed vide order dt.12.05.1995 till disposal of the writ petition. However, it may be noticed that the ld.Single Judge finally dismissed the writ petition vide order dt.11.3.2008 after placing reliance on the judgment of Apex Court in Sadhana Lodh Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd. & Anr. reported in (2003) 3 SCC 524 and observed that the High Court is not a court of appeal over Tribunals and Art.226/227 of the Constitution is a device to secure & advance justice and not inclined to interfere with the discretion exercised by the ld.Labour Court under impugned award dt.30.07.1994. It may be noticed that during pendency of the writ petition, an application was filed by the respondent-workman u/Sec.17-B of the Act, 1947 and in reference thereto reply was filed by the present appellant & it was stated that the respondent-workman is running a stationary shop in the name & style of Laxmi Traders and being gainfully employed after 18.09.1984, he is not entitled to the wages last drawn, pending writ petition. However, it appears that the application filed by the respondent-workman u/Sec.17-B of the Act, 1947 remained unattended and the writ petition itself was dismissed vide order dt.11.03.2008. The present special appeal has been preferred at the instance of the appellant-employer. Initially, notices were issued on 16.05.2008 and operation of the impugned award dt.30.07.1994 was stayed and the appeal came to be admitted vide order dt.28.05.2009. At one point of time, on 24.2.2015, the matter was heard on merits but not concluded, at this stage, the respondent-workman filed an application u/Sec.17-B of the Act, 1947 on 11.05.2015 and in para-11 of the application it has been stated that he is still out of employment since his termination and as such is entitled to full wages last drawn by him, as per the mandate of Sec.17-B of the Act, 1947. In reply filed by the appellant to the application, apart from merits of the matter, it has been stated that all retiral dues have been paid to the respondent-workman including Provident Fund later on, which is evident from letter dt.17.10.1984 (Ann.8 on record) and it has also been stated that the respondent-workman has taken on rent a shop and running the same in the name & style of M/s.Laxmi Traders (dealing in stationery, general goods & books, etc.) and that is the reason back wages were denied to him in the award impugned dt.30.07.1994 and certain documentary evidence in support has been placed on record by the appellant including invoices by which people purchased stationary from rented shop of the respondent-workman. At the same time, it has also been stated that the respondent-workman has attained the age of superannuation on 31.03.2003 and there is no further counter to reply filed by the appellant to the application u/Sec.17-B of the Act, 1947 and even if this court comes to the conclusion that he is not gainfully employed, as he has attained age of superannuation on 31.03.2003, the respondent-workman is not entitled even for the last wages drawn u/Sec.17-B of the Act, 1947. Counsel for respondent-workman submits that the workman is out of employment and has no source of earning and is entitled for last wages drawn provided u/Sec.17-B of the Act, 1947 and while opposing the application, counsel for appellant Mr.Lodha submits that Sec.17-B of the Act, 1947 does not contemplate payment of wages to a workman who has attained the age of superannuation & in support of his submission relied upon judgment in M/s. Hind Rectifiers Limited Vs. Presiding Officer, 1st Labour Court, Bombay & Another reported in 2000 (3) LLJ 300 (Bom.). It will be relevant to quote Sec.17-B of the Act, 1947, which reads ad infra:-“17B. Presiding Officer, 1st Labour Court, Bombay & Another reported in 2000 (3) LLJ 300 (Bom.). It will be relevant to quote Sec.17-B of the Act, 1947, which reads ad infra:-“17B. Payment of full wages to workman pending proceedings in higher courts.- Where in any case, a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal by its award directs reinstatement of any workman and the employer prefers any proceedings against such award in a High Court or the Supreme Court, the employer shall be liable to pay such workman, during the period of pendency of such proceedings in the High Court or the Supreme Court, full wages last drawn by him, inclusive of any maintenance allowance admissible to him under any rule if the workman had not been employed in any establishment during such period and an affidavit by such workman had been filed to that effect in such Court: Provided that where it is proved to the satisfaction of the High Court or the Supreme Court that such workman had been employed and had been receiving adequate remuneration during any such period or part thereof, the Court shall order that no wages shall be payable under this section for such period or part, as the case may be.” The objects & reasons for enacting the said provision was articulated as under:- “When labour courts passed award of reinstatement, these are often contested by the employer before the Supreme Court or High Courts. It was felt that the delay in implementation of the award caused hardship to the workman concerned. It was, therefore, proposed to provide the payment of wages last drawn by the workman concerned, under certain conditions, from the date of award till the case is finally decided in the Supreme Court/High Court.” The three necessary ingredients for the application of Sec.17-B of the Act, 1947 are (i) the Labour Court should have directed reinstatement of the workman; (ii) the employer should have preferred proceedings against such award in the High Court of in the Supreme Court; and (iii) the workman should not have been employed in any establishment during such period. It is apparent from the above that Section 17-B of the Act was introduced for the purposes of mitigating hardship faced by the workman who had been reinstated but the reinstatement had been delayed on account of the contest laid by the employer before the High Court or the Supreme Court. It is also clear that Sec.17-B of the Act, 1947 proposed to provide “payment of wages last drawn”. The object of introducing Sec.17-B of the Act appears to ensure that a workman, in whose favour an award for reinstatement has been passed, is at least paid his last drawn wages. The purpose of introducing Sec.17-B of the Act appears to be not to provide for a punitive measure or a disincentive for the employers to challenge the award passed by the Labour Court, but to mitigate the hardship faced by the workman on account of delays occasioned because of pendency of litigation before the High Courts and the Supreme Court. The Parliament in its wisdom, obviously thought it fit that the workman having succeeded in obtaining an award of reinstatement ought to be paid at least last wages that were drawn by him. It is also made a condition that for purposes of obtaining wages u/Sec.17-B of the Act, the employee should not be gainfully employed elsewhere. This object appears to be not to discourage an employer from assailing the award but to ensure that the workman who has prevailed before the labour court does not suffer for want of subsistence allowance for his sustenance. It is always open for the employer to implement the award by reinstating the workman and yet continue with his challenge to the award rendered by the Labour Court. If the argument of the workman is accepted, it would mean that even in cases where an employer has challenged the award and yet has reinstated the employee during the interregnum, he would nonetheless be obliged to pay the last drawn wages beyond the period of superannuation but this would lead to an absurd situation that could never be an intention of the Legislature. The obligation of the employer to pay “full wages last drawn” is indeed relatable to the relationship of employer and employee and is a direct consequence of the award which reinstates the employee in service of an employer. The obligation of the employer to pay “full wages last drawn” is indeed relatable to the relationship of employer and employee and is a direct consequence of the award which reinstates the employee in service of an employer. Sec.17-B of the Act ensures that at least last drawn wages are paid to the employee who has prevailed before the Labour Court and has been able to establish that breach of mandatory requirement of the provisions of Sec.17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, provided the conditions stipulated therein are satisfied but we are unable to persuade ourselves that the employer would be liable to pay the wages even beyond the date of superannuation and this is so, because it would amount to imposing a liability on an employer to pay wages even in cases where admittedly, the relationship of employee & employer stand extinguished/come to an end. The award passed by the ld.Labour Court reinstating the workman in services of employer would not work in so far as the relationship of employer & employee is concerned, with the superannuation of the workman from the services of employer. Any other interpretation to the requirement of Sec.17-B of the Act, 1947 after their relationship of employee & employer, on account of attaining age of superannuation, has come to an end would certainly lead to an absurd situation. The word “wages” as defined u/Sec.2(rr) of the Act, 1947 is relatable to an employment and once the employment has come to an end on attaining the age of superannuation, the question of payment u/Sec.17-B of the Act did not arise. It is undoubtedly true that the language of Sec.17-B of the Act, 1947 is in wide terms yet in its amplitude cannot be expanded beyond the sphere of employment. It is well recognized that in selecting out different interpretations the court will adopt that interpretation which is just, reasonable and sensible rather than that which is none of those things. Justice G.P.Singh in his book Principles of Statutory Interpretation has quoted the speech of Lord Simon of Glaisdale ad infra:- “Parliament is prima facie to be credited with meaning what is said in an Act of Parliament. Justice G.P.Singh in his book Principles of Statutory Interpretation has quoted the speech of Lord Simon of Glaisdale ad infra:- “Parliament is prima facie to be credited with meaning what is said in an Act of Parliament. The drafting of statutes, so important to a people who hope to live under the rule of law, will never be satisfactory unless Courts seek whenever possible to apply the golden rule of construction, that is to read the statutory language, grammatically and termino-logically, in the ordinary and primary sense which it bears in its context, without omission or addition. Of course, Parliament is to be credited with good sense; so that when such an approach produces injustice, absurdity, contradiction or stultification of statutory objective the language may be modified sufficiently to avoid such disadvantage, though no further.” The Apex Court in several cases has accepted the doctrine of purposive construction of interpreting the statute. In the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Laxmi Narain Dhut reported in AIR 2007 SC 1563 , it has been opined that more often than not, literal interpretation of a statute or a provision of a statute results in absurdity and, therefore, while interpreting statutory provisions, the courts should keep in mind the object or purpose for which the statute has been enacted. The Apex Court reiterated the principles relating to interpretation of statutes ad infra:- “27. Golden Rule” of interpretation of statutes is that statutes are to be interpreted according to grammatical and ordinary sense of the word in grammatical or liberal meaning unmindful of consequence of such interpretation. It was the predominant method of reading statutes. More often than not, such grammatical and literal interpretation leads to unjust results which the Legislature never intended. The golden rule of giving undue importance to grammatical and literal meaning of late gave place to rule of legislative intent . The world over, the principle of interpretation according to the legislative intent is accepted to be more logical. 28. When the law to be applied in a given case prescribed interpretation of statute, the Court has to ascertain the facts and then interpret the law to apply to such facts. Interpretation cannot be in a vacuum or in relation to hypothetical facts. 28. When the law to be applied in a given case prescribed interpretation of statute, the Court has to ascertain the facts and then interpret the law to apply to such facts. Interpretation cannot be in a vacuum or in relation to hypothetical facts. It is the function of the legislature to say what shall be the law and it is only the Court to say what the law is.” Taking note of principles of Golden Rule of Interpretation of statute (supra), when the law to be applied in a given case, the Court has to ascertain the facts and then interpret the law to apply to such facts. It goes without saying that interpretation of statutes cannot be in a vacuum or in relation to hypothetical facts. It is the function of the legislature to say what shall be the law and it is only the Court to say what the law is. It is well settled that in interpreting a provision, the Court would read words in a statute, which are necessary to give effect to the language of the statute and it is also well settled that it is permissible to supply words to a statute where, in absence of the same, the existing language would be deprived of its meaning. What is to be paid to the employee under the provisions of Sec.17-B of the Act, 1947 is only the wages which he is entitled to and also for the period for which he is entitled to. So far as the extent of wages are concerned, it is clarified in the provision itself by mentioning that he should be paid full wages last drawn by him at the time of termination of service. It is not disputed at bar that services of the employee are governed by the conditions of service. It is also not disputed that the workman attained the age of superannuation on 31.03.2003 and even in normal course and where there is no litigation, the employee could have continued or is entitled to continue in service only upto the age of superannuation and not beyond that. At the same time, even if under the award passed by the ld.Labour Court for reinstatement of workman and if had been given effect to, that would entitle the employee to continue in service only upto the age of superannuation and not beyond that. At the same time, even if under the award passed by the ld.Labour Court for reinstatement of workman and if had been given effect to, that would entitle the employee to continue in service only upto the age of superannuation and not beyond that. Taking purposive interpretation of Sec.17-B of the Act, 1947 into consideration, we have no hesitation to note that the provisions of Sec.17-B of the Act, 1947 are subject to the conditions of employment which may not cross the limit laid down by the conditions of service. The employee cannot claim anything which he cannot get under the terms of employment and any order passed, to the contrary, may not be in conformity with the provisions of law. The provisions of Sec.17-B of the Act, 1947 although speak about the payment of full wages during pendency of the proceedings before the High Court or the Supreme Court but that right is always subject to the basic which the employee enjoys under the conditions of service i.e. the age of superannuation and we are fortified with the view expressed by the Madras High Court in the judgment dt.24.1.1998 passed in Misc. Petition No.29599 of 1997 in Writ Petition No.12743 of 1993 Varadaraja Textiles (P) Ltd. Vs. Labour Court. Similar view has been taken by the Bombay High Court in M/s. Hind Rectifiers Limited Vs. Presiding Officer, 1st Labour Court, Bombay & Another reported in 2000 (3) LLJ 300 (Bom.) and by the Delhi High Court in the judgment dt.4.9.2014 passed in CM No.5914/2014 in Writ Petition © No.4703/2003 Moolchand Khairati Ram Hospital & Ayurved Rsearch Institute Vs. Government of NCT & Anr. reported and by the Division Bench judgment in LPA No.89 of 2012 [Delhi Transport Corp. Vs. Ramesh Chand] decided on 11.05.2012. To sum up, we hold that since the respondent-workman has attained the age of superannuation way back on 30.03.2003, he is not entitled to the benefit of Sec.17-B of the Act, 1947 and accordingly, the application filed by the respondent-workman u/Sec.17-B of the Act, 1947 is without substance and stands dismissed. Since the appeal has been riped for hearing, the Registry may list the appeal for final hearing according to its priority.