JUDGMENT 1. - Petitioner, an Ex-Chairperson of Municipal Board, Rajsamand has preferred this writ petition to challenge the impugned order dated 26.09.2011 (Annex.8) passed by the Dy. Secretary, Local Self Department, Rajasthan, Jaipur whereby he is declared ineligible for re-election of the Ward Member of the Municipality for six years from the date of the order. The order impugned against the petitioner is passed under Sections 39, 40 and 41 of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 2009 (for short ‘the Act of 2009’). 2. Succinctly stated the factual matrix giving rise to this writ petition are that the petitioner was elected as Ward Member of Municipal Board, Rajsamand from Ward No.18 in the year 2006. Later on, the petitioner was elected as Chairperson of the Municipal Board by lottery. Projecting very tall claims about his abilities and impartiality during the entire tenure, it is submitted by the petitioner in the writ petition that the tenure came to an end in February 2011. When the petitioner was in helm of affairs as Chairperson of Municipal Board, Rajsamand, leader of opposition Mr. Chunnilal Pancholi lodged many complaints against him alleging serious irregularities in disposal of his work as Chairperson. While categorising all these complaints as frivolous and vexatious, the petitioner has submitted in the writ petition that all the complaints were of no substance. Be that as it may, the fact remains that complaints of the leader of opposition were taken cognizance by the Dy. Director (Regional), Local Self Department, Udaipur and vide communication dated 02.07.2009 forwarded the inquiry report prepared by him to the Assistant Director (Vigilance), Local Self Department, Jaipur. It appears that Dy. Director (Regional), Local Self Department, Udaipur conducted an inquiry during his visit to Municipal Board, Rajsamand on 18/19-06-2009 and arrived at a conclusion that allegations levelled by the leader of opposition against the petitioner are prima facie proved. This sort of situation facilitated a charge-sheet and statement of charges and in all four charges were framed against the petitioner. The petitioner has mentioned with clarity and precision that during inquiry conducted by the Dy. Director (Regional), Local Self Department, Udaipur, no opportunity of hearing was afforded to him and for substantiating this assertion, the petitioner has laid emphasis on communication dated 02.07.2009 containing recitals that the Dy. Director has examined the record and heard Mr. Pancholi only. The report submitted by the Dy. Director (Regional), Local Self Department, Udaipur, no opportunity of hearing was afforded to him and for substantiating this assertion, the petitioner has laid emphasis on communication dated 02.07.2009 containing recitals that the Dy. Director has examined the record and heard Mr. Pancholi only. The report submitted by the Dy. Director (Regional), Local Self Department, Udaipur prompted the Dy. Secretary, Local Self Department to issue a notice dated 24.08.2009 to the petitioner in terms of Section 63 of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1959 (for short ‘the Act of 1959’). By this notice, the petitioner was called upon to submit his explanation in relation to the charges levelled against him within a fortnight with a stipulation that if desired explanation is not furnished within stipulated period, proceedings under Section 63 of the Act of 1959 would be initiated against him. In the notice dated 24.08.2009, four charges were levelled against the petitioner. In response to the notice, the petitioner submitted his reply on 02.09.2009 (Annex.3). After considering reply/explanation of the petitioner, State Government was satisfied vis-a-vis charge No.2 and as such the said charge was dropped against the petitioner but for the remaining three charges i.e. charge Nos.1,3 & 4, a judicial inquiry was ordered and Special Secretary cum Joint Legal Remembrancer, Law Department was appointed as Enquiry Officer. Taking a dig at the stand of the respondents in mentioning the provisions of the Act of 1959, the petitioner has submitted that Section 63 of the Act of 1959 is replaced by Section 39 of the Act of 2009. During judicial inquiry under Section 39 of the Act of 2009, notices were issued to the petitioner accompanying the charge-sheet, list of witnesses and list of documents in regard to all the three charges on 16.12.2009. In response to Annex.4, the petitioner submitted his reply and also presented himself personally before the Enquiry Officer as desired by him on 03.02.2010. While proceeding with the inquiry, the Enquiry Officer called upon the department to produce the evidence but no evidence was tendered by the department after availing many opportunities and finally the Enquiry Officer closed the evidence of department on 04.01.2011. Although no evidence was tendered by the department to substantiate the charges, the Enquiry Officer by its inquiry report dated 05.08.2011 indicted the petitioner for charge Nos.1 and 2 and recorded a finding that charge No.3 is not proved against the petitioner. Although no evidence was tendered by the department to substantiate the charges, the Enquiry Officer by its inquiry report dated 05.08.2011 indicted the petitioner for charge Nos.1 and 2 and recorded a finding that charge No.3 is not proved against the petitioner. The inquiry report is submitted by the Enquiry Officer on 05.08.2011. Assailing the procedure adopted by the Enquiry Officer, the petitioner has pleaded in the writ petition that findings on charge Nos.1 and 2 recorded in the report against him are contrary to settled law, prescribed cannons of justice, fair play and natural justice. The petitioner has made an attempt to categorise the judicial inquiry as an empty formality by submitting that as a matter of fact, in want of evidence, the proceedings ought to have been dropped. While referring to Sub-section (3) of Section 63 of the Act of 1959, the petitioner has submitted in the writ petition that it was expected of the Enquiry officer to send the record along with his finding to the State Government for passing the necessary orders. It is further submitted that the Enquiry Officer was obliged to record reasons for recording his finding on the statement of charges. It is specifically pleaded by the petitioner that even the inquiry report was not endorsed to him before sending it to the Government. The inquiry report was, thereafter, considered by the State Government and while concurring with the findings of the report, impugned order was passed whereby the petitioner was declared as disqualified for six years to contest the election. 3. In the writ petition, the petitioner has made an attempt to defend his action vis-a-vis both the charges. As regards charge No.1, the petitioner has submitted that land situated in Arazi No.347 measuring 1 bigha and 15 biswas of village Tarsingda jointly owned by him and his partner Hemant Kumar was pending consideration before the Municipal Board in a proceedings under Section 90B of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956 (for short ‘the Act of 1956’) and when the said file was put up before him in the capacity of Chairperson, he has simply put a remark " fu;ekuqlkj dk;Zokgh dh tkos ". Therefore, according to him, he has not passed any affirmative order in respect of that file. Therefore, according to him, he has not passed any affirmative order in respect of that file. It is also asserted by the petitioner that till date, the proceedings under Section 90B of the Act of 1956 have not completed and patta has not been issued by the Municipal Board, Rajsamand in this behalf. Therefore, as per version of the petitioner, regarding this charge, no culpability can be attributed to him. On the second charge, the petitioner submitted his explanation that tender was issued by the Municipal Board on 24.05.2008 of Rs.2,72,000/- for filling work of road at the places mentioned in the tender document. It is also averred that in front of Kawadia Hospital, a big pit was there which was hurdle in traffic causing danger to the public at large and, therefore, on a request being made by the Collector and other Government officers, he has instructed the contractor Kanhaiyalal Tak to do filling work. In order to justify this action, the petitioner has also romped in involvement of the larger public interest for doing the said work. The approval of the Municipal Board in general meeting about the said work on 04.03.2009 is also cited as a plausible defence to repudiate charge No.2. 4. For assailing the impugned order as well as the inquiry report, the petitioner has essentially taken shelter of violation of principles of natural justice and the laconic findings of the inquiry report, which according to his version, are based on mere ipse dixit of Enquiry Officer. The petitioner has also assailed the finding on the anvil of it being ex facie erroneous and a glaring example of an error apparent on the face of record. A yet another attempt is made that the entire complaint was outcome of political vengeance and it has finally culminated into crucification of the petitioner halting his political career for six years. The petitioner has also assailed the impugned action on the anvil of invasion of Article 14 and 243B of the Constitution of India. 5. On behalf of respondents, reply to the writ petition is submitted. As preliminary objection, it is urged by the respondents that challenge thrown to the order (Annex.8) at the behest of the petitioner is not sustainable in absence of laying challenge to the judicial inquiry report being consequential order. 5. On behalf of respondents, reply to the writ petition is submitted. As preliminary objection, it is urged by the respondents that challenge thrown to the order (Annex.8) at the behest of the petitioner is not sustainable in absence of laying challenge to the judicial inquiry report being consequential order. It is further submitted in the reply that judicial inquiry is self-explanatory wherein the petitioner is indicted for charge Nos.1 and 2. Therefore, in substance, it is urged in the form of preliminary objection by the respondents that writ petition against the impugned order is not sustainable without challenging the inquiry report. Joining the issue with the petitioner on merits of the case, the respondents have vociferously defended the impugned action and submitted that impugned order is just and proper which requires no interference in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction. The contention of the petitioner about violation of principles of natural justice is also aptly dealt with in the reply and it is specifically pleaded that in there no question of violation of principles of natural justice in the instant case. As regards the findings recorded in the judicial inquiry report, it is submitted by the respondents that the said finding is based on material available on record and as such the report cannot be faulted. The allegation of the petitioner that he was not made available copy of judicial inquiry report is repudiated by the respondents in the reply by urging that the petitioner has failed to point out any provision of law under which it was imperative for the enquiry officer to supply him copy of report. While referring to charge No.1, it is submitted in the return by the respondents that petitioner himself was interested in file No.57 of the year 2008-09 yet, he has made endorsement to do the needful in the matter in accordance with law. As a matter of fact, that was file for land conversion and approval of lay out plan of agricultural land jointly owned by the petitioner with his other partner in which the petitioner ought not to have made any remark. By making a positive endorsement to do the needful in accordance with law, as per the version of the respondents, the petitioner has committed serious misdemeanor and, therefore, no interference in the matter is called for. 6. By making a positive endorsement to do the needful in accordance with law, as per the version of the respondents, the petitioner has committed serious misdemeanor and, therefore, no interference in the matter is called for. 6. After submission of reply to the writ petition, the petitioner filed rejoinder wherein facts averred in the writ petition are reiterated. While countering the preliminary objection in the rejoinder, it is submitted by the petitioner that preliminary objection is frivolous inasmuch as the inquiry report was recommendatory in nature and the same stands merged in the final order which is the order impugned in the writ petition. With this positive assertion, the petitioner has completely repudiated the preliminary objection and urged that the matter requires judicial scrutiny on merits. Apart from reiterating the averments contained in the writ petition, the petitioner has also made an attempt to castigate the inquiry report on the anvil of being violative of all cannons of fair play and principles of natural justice. The petitioner has also urged that since no evidence was tendered against him, the enquiry officer has committed grave and serious error in holding him guilty for charge Nos.1 & 2. That apart, the petitioner has also submitted that inquiry report is absolutely cryptic and unspecific and no reasons have been spelt out for indicting him for charge Nos.1 & 2. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record. 8. The pivotal question which requires judicial scrutiny in the instant petition is the legality and propriety of the impugned order dated 26.09.2011 (Annex.8) whereby the petitioner is debarred from contesting the municipal election for six years. The respondent has passed the said order while exercising powers under Sections 39, 40 & 41 of the Act of 2009. A glance at the impugned order clearly and unequivocally reveals that the same is edificed on a judicial inquiry conducted by the Special Secretary-cum-Joint Legal Remembrancer, Law Department, Jaipur. The judicial inquiry was ordered against the petitioner to inquire about three charges. A glance at the impugned order clearly and unequivocally reveals that the same is edificed on a judicial inquiry conducted by the Special Secretary-cum-Joint Legal Remembrancer, Law Department, Jaipur. The judicial inquiry was ordered against the petitioner to inquire about three charges. The three charges are reproduced in vernacular as infra:- vkjksi la[;k 1%& ;g gS fd vki Lo;a ds fgr ds ekeys esa fely ua0 57 o"kZ 2008&09 esa uksV'khV ds isjk la0 9 ij viuh la;qDr [kkrsnkjh vkjkth ua0 347 jdck 1 ch?kk 15 fcLok Hkwfe jktLo xzke rjflaxMk dk Hkwfe :ikUrj.k Lohd'fr ,oa ys&vkmV Iyku dh Lohd'fr iznku dhA ftlds fy, vki vkjksfir gSA vkjksi la[;k 2%& ;g gS fd vki }kjk ,d vkns'k ds vykok vkius Lo;a ds gLrk{kj ls ,d vU; vkns'k fnukad 28-06-2008 dks tkjh dj fQfyax dk;Z ds LFkkuksa esa ifjorZu dj vius ifjfprsa ,oa Bsdsnkj dks ykHk igqWapkus ds fy, fu;eksa ds foijhr tkdj vius in dk nq:i;ksx ds lkFk gh fufonk i= fnukad 10-04-2008 esa of.kZr LFkkuksa ij dk;Z ugha djok;k tkdj dkofM;k vLirky o mlds ikl gh fQfyax dk dk;Z djok;k gS rFkk dkofM+;k vLirky ds vkl ikl jksM+ fQfyax dk fdruk dk;Z gksuk Fkk tks th&f'kM;wy rdehuk ugha cuk;k rFkk dk;kZy; izfdz;k ,oa foRrh; fu;eksa dh vuns[kh dh xbZA vkidk mDr d'R; in ds nq:i;ksx dh Js.kh esa vkrk gSA ftlds fy, vki vkjksfir gSA vkjksi la[;k 3 %& ;g gS fd vki }kjk xa.kxkSj esyk vk;kstu gsrq iwoZ tkudkjh ds ckotwn l{ke foRr lfefr ls O;; gsrq dksbZ izLrko ikfjr ugha djok;k vkSj uk gh jkT; ljdkj ls bl gsrq iwokZuqefr izkIr dh x;hA vki }kjk euekuh njksa ls Hkqxrku djds foRrh; vfu;ferrk;sa dh xbZA ftlds fy, vki vkjksfir gSA 9. True it is that the Department has not examined any witness to substantiate and prove the charges but then, the enquiry officer has made sincere endeavour to examine the relevant material which was available on record. The enquiry officer while recording its finding on charge No.1 has taken serious note of the fact that a particular file in which the petitioner himself was a party was dealt with by him and further he has made endorsement to do the needful in accordance with law. The enquiry officer while recording its finding on charge No.1 has taken serious note of the fact that a particular file in which the petitioner himself was a party was dealt with by him and further he has made endorsement to do the needful in accordance with law. The note " fu;ekuqlkj dk;Zokgh dh tkos " was construed as an order by the enquiry officer and as per the version of the enquiry officer, this sort of noting has influenced the other officers of the Municipal Board to proceed in the matter with favourable disposition. The enquiry officer has also recorded a definite finding that petitioner ought to have refrained from making any observation in the file being interested person and the very fact that he has made endorsement to do the needful in accordance with law is sufficient to indict him for charge No.1. Similarly, for charge No.2, the enquiry officer has recorded a definite finding that from the record, it is clearly evident that the petitioner has committed serious irregularities and has issued work order pursuant to NIT dated 10.04.2008 at some places which were not part of NIT. In substance, the second charge is also found to be proved by the enquiry officer against the petitioner on the basis of available material. 10. The first charge against the petitioner is based on rule against bias. Rule against bias is founded on a legal maxim “Nemo debet essee judex in causa propria sua” which is one of the facets of principles of natural justice. HALSBURY says: This principle “nemo debet essee judex in causa propria sua” precludes a justice, who is interested in the subject matter of a dispute, from acting as a justice therein. This principle applies to all tribunals and bodies which are given jurisdiction to determine judicially the rights of parties. 11. In India, no uniform test of bias has been applied by the courts. The Supreme Court in Manak Lal v. Prem Chand, AIR 1957 SC 425 examined the true purport of rule against bias. In that case, a complaint alleging professional misconduct against the lawyer Manak Lal was filed by one Prem Chand and the then Chief Justice of High Court of Rajasthan constituted Bar Council Tribunal consisting of a Chairman and two other Members. The Chairman of the Tribunal had earlier represented Prem Chand in a case. In that case, a complaint alleging professional misconduct against the lawyer Manak Lal was filed by one Prem Chand and the then Chief Justice of High Court of Rajasthan constituted Bar Council Tribunal consisting of a Chairman and two other Members. The Chairman of the Tribunal had earlier represented Prem Chand in a case. However, being a Senior Advocate and being Government Advocate, he was asked to act as Chairman of the Tribunal. The Supreme Court without any hesitation assumed that Chairman had no personal contact with his client and, therefore, there was no real likelihood of bias but still, it held that Chairman was disqualified on the ground that “justice not only be done but must appear to be done to the litigating public.” The Court further ruled that actual proof of prejudice was not necessary in such cases; it was not necessary to prove that any prejudice was caused or that the biased member did improperly influence the final decision of the tribunal; reasonable ground for assuming the possibility of bias was sufficient. 12. The Supreme Court in the case of Ashok Kumar Yadav & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors., (1985) 4 SCC 417 reiterated the proposition as expressed in its earlier decision in Kraipak's case and ruled that a fundamental principle of administrative law is that no one can be judged in his own cause. The Court finally held,- “18. We must straightaway point out that A.K. Kraipak's case is a landmark in the development of administrative law and it has contributed in a large measure to the strengthening of the rule of law in this country. We would not like to whittle down in the slightest measure the vital principle laid down in this decision which has nourished the roots of the rule of law and injected justice and fair play into legality. We would not like to whittle down in the slightest measure the vital principle laid down in this decision which has nourished the roots of the rule of law and injected justice and fair play into legality. There can be no doubt that if a Selection Committee is constituted for the purpose of selecting candidates on merits and one of the members of the Selection Committee is closely related to a candidate appearing for the selection, it would not be enough for such member merely to withdraw from participation in the interview of the candidate related to him but he must withdraw altogether from the entire selection process and ask the authorities to nominate another person in his place on the Selection Committee, because otherwise all the selections made would be vitiated on account of reasonable likelihood of bias affecting the process of selection. But the situation here is a little different because the selection of candidates to the Haryana Civil Service (Executive) and Allied Services is being made not by any Selection Committee constituted for that purpose but it is being done by the Haryana Public Service Commission which is a Commission set up under Article 316 of the Constitution. It is a Commission which consists of a Chairman and a specified member of members and is a constitutional authority. We do not think that the principle which requires that a member of a Selection Committee whose close relative is appearing for selection should decline to become a member of the Selection Committee or withdraw from it leaving it to the appointing authority to nominate another person in his place, need be applied in case of a constitutional authority like the Public Service Commission, whether Central or State. If a member of a Public Service Commission were to withdraw altogether from the selection process on the ground that a close relative of his is appearing for selection, no other person save a member can be substituted in his place. And it may sometimes happen that no other member is available to take the place of such member and the functioning of the Public Service Commission may be affected. When two or more members of a Public Service Commission are holding a viva voce examination, they are functioning not as individuals but as the Public Service Commission. And it may sometimes happen that no other member is available to take the place of such member and the functioning of the Public Service Commission may be affected. When two or more members of a Public Service Commission are holding a viva voce examination, they are functioning not as individuals but as the Public Service Commission. Of course, we must make it clear that when a close relative of a member of a Public Service Commission is appearing for interview, such member must withdraw from participation in the interview of that candidate and must not take part in any discussion in regard to the merits of that candidate and even the marks or credits given to that candidate should not be disclosed to him. Chinnappa Reddy, J. observed to the same effect in Javid Rasool Bhat v. State of J & K while dealing with a similar question which arose before him for consideration: (SCC pp.644-45, paras 13 and 14) "The procedure adopted by the Selection Committee and the member concerned was in accord with the quite well-known and generally accepted procedure adopted by the Public Service Commission everywhere. It is not unusual for candidates related to members of the Service Commission or other Selection Committee to seek employment. Whenever such a situation arises, the practise generally is for the member concerned to excuse himself when the particular candidate is interviewed. We notice that such a situation had also been noticed by this Court in the case of Nagarajan v. State of Mysore where it was pointed out that in the absence of mala fides, it would not be right to set aside the selection merely because one of the candidates happened to be related to a member of the Selection Committee who had abstained from participating in the interview of that candidate. Nothing unusual was one by the present Selection Committee. The girl's father was not present when she was interviewed. She was one among several hundred candidates. The marks obtained by her in the written test were not even known when she was interviewed...... In the case before us, the Principal of the Medical College, Srinagar, dissociated himself from the written test and did not participate in the proceedings when his daughter was interviewed. When the other candidates were interviewed, he did not know the marks obtained either by his daughter or by any of the candidates. In the case before us, the Principal of the Medical College, Srinagar, dissociated himself from the written test and did not participate in the proceedings when his daughter was interviewed. When the other candidates were interviewed, he did not know the marks obtained either by his daughter or by any of the candidates. There was no occasion to suspect his bona fides even remotely. There was not even a suspicion of bias, leave alone a reasonable likelihood of bias. There was no violation of the principles of natural justice." We wholly endorse these observations. Here in the present case it was common ground between the parties that Shri Raghubar Gaur Dayal Gaur did not participate at all in interviewing Trilok Nath Sharma and likewise Shri R.C. Marya did not participate at all when Shakuntala Rani and Balbir Singh came to be interviewed and in fact, both of them retired from the room when the interviews of their respective relatives were held. Moreover, neither of them took any part in any discussion in regard to the merits of his relatives nor is there anything to show that the marks or credits obtained by their respective relatives at the interviews were disclosed to them. We are therefore of the view that there was no infirmity attaching to the selections made by the Haryana Public Service Commission on the ground that, though their close relatives were appearing for the interview, Shri Raghubar Dayal Gaur and Shri R.C. Marya did not withdraw completely from the entire selection process. This ground urged on behalf of the petitioners must therefore be rejected.” 13. That being the position, applying the principles of justice should not only be done but it must appear to have been done, in the considered opinion of this Court, endorsement by the petitioner in the file in which he was personally interested for doing the needful in the matter, is sufficient to conclude that charge No.1 is proved against the petitioner and consequently the finding of the enquiry officer in this behalf cannot be categorised as infirm or contrary to law. 14. Being the Chairperson of the Municipal Board, it is rather unthinkable that the petitioner has made said endorsement in a routine manner without examining the contents of the file and the name of the applicant concerned. 14. Being the Chairperson of the Municipal Board, it is rather unthinkable that the petitioner has made said endorsement in a routine manner without examining the contents of the file and the name of the applicant concerned. The explanation of the petitioner that he has made routine endorsement is a clear case of lame excuse or an afterthought, which in the backdrop of facts and circumstances of the instant case, cannot be countenanced. The argument of learned counsel for the petitioner that endorsement/recommendation so made on the personal file was not final appears to be quite alluring but without any substance inasmuch as the very recommendation by the petitioner clearly tantamounts to becoming a judge in his own cause. Thus, in the considered opinion of this court, findings on charge No.1 are just and proper and consequential order which is the order impugned in the instant writ petition cannot be treated as vulnerable. 15. Now, adverting to the second charge, the same was also found to be proved against the petitioner on the basis of materials available on record. There remains no quarrel that when NIT is issued, the work which is required to be undertaken by the contractor is mentioned in the NIT with clarity and precision and after completing the tender process, the work orders are required to be issued strictly in accordance with NIT. Any work order issued in derogation to the work mentioned in the NIT is a clear case of transgressing the terms and conditions of NIT. Being Chairperson of the Municipal Board, the petitioner has issued work order contrary to the work which was part of NIT, which has sufficiently proved second charge against the petitioner and, therefore, finding of judicial inquiry on charge No.2 is also undoubtedly free from any infirmity. Therefore, consequential order debarring the petitioner from contesting the election from next six years in totality is a just decision requiring no interference in the limited scope of judicial review under Article 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India. 16. It is trite that extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is not akin to that of appellate jurisdiction and this Court while exercising extraordinary jurisdiction is not expected to re-apprise the evidence which were available on record during judicial inquiry. 17. This Court in Meena Saini (Smt.) v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., 2005(1) DNJ 267 has held,- “21. 17. This Court in Meena Saini (Smt.) v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., 2005(1) DNJ 267 has held,- “21. Now the question remains with regard to the factual aspect of the matter. The charges levelled against the petitioner is found proved by the judicial officer and findings have been recorded against the petitioner. As consistent view has been taken by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that while exercising power u/Art.226 of the Constitution of India the Court cannot sit as appellate Court to re-appreciate each and every finding given by the judicial officer. Thus, I do not want to enter into the fact finding given by the enquiry officer and judicial officer.” 18. In this view of the matter, I am unable to find any infirmity much less legal infirmity in the impugned order to exercise extraordinary jurisdiction for upsetting the same. 19. The upshot of above discussion is that I am not persuaded to interfere with the impugned order and consequently, the writ petition fails and the same is hereby dismissed.Petition dismissed. *******