JUDGMENT 1. - Aggrieved of the denial by the respondent-Bank of his entitlement to receive ex-gratia relief under circular dated 22nd December, 1998; the petitioner has instituted the present writ petition praying for the following relief(s):- "(i) To issue an appropriate writ/order/direction quashing and setting aside the order dated 7.5.2012. (ii) To issue an appropriate writ/order/direction holding that petitioner entitled is entitled to receive exgratia relief along with all it's arrears with interest @ 18% p.a. (iii) To issue an appropriate writ/order/direction directing the respondents to grant all other reliefs to the petitioner which are admissible to retired employees of the Respondent Bank. (iv) Any other relief which this Hon'ble Court deem fit and proper in facts and circumstances of the case may also be passed in favour of petitioner. (v) Award cost of petition." 2. Briefly, the indispensable skeletal material facts necessary for appreciation of the controversy raised needs to be first noticed. The petitioner on 8th September, 1945 joined the erstwhile Hind Bank Ltd., which later on merged in the Bank of Baroda and his services stood transferred to Bank of Baroda. While working on the post of 'Agent' (Branch Head) at Main Branch Ajmer, the petitioner was transferred to Sitla Mata Bazaar Branch of Bank of Baroda, Indore as 'Accountant' vide order dated 11th September, 1967. In response to his representation for cancellation/reconsideration of his transfer from Ajmer Branch to Sitla Mata Bazaar Branch of Bank of Baroda, Indore; he was informed by the respondent-Bank, vide communication dated 19th October, 1967, to the effect that his request could not be acceded to and was directed to report at the transferred station i.e. Sitla Mata Bazaar Branch of Bank of Baroda, Indore. The petitioner was not desirous to serve at the transferred station at Indore, and therefore, decided to retire from the bank services and submitted his 'resignation' claiming all leaves (privilege and other leaves due prior to retirement) and also requested for grant of terminal benefits including double provident fund vide communication dated 3rd November, 1967. The request for retirement-cum-resignation was accepted by the respondent-Bank vide communication dated 13th November, 1967; with effect from 11th November, 1967. 3. It is pleaded case of the petitioner that prior to his resignation-cum-retirement, he had rendered more than 23 years of unblemished service. The request for retirement-cum-resignation was accepted by the respondent-Bank vide communication dated 13th November, 1967; with effect from 11th November, 1967. 3. It is pleaded case of the petitioner that prior to his resignation-cum-retirement, he had rendered more than 23 years of unblemished service. The respondent-Bank vide circular dated 26th November, 1998, allowed the ex-gratia relief to all the employees, who retired on or before 31st December, 1985, having rendered at least 20 years of continuous service prior to their superannuation and were not getting any pensionary benefits from the Bank. However, the ex-gratia relief was not made admissible to - (a) those who were dismissed/removed from service and (b) those who 'resigned' from service. Since the petitioner resigned from the service, he was declined the ex-gratia relief of which he is aggrieved of. 4. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, Mr. Sunil Samdaria, reiterating the pleaded facts and grounds of the writ application, emphatically argued that vide communication dated 26th November, 1998; the Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Department of Economic Affairs (Banking Division), advised all the Nationalised Banks for grant of ex-gratia relief to all such employees who had retired from the bank on or before 31st December, 1985; and had rendered 20 years of service before such retirement and who are not getting any pensionary benefit from the Bank. The respondent-Bank pursuant to the communication dated 26th November, 1998; issued a circular on 22nd December, 1998, granting the ex-gratia relief to all pre-1986 retirees, but declined the request of the petitioner on the premise that the petitioner 'resigned' from the services of the Bank, and therefore, he is not entitled to ex-gratia relief as contemplated under the Government of India letter dated 26th November, 1998; as would be evident from the communication dated 27th November, 2000. 5. Another representation addressed on 16th July, 2009; was again declined vide communication dated 10/11th August, 2009; for the same reason. A notice for demand of justice dated 18/23rd April, 2012; addressed relying upon the opinion of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sheel Kumar Jain v. New India Assurance Company Limited & Ors.: 2011 (12) SCC 197 ; was also declined vide communication dated 7th May, 2012; stating that the petitioner 'resigned' from the service of the Bank, and therefore, was not entitled the relief prayed for. 6. 6. According to the learned counsel, the mere use of word 'resign/resignation', in the letter intending to leave the service/job is not only the factor decisive, as has been observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sheel Kumar Jain (supra). The word 'resign/resignation', has to be interpreted taking into consideration the attendant circumstances keeping in mind the object and purpose of the statutory provisions, as has been indicated by the Hon'ble Apex Court of the land. 7. The petitioner had put more than 23 years of service, and therefore, he cannot be deprived of his ex-gratia relief, which is in lieu of pension. Thus, the petitioner, who had completed the qualifying service of more than 20 years, cannot be deprived of his right to get the ex-gratia relief for his resignation under mistaken belief as has been ruled by the Hon'ble Apex Court of the land. 8. The petitioner while submitting his resignation, in so many words wrote that he did not desire to serve the bank half-heartedly and had to retire from the service of the Bank. He further claimed the benefit of all leaves (privilege and other leaves prior to resignation/retirement). Thus, the petitioner intended to retire from the services of the Bank, as would be evident from his letter dated 3rd November, 1967 (Annexure-2). 9. Heavily relying upon the judgment in the case of Sheel Kumar Jain (supra), the learned counsel emphasised that the word 'resign/resignation', in the instant case at hand, must be interpreted in the backdrop of the attendant circumstances and keeping in mind the object and purpose of the statutory provisions and the petitioner cannot be deprived of his retirement benefits, who had rendered more than 20 years of service, before tendering his 'resignation', which was qualified in order to earn pension. The use of the words, under a mistaken belief, ought not to be interpreted to his disadvantage. The use of the words, under a mistaken belief, ought not to be interpreted to his disadvantage. In order to support his submissions, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the opinion of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Nawal Kishore Sharma v. Union of India & Ors.: (2014) 9 SCC 329 ; Smt. Rukma v. State of Rajasthan & Ors.: 2000 (3) WLC (Raj.) 102 ; Sultan Singh v. Union of India & Ors.: 2003 (1) WLC (Raj.) 58 ; Balu Singh v. Union of India & Ors.: 2003 (1) WLC (Raj.) 368 ; Smt. Emna v. Union of India & Ors.: 2004 (1) WLC (Raj.) 442 ; Manohar Singh v. Union of India & Ors.: 2014 (4) WLC (Raj.) 168 . 10. In response to the notice of the writ application, the respondent-Bank has filed its counter-affidavit raising preliminary objections as to the very maintainability of the writ application for want of territorial jurisdiction as well as in view of the text of circular dated 26th November, 1998; issued by the Government of India to provide ex-gratia relief to all such employees, who were retired on or before 31st December, 1985; provided they fulfilled the conditions stipulated therein. The ex-gratia relief was not admissible to those who were dismissed/removed from the service and those who resigned from the service. 11. Mr. Rupin Kala, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-Bank in addition to preliminary objections, urged that the writ application also suffers with the vice of delay and laches for the claim of the petitioner was declined by the respondent-Bank as early as in the year 2000, as would be evident from the communication dated 27th November, 2000 (Annexure-6), with reasons detailed out therein. The writ application instituted in the year 2012; thus, suffers with an inordinate, unexplained and huge delay, and therefore, deserves to be dismissed on that count alone. 12. The writ application instituted in the year 2012; thus, suffers with an inordinate, unexplained and huge delay, and therefore, deserves to be dismissed on that count alone. 12. According to the learned counsel, the petitioner 'resigned' from the services of the Bank on 3rd November, 1967, and the resignation was accepted by the respondent-Bank with effect from 11th November, 1967; and thus, a period of 48 years has elapsed since the petitioner retired from the services of the Bank and therefore, the claim staked for ex-gratia relief in the year 2012 in the backdrop of circular dated 22nd December, 1998, which specifically excluded the category to which the petitioner belongs; cannot be sustained. 13. Repelling the contentions advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner in the backdrop of the law declared by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Sheel Kumar Jain (supra), learned counsel relying upon a subsequent pronouncement rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of M.R. Prabhakar & Ors. v. Canara Bank & Ors.: (2012) 9 SCC 671 ; asserted that the claim for exgratia relief is not sustainable for resignation brings about complete cessation of master-and-servant relationship. Hence, the writ application merits rejection on this count alone. 14. Referring to the opinion of the Hon'ble Apex Court of the land in the case of M.R. Prabhakar & Ors. (supra), learned counsel emphasised the difference between two words 'resignation' and 'retirement', for an employee can resign at any point of time, even on his second day of his appointment, but in the case of retirement, he retires only after attaining the age of superannuation or in case of voluntary retirement on completion of qualifying service. The learned counsel would further submit that 'resignation' brings about complete cessation of master-and-servant relationship whereas 'voluntary retirement' maintains the relationship for the purpose of grant of retiral benefits for the past services. So also acceptance of resignation is dependent upon the discretion of the employer whereas the retirement is upon completion of service in terms of regulations/rules framed by the Bank. Therefore, the 'resignation' tendered by the petitioner and the accepted by the respondent-Bank in the year 1967 i.e. almost more than 48 years ago, cannot now be interpreted to mean as 'voluntary retirement' so as to entitle the petitioner for grant of ex-gratia relief. Therefore, the 'resignation' tendered by the petitioner and the accepted by the respondent-Bank in the year 1967 i.e. almost more than 48 years ago, cannot now be interpreted to mean as 'voluntary retirement' so as to entitle the petitioner for grant of ex-gratia relief. Learned counsel laid much emphasis on the contents of the communication dated 26th November, 1998, issued by the Government of India as well as the circular dated 22nd December, 1998, wherein the incumbents who were dismissed/removed from service and those who 'resigned' from service, were not entitled for ex-gratia relief. 15. Inviting the attention of this Court to the document/communication dated 7th May, 2012; learned counsel would submit that it is not an order, which has been assailed in the writ application and a prayer to quash and set aside the same has been incorporated in the relief clause of the writ application rather communication dated 7th May, 2012, is an information in response to the notice demanding justice dated 18/23rd April, 2012; and therefore, attempt made by the petitioner to cover-up the inordinate, unexplained and huge delay, would alone disentitle him to maintain the writ proceedings. In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the respondent-Bank has place reliance on the opinion in the case of Eastern Coalfields Ltd. & Ors. v. Kalyan Banerjee: (2008) 3 SCC 456 ; Mahesh Chandra Singhania v. Gujarat Narmada Valley Fertilizers Co. Ltd. & Anr.: 2011 (1) CDR 102 (Raj.) ; Shri K.C. Meena v. Bank of Baroda & Ors. (S.B. Civil Writ Petition Number 4452/2007; decided on 15th January, 2014 , by a Coordinate Bench of this Court; State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. v. Arvind Kumar Srivastava & Ors.: (2015) 1 SCC 347 ; Prof. A. Marx v. Government of Tamil Nadu & Anr.: (2014) 13 SCC 329 ; Tamil Nadu Rural Development Engineers Association v. Secretary to Government Rural Development Department & Ors.: (2013) 15 SCC 380 ; Mineral Exploration Corporation Limited v. Arvind Kumar Dixit & Anr.: (2015) 2 SCC 535 ; Sudhir Kumar Counsul v. Allahabad Bank: (2011) 3 SCC 486 ; All India Reserve Bank Retired Officers Association & Ors. v. Union of India & Anr.: 1992 Supp (1) SCC 664 ; Union of India & Ors. v. Shri Hanuman Industries & Anr.: (2015) 6 SCC 600 ; Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board & Ors. v. Union of India & Anr.: 1992 Supp (1) SCC 664 ; Union of India & Ors. v. Shri Hanuman Industries & Anr.: (2015) 6 SCC 600 ; Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board & Ors. v. T.T. Murali Babu: (2014) 4 SCC 108 ; Asger Ibrahim Amin v. Life Insurance Corporation of India: 2013 (138) FLR 142 ; M.K. Krishnaswamy, etc. v. The Union of India & Ors.: (1973) 4 SCC 163 ; State of Tripura & Ors. v. Arabinda Chakraborty & Ors.: (2014) 6 SCC 460 ; and UCO Bank & Ors. v. Sanwar Mal: (2004) 4 SCC 412 . 16. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and with their assistance, perused the materials available on record as well as gave my thoughtful consideration to the rival submissions at Bar. 17. Indisputably, the petitioner vide communication dated 3rd November, 1967, having learnt about the rejection of his request for re-transfer to Ajmer Branch; decided to retire from the bank services. At this juncture, it will be gainful to consider the text of communication addressed by the petitioner to the respondent-Bank, which reads thus:- "N.M. Chokeshi, ESq., Chairman, The Bank of Baroda Ltd., Fort Bombay. Ajmer 3rd November, 1967 Through: Proper channel. Dear Sir, Ref: My transfer to our Sitlamata Bazar, Branch Indore. I refer to your AGM (N&E) Bombay letter No.2/739 dated 19.10.67 in response to my representation dated 13.10.67 addressed to you and thank you very much for your consideration and advise to me that I should not construe my posting as Accountant at Sitalamata Bazar as 'Demotion'. I would like to mention here that I joined Ajmer Branch in the year 1945 with very high ambition and as a true and sincere devotee worked very hard for 23 years and could rise to the post of Agent at the Branch. I now do not desire to serve half heartedly and have decided to retire from the Bank services and submit my resignation which may be effective after granting me all leaves (privilege and other leaves due prior to retirement). I shall thank you to kindly grant me all the necessary privileges as under to which I am entitled. 1. All kind of leave due prior retirement. 2. Double provident fund. 3. Gratuity. 4. Travel fare concession. 5. All other facilities available from an employee prior and after retirement. I shall thank you to kindly grant me all the necessary privileges as under to which I am entitled. 1. All kind of leave due prior retirement. 2. Double provident fund. 3. Gratuity. 4. Travel fare concession. 5. All other facilities available from an employee prior and after retirement. Hope you will very kindly arrange to do the needful and oblige. Thanking you. Yours faithfully, Sd/- J.S. Parakh The Regional Manager, The Bank of Baroda Ltd., Sitlamata Bazar, Indore. Copy to the Chairman. The Bank of Baroda Ltd. Bombay Copy to the Asstt. General Manager (N&E). The Bank of Baroda Ltd., Bombay. Copy to the Chairman, The Bank of Baroda Ltd. Bombay for information. (J.S. Parakh)" 18. The communication dated 3rd November, 1967; as extracted herein above wherein the petitioner decided to retire from the bank service and submitted his resignation, which was accepted by the respondent-Bank vide communication dated 13rd September, 1967; accepting the resignation from the bank service with effect from 11th November, 1967. The communication dated 13th November, 1967; reads thus:- "No.RGMI:2/8792 Nov. 13, 1967 Mr. J.S. Parakh, Parakh Kothi, Mayo Link Road, Ajmer. Dear Sir, Re: Your resignation from the Bank's Service. We refer to your letter dated 3rd November, 1967 addressed to our Chairman submitting your resignation and have to advise that we have been informed by the Assistant General Manager (North & East Zone) Bombay that the Chairman has accepted your resignation from our Bank's service. You, therefore, stand relieved from 11th November, 1967 after office hours on expiry of your leave. As regards your request for other benefits, the matter is under consideration and you will be advised separately in course of time. Yours faithfully, Sd/- For Regional Manager. c.c.to 1) AGM (N&E) Bombay (2) AGM (F&P) Bombay. 3) AGM, HO, Baroda (4) Ajmer branch." 19. The communication issued to All the Chief Executives of Nationalised Banks and Associate Banks of SBI dated 26th November, 1998; by the Government of India providing ex-gratia relief to surviving pre-1.1.86 retirees of the banks allowed the relief to all such employees who retired on or before 31st December, 1985, provided they had rendered at least twenty years of continuous service prior to their superannuation and are not getting any pensionary benefits from the bank. The ex-gratia relief was to be paid with effect from 1st November, 1997 @ Rs.300/- per month with dearness relief. The ex-gratia relief was to be paid with effect from 1st November, 1997 @ Rs.300/- per month with dearness relief. The communication specifically detailed out that the ex-gratia payment was not admissible to - (a) those who were dismissed/removed from service and (b) those who resigned from service. 20. The respondent-Bank issued circular dated 22nd December, 1998, to all the branches/offices in the country on the same terms and conditions specifically stipulating the condition that the exgratia relief is not admissible to - (a) those who were dismissed/removed from service and (b) those who resigned from service. The representation of the petitioner, staking claim for exgratia relief, was declined on reconsideration of his application, as is evident from communication dated 27th November, 2000. The petitioner again requested vide another representation dated 16th July, 2009; which was again declined since the petitioner resigned from the bank services. The notice for demand of justice addressed dated 18/23rd April, 2012; has also been declined vide communication dated 7th May, 2012; on the same ground. 21. The preliminary objection as to territorial jurisdiction, raised by the learned counsel appearing for the respondent-Bank, may not detain this Court for long for the law declared by the Hon'ble Apex Court of the land in the case of Nawal Kishore Sharma (supra), wherein the objection to territorial jurisdiction was repelled taking note of the fact that disability compensation and the correspondence made by the petitioner therein (Nawal Kishore Sharma), was made from his native place in Bihar, held that part or fraction of cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the High Court where he was forced to stay. Interpreting the amended clause(s) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the Hon'ble Apex Court of the land held thus:- "10. The interpretation given by this Court in the aforesaid decisions resulted in undue hardship and inconvenience to the citizens to invoke writ jurisdiction. As a result, Clause 1(A) was inserted in Article 226 by the Constitution (15th) Amendment Act, 1963 and subsequently renumbered as Clause (2) by the Constitution (42nd) Amendment Act, 1976. The amended Clause (2) now reads as under: "226. As a result, Clause 1(A) was inserted in Article 226 by the Constitution (15th) Amendment Act, 1963 and subsequently renumbered as Clause (2) by the Constitution (42nd) Amendment Act, 1976. The amended Clause (2) now reads as under: "226. Power of the High Courts to issue certain writs-(1) Notwithstanding anything in Article 32, every High Court shall have power, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, within those territories directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose. (2) The power conferred by Clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories. (3) xxxxx (4) xxxxx 11. On a plain reading of the amended provisions in Clause (2), it is clear that now High Court can issue a writ when the person or the authority against whom the writ is issued is located outside its territorial jurisdiction, if the cause of action wholly or partially arises within the court's territorial jurisdiction. Cause of action for the purpose of Article 226(2) of the Constitution, for all intent and purpose must be assigned the same meaning as envisaged Under Section 20(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure. The expression cause of action has not been defined either in the Code of Civil Procedure or the Constitution. Cause of action is bundle of facts which is necessary for the Plaintiff to prove in the suit before he can succeed. 12. The term 'cause of action' as appearing in Clause (2) came for consideration time and again before this Court. 13. In the case of State of Rajasthan and Ors. v. M/s. Swaika Properties and Anr. Cause of action is bundle of facts which is necessary for the Plaintiff to prove in the suit before he can succeed. 12. The term 'cause of action' as appearing in Clause (2) came for consideration time and again before this Court. 13. In the case of State of Rajasthan and Ors. v. M/s. Swaika Properties and Anr. : (1985) 3 SCC 217 , the fact was that the Respondent-Company having its registered office in Calcutta owned certain land on the outskirts of Jaipur City was served with notice for acquisition of land under Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959. Notice was duly served on the Company at its registered office at Calcutta. The Company, first appeared before the Special Court and finally the Calcutta High Court by filing a writ petition challenging the notification of acquisition. The matter ultimately came before this Court to answer a question as to whether the service of notice Under Section 52 (2) of the Act at the registered office of the Respondent in Calcutta was an integral part of cause of action and was it sufficient to invest the Calcutta High Court with a jurisdiction to entertain the petition challenging the impugned notification. Answering the question this Court held: "7. Upon these facts, we are satisfied that the cause of action neither wholly nor in part arose within the territorial limits of the Calcutta High Court and therefore the learned Single Judge had no jurisdiction to issue a rule nisi on the petition filed by the Respondents Under Article 226 of the Constitution or to make the ad interim ex parte prohibitory order restraining the Appellants from taking any steps to take possession of the land acquired. Under Sub-section (5) of Section 52 of the Act the Appellants were entitled to require the Respondents to surrender or deliver possession of the lands acquired forthwith and upon their failure to do so, take immediate steps to secure such possession Under Sub-section (6) thereof. 8. The expression "cause of action" is tersely defined in Mulla's Code of Civil Procedure: 'The 'cause of action' means every fact which, if traversed, it would be necessary for the Plaintiff to prove in order to support his right to a judgment of the court. 8. The expression "cause of action" is tersely defined in Mulla's Code of Civil Procedure: 'The 'cause of action' means every fact which, if traversed, it would be necessary for the Plaintiff to prove in order to support his right to a judgment of the court. In other words, it is a bundle of facts which taken with the law applicable to them gives the Plaintiff a right to relief against the Defendant. The mere service of notice Under Section 52(2) of the Act on the Respondents at their registered office at 18-B, Brabourne Road, Calcutta i.e. within the territorial limits of the State of West Bengal, could not give rise to a cause of action within that territory unless the service of such notice was an integral part of the cause of action. The entire cause of action culminating in the acquisition of the land Under Section 52(1) of the Act arose within the State of Rajasthan i.e. within the territorial jurisdiction of the Rajasthan High Court at the Jaipur Bench. The answer to the question whether service of notice is an integral part of the cause of action within the meaning of Article 226 (2) of the Constitution must depend upon the nature of the impugned order giving rise to a cause of action. The notification dated February 8, 1984 issued by the State Government Under Section 52(1) of the Act became effective the moment it was published in the Official Gazette as thereupon the notified land became vested in the State Government free from all encumbrances. It was not necessary for the Respondents to plead the service of notice on them by the Special Officer, Town Planning Department, Jaipur Under Section 52(2) for the grant of an appropriate writ, direction or order Under Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing the notification issued by the State Government Under Section 52(1) of the Act. If the Respondents felt aggrieved by the acquisition of their lands situate at Jaipur and wanted to challenge the validity of the notification issued by the State Government of Rajasthan Under Section 52(1) of the Act by a petition Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the remedy of the Respondents for the grant of such relief had to be sought by filing such a petition before the Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench, where the cause of action wholly or in part arose. 14. 14. This provision was again considered by this Court in the case of Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu and Ors., (1994) 4 SCC 711 . In this case the Petitioner Oil and Natural Gas Commission (ONGC) through its consultant Engineers India Limited (EIL) issued an advertisement in the newspaper inviting tenders for setting up of Kerosene Recovery Processing Unit in Gujarat mentioning that the tenders containing offers were to be communicated to EIL, New Delhi. After the final decision was taken by the Steering Committee at New Delhi, the Respondent NICCO moved the Calcutta High Court praying that ONGC be restrained from awarding the contract to any other party. It was pleaded in the petition that NICCO came to know of the tender from the publication in the "Times of India" within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court. This Court by setting aside the order passed by the Calcutta High Court came to the following conclusion: "6. Therefore, in determining the objection of lack of territorial jurisdiction the court must take all the facts pleaded in support of the cause of action into consideration albeit without embarking upon an enquiry as to the correctness or otherwise of the said facts. In other words the question whether a High Court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition must be answered on the basis of the averments made in the petition, the truth or otherwise whereof being immaterial. To put it differently, the question of territorial jurisdiction must be decided on the facts pleaded in the petition. Therefore, the question whether in the instant case the Calcutta High Court had jurisdiction to entertain and decide the writ petition in question even on the facts alleged must depend upon whether the averments made in paragraphs 5, 7, 18, 22, 26 and 43 are sufficient in law to establish that a part of the cause of action had arisen within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court." 15. In Kusum Ingots and Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India and Anr., (2004) 6 SCC 254 , this Court elaborately discussed Clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution, particularly the meaning of the word 'cause of action' with reference to Section 20(c) and Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure and observed: "9. In Kusum Ingots and Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India and Anr., (2004) 6 SCC 254 , this Court elaborately discussed Clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution, particularly the meaning of the word 'cause of action' with reference to Section 20(c) and Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure and observed: "9. Although in view of Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure the provisions thereof would not apply to writ proceedings, the phraseology used in Section 20 (c) of the Code of Civil Procedure and Clause (2) of Article 226, being in pari materia, the decisions of this Court rendered on interpretation of Section 20(c) Code of Civil Procedure shall apply to the writ proceedings also. Before proceeding to discuss the matter further it may be pointed out that the entire bundle of facts pleaded need not constitute a cause of action as what is necessary to be proved before the Petitioner can obtain a decree is the material facts. The expression material facts is also known as integral facts. 10. Keeping in view the expressions used in Clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India, indisputably even if a small fraction of cause of action accrues within the jurisdiction of the Court, the Court will have jurisdiction in the matter." Their Lordships further observed as under: 29. In view of Clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India, now if a part of cause of action arises outside the jurisdiction of the High Court, it would have jurisdiction to issue a writ. The decision in Khajoor Singh has, thus, no application. 30. We must, however, remind ourselves that even if a small part of cause of action arises within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court, the same by itself may not be considered to be a determinative factor compelling the High Court to decide the matter on merit. In appropriate cases, the Court may refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction by invoking the doctrine of forum conveniens. 16. In the case of Union of India and Ors. In appropriate cases, the Court may refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction by invoking the doctrine of forum conveniens. 16. In the case of Union of India and Ors. v. Adani Exports Ltd. and Anr., (2002) 1 SCC 567 , this Court held that in order to confer jurisdiction on a High Court to entertain a writ petition it must disclose that the integral facts pleaded in support of the cause of action do constitute a cause so as to empower the court to decide the dispute and the entire or a part of it arose within its jurisdiction. Each and every fact pleaded by the Respondents in their application does not ipso facto lead to the conclusion that those facts give rise to a cause of action within the Court's territorial jurisdiction unless those facts are such which have a nexus or relevance with the lis i.e. involved in the case. This Court observed: 17. It is seen from the above that in order to confer jurisdiction on a High Court to entertain a writ petition or a special civil application as in this case, the High Court must be satisfied from the entire facts pleaded in support of the cause of action that those facts do constitute a cause so as to empower the court to decide a dispute which has, at least in part, arisen within its jurisdiction. It is clear from the above judgment that each and every fact pleaded by the Respondents in their application does not ipso facto lead to the conclusion that those facts give rise to a cause of action within the court's territorial jurisdiction unless those facts pleaded are such which have a nexus or relevance with the lis that is involved in the case. Facts which have No. bearing with the lis or the dispute involved in the case, do not give rise to a cause of action so as to confer territorial jurisdiction on the court concerned. If we apply this principle then we see that none of the facts pleaded in para 16 of the petition, in our opinion, falls into the category of bundle of facts which would constitute a cause of action giving rise to a dispute which could confer territorial jurisdiction on the courts at Ahmedabad. 17. If we apply this principle then we see that none of the facts pleaded in para 16 of the petition, in our opinion, falls into the category of bundle of facts which would constitute a cause of action giving rise to a dispute which could confer territorial jurisdiction on the courts at Ahmedabad. 17. In Om Prakash Srivastava v. Union of India and Anr., (2006) 6 SCC 207 , answering a similar question this Court observed that on a plain reading of Clause (2) of Article 226 it is manifestly clear that the High Court can exercise power to issue direction, order or writs for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights or for any other purpose if the cause of action in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction notwithstanding that the seat of the Government or authority or the residence of the person against whom the direction, order or writ is issued is not within the said territory. In para 7 this Court observed: 7. The question whether or not cause of action wholly or in part for filing a writ petition has arisen within the territorial limits of any High Court has to be decided in the light of the nature and character of the proceedings Under Article 226 of the Constitution. In order to maintain a writ petition, a writ Petitioner has to establish that a legal right claimed by him has prima facie either been infringed or is threatened to be infringed by the Respondent within the territorial limits of the Court's jurisdiction and such infringement may take place by causing him actual injury or threat thereof. 18. In the case of Rajendran Chingaravelu v. R.K. Mishra, Additional Commissioner of Income Tax and Ors.,: (2010) 1 SCC 457 , this Court while considering the scope of Article 226(2) of the Constitution, particularly the cause of action in maintaining a writ petition, held as under: 9. The first question that arises for consideration is whether the Andhra Pradesh High Court was justified in holding that as the seizure took place at Chennai (Tamil Nadu), the Appellant could not maintain the writ petition before it. The High Court did not examine whether any part of cause of action arose in Andhra Pradesh. The first question that arises for consideration is whether the Andhra Pradesh High Court was justified in holding that as the seizure took place at Chennai (Tamil Nadu), the Appellant could not maintain the writ petition before it. The High Court did not examine whether any part of cause of action arose in Andhra Pradesh. Clause (2) of Article 226 makes it clear that the High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action arises wholly or in part, will have jurisdiction. This would mean that even if a small fraction of the cause of action (that bundle of facts which gives a Petitioner, a right to sue) accrued within the territories of Andhra Pradesh, the High Court of that State will have jurisdiction. xxxxxx 11. Normally, we would have set aside the order and remitted the matter to the High Court for decision on merits. But from the persuasive submissions of the Appellant, who appeared in person on various dates of hearing, two things stood out. Firstly, it was clear that the main object of the petition was to ensure that at least in future, passengers like him are not put to unnecessary harassment or undue hardship at the airports. He wants a direction for issuance of clear guidelines and instructions to the inspecting officers, and introduction of definite and efficient verification/investigation procedures. He wants changes in the present protocol where the officers are uncertain of what to do and seek instructions and indefinitely wait for clearances from higher-ups for each and every routine step, resulting in the detention of passengers for hours and hours. In short, he wants the enquiries, verifications and investigations to be efficient, passenger-friendly and courteous. Secondly, he wants the Department/officers concerned to acknowledge that he was unnecessarily harassed. 19. Regard being had to the discussion made here in above, there cannot be any doubt that the question whether or not cause of action wholly or in part for filing a writ petition has arisen within the territorial limit of any High Court has to be decided in the light of the nature and character of the proceedings Under Article 226 of the Constitution. In order to maintain a writ petition, the Petitioner has to establish that a legal right claimed by him has been infringed by the Respondents within the territorial limit of the Court's jurisdiction." 22. In order to maintain a writ petition, the Petitioner has to establish that a legal right claimed by him has been infringed by the Respondents within the territorial limit of the Court's jurisdiction." 22. In the instant case at hand, the petitioner, who served the respondent-Bank since 1945 to 1967 at Ajmer, and declined to continue in the service with the respondent-Bank for he was transferred to Indore as well as in view of all the correspondence with reference to his claim for ex-gratia relief a part of cause of action did arise in the District of Ajmer, and therefore, this Court has the territorial jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. Hence, the preliminary objection as to the territorial jurisdiction is hereby rejected. 23. In the instant case at hand, the petitioner has staked his claim for ex-gratia relief along with all its arrears as well as interest @ 18% per annum; heavily relying upon the opinion of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sheel Kumar Jain (supra). 24. The claim of the petitioner is resisted relying upon the opinion o the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M.R. Prabhakar (supra), wherein M.R. Prabhakar resigned from the Bank and in the opinion of the Hon'ble Supreme Court was held not entitled to pension for the 'resignation' cannot be equated with 'voluntary retirement'. The observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court under the relevant paragraph 15 to 17 of the judgment in the case of M.R. Prabhakar (supra), reads thus:- "15. We find it difficult to accept the contentions raised by the Appellants. There is no ambiguity in the definition clause under Regulation 2(y) which has statutorily brought in the 'voluntarily retirement' as 'retirement'. Though the concept of 'resignation' is well known in Service Jurisprudence, the same has not been brought within the definition of 'retirement' under Regulation 2 (y). Further, the words 'retired' and 'retirement' have some resemblance in their meanings, but not 'resignation'. Regulation 3(1)(a) specifically used the expression 'retirement' and the expression 'resignation' has not been incorporated either in the definition clause or in Regulation 3(1) (a). Further, the words 'retired' and 'retirement' have some resemblance in their meanings, but not 'resignation'. Regulation 3(1)(a) specifically used the expression 'retirement' and the expression 'resignation' has not been incorporated either in the definition clause or in Regulation 3(1) (a). We need not labour much on this issue, since the difference between these two concepts 'resignation' and 'retirement', in the context of the same Banking Regulations 1995, came up for consideration before this Court in Sanwar Mal (supra), wherein this Court has distinguished the words 'resignation' and 'retirement' and held as follows: "9. ... The words "resignation" and "retirement" carry different meanings in common parlance. An employee can resign at any point of time, even on the second day of his appointment but in the case of retirement he retires only after attaining the age of superannuation or in the case of voluntary retirement on completion of qualifying service. The effect of resignation and retirement to the extent that there is severance of employment but in service jurisprudence both the expressions are understood differently. Under the Regulations, the expressions "resignation" and "retirement" have been employed for different purpose and carry different meanings. The pension scheme herein is based on actuarial calculation; it is a self financing scheme, which does not depend upon budgetary support and consequently it constitutes a complete code by itself. The scheme essentially covers retirees as the credit balance to their provident fund account is larger as compared to employees who resigned from service. Moreover, resignation brings about complete cessation of master and servant relationship whereas voluntary retirement maintains the relationship for the purposes of grant of retiral benefits, in view of the past service-Similarly, acceptance of resignation is dependent upon discretion of the employer whereas retirement is completion of service in terms of Regulations/rules framed by the bank-Resignation can be tendered irrespective of the length of service whereas in the case of voluntary retirement, the employee has to complete qualifying service for retiral benefits......" (Emphasis added) 16. In the above mentioned judgment, this Court has also held that there are different yardsticks and criteria for submitting the resignation, vis-`-vis voluntary retirement and exceptions thereof. In that context, the scope of Regulation 22 of Regulations 1995 was also considered and the Court held as follows: "9. ... In the above mentioned judgment, this Court has also held that there are different yardsticks and criteria for submitting the resignation, vis-`-vis voluntary retirement and exceptions thereof. In that context, the scope of Regulation 22 of Regulations 1995 was also considered and the Court held as follows: "9. ... In our view, Regulation 22 provides for disqualification of employees who have resigned from service and for those who have been dismissed or removed from service. Hence, we do not find any merit in the arguments advanced on behalf of the Respondent that Regulation 22 makes an arbitrary and unreasonable classification repugnant to Article 14 of the Constitution by keeping out such class of employees. The view we have taken is supported by the judgment of this Court in the case of Reserve Bank of India v. Cecil Dennis Solomon: (2004) 9 SCC 461 . Before concluding we may state that Clause 22 is not in the nature of penalty as alleged. It only dis-entitles an employee who has resigned from service from becoming a member of the Fund. Such employees have received their retiral benefits earlier. The pension scheme, as stated above, only provides for a second retiral benefit. Hence there is no question of penalty being imposed on such employees as alleged. The pension scheme only provides for an avenue for investment to retirees. They are provided avenue to put in their savings and as a term or condition which is more in the nature of an eligibility criteria the scheme dis-entitles such category of employees out of it." 17. We may indicate that in Sanwar Mal (supra), the employee, who was working on Class III post, resigned from the service of UCO Bank on 25.2.1988 after giving one month's notice and also accepted his provident fund without protest. On coming into force of the Regulations 1995, Sanwar Mal opted for pension scheme. Since Sanwar Mal had resigned in the year 1988, UCO Bank declined its option for admitting him as a member of the fund." 25. It may be noted here that in case of M.R. Prabhakar (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court distinguished the judgment in the case of Sheel Kumar Jain (supra), on the ground that the said judgment in the case of Sheel Kumar Jain (supra), pertained to the facts of 'insurance scheme' and not a 'pension scheme'. The distinction brought out, reads thus:- "19. The distinction brought out, reads thus:- "19. We may point out in Sheelkumar Jain (supra) that this Court was dealing with an insurance scheme and not the pension scheme, which is applicable in the banking sector. The provisions of both the scheme and the Regulation are not pari materia. In Sheelkumar Jain case (supra), while referring to Para 5, this Court came to the conclusion that the same does not make distinction between 'resignation' and 'voluntary retirement' and it only provides that an employee who wants to leave or discontinue his service amounts to 'resignation' or 'voluntary retirement'. Whereas, Regulation 20(2) of the Canara Bank (Officers) Service Regulations 1979 applicable to banks, had specifically referred to the words 'resignation', unlike Para 5 of the Insurance Rules. Further, it is also to be noted that, in that judgment, this Court in Para 30 held that the Court will have to construe the statutory provisions in each case to find out whether the termination of service of an employee was a termination by way of resignation or a termination by way of voluntary retirement. " 26. The Bank of Baroda (Employees) Pension Regulations, 1995, were notified in the Gazette of India on 29th September, 1995. The said Regulations were framed by the Board of Directors of the respondent-Bank after consultation with the Reserve Bank of India and with the previous sanction of the Central Government and in exercise of powers conferred by Section 19(2)(f) of the Banking Companies (Acquisition & Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970. Regulation 2(r) defines 'notified date' as the date on which the Regulations are published in the official gazette i.e. on 29th September, 1995. The Pension Regulations apply inter-alia to those who retired on or after 1st November, 1993, but before the notified date and who were in service of the Bank on or after the first day of January, 1986, but had retired before first day of November, 1993; and exercised an option in writing within 120 days of the notified date to become a member of the fund and who, within 60 days of the expiry of the said period of 120 days, refunded the entire amount of Bank's contribution to the provident fund and interest accrued thereon together with interest as provided therein. Regulation 2(y), spells out meaning of 'retirement', which means cessation from the Bank's service inter-alia on voluntary retirement in accordance with provisions contain in the Regulations. 27. Regulation 22 provides that resignation from service of the Bank entails forfeiture of entire past service and shall not qualify for pensionary benefits. Regulation 29 provides that on or after 1st November, 1993, an employee who has completed 20 years of qualifying service may, by giving notice of not less than three months in writing to the appointing authority retire from service. However, Regulation 29(2) requires acceptance by the appointing authority of the notice of voluntary retirement. 28. It will not be relevant to consider the text of Regulation 3, 22, 28 and 29, which reads thus:- "3. Application. (1) These regulations shall apply to employees who, - (a) were in the service of the Bank on or after the 1st day of January. 28. It will not be relevant to consider the text of Regulation 3, 22, 28 and 29, which reads thus:- "3. Application. (1) These regulations shall apply to employees who, - (a) were in the service of the Bank on or after the 1st day of January. 1986 but had retired before the 1st day of November, 1993; and (b) exercise an option in writing within one hundred and twenty days from the notified date to become member of the Fund' and (c) refund within sixty days after the expiry of the said period of one hundred and twenty days specified in clause (b) the entire amount of the Bank's contribution to the Provident Fund including interest accrued thereon together with a further simple interest at the rate of six per cent per annum on the said amount from the date of settlement of the Provident Fund account till the date of refund of the aforesaid amount to the bank or till the 1st day of April, 1995 whichever is earlier; or (2) (a) have retired on or after the 1st day of November, 1993 but before the notified date; and (b) exercise an option in writing within one hundred and twenty days from the notified date to become member of the Fund; and (c) refund within sixty days after the expiry of the said period of one hundred and twenty days specified in clause (b) the entire amount of the Bank's contribution to the Provident Fund and interest accrued thereon together with a further simple interest at the rate of six per cent per annum on the said amount from the date of settlement of the Provident Fund account till the date of the refund of the aforesaid amount to the Bank; or (3) (a) are in the service of the Bank before the notified date and continue to be in the service of the Bank on or after the notified date; and (b) exercise an option in writing within one hundred and twenty days from the notified date to become member of the Fund; and (c) authorise the trust of the Provident Fund of the Bank to transfer the entire contribution of the Bank along with the interest accrued thereon to the credit of the Fund constituted for the purpose under Regulation 5; or (4) join the service of the Bank on or after the notified date; or (5) were in the service of the Bank during any time on or after the 1st day of November, 1993 and had died after retirement but before the notified date, their family shall be entitled for the amount of pension payable to them from the date on which they would have been entitled to pension under these regulations, had they been alive till the date on which they died, if the family of the deceased - (a) exercise an option in writing one hundred and twenty days from the notified date to become member of the Fund; and (b) refund within sixty days after the expiry of the said period of one hundred and twenty days specified in clause (a) above the entire amount of the Bank's contribution to the Provident Fund and interest accrued thereon together with a further simple interest at the rate of six per cent per annum from the date of settlement of the Provident Fund account till the date of refund of the aforesaid amount to the Bank; or (6) joined the service of the bank on or after the 1st day of November, 1993 but who have died while in the service of the Bank before the notified date, their family shall be entitled to the family pension under these regulations; Provided that the family of such a deceased employee refunds within one hundred and eight days from the notified date the entire amount of the Bank's contribution to the Provident Fund. If any, ad interest accrued thereon together with further simple interest at the rate of six per cent per annum from the date of settlement of the provident Fund account till the date of refund of the aforesaid amount to the Ban; Provided further that the family of such a deceased employee shall apply in writing for grant of family pension; or (7) were in the service of the bank during any time on or after the 1st day of January, 1986 and had died while in service on or before the 31st day of October, 1993 or had retired on or before the 31st day of October, 1993 but died before the notified date in which case their family shall be entitled to the pension or the family pension as the case may be under these regulations, if the family of the deceased, (a) exercise an option in writing within on hundred and twenty days from the notified date to become member of the Fund; and (b) refund within sixty days of the expiry of the said period of one hundred and twenty days specified in clause (a) above the entire amount of the Bank?s contribution to the Provident Fund and interest accrued thereon together with further simple interest at the rate of six per cent per annum from the date of settlement of the Provident Fund account till the date of refund of the aforesaid amount to the Bank or till the 1st day of April, 1995 whichever is earlier?; or (8) joined the service of the bank on or before the 31st day of October, 1993 and who died while in service on or after the 1st day of November, 1993 but before the notified date in which case their families shall be entitled to family pension under these regulations if the family of the deceased employee,- (a) exercise an option in writing within one hundred and twenty days from the notified date to become a member of the Fund; and (b) refund within sixty days of the expiry of the said period of one hundred and twenty days specified in clause (a) above the entire amount of the Bank's contribution to the Provident Fund, including interest accrued thereon together with a further simple interest at the rate of six per cent per annum from the date of settlement of the Provident Fund account of the employee till the date of refund of the aforesaid amount to the Bank; (9) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub regulations (1), (2), (3), (5) and (8) an option exercised before the notified date by an employee or the family of a deceased employee in pursuance of the settlement shall be deemed to be an option for the purpose of this chapter if such an employee or the family of the deceased employee refund within sixty days from the notified date, the amount of the Bank's contribution to the Provident Fund including interest accrued thereon together with a further simple interest in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter and in case employer's contribution of Provident Fund has not been received from Provident Fund Trust, has authorised or authorises within sixty days from the notified date, the trustees of the Provident Fund of the Bank to transfer the entire contributions of the Bank to the Provident Fund including interest accrued thereon in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter to the credit of the fund constituted for this purpose under Regulation 5. (10) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub regulation (2), (5), (6) and (8), in cases where an employee had retired/died after retirement on or after the 1st day of November, 1993 but on or before the 1st day of April, 1995 or where an employee had died while in service of the Bank on or after the 1st day of November, 1993 but on or before the 1st day of April, 1995 such an employee or the family of the deceased employee, as the case may be, shall refund within the period specified in aforesaid sub-regulations the entire amount of the Bank?s contribution to the Provident Fund including interest accrued thereon with a further simple interest at the rate of six percent per annum on the said amount from the date of settlement of the Provident Fund account till the date of refund of the aforesaid amount to the Bank or till the 1st day of April,1995 whichever is earlier". 22. Forfeiture of Service. (1) Resignation or dismissal or removal or termination of an employee from the service of the Bank shall entail for forfeiture of his entire past service and consequently shall not qualify for pensionary benefits; (2) An interruption in the service of a Bank employee entails forfeiture of his past service, except in the following cases, namely:- (a) authorised leave of absence; (b) suspension, where it is immediately followed by reinstatement, whether in the same or a different post, or where the Bank employee dies or is permitted to retire or is retired on attaining the age of compulsory retirement while under suspension: (c) transfer to non-qualifying service in an establishment under the control of the Government of Bank if such transfer has been ordered by a competent authority in the public interest; (d) Joining time while on transfer from one post to another. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-regulation (2) the appointing authority may, by order, commute retrospectively the periods of absence without leave as extraordinary leave. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-regulation (2) the appointing authority may, by order, commute retrospectively the periods of absence without leave as extraordinary leave. (4) (a) In the absence of specific indication to the contrary in the service record, an interruption between two spells of service rendered by a bank employee shall be treated as automatically condoned and the pre-interruption service treated as qualifying service; (b) Nothing in clause (a) shall apply to interruption caused by resignation, dismissal or removal from service or for participation in a strike: Provided that before making an entry in the service record of the Bank employee regarding forfeiture of past service because of his participation in strike, an opportunity of representation may be given to such bank employees. 28. Superannuation Pension. Superannuation pension shall be granted to an employee who has retired on his attaining the age of Superannuation specified in the Service Regulations or Settlements. Provided that, with effect from 1st day of September, 2000 pension shall also be granted to an employee who opts to retire before attaining the age of Superannuation, but after rendering service for a minimum period of 15 years in terms of any Scheme that may be framed for such purpose by the Board with the approval of the Government. Explanatory Memorandum 1.Indian Banks' Association, after taking a no objection from the Government of India, circulated a model Voluntary Retirement Scheme (VRS) to all the Public Sector Banks on 31.8.2000. The Scheme, inter alia, provided that employees who have rendered 15 years' service are eligible for the Scheme. According to the existing provisions in the pension regulations, it is only employees who opt voluntary retirement after completing 20 years' of qualifying service and after giving notice of not less than 3 months in writing to the appointing authority, are eligible for pensionary benefits. The eligibility criteria and the benefits flowing out of the above provisions in the Pension Regulations are distinct and separate from that envisaged under VRS circulated on 31.8.2000. There are no provisions available in the Pension Regulations for extending pensionary benefits to a member employee who retires before attaining the age of superannuation under such specific schemes. It has been, therefore, decided to provide the benefit of pro rata pensionary benefits to members of Pension Fund who opt for voluntary retirement under specified scheme(s). 2. There are no provisions available in the Pension Regulations for extending pensionary benefits to a member employee who retires before attaining the age of superannuation under such specific schemes. It has been, therefore, decided to provide the benefit of pro rata pensionary benefits to members of Pension Fund who opt for voluntary retirement under specified scheme(s). 2. It is, therefore, necessary that the amendment may be made effective from 1st September 2000 so that all employees who are members of the Pension Fund and have taken voluntary retirement under the scheme after completion of 15 years of service can draw the benefit of pension. 3. It is certified that no employee/officer of the Bank of Baroda is likely to be affected adversely by the Notification being given retrospective effect. 29. Pension on Voluntary Retirement. (1) On or after the 1st day of November, 1993, at any time after an employee has completed twenty years of qualifying service he may, by giving notice of not less than three months in writing to the appointing authority retire from service; Provided that this sub-regulation shall not apply to an employee who is on deputation or on study leave abroad unless after having been transferred or having returned to India he has resumed charge of the post in India and has served for a period of not less than one year; Provided further that this sub-regulation shall not apply to an employee who seeks retirement from service for being absorbed permanently in an autonomous body or a public sector undertaking or company or institution or body, whether incorporated or not to which he is on deputation at the time of seeking voluntary retirement: Provided that this sub-regulation shall not apply to an employee who is deemed to have retired in accordance with clause (1) of Regulation 2. (2) The notice of voluntary retirement given under sub regulation (1) shall require acceptance by the appointing authority; Provided that where the appointing authority does not refuse to grant the permission for retirement before the expiry of the period specified in the said notice, the retirement shall become effective from the date of expiry of the said period. (2) The notice of voluntary retirement given under sub regulation (1) shall require acceptance by the appointing authority; Provided that where the appointing authority does not refuse to grant the permission for retirement before the expiry of the period specified in the said notice, the retirement shall become effective from the date of expiry of the said period. (3) (a) An employee referred to in sub-regulation (1) may make a request in writing to the appointing authority to accept notice of voluntary retirement of less than three months giving reasons thereof; (b) On receipt of a request under clause (a), the appointing authority may, subject to the provisions of sub-regulation (2), consider such request for the curtailment of the period of notice of three months on merits and if it is satisfied that the curtailment of the period of notice will not cause any administrative inconvenience, the appointing authority may relax the requirement of notice of three months on the condition that the employee shall not apply for commutation of a part of his pension before the expiry of the notice of three months. (4) An employee, who has elected to retire under this regulation and has given necessary notice to that effect to the appointing authority, shall be precluded from withdrawing his notice except with the specific approval of such authority; Provided that the request for such withdrawal shall be made before the intended date of his retirement. (5) The qualifying service of an employee retiring voluntarily under this regulation shall be increased by a period not exceeding five years, subject to the condition that the total qualifying service rendered by such employee shall not in any case exceed thirty-three years and it does not take him beyond the date of superannuation (6) The pension of an employee retiring under this regulation shall be based on the average emoluments as defined under clause (d) of Regulation 2 of these Regulations and the increase, not exceeding five years in his qualifying service, shall not entitle him to any notional fixation of pay for the purpose of calculating his pension." 29. In the instant case at hand, while the order was reserved after conclusion of the arguments, the learned counsel for the petitioner invited the attention of this Court to yet another opinion of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Asger Ibrahim Amin v. Life Insurance Corporation of India: Civil Appeal Number 10251 of 2014, decided on 12th October, 2015 ; reiterating the opinion in the case of Sheel Kumar Jain (supra), holding that the termination of the services of the appellant - Asger Ibramhim Amin, in essence was 'voluntary retirement' within the ambit of Rule 31 of the Pension Rules, 1995. The relevant paragraph of the judgment in the case of Azgar (supra), reads thus:- "15. The cases of Shyam Babu Verma v. Union of India: (1994) 2 SCC 521 ; State of M.P. v. Yogendra Shrivastava: (2010) 12 SCC 538 ; M.R. Prabhakar v. Canara Bank: (2012) 9 SCC 671 ; National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Kirpal Singh: (2014) 5 SCC 189 ; UCO Bank v. Sanwar Mal: (2004) 4 SCC 412 relied upon by the parties are distinguishable on facts from the present case. 16. We thus hold that the termination of services of the Appellant, in essence, was voluntary retirement within the ambit of Rule 31 of the Pension Rules of 1995. The Appellant is entitled for pension, provided he fulfils the condition of refunding of the entire amount of the Corporation's contribution to the Provident Fund along with interest accrued thereon as provided in the Pension Rules of 1995. Considering the huge delay, not explained by proper reasons, on part of the Appellant in approaching the Court, we limit the benefits of arrears of pension payable to the Appellant to three years preceding the date of the petition filed before the High Court. These arrears of pension should be paid to the Appellant in one instalment within four weeks from the date of refund of the entire amount payable by the Appellant in accordance of the Pension Rules of 1995. In the alternative, the Appellant may opt to get the amount of refund adjusted against the arrears of pension. In the latter case, if the amount of arrear is more than the amount of refund required, then the remaining amount shall be paid within two weeks from the date of such request made by the Appellant. In the alternative, the Appellant may opt to get the amount of refund adjusted against the arrears of pension. In the latter case, if the amount of arrear is more than the amount of refund required, then the remaining amount shall be paid within two weeks from the date of such request made by the Appellant. However, if the amount of arrears is less than the amount of refund required, then the pension shall be payable on monthly basis after the date on which the amount of refund is entirely adjusted." 30. From a glance of the opinion of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M.R. Prabhakar (supra) as well as Asger Ibrahim Amin (supra), it would be apparent that the cases have been distinguished relying upon the fact that in the case of Sheel Kumar Jain (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court dealt with 'Insurance Scheme' and not 'Pension Scheme', which is applicable in Banking Sector. Referring to Regulation 20(2) of Canara Bank Officers Service Regulation, 1975, applicable to the Bank, specifically referred to word 'resignation', unlike para 5 of the Insurance Rules. Referring to para 30 of the case of Sheel Kumar Jain (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that the Court will have to consider the statutory provisions in each case to find out whether termination of service of an employee was a termination by way of 'resignation' or a termination by way of 'voluntary retirement'. 31. In the instant case at hand, a glance of Regulation 22 of the Regulations of 1995, as extracted herein above, specifically details out the conditions, which would entail forfeiture of service. Regulation 22(1) specifically provides for resignation or dismissal or removal or termination of an employee from service of the Bank shall entail for forfeiture of his/her entire past service and consequently shall not qualify for pensionary benefits. 32. In the case of M.R. Prabhakar (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered somewhat similar provisions of Canara Bank (Employees) Pension Regulations, 1995; as would be evident from paragraph 10 to 13, which reads thus:- "10. 32. In the case of M.R. Prabhakar (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered somewhat similar provisions of Canara Bank (Employees) Pension Regulations, 1995; as would be evident from paragraph 10 to 13, which reads thus:- "10. The facts of the case disclose that the Appellant has worked for over twenty years and had tendered his resignation in accordance with the provision of Regulation 18 of LIC of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960, which, as is apparent from its reading, does not dissimulate between the termination of service by way of resignation on the one hand and voluntary retirement on the other, or distinguish one from the other. Significantly, there was no provision for voluntary retirement at the relevant time, and it was for this reason that the Pension Rules of 1995 specifically provided for it Under Rule 31. In this backdrop of facts, we need not dwell much on the issue because the case of Sheelkumar Jain v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd., (2011) 12 SCC 197 is on all fours of this case. 11. In Sheelkumar, the Appellant resigned from the services of the Respondent Company after serving for over 20 years on 16.12.1991. His resignation was offered and granted Under Clause 5 of General Insurance (Termination, Superannuation and Retirement of Officers and Development Staff) Scheme, 1976. Thereafter, the Central Government formulated General Insurance (Employees') Pension Scheme, 1995 with retrospective effect from 1.11.1993. Sheelkumar applied for pension under this Scheme, which was declined on the ground that resignation from service would entail forfeiture of service Under Clause 22 of the General Insurance (Employees') Pension Scheme, 1995. The Appellant moved the High Court challenging the rejection of his claim. His writ petition as well as the writ appeal was dismissed by the High Court. The Appellant then moved this Court, whereby we noted that Clause 5 of the Scheme of 1976 did not mention resignation nor was the Appellant made aware of the distinction between resignation and voluntary retirement; that this distinction was a product of the General Insurance (Employees') Pension Scheme of 1995. This Court observed: 20. The Appellant then moved this Court, whereby we noted that Clause 5 of the Scheme of 1976 did not mention resignation nor was the Appellant made aware of the distinction between resignation and voluntary retirement; that this distinction was a product of the General Insurance (Employees') Pension Scheme of 1995. This Court observed: 20. Sub-para (1) of Para 5 does not state that the termination of service pursuant to the notice given by an officer or a person of the Development Staff to leave or discontinue his service amounts to "resignation" nor does it state that such termination of service of an officer or a person of the Development Staff on his serving notice in writing to leave or discontinue in service amounts to "voluntary retirement". Sub-para (1) of Para 5 does not also make a distinction between "resignation" and "voluntary retirement" and it only provides that an employee who wants to leave or discontinue his service has to serve a notice of three months to the appointing authority. 21. We also notice that sub-para (1) of Para 5 does not require that the appointing authority must accept the request of an officer or a person of the Development Staff to leave or discontinue his service but in the facts of the present case, the request of the Appellant to relieve him from his service after three months' notice was accepted by the competent authority and such acceptance was conveyed by the letter dated 28-10-1991 of the Assistant Administrative Officer, Indore. xxx 23. The 1995 Pension Scheme was framed and notified only in 1995 and yet the 1995 Pension Scheme was made applicable also to employees who had left the services of Respondent 1 Company before 1995. Paras 22 and 30 of the 1995 Pension Scheme quoted above were not in existence when the Appellant submitted his letter dated 16-9-1991 to the General Manager of Respondent 1 Company. Hence, when the Appellant served his letter dated 16-9-1991 to the General Manager of Respondent 1 Company, he had no knowledge of the difference between "resignation" under Para 22 and "voluntary retirement" under Para 30 of the 1995 Pension Scheme. Similarly, Respondent 1 Company employer had no knowledge of the difference between "resignation" and "voluntary retirement" under Paras 22 and 30 of the 1995 Pension Scheme, respectively. 24. Similarly, Respondent 1 Company employer had no knowledge of the difference between "resignation" and "voluntary retirement" under Paras 22 and 30 of the 1995 Pension Scheme, respectively. 24. Both the Appellant and Respondent 1 have acted in accordance with the provisions of sub-para (1) of Para 5 of the 1976 Scheme at the time of termination of service of the Appellant in the year 1991. It is in this background that we have now to decide whether the termination of service of the Appellant under sub-para (1) of Para 5 of the 1976 Scheme amounts to resignation in terms of Para 22 of the 1995 Pension Scheme or amounts to voluntary retirement in terms of Para 30 of the 1995 Pension Scheme. 25. Para 22 of the 1995 Pension Scheme states that the resignation of an employee from the service of the corporation or a company shall entail forfeiture of his entire past service and consequently he shall not qualify for pensionary benefits, but does not define the term "resignation". Under sub-para (1) of Para 30 of the 1995 Pension Scheme, an employee, who has completed 20 years of qualifying service, may by giving notice of not less than 90 days in writing to the appointing authority retire from service and under sub-para (2) of Para 30 of the 1995 Pension Scheme, the notice of voluntary retirement shall require acceptance by the appointing authority. Since "voluntary retirement" unlike "resignation" does not entail forfeiture of past services and instead qualifies for pension, an employee to whom Para 30 of the 1995 Pension Scheme applies cannot be said to have "resigned" from service. 26. In the facts of the present case, we find that the Appellant had completed 20 years of qualifying service and had given notice of not less than 90 days in writing to the appointing authority of his intention to leave the service and the appointing authority had accepted notice of the Appellant and relieved him from service. Hence, Para 30 of the 1995 Pension Scheme applied to the Appellant even though in his letter dated 16-9-1991 to the General Manager of Respondent 1 Company he had used the word "resign". 12. Hence, Para 30 of the 1995 Pension Scheme applied to the Appellant even though in his letter dated 16-9-1991 to the General Manager of Respondent 1 Company he had used the word "resign". 12. What is unmistakably evident in the case at hand is that the Appellant had worked continuously for over 20 years, that he sought to discontinue his services and requested waiver of three months notice in writing, and that the said notice was accepted by the Respondent Corporation and the Appellant was thereby allowed to discontinue his services. If one would examine Rule 31 of the Pension Rules juxtaposed with the aforementioned facts, it would at once be obvious and perceptible that the essential components of that Rule stand substantially fulfilled in the present case. In Sheelkumar, this Court was alive to the factum that each case calls for scrutiny on its own merits, but that such scrutiny should not be detached from the purpose and objective of the concerned statute. It thus observed: 30. The aforesaid authorities would show that the court will have to construe the statutory provisions in each case to find out whether the termination of service of an employee was a termination by way of resignation or a termination by way of voluntary retirement and while construing the statutory provisions, the court will have to keep in mind the purposes of the statutory provisions. 31. The general purpose of the 1995 Pension Scheme, read as a whole, is to grant pensionary benefits to employees, who had rendered service in the insurance companies and had retired after putting in the qualifying service in the insurance companies. Paras 22 and 30 of the 1995 Pension Scheme cannot be so construed so as to deprive of an employee of an insurance company, such as the Appellant, who had put in the qualifying service for pension and who had voluntarily given up his service after serving 90 days' notice in accordance with sub-para (1) of Para 5 of the 1976 Scheme and after his notice was accepted by the appointing authority. 13. The Appellant ought not to be deprived of pension benefits merely because he styled his termination of services as "resignation" or because there was no provision to retire voluntarily at that time. 13. The Appellant ought not to be deprived of pension benefits merely because he styled his termination of services as "resignation" or because there was no provision to retire voluntarily at that time. The commendable objective of the Pension Rule is to extend benefits to a class of people to tide over the crisis and vicissitudes of old age, and if there are some inconsistencies between the statutory provisions and the avowed objective of the statute so as to discriminate between the beneficiaries within the class, the end of justice obligates us to palliate the differences between the two and reconcile them as far as possible. We would be failing in our duty, if we go by the letter and not by the laudatory spirit of statutory provisions and the fundamental rights guaranteed Under Article 14 of the Constitution of India." 33. The petitioner vide his communication dated 3rd November, 1967, expressed his willingness to retire from Bank services and submitted his 'resignation'. The respondent-Bank accepted the 'resignation' of the petitioner and informed him that he stood relieved with effect from 11th November, 1967, as would be evident from the communication dated 13rd November, 1967. The petitioner has made an effort to build up a case that in the absence of a legal definition of 'voluntary retirement' or in the absence of legally prescribed consequences of 'resignation', it must be understood in the sense of 'voluntarily relinquishment' from service for there cannot be any definition in between 'voluntary retirement' and 'resignation'. Since the expressions aforesaid are to be understood in the ordinary literal sense relying upon the opinion of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sheel Kumar Jain (supra). Seen in view of the Regulations of 1995, framed by the respondent-Bank, in the backdrop of the definition of 'voluntary retirement', concept of 'resignation' as recognised in Service Law Jurisprudence as well as the definition of 'retirement', this Court is not persuaded to accept the contention for what has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M.R. Prabhakar (supra), which applies on all fours of the case at hand since the petitioner was an employee of the respondent-Bank of Baroda. 34. 34. In the case of Asger Ibrahim Amin and Sheel Kumar Jain (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court dealt with the 'Insurance Scheme', and not 'Pension Scheme' which is applicable in the Banking Sector, and therefore, the reasoning which was applied in the case of M.R. Prabhakar (supra), while declining such a claim to an employee of Banking Sector, would also be applicable to the instant case at hand since there is no pre-existing legal fundamental right in favour of the petitioner so such sustain his claim for the benefit of ex-gratia payment under the Regulations of 1995 as well as under the Government of India letter dated 26th November, 1998. Hence, the action of the respondent-Bank in declining the claim of the petitioner cannot be faulted. 35. For the reasons and discussions herein above, the writ petition is devoid of any substance and lacks in merit, and therefore, deserves to be dismissed.Ordered accordingly. 36. In view of the final adjudication on the writ application, the stay application stands closed. 37. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.Writ Petition Dismissed - Stay Application Closed - No Costs. *******