JUDGMENT Sudhir Agarwal, J. 1. Heard Sri A.S. Rai, Advocate, for appellant and Sri Ashish Agarwal, Advocate, holding brief of Sri Rahul Sahai, Advocate, representing respondents 6 and 7. Learned Standing Counsel is present for respondents 8 to 11. None appeared on behalf of any other respondent though the case has been called in revised and name of Sri A.K. Rai and Sri Nimai Das have been shown in the cause list as counsel for respondents. 2. The only question is whether the sale-deed with respect to property in dispute could have been cancelled by a unilateral document of cancellation dated 26.8.1981, executed by defendant no. 2. 3. The facts in brief giving rise to the present dispute necessary for proper adjudication of the matter may be stated as under: 4. The case set up by the plaintiff, Govind Prasad Srivstava, is that he was an employee of Northern Eastern Railway posted at Varanasi. He had no independent house of his own at Varanasi. Defendant no. 2, Railway Men Sahkari Samiti Limited, Varanasi, (hereinafter referred to as "Housing Society") is a Society of the employees of Railways the object whereof was to facilitate for accommodation to the Railway employees. The Housing Society purchased a land at Ashapur and at Village Mavaiya. After planning colonization therein its plotting was done. The plots were sold to Railway employee who were members of Housing Society. The land initially belong to Government of India, Ministry of Railway, who had sold it to Housing Society for the purpose of benefit of Railway employees and was not liable to be sold to any outsider. 5. The plaintiff also purchased a plot No. 8, area 2560 sq. feet, for consideration of Rs. 3648/- vide sale-deed dated 11.2.1980. When the plaintiff proceeded for commencing construction activities and attempted to start construction on 7.7.1983, he found defendant no. 1 and Shiv Poojan Singh, Secretary of Housing Society, obstructing construction thereon and when the plaintiff asked them not to do so, they threatened him of getting their own construction forcibly. Plaintiff, therefore, sought a permanent injunction and also a direction for removal of construction already raised on the disputed plot. 6. The defendant no. 1 contested the suit stating that though plot no. 8 was sold by defendant no. Plaintiff, therefore, sought a permanent injunction and also a direction for removal of construction already raised on the disputed plot. 6. The defendant no. 1 contested the suit stating that though plot no. 8 was sold by defendant no. 2 to plaintiff vide sale-deed dated 11.2.1980, but it was subject to certain conditions and one of such condition, whenever the development charges would be demanded by defendant no.2, plaintiff would pay the same. Since plaintiff did not pay development charges, therefore, his membership of Housing Society was revoked on 6.5.1983 and plot in question was sold by defendant no. 2 to defendant no. 1 vide sale-deed dated 10.6.1983. After purchasing disputed plot, defendant no. 1 has raised certain construction thereon. 7. The defendant no. 2 also contested the suit by filing his written statement and though admitted execution of sale-deed dated 11.2.1980, in favour of plaintiff, he said that plaintiff became member of Society on 8.4.1976 and remained so till November' 1990. The defendant no. 2 purchased disputed land from Railway Department of Government of India on 3.6.1979. Lay out plan was submitted to Varanasi Development Authority in which 116 plots were carved out. One plot was allotted and sold to plaintiff vide sale-deed dated 11.2.1980. There was condition of payment of development charge in the sale-deed dated 11.2.1980. On 30.11.1980 Housing Society demanded development charges as per demand raised by Varanasi Development Authority. A sum of Rs. 8176/- was demanded from plaintiff. Despite notice, plaintiff deposited only Rs. 3109/- instead of 8176/-. In a General Body meeting dated 28.11.1982, it was decided that those who have not deposited balance dues till 11.8.1982, their primary membership of Housing Society shall be cancelled. The plaintiff was also present in the aforesaid meeting. The resolution of meeting was communicated to plaintiff, still he did not deposit dues. The Managing Committee of Housing Society passed a resolution on 6.5.1983 terminating primary membership of plaintiff and communicated this resolution to him by registered letter dated 25.5.1983. Since plaintiff seized to be a member of Housing Society, his right of property also disappeared and thereafter Housing Society sold plot in dispute to defendant no. 1, vide sale-deed dated 10.6.1983. 8. The Trial Court formulated following nine issues: "1. Whether plaintiff is the owner and in possession of property in dispute as alleged in plaint? 2. Since plaintiff seized to be a member of Housing Society, his right of property also disappeared and thereafter Housing Society sold plot in dispute to defendant no. 1, vide sale-deed dated 10.6.1983. 8. The Trial Court formulated following nine issues: "1. Whether plaintiff is the owner and in possession of property in dispute as alleged in plaint? 2. Whether plaintiff is entitled to the relief of injunction as alleged in the plaint? 3. Whether suit is barred by Section 34, 38 and 41 of Specific Relief Act? 4. Whether suit is barred by Section 17 of U.P. Cooperative Societies Act? 5. Whether the suit is barred by Section 70, 71 and 11 of U.P. Cooperative Societies Act? 6. Whether the suit is undervalued and C.F. paid is insufficient? 7. Whether plaintiff is entitled to any other relief? 8. D;k oknh bUrdke ds dCtkn[ky ij vuqrks"k ikus dk vf/kdkjh gS\ English Translation by the Court: "8. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to get any relief as to possession and occupation over the property? 9- D;k oknh dk ewY;kadu de fd;k x;k gSA vkSj mlds }kjk nh x;h dksVZ Qhl vi;kZIr gS\^ English Translation by the Court: 9. Whether the suit has been undervalued and court fee paid is insufficient?" 9. Issue no. 5 was taken up as a preliminary issue. It was relating to maintainability of suit and decided by Trial Court vide judgment and decree dated 31.5.1984 in favour of plaintiff. Similarly, issues no. 4 and 6 were also taken up as preliminary issues and decided by Trial Court vide order dated 12.7.1984, in favour of plaintiff. Then Trial Court dealt with issue no. 1 and found that once sale-deed was executed on 11.2.1980 in favour of plaintiff by defendant no. 2, he (plaintiff) became owner thereof in absolute terms. 10. The defendant no. 2 relied on a document of revocation of sale-deed dated 26.8.1981 stating that Housing Society unilaterally revoked sale-deed dated 11.2.1980. Trial Court held that once sale-deed was executed and title of property was transferred to plaintiff, neither the defendant-Society had any right to cancel sale-deed by passing a resolution on its own on 10.6.1983, nor by execution of an unilateral document dated 26.8.1981 the aforesaid sale-deed could have been cancelled. Trial Court, thereafter decreed the suit vide judgment and decree dated 16.2.1991. 11. Trial Court, thereafter decreed the suit vide judgment and decree dated 16.2.1991. 11. In Civil Appeal No. 9 of 1991, preferred by defendants, Lower Appellate Court held that sale-deed dated 11.2.1980 did not transfer land in dispute in absolute terms to the plaintiff. It was subject to right of alteration by Society in terms of sale-deed which it had done by document dated 26.8.1981. The said document could not have been ignored only on the ground that it was unilateral one. Since vide document dated 26.8.1981 the right of plaintiff under sale-deed dated 11.2.1980 were terminated, therefore, he had no right over the property in dispute. Consequently, the appeal was allowed and Trial Court's judgment was set aside. The suit was accordingly also dismissed vide judgment dated 31.5.1999. 12. In the light of aforesaid facts, it is now to be considered "whether sale-deed dated 11.2.1980 was rightly cancelled by defendant no. 2 by the unilateral document dated 26.8.1981". 13. Clauses 2, 3, 4 and 6 of sale-deed dated 11.2.1980 would be relevant to examine the nature of the said document. 12. In the light of aforesaid facts, it is now to be considered "whether sale-deed dated 11.2.1980 was rightly cancelled by defendant no. 2 by the unilateral document dated 26.8.1981". 13. Clauses 2, 3, 4 and 6 of sale-deed dated 11.2.1980 would be relevant to examine the nature of the said document. It would be appropriate to reproduce the same as under: ^^2- ;g fd ge eqfdj us vkt dh rkjh[k ls viuk dCtk&n[ky vkSj lEifRr ls ekfydkuk o okbZ gVkdj fodzhr lEifRr ij vyx&vyx [kjhnkjku dk vyx&vyx dCtk&n[ky ekfydkuk o okdbZ muds tehu ij djk fn;kA vc ge eqfdj dk dksbZ ^gd o fgLlk* fodzhr lEifRr esa dk;e u jgk vkSj u ge eqfdj ls dksbZ ^^okLrk o ljksdkj** gh jgkA fodzhr lEifRr ds eq'rfdy ekfyd o dkfct gj [kjhnkjku vyx&vyx vius vius tehu ds gks x;s vkSj gj [kjhnkjku dks vyx&vyx vf[r;kj gkfly gS o gksxk fd dkxtkr ljdkjh o dkxtkr uxjegkikfydk] okjk.klh esa jsyos dk uke dVokdj viuk vyx vyx uke ntZ djok ysosa vkSj tks lkykuk ekyxqtkjh ljdkj vFkok VSDl vkfn vk;n nks vyx vyx uke ls vnk djds vyx vyx jlhn gkfly fd;k djsaA pwWafd fodzhr lEifRr jsyos eSau lgdkjh x`g fuekZ.k lfefr fyfeVsM] okjk.klh dh lEifRr gS] blfy, tk;nkn] tks fcdzh dh tk jgh gS] dks cspus vFkok jsgu djus vFkok c['kh'k djus vFkok nku djus dk dksbZ vf[r;kj fdlh [kjhnkj dks u gksxk vkSj [kjhnkjku jsyos eSau lgdkjh x`g fuekZ.k lfefr fyfeVsM okjk.klh] dh mi fof/k;ksa ls o fu;eksa ls ikcUn jgsaxsA 3- ;g fd fcdzhr lEifRr jsyos eSu lgdkjh x`g fuekZ.k lfefr fyfeVsM okjk.klh dh tk;nkn gSs] tks gj rjg ds okjnsu o .k ls eqDr gSA 4- ;g fd vxj fodzhr lEifRr ds gd fefYd;r esa uqDl gksus dh otg ls [kjhnkjku dk dCtk&n[ky u gks lds vFkok [kjhnjku ds dCtk&n[ky ls fudy tkos rks mu ij gj lwjrksa esa [kjhnkjku dks vf[r;kj gkfly gS o gksxk fd viuk dqy tj leu cSukek gktk ge eqfdj ls olwy dj ysosaA blesa ge eqfdj dks u dksbZ mtz gS vkSj u vkbUnk gksxkA 6- ;g fd Hkfo"; esa fodkl izkf/kdj.k }kjk lfefr ds izLrkfor ys vkmV esa dksbZ la'kks/ku fd;k tkosxk rks ge eqfdj rnuqlkj bl fodz; i= esa la'kks/ku djus dk vf/kdkj jgsxk vkSj mlesa [kjhnkjku dks vkifRr djus dk vf/kdkj u gksxkA** (emphasis added) English Translation by the Court: "2. That we executants, by removing our actual occupation and possession over the property from today, handed over actual possession and occupation separately to respective buyers on their lands in the sold property. Now, we executants no longer have any right or share in the sold property, nor do we have any concern or business in it. Every buyer has become permanent owner having occupation over his respective land in the sold property and every buyer has right to get his name registered in the records of the government and the Municipal Board, Varanasi after getting the name of Railways removed; everyone of them should pay separate annual land revenue or tax under separate heads and should obtain their receipts in his name. As the sold property is that of Railwaymen Sahakari Samiti, Varanasi, none of the buyers shall have the right to sell, mortgage, gift or donate it and the buyers shall be bound by by-laws and rules of Railwaymen Shahakari Grih Nirman Samiti Limited, Varanasi. 3. That the sold property is that of Railwaymen Sahakari Grih Nirman Samiti Limited, Varanasi, which is free from all kinds of liabilities and debts. 4. That if the buyers fail to get possession and occupation on account of any lacuna in the right or title to the sold property or if the property gets out of the possession and occupation of the buyers, then the buyers shall in such situations have the right to realise total consideration amount as to the sale deed from us, the executants. For this, we executants have no objection, nor shall we have it hereinafter. 6. That if any change is made in the layout of the Samiti by Vikas Pradhikaran (Development Authority), then we executants shall have the right to accordingly make modifications in the sale deed and the buyers shall have no right to raise objection." 14. Clause 2 thereof clearly shows that every vendee who had purchased land under sale-deed dated 11.2.1980, become owner in possession of the land allotted to him and was entitled for getting mutation and also liable to pay other tax etc., accordingly. However, the purchaser would not be entitled to further sell or mortgage or gift disputed land and it would be governed by bye-laws and rules of Housing Society. However, the purchaser would not be entitled to further sell or mortgage or gift disputed land and it would be governed by bye-laws and rules of Housing Society. Clause-6 says that if any amendment is made in the lay out plan by Varanasi Development Authority, then it would be open to Housing Society to make appropriate amendment in the sale-deed and purchaser would have no objection therein. 15. The document dated 11.2.1980 nowhere left any right upon Housing Society to cancel sale-deed for non payment of any dues etc. On the contrary, Clause-1 of sale-deed says that entire amount has been paid by purchaser and now no amount is due. Admittedly, it was not the case of defendant that document dated 26.8.1981 was executed in the light of any change made in the lay out, if any, by Varanasi Development Authority. Lower Appellate Court has read Clause-6 as if it did not result in transfer of ownership upon plaintiff. In my view, it is nothing but a misreading. Clause-6 of sale-deed dated 11.2.1980 permits change in the sale-deed on the part of Housing Society if such change has been made in lay-out plan, by Varanasi Development Authority but did not confer any right upon Society to cancel sale-deed itself by an unilateral document. In view thereof, I have no manner of doubt that Lower Appellate Court has committed a manifest error of law and proceeded wholly illegally in justifying document dated 26.8.1981, unilaterally executed by defendant no. 2, on the strength of Clause-6 of sale-deed dated 11.2.1980. The aforesaid Clause-6 does not confer any right upon defendant no. 2 to cancel the sale-deed itself unilaterally. Lower Appellate Court, in my view, has completely misread the aforesaid Clause. 16. No other reason has been assigned by Lower Appellate Court so as to validate document dated 26.8.1981. Once the document dated 26.8.1981 goes, there remains nothing further which may deny title to plaintiff over the property in dispute on the basis of sale-deed dated 11.2.1980. So long as the plaintiff is owner of property in dispute, any subsequent sale-deed executed in respect of the said property, by defendant no. 2 was wholly illegal since it has no title over disputed property after it executed sale-deed dated 11.2.1980 in favour of plaintiff. 17. The question of law, formulated above, therefore, is answered in favour of plaintiff-appellant. So long as the plaintiff is owner of property in dispute, any subsequent sale-deed executed in respect of the said property, by defendant no. 2 was wholly illegal since it has no title over disputed property after it executed sale-deed dated 11.2.1980 in favour of plaintiff. 17. The question of law, formulated above, therefore, is answered in favour of plaintiff-appellant. The judgment of Lower Appellate Court in the above circumstances cannot sustain. 18. The appeal is allowed. Judgment and decree of Lower Appellate Court dated 31.5.1999 is hereby set aside. The judgment and decree of Trial Court dated 16.2.1991 is hereby restored and confirmed. The suit of plaintiff stands decreed in terms of the judgment and decree passed by Trial Court. 19. Costs made easy.