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2015 DIGILAW 208 (BOM)

Chandrakala v. State of Maharashtra

2015-01-21

S.B.SHUKRE

body2015
JUDGMENT S.B. SHUKRE, J. 1. Heard. 2. Leave to place additional documents on record is granted. 3. Rule, returnable forthwith. Heard finally by consent. 4. By this petition, the petitioner has challenged order dated 10/9/2013 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Chandrapur below her application at Exh.33, thereby rejecting the application that was filed for her discharge from Sessions Case No.53 of 3022 pending on the file of the Additional Sessions Judge. 5. It is the contention of learned Counsel for the petitioner that there is not even an iota of prima facie evidence to substantiate various offences such as 498-A, 304-B, 306 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code registered against the applicant, who was sister-in-law of deceased Chhaya and husband, father-in-law and mother-in-law of deceased Chhaya. He submits that even if whatever material present on record is accepted as true, it would not be sufficient to constitute the offences alleged against the applicant. 6. According to learned A.P.P. for the State, although it is true that in the first information report dated 11/12/2010 lodged by father of the deceased with Police Station, Sindewahi, name of the present applicant does not figure, there is a supplementary statement given by mother of the deceased dated 14/12/2010 indicating that the present applicant was the main accused who used to instigate her brother, i.e. husband of deceased Chhaya in subjecting deceased Chhaya to cruelty. Therefore, according to him, this is not a fit case for discharge of the applicant from the case. 7. On perusal of the first information report as well as supplementary statements of Bandu Nardelwar - father of the deceased and Devangana Nardelwar - mother of the deceased, what I find is that some vague and general allegations of the applicant being responsible by instigation for subjecting deceased Chhaya to harassment and torture thereby leading to her unnatural death. 8. In the supplementary statement of Bandu Nardelwar dated 14/12/2010 it has been stated that the present applicant is mainly responsible for the plight of deceased Chhaya and her dying. It is also stated that the present applicant used to frequently pay visits to the house of her brother and parents, in which deceased Chhaya used to reside with her husband and pick up quarrels without any reason and used to subject deceased Chhaya to physical, mental and financial harassment. It is also stated that the present applicant used to frequently pay visits to the house of her brother and parents, in which deceased Chhaya used to reside with her husband and pick up quarrels without any reason and used to subject deceased Chhaya to physical, mental and financial harassment. These allegations, even if accepted at their face value, would not be sufficient to constitute an offence of cruelty as contemplated under Section 498-A IPC. In order to make out an offence of cruelty, it is necessary that specific acts of harassment are stated by the witnesses. If the witnesses state that the deceased was subjected to harassment or cruelty, at the most, it would be regarded as opinions of the witnesses and the case cannot be decided on the opinions of the witnesses. By elaboration of the various acts committed by the accused persons in relation to the deceased, the Courts are enabled to come to a conclusion as to whether or not these acts proved in the evidence constitute cruelty as contemplated by law. It is not for the witnesses to say that there was a cruelty meted out to the deceased. Therefore, statement dated 14/12/2010, even if accepted as true, would not by itself be sufficient to make out an offence of cruelty. Even, this statement does not make any allegation about demand of dowry and subjecting deceased Chhaya to cruelty on her failure to meet said illegal demand. Therefore, on the basis of this statement, none of the offences as alleged against the present applicant are prima facie made out. 9. The supplementary statement of Devangana recorded on 14/12/2010 only states about applicant instigating her brother and parents in cruelly treating her daughter. What kind of instigation it was, is not clarified in the statement. Therefore, even this statement, taken at its face value, would not be sufficient to prima facie making out of offences alleged against the petitioner. 10. There is also statement of one Mohan Shamrao Nardelwar dated 14/12/2010, who is the neighbour of the complainant residing at Bhojapur, to which my attention has been invited by learned A.P.P. to support his argument that there is some material collected by the police, which would require the Court to proceed further in this case against the petitioner as well. There is also statement of one Mohan Shamrao Nardelwar dated 14/12/2010, who is the neighbour of the complainant residing at Bhojapur, to which my attention has been invited by learned A.P.P. to support his argument that there is some material collected by the police, which would require the Court to proceed further in this case against the petitioner as well. However, a close perusal of this statement discloses that whatever he has stated about the harassment and cruelty allegedly meted out to deceased Chhaya by the accused persons is nothing but hearsay evidence. He has categorically stated that he had heard about the same from some other persons. Therefore, even this statement would not be sufficient to make out any prima facie case against the petitioner for the offence alleged against her. 11. In the result, the only conclusion that can be drawn in this case is that the trial of the petitioner on the basis of the evidence so collected by the Investigating Officer would be an exercise in futility. The result of the trial case against the petitioner with such an evidence being there on record, is now a foregone conclusion. Therefore, proceeding further against the petitioner would be an abuse of process of law, which cannot be allowed by this Court. 12. For the reasons stated above, I am inclined to allow this petition. Accordingly, the petition is allowed. Impugned order dated 10/9/2013 is hereby quashed and set aside. The petitioner is discharged from the case. Rule is made absolute in the above terms.