Research › Search › Judgment

Rajasthan High Court · body

2015 DIGILAW 2068 (RAJ)

Rajiya Begum v. Kishan Lal Sethi (deceased) through his LR's

2015-12-11

BELA M.TRIVEDI

body2015
JUDGMENT : Bela M. Trivedi, J. The present appeal filed by the appellants-defendants under Section 100 of CPC, is directed against the judgment and decree dated 04.04.2014 passed by the Additional District Judge No. 7, Jaipur Mahanagar, Jaipur (hereinafter referred to as "the appellate court") in Regular Civil Appeal No. 188/2002, whereby the appellate court has confirmed the judgment and decree dated 15.09.1995 passed by the Additional Civil Judge (Junior Division) No. 4, Jaipur City, Jaipur (hereinafter referred to as "the trial court") in Civil Suit No. 108/1993, filed by the deceased respondent No.1 Kishan Lal Sethi, the original plaintiff. 2. The short facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the original-plaintiff Kishan Lal Sethi (deceased respondent No. 1 herein) had filed the suit on 14.09.1983 seeking specific performance of the agreement dated 15.09.1980, alleging inter-alia that the original-defendant Radhey Shyam Modi (deceased respondent No. 2 herein) had executed the agreement in question in respect of the property described in para 1 of the plaint, and that the plaintiff had paid Rs.20,000/- on 15.09.1980 and had agreed to pay rest of the amount at the time of the execution of the registered sale deed. It was also alleged that the plaintiff was put in possession of the property as mentioned in the said agreement. It was further alleged that the plaintiff was always ready and willing to perform his part of agreement, and he had also given notice to the defendant, however the defendant refused to execute the sale deed, and therefore the suit was filed. The original-defendant Radhey Shyam resisted the suit by filing the written statement, denying the allegations made in the plaint, and further contended interalia that no such agreement as alleged was executed by him and that the plaintiff was in possession of the property in question by virtue of his being tenant, however he was not paying the rent to him. It appears that during the pendency of the said suit, the original-defendant Radhey Shyam sold out the suit property to the appellants (original defendant Nos. 2 & 3) by executing the sale deed on 23.01.1988. The present appellants therefore made an application in the year 1993 to implead them as party defendants in the suit. It appears that during the pendency of the said suit, the original-defendant Radhey Shyam sold out the suit property to the appellants (original defendant Nos. 2 & 3) by executing the sale deed on 23.01.1988. The present appellants therefore made an application in the year 1993 to implead them as party defendants in the suit. They having been subsequently impleaded as the party defendants in the suit, they had filed their written statement, contending inter-alia that the plaintiff was a property dealer and the plaintiff himself had arranged for the sale of property to one Abdul Sattar, however the said Abdul Sattar having refused to purchase the said property, an agreement with him was cancelled, and therefore the said property was purchased by them. 3. The trial court from the pleadings of the parties had framed as many as 10 issues, and after appreciating the evidence on record, had decreed the suit of the respondent-plaintiff vide the judgment and decree dated 15.09.1995. Being aggrieved by the same, the appellants i.e. the subsequent purchasers had preferred the appeal before the appellate court, which also came to be dismissed vide the judgment and decree dated 04.04.2014. Being aggrieved by the same, the present second appeal has been filed. 4. Learned senior counsel Mr. M.M. Ranjan for the appellants vehemently submitted that the findings of the appellate court that the subsequent purchaser cannot challenge the readiness and willingness of the plaintiff, when the original-defendant had not challenged the same, was in utter disregard of the decision of the Apex Court in case of Ram Awadh (dead) by Lrs. & Ors. v. Achhaibar Dubey & Anr., 2000 I AD (S.C.) 505 following the case of Azhar Sultana v. B. Rajamani & Ors., 2009 (17) SCC 27 . Taking the Court to the entire evidence and the judgments and decrees passed by the courts below, the learned senior counsel submitted that both the courts below had failed to appreciate the evidence in right the prospective, and failed to hold that the respondent-plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform his part of contract. Taking the Court to the entire evidence and the judgments and decrees passed by the courts below, the learned senior counsel submitted that both the courts below had failed to appreciate the evidence in right the prospective, and failed to hold that the respondent-plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform his part of contract. He further submitted that the defendants were entitled to take inconsistent pleas and even if the original-defendant had taken up the contention that the agreement was forged, the plaintiff was required to plead and prove that he was ready and willing to perform his part of contract, in view of Section 16 (c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as "the said Act"). 5. However, the learned counsel Mr. Anil Mehta for the respondent No. 1 (original-plaintiff) submitted that both the courts below have concurrently found that the original-defendant Radhey Shyam had executed the agreement in question. He also referring the plaint and evidence of the original plaintiff, submitted that the plaintiff had pleaded and proved his willingness and readiness to perform his part of contract, which had remained unchallenged in the cross examination. Relying upon the decision of this Court in case of Gulam Mohammed v. Mst. Mariyam, 1984 (35) Rajasthan Law Weekly, 331, he submitted that the defendants having not denied the allegation of the plaintiff that he was ready and willing to perform his part of contract, the said fact was remained to be treated as proved. He submitted that the evidence of the original-defendant Radhey Shyam was not found to be trustworthy by the trial court, and therefore was not believed, whereas the plaintiff by examining the notary as well as other witnesses had duly proved the execution of the agreement in question. He also submitted that admittedly the appellants had purchased the property in question with the full knowledge of the pendency of the suit filed by the plaintiff and therefore could not be said to be the bona fide purchaser for value without notice. 6. Having regard to the submissions made by the learned counsels for the parties, and to the record of the case, it appears that the original-defendant Radhey Shyam had not preferred the appeal before the appellate court, challenging the judgment and decree of the trial court. 6. Having regard to the submissions made by the learned counsels for the parties, and to the record of the case, it appears that the original-defendant Radhey Shyam had not preferred the appeal before the appellate court, challenging the judgment and decree of the trial court. In the instant appeal also service of notice to the respondent No. 2/1 Smt. Vimla was dispensed with at the instance of the learned counsel for the appellants as per the order dated 18.05.2015. Hence, the dispute survives between the decree holder and the subsequent purchasers only. 7. The bone of contention raised by the learned senior counsel Mr. Ranjan for the appellants is that the appellate court had not considered the plea of the appellants that the plaintiff had failed to prove that he was ready and willing to perform his part of agreement, merely on the ground that the original-defendant Radhey Shyam had not preferred the appeal, and that such finding was in contravention of the decision of the Supreme Court in case of Ram Awadh (dead) by Lrs. & Ors. (supra). In the opinion of the Court there cannot be any disagreement with the said proposition of law laid down by the Apex Court, however it is pertinent to note that the appellate court has duly considered the other issues also which were involved in the appeal, and also appreciated the findings recorded by the trial court on such issues. 8. It is true that in a suit for specific performance of the agreement, the plaintiff has to aver and prove that he was also ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract, in view of Section 16 (c) of the said Act. In the instant case, the deceased-respondent No. 1 Kishan Lal Sethi, had specifically averred in the plaint and also stated in his evidence that he was always ready and willing to perform his part of contract, however the defendant Radhey Shyam was avoiding the registration of the sale deed, and that he had also given one notice to him however, he did not execute the sale deed, and therefore the suit was filed. This specific pleading and the evidence of the plaintiff has remained totally unchallenged at the instance of the defendants. This specific pleading and the evidence of the plaintiff has remained totally unchallenged at the instance of the defendants. The only plea taken by the original-defendant Radhey Shyam was that no such agreement was ever executed by him and that the agreement in question was forged one. The said contention has not been believed by either of the courts below, and they have found the evidence of the original-defendant to be totally untrustworthy. 9. It is also very much significant to note that the present appellants were subsequently impleaded in the suit as defendants. They had not stated either in the written statement or in their evidence that they were the bona fide purchasers for value without notice. On the contrary according to them, the plaintiff was a dealer in property and after the cancellation of earlier agreement with Abdul Sattar, the appellants had purchased the same with the knowledge of the plaintiff. Further, the plea of the defendants that the plaintiff being in possession of the suit premises as the tenant, has also not been believed by the courts below. Both the courts have believed the possession of the plaintiff by virtue of the agreement in question. The respondent-plaintiff had examined the notary before whom the agreement was attested and also examined two witnesses, who had signed as witnesses to the agreement in question. Mr. Ranjan, learned counsel for the appellants has fairly conceded that the appellants had purchased the property in question, with the knowledge that the suit was pending against the seller Radhey Shyam. Hence, the agreement in question having been duly proved by the plaintiff and his evidence with regard to his readiness and willingness to perform his part of contract having not been challenged by any of the defendants, coupled with the fact that the appellants had failed to prove that they were bona fide purchasers for value without notice, the courts below were perfectly justified in decreeing the suit of the plaintiff. 10. As per Section 19(b) of the said Act, the specific performance of the agreement could be enforced against any other person claiming title subsequent to the contract, except a transfer for value, who had paid his money in good faith and without notice of the original contract. 10. As per Section 19(b) of the said Act, the specific performance of the agreement could be enforced against any other person claiming title subsequent to the contract, except a transfer for value, who had paid his money in good faith and without notice of the original contract. In the instant case, admittedly the appellants were aware about the pendency of the suit, in which the respondent-plaintiff had sought specific performance of the agreement in question, and therefore the appellants cannot be said to be bona fide purchasers, who did not have the notice of the agreement in question. 11. In that view of the matter, the Court does not find any illegality or infirmity in the impugned judgments and decrees passed by the courts below. There being concurrent findings of facts recorded by both the courts below and the learned counsel for the appellants having failed to point any substantial question of law being involved in the present appeal, the present appeal deserves to be dismissed, and is accordingly dismissed. By this order, the stay application and other pending application if any, also stand dismissed. Appeal dismissed.