JUDGMENT S. Manikumar, J. 1. Challenge in this appeal, is to the order, made in W.P. (MD) No. 16300 of 2014, dated 11.12.2014, wherein, a learned single Judge of this Court, sustained the competency of the Corporate Manager, R.C. Schools, Diocese of Kottar, Kanyakumari District, suspending the appellant. Facts leading to the appeal, are that, the appellant is the Headmistress in St. Francis Xavier Higher Secondary School, Manguzhi, Kanyakumari District. Alleging that certain acts of the appellant, were not satisfactory, Corporate Manager, R.C. Schools, Diocese of Kottar, Kanyakumari District, 2nd respondent herein, has issued a notice dated 18.07.2014, to the appellant, calling for an explanation and the same dated 25.07.2014, has been submitted. Not satisfied with the explanation, vide order, dated 22.09.2014, Corporate Manager, R.C. Schools, Diocese of Kottar, Kanyakumari District, has suspended the appellant. 2. Though in the show cause notice, dated 18.07.2014, Corporate Manager, R.C. Schools, Diocese of Kottar, Kanyakumari District, has sought for an explanation, for certain acts, which were not satisfactory, at the time of issuing the show cause notice, while suspending the appellant, the Corporate Manager, R.C. Schools, Diocese of Kottar, Kanyakumari District, has alleged indiscipline, negligence of duty, breaking the discipline and impeding the growth of the school, responsible for spoiling the student-parent relationship in the school, non transparency of financial management in the school, and disobedience to higher officials. It should be noted that acts, which were mentioned in the show cause notice, dated 18.07.2014, as not satisfactory, have been categorized, as indiscipline and others, as stated supra. Disobedience to the higher officials, is one of the reasons, mentioned in the order of suspension. 3. Before the Writ Court, the appellant has challenged the order of suspension, and among other grounds, she has stated that as per the procedure, contemplated under the Aided Schools Manual, the Correspondent of the school alone, is competent authority, to issue a charge memo and pass an order of suspension. According to her, Corporate Manager, has no authority, to suspend the appellant. Initially, on 25.09.2014, the Writ Court, has granted interim stay. 4. The District Educational Officer, Thuckalay, Kanyakumari District, has filed a counter affidavit in the writ petition, stating that he has no role, to go into the internal affairs of a minority management. According to her, Corporate Manager, has no authority, to suspend the appellant. Initially, on 25.09.2014, the Writ Court, has granted interim stay. 4. The District Educational Officer, Thuckalay, Kanyakumari District, has filed a counter affidavit in the writ petition, stating that he has no role, to go into the internal affairs of a minority management. Thereafter, upon hearing the learned counsel for the parties and going through the rules and regulations, for the schools, under the Corporate Management of R.C. Diocese of Kottar, Kanyakumari District, a learned single Judge, vide order, dated 11.12.2014, sustained the impugned order, holding that the Corporate Manager, has competence, to suspend a teacher and that the person aggrieved, may prefer a revision, before the Bishop, under rule 44 of the rules and regulations for the schools in the Corporate Management of R.C. Diocese of Kottar, Kanyakumari District. 5. Assailing the correctness of the order, made in W.P. (MD) No. 16300 of 2014 dated 11.12.2014, Mr. K. Balakrishna, learned counsel for the appellant, submitted that as per the rules and regulations, for the schools, under the Corporate Management of R.C. Diocese, Kottar, Kanyakumari District, and in particular, rule 37, Correspondent of the school alone, is competent to have disciplinary control over the staff, and as per rule 42 of the said rules, if any action is taken, or orders, issued by the Correspondent, an appeal shall lie, to the Corporate Manager, at the instance of the aggrieved person. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant further submitted that the Writ Court, has failed to advert to the above said plea and instead, applied rule 20 of Chapter II, which deals with the powers and functions of the Corporate Manager. It is also his contention that the Writ Court, failed to consider that the Corporate Manager of R.C. Schools, Diocese of Kottar, Kanyakumari District, has not considered the explanation of the petitioner, in proper perspective and without assigning any reasons, chose to suspend the appellant, alleging negligence, indiscipline and other acts. Learned counsel for the appellant, restricted his submission, only to the aspect of jurisdiction. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant, restricted his submission, only to the aspect of jurisdiction. 7. Per contra, inviting the attention of this Court, to rule 20 Chapter III, which delineates the powers of administration, over all the schools, including the power to appoint, teaching and non teaching staff, to those institutions, power to order promotions, to effect transfers of any of the members of the staff, among the schools and to take disciplinary action against them, Mr. V.R. Shanmuganathan, learned Special Government Pleader, appearing for the respondents 1 and 2, submitted that in the light of the above provision, Corporate Manager, being the appointing authority, is competent to suspend the appellant. 8. Attention of this Court was also invited to rules 32 and 37 in Chapter-III, which states that the Correspondent is responsible, for the day-to-day administration of the schools and he shall also have disciplinary control, over the staff. When the learned counsel for the private respondent, was also posed with a question, as to how the Correspondent, could exercise his power of disciplinary control over the staff, without there being any action or order, issued by him, against which, an appeal would lie to the Corporate Manager, under rule 42, in Chapter IV of the rules and regulations, learned counsel for the private respondent submitted that such an action or order, if any, passed by the Correspondent, would be only with reference to the day-to-day administration of the school and not the disciplinary action, which is within the exclusive competence of the Corporate manager, who is the appointing authority. Mr. Isaac Mohanlal, learned counsel reiterated the above submissions. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record. 9. Before adverting to the rival submissions, as to whether the Correspondent of the school or the Corporate Manager, R.C. Schools, Diocese of Kottar, Kanyakumari District, is the competent authority to suspend a teacher, this Court deems it fit to extract the powers of the Correspondent, vis-a-vis the Corporate Manager. As per the procedure for discipline and disciplinary action, published by Catholic Bishops' Conference of India, disciplinary action is the right of the management, as part of administration. One who appoints, has right to remove or punish, provided that, natural justice is maintained and that a proper procedure is followed. As per the procedure for discipline and disciplinary action, published by Catholic Bishops' Conference of India, disciplinary action is the right of the management, as part of administration. One who appoints, has right to remove or punish, provided that, natural justice is maintained and that a proper procedure is followed. As per the procedure for discipline and disciplinary action, published by Catholic Bishops' Conference of India, the following steps are to be followed, for disciplinary action:- "First step. "Show cause" notice: When some act or omission contrary to rules comes to the notice of the employer, the management (that is one who appoints) gives a show cause notice. The notice has four parts. 1. A statement of the case: an omission or commission contrary to the rules and standing orders of the institution. It must be stated very specifically. Who, how, when and where must be clearly recorded. 2. Ask for an explanation: the reason for omission or commission must be sought for. 3. A time period must be given for the reply. Normally it is 48 to 72 hours. 4. As a conclusion, ask why action should not be taken. Second step. The employee may or may not give a reply. If a reply has been submitted: 1. File. The management may file the reply without any further action nothing that no action is proposed and why. It must note well whether the explanation was satisfactory or whether it was unsatisfactory. If it was unsatisfactory why further action was not taken. If there was any exonerating factor like the past good record, or nature of the act or omission, that must be placed on record. In this case a warning could be in order. Or 2. Proceed. The management may proceed further after informing the employee that the explanation was unsatisfactory. Third step. A preliminary investigation is made to establish whether a "prima facie" case exists. This should ascertain the facts when, where, why, who and how the omission or commission was committed. The Headmaster or his delegate undertakes this. This is to ascertain clearly all the facts preparing for the next step. At this stage, there is no natural justice involved. Fourth step. A charge sheet is framed by the employer (the appointing authority). It should state the following. 1. Specifically state giving details where, when, who and how the acts of misconduct was committed. This is to ascertain clearly all the facts preparing for the next step. At this stage, there is no natural justice involved. Fourth step. A charge sheet is framed by the employer (the appointing authority). It should state the following. 1. Specifically state giving details where, when, who and how the acts of misconduct was committed. It should not be a vague allegation; otherwise, it cannot be said that an opportunity to defend himself/herself has been given to the concerned employee. 2. Mention the specific rule or standing order, which the employee has violated. 3. If the employee does not read or understand the language, the charge sheet must be read and translated for him. 4. The one who reads and translates should place on record thus: "This letter, Memo No. ......dated.....has been read, translated and explained by me Signature. 5. In the same way the employee should place on record thus: "I have heard and understood the letter, Memo No. .....dated.....Signature. 6. Mention the date by which the reply should be given. Failure of the employee to send an explanation is not to be construed as admission of guilt. If the employee asks for extension of time on reasonable grounds, it should be given. On the other hand, there should be no unreasonable delay to hold the enquiry, as it seriously affects the employee, especially if suspended. 7. The communications should be addressed to persons concerned by name in full with postal address. It must be sent either by hand delivery or by Registered Post with Acknowledgement due. It can be delivered in person with signature of receipt. Or if he/she refuses to give a signature of receipt, it can be given in the presence of two witnesses. No need to hold a formal enquiry. 1. If the employee acknowledges his her guilt unconditionally and in writing. 2. If the employee is unable to attend or continue work due to any conviction in criminal proceedings. 3. If the employee gives up his/her service. Requirement for a fair enquiry. 1. The employee is informed clearly of the charges. 2. Witnesses are examined ordinarily in his presence. 3. He/she is given a chance to cross - examine the witnesses brought against him/her. 4. He she is given a chance to examine and produce his/her defence witnesses. 5. The enquiry officer records the finding with reason in the report. 1. The employee is informed clearly of the charges. 2. Witnesses are examined ordinarily in his presence. 3. He/she is given a chance to cross - examine the witnesses brought against him/her. 4. He she is given a chance to examine and produce his/her defence witnesses. 5. The enquiry officer records the finding with reason in the report. Fifth step, the enquiry. 1. The Managing Committee has to appoint formally in writing an enquiry officer. He/she should not be the Headmaster or Principal. The person appointed should not be involved in the management of the institution. For judge, witness and/or victim cannot be rolled into one. Neither should it be one who may import personal knowledge. He/she must be able to pass judgment on evidence produced before him/her. 2. The charge sheet and the copy of the reply of the employee should be given to the enquiry officer. A copy of the report of the preliminary enquiry leading to the charge sheet and any other document relied on, should be provided to the enquiry officer as well as to the employee. 3. The employee should be allowed the assistance of a co-worker or the service of an interpreter, if he/she so desires. 4. Notice of institution of the enquiry date, time and venue must be clearly intimated to the employee concerned. Procedure of the enquiry. 1. Witnesses must be examined as far as possible in the presence of the employee involved. If the accused is not present, the record of witnesses examined in his absence, must be given to the employee so that he/she may prepare his/her cross - examination of witnesses. 2. The employee must be given the opportunity to cross examine the witnesses. 3. The employee must be given the opportunity to present his/her defence. 4. The employee must be given the opportunity to bring witnesses for his/her defence and examine them. 5. If ex-parte, after the recording of the evidence, the employee must be given a copy of the record or a chance to read the record of evidence and all the relevant documents. 6. The enquiry officer gives his/her findings after evaluating the evidence, for each charge separately, giving reasons in writing together with the punishment or penalty to be awarded. 7. 6. The enquiry officer gives his/her findings after evaluating the evidence, for each charge separately, giving reasons in writing together with the punishment or penalty to be awarded. 7. A copy of the findings with the copy must be furnished to the employee together with the statement from the management giving its own reasons for accepting or rejecting the same. Sixth step. 1. The management may accept the findings of the enquiry officer, in which case no reasons are to be adduced. 2. The management may reject the findings of the enquiry officer, in which case, it must furnish in writing the reasons for rejection. Seventh step. Give a second show cause notice with regard to the imposition of the penalty. 1. State the findings of the enquiry. 2. State the penalty proposed. 3. Fix a certain date for reply. 4. Ask why the proposed penalty should not be imposed. Eighth step. It is the right of the management to decide what punishment would be appropriate, subject to Past record and Proportionate penalty It should not be mala fide. Penalty: It should be proportionate to the gravity of the misdemeanor. There are various penalties. Minor Penalties. Warning. It can be either oral or written. Fine. This will bring hardship to the employee. As a normal rule it should not be more than 2% of the monthly income. Suspension. The employee can be suspended from duty. It should not be more than 4 days. During the period of suspension the employee is entitled to receive subsistence allowance, that is salary for half pay leave, which is 50% of pay. Minor penalties. Withholding increment. Demotion. This involves loss of status and pay. Discharge for misconduct. It is a very serious punishment, as the employee will lose the job. Dismissal. This is the most serious punishment. For the employee not only loses the employment but will lose all cash benefits. There is also odium attached to dismissal. In many states, prior permission or approval of the Education Department (for aided schools) is required for the imposition of major punishment on employees in educational institutions." 10. Rules and Regulations for the schools, in the Corporate Management of the R.C. Diocese of Kottar, has four chapters. Chapter III, deals with the powers and functions of the President and General Manager, Secretary cum Treasurer, and the Correspondent. 11. Rules and Regulations for the schools, in the Corporate Management of the R.C. Diocese of Kottar, has four chapters. Chapter III, deals with the powers and functions of the President and General Manager, Secretary cum Treasurer, and the Correspondent. 11. As per Chapter III, rule 18, the Secretary cum Treasurer shall be the ex-officio Corporate Manager of all the educational institutions, under the corporate management. As per rule 19, as a Corporate Manager, the Secretary cum Treasurer, shall administer all the educational administrations, under the corporate management, as one single unit, for all purposes, in conformity with the rules and the decisions of the Bishop-President. Rule 20 speaks about the powers of the Secretary cum Treasurer, for administration over all the schools, including the power to appoint, teaching and non teaching staff to those institutions; to give promotions; to effect transfers of any of the members of staff among those schools, and to take disciplinary actions against them. The Secretary cum Treasurer has such other powers mentioned in rules 21 to 31 of the Rules and Regulations for schools, in the Corporate Management of the R.C. Diocese of Kottar. 12. As per rules 32 to 37 of the rules, the Correspondent has the following powers:- "32. To be responsible for the day administration of the schools. 33. To attend the day to day correspondence relating to the normal functioning of the schools under his/her control. 34. To claim and disburse grant-in-aid from the department of education and to maintain acquittance and other records there for. 35. To sanction and get all the benefits including monetary benefits to the staff. 36. To sign in the service registers of the staff on behalf of the Corporate Manager. 37. To have disciplinary control over the staff." The Correspondent has such other powers mentioned in rules 38 to 41 of the rules. 13. As per rule 42 of the rules, an appeal shall lie to the Corporate Manager, against any action taken or orders issued by the Correspondent, at the instance of the aggrieved person concerned. As per rule 43, the Corporate Manager, while considering the above appeal, shall have all powers, to call for any of the records, to afford opportunity of hearing, to summon the witnesses and to take appropriate decision, which shall be final. 14. As per rule 43, the Corporate Manager, while considering the above appeal, shall have all powers, to call for any of the records, to afford opportunity of hearing, to summon the witnesses and to take appropriate decision, which shall be final. 14. As per rule 44, the Bishop, who is the General Manager of the Diocesan Schools, shall have the power, to revise any decision or order of any authority, under these rules, either suo motu or on an application, by any person aggrieved by such decision. 15. Reading of the rules 19 and 20 makes it clear that the Corporate Manager, shall administer all the educational institutions, under the corporate management, as one single unit, for all purposes, in conformity with the rules and the Corporate Manager shall have all the powers of administration, over all the schools, including the power to appoint teaching and non teaching staff to those institutions; to give promotions; to effect transfers of any of the members of staff among those schools; and to take disciplinary actions against them. 16. As regards the Correspondent, rules are clear that he is responsible for the day-to-day administration of the schools and to have disciplinary control over the staff. 17. As stated supra, when a specific question was posed to Mr. Isaac Mohanlal, learned counsel appearing for the Corporate Manager, as to what is the power of the Corporate Manager, his control and limitation in the functions of the Correspondent; what is the responsibility of the Correspondent in the day-to-day administration of the school, read with disciplinary control of the staff, he submitted that the Correspondent is not the competent authority, to take disciplinary action, but, his powers are circumscribed only in relation to the subjects, mentioned in rules 32 to 41 of the aforesaid rules. According to him, Corporate Manager alone, has the power to take disciplinary action, against teaching and non teaching staff, transfer any of the staff, order promotions, because, he is the appointing authority. 18. We are not in agreement with the argument of Mr. According to him, Corporate Manager alone, has the power to take disciplinary action, against teaching and non teaching staff, transfer any of the staff, order promotions, because, he is the appointing authority. 18. We are not in agreement with the argument of Mr. Issac Mohanlal, learned counsel for the Corporate Manager, for the reason that, if a person has to be responsible, for the day-to-day administration of the school and to have an effective disciplinary control, over the staff, which includes teaching and non teaching staff, certainly, he may have to issue certain directions, orders, instructions, oral or in writing, and if any of the teaching and non teaching staff, disobey such action or order or instructions issued by the Correspondent, then he has to see that the same is followed, implemented and obeyed. If there is any disobedience or failure on the part of the teaching or non teaching staff, as the case may be, then, he has to take appropriate action. If the contentions of the Corporate Manager is accepted, then he cannot exercise disciplinary control over such staff. In a given case, if the Correspondent issues a memo to the teaching or non teaching staff, on the basis of the rules that he has disciplinary control over the staff, such order or action taken is appealable, to the Corporate Manager, at the instance of the person aggrieved. 19. The words, 'disciplinary control' coupled with 'day-to-day administration', of the school, should be read and meant to confer powers on the Correspondent, to take disciplinary action, against teaching and non teaching staff. Correspondent is not the Headmaster of the school. 19. The words, 'disciplinary control' coupled with 'day-to-day administration', of the school, should be read and meant to confer powers on the Correspondent, to take disciplinary action, against teaching and non teaching staff. Correspondent is not the Headmaster of the school. He is one step above the Headmaster/Headmistress, who deal with academics and he deals with matters pertaining to the day-to-day administration of the school, and for the matters enumerated in rules 32 to 37 in Chapter III, teaching and non teaching staff, may have to report, only to the Correspondent, who has to claim and disburse grant-in-aid, from the department of education and to maintain the acquittance (sic) and other records there for; to sanction and get all the benefits, including monetary benefits to the staff; to sign in the service registers of the staff, on behalf of the Corporate Manager; to have disciplinary control over the staff; to be responsible, for the healthy co-operation of the parish priest, the parishioners and the public; to follow scrupulously the rules, the orders of the Bishop-President and the Corporate Manager and to report vacancies arising out of death, retirement resignation and new posts sanctioned by the department of education in the corporate management and to grant leave to the teaching and non teaching staff. However, the Correspondent can authorize the concerned Headmaster, to sanction the casual leave. 20. Thus, in our view, the Correspondent of a school acts as a superior authority, in all matters relating to administration of the school, except, appointing teaching and non teaching staff, order promotions and transfers, which is done by the Corporate Manager. The Corporate Manager has the powers and control, over the financial transaction, in connection with the Corporate Educational Board and all the educational institutions there under. 21. In Laxmikant Shripat Bhandare v. C.R. Gerrard reported in AIR (34) 1947 Bombay 193, Hon'ble Justice Blagden considered a case, where a student was expelled by the Director of a Institution. Action under Section 45 of the Specific Relief Act, was prayed for. Defining the word, "discipline", the Hon'ble Judge, at paragraph 3, held as follows: "3. Discipline and its opposite are things which, I am afraid, I find myself perfectly incapable of defining. Action under Section 45 of the Specific Relief Act, was prayed for. Defining the word, "discipline", the Hon'ble Judge, at paragraph 3, held as follows: "3. Discipline and its opposite are things which, I am afraid, I find myself perfectly incapable of defining. Still, as Scrutton L.J. said on another occasion, "I cannot define an elephant, but I do recognize one when I see one," and I think I am capable of recognizing some of the more startling acts of indiscipline. I may say this about the word "discipline" itself, that one generally thinks of it, particularly in these days, as a relationship between superior and inferior members of one of the fighting services. That, however, is not the primary meaning of the word. The word "disciple" from which it is derived, literally means "pupil" and the proper primary meaning of the word is the relationship which ought to subsist between the teacher and the taught. Of course, it has been transplanted into many other walks of life. Some element of discipline is, I think, necessary between higher and lower officers of any public service, between master and servant, as well as, of course, between officers and other ranks of an army and between higher and lower officers of an army inter se. Indeed, in almost any regularly organized department of society, there must be some who rule and teach and others whose duty it is to learn, submit, and obey. I suppose that "discipline" necessarily involves a state of mind, in the person subject to it, which unquestioningly admits superiority to himself, for certain limited purposes, of another human being. Though it happens, I suppose, every day in every army in the world, the moment a private soldier says, "Our General is an ass" or something to that effect, he is, at once, guilty of a breach of "good order and military discipline," because by criticizing his superior officer, he, impliedly at all events, asserts that he knows more about the manner in which the officer concerned should discharge his duties than the officer does himself, and, therefore, he is denying that superiority which discipline requires he should admit. No doubt, the case I have just given is a very trivial incident of indiscipline. No doubt, the case I have just given is a very trivial incident of indiscipline. But supposing the soldier writes to the Press and says that the General Officer Commanding under whom he is serving has no more idea "of tactics than a novice in a nunnery," there is a clear implication in the letter that he knows more of tactics than the General knows. The breach of discipline is, in a way, all the worse if and in so far as the criticisms are well-founded, because a brilliant and victorious General might easily enjoy the respect of those under his command in spite of the public criticism of a private, while a General who really was an ass-and such a thing is not unknown in history-could ill-afford to be criticized by anybody. It does not, of course, necessarily follow that the same thing which would be a breach of discipline in the army is a breach of discipline as between the teacher and the taught, but in considering that question I think it is most important to try to look at the matter from the point of view of the teacher. If he is to do his work at all, he must have students who recognize that he knows more about his subject than they do. The minute that is seriously called in question by his pupils, not only has he so lost the confidence of those he has to try to teach that he cannot hope to impart knowledge to them, but his own confidence in himself, which is equally essential, must be greatly undermined." 22. In The State of West Bengal v. Nripendra Nath Bagchi reported in AIR 1966 SC 447 , the Apex Court explained the word "control" under Articles 225 of the Constitution of India. At Paragraph 13, the Apex Court held as follows: "The word "control" is not defined in the Constitution at all. In Part XIV which deals with Services under the Union and the States the words "disciplinary control" or "disciplinary jurisdiction" have not at all been used. It is not to be thought that disciplinary jurisdiction of services is not contemplated. In the context the word "control" must, in our judgment, include disciplinary jurisdiction. In Part XIV which deals with Services under the Union and the States the words "disciplinary control" or "disciplinary jurisdiction" have not at all been used. It is not to be thought that disciplinary jurisdiction of services is not contemplated. In the context the word "control" must, in our judgment, include disciplinary jurisdiction. Indeed, the word may be said to be used as a term of art because the Civil Services (Classification Control and Appeal) Rules used the word "control" and the only rules which can legitimately come under the word "control" are the Disciplinary Rules. Further as we have already shown, the history which lies behind the enactment of these articles indicate that "control" was vested in the High Court to effectuate a purpose, namely, the securing of the independence of the subordinate judiciary and unless it included disciplinary control as well the very object would be frustrated. This aid to construction is admissible because to find out the meaning of a law, recourse may legitimately be had to the prior state of the law, the evil sought to be removed and the process by which the law was evolved. The word "control", as we have seen, was used for the first time in the Constitution and it is accompanied by the word "vest" which is a strong word. It shows that the High Court is made the sole custodian of the control over the judiciary. Control, therefore, is not merely the power to arrange the day to day working of the court but contemplates disciplinary jurisdiction over the presiding Judge. Art. 227 gives to the High Court superintendence over these court and enables the High Court to call for returns etc. The word "control" in Art. 235 must have a different content. It includes something in addition to mere superintendence. It is control over the conduct and discipline of the judges. This conclusion is further strengthened by two other indications pointing clearly in the same direction. The first is that the order of the High Court is made subject to an appeal if so provided in the law regulating the conditions of service and this necessarily indicates an order passed in disciplinary jurisdiction. Secondly, the words are that the High Court shall "deal" with the judge in accordance with his rules of service and the word "deal" also points to disciplinary and not mere administrative jurisdiction." 23. Secondly, the words are that the High Court shall "deal" with the judge in accordance with his rules of service and the word "deal" also points to disciplinary and not mere administrative jurisdiction." 23. Though the word "Control", is not defined in the Act and the Rules, reference can be made to a decision in State of Mysore v. Allum Karibasappa reported in 1974 (2) SCC 498 , the Apex Court, while considering Section 54 of the Mysore Cooperative Societies Act, 1959, wherein, the word, "control" is used, with reference to the above said Section, at Paragraph 16, defined as follows: "The word "control" suggests check, restraint or influence. Control is intended to regulate and hold in check and restrain from action. In the guise exercising control the State has displaced the committee of Management and substituted its own Committee. The State has indirectly intended to achieve what it is directly prohibited from doing under section 54 of the Act." 24. In Headmaster, Poilkav High School v. Murali A., reported in AIR 1995 Kerala 21, a Hon'ble Division Bench of Kerala High Court, had an occasion to consider a case, relating to indiscipline of a student in a class. Though the Kerala Education Act and the Rules, do not define the word, "discipline", the Hon'ble Division Bench, taking note of Rule 10 of the Kerala Education Rules, which declared that the Headmaster of the School shall be responsible for all matters connected with discipline in the school and also Rule 12, which provides that it shall be the duty of the teachers to maintain discipline in the class room and to assist the Headmaster in maintaining the general discipline of the school, at Paragraphs 6 and 7, discussed as to what, "discipline" means and considered certain cases, relating to discipline. The said paragraphs are extracted hereunder: "6. Since the word 'discipline' as such is not defined either in the Kerala Education Act or in the Rules, it would be worthwhile to examine the content of 'discipline' so as to see what encompass within it. In common parlance discipline may be a state of order maintained by training and control; a particular system of regulations or conduct; instructions and exercise designed to train to proper conduct or action. But if it is jurisprudentially examined it brings forth something more. "Obedientia est legis essentia" (obedience is the essence of law). In common parlance discipline may be a state of order maintained by training and control; a particular system of regulations or conduct; instructions and exercise designed to train to proper conduct or action. But if it is jurisprudentially examined it brings forth something more. "Obedientia est legis essentia" (obedience is the essence of law). Obedience is the guiding force to sustain the law, rule regulation or custom. It is that force we call it as discipline. Habit of obedience will alone supply discipline without which the society cannot survive. Of course the discipline is a state of mind. A punctured mind degenerates in committing disobedience; but it can easily be recouped on advice, instructions or commands and sometimes on warning, censure or chastisement. 7. Blagden, J. in Laxmikant Shripat Bhandare v. C.R. Gerrard (AIR 1947 Bombay 193) however remarks: "The word 'disciple' from which it is derived, literally means 'pupil' and the proper primary meaning of the word is the relationship which ought to subsist between the teacher and the taught. Of course, it has been transplanted into many other walks of life." This would indicate that inherent apparition of discipline in maintaining 'tone and timbre' of the school by the Headmaster. A Division Bench of this court in Thampan v. Principal, Medical College, Calicut, AIR 1979 Kerala 171, observed : "The inherent right and the quasi-parental authority of a teacher to proceed by way of disciplinary action against a pupil under his charge' has been well-recognized over the years; and we should think it is ingrained in the habits of thought and philosophy of our country," The Supreme Court in Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education v. K.S. Gandhi, (1991) 2 SCC 716 : (1991 AIR SCW 879) pointed out : "Teacher occupies pride of place next below the parents as he/she imparts education and disciplines the students. On receiving salary from public exchequer he/she owes social responsibility and accountability to disciple the students by total dedication and sincere teaching." Thus the teachers and Headmasters are in loco-parentis to all the students--male and female as observed by the Supreme Court in Hira Nath Mishra v. The Principal, Rajendra Medical College, AIR 1973 SC 1260 ." 25. On receiving salary from public exchequer he/she owes social responsibility and accountability to disciple the students by total dedication and sincere teaching." Thus the teachers and Headmasters are in loco-parentis to all the students--male and female as observed by the Supreme Court in Hira Nath Mishra v. The Principal, Rajendra Medical College, AIR 1973 SC 1260 ." 25. In The Principal, Sree Narayana College v. Vice-Chancellor, University of Kerala reported in AIR 1996 Kerala 369, the power of the Principal to take action against a undisciplined student, came up for consideration. The Vice-Chancellor ordered for a fresh enquiry, regarding the disciplinary action taken against the said student. One of the questions that was considered by the Kerala High Court was whether, it was proper for the Vice-Chancellor to sit in judgment over the decision taken by the Principal in the student's discipline. Though the above said dispute is not relevant for the present controversy, but in the absence of specific definition to the word, "discipline", either in the Kerala University Act, 1974 and Statutes and Ordinances made there under, the Kerala High Court, explained the word, "discipline", at Paragraph 20, which is as follows: "The word 'discipline' as such is not defined either in the Kerala University Act or in the Statutes, or Ordinances. In common parlance discipline may be a state of order maintained by training and control; a particular system of regulations or conduct, instructions and exercise designed to train to proper conduct or action. But it is jurisprudentially examined it brings forth something more. "Obedientia est legis essentia.' Obedience is the guiding force to sustain the law, rule, regulation or custom. It is that force we call it as discipline." 26. The word "control", as defined in Black's Law Dictionary (6th Edition) at Page 329, means as verb "to exercise restraining or directing influence over; to regulate; restrain; dominate; curb; to hold from action; overpower; counteract; govern; power of authority to manage, direct, superintend, restrict, regulate, govern. Administer or overseen. The ability to exercise a restraining or directing influence over something. 27. As per Corpus Juris Secundum, Volume 18, the word, "control" when broadly used, may embrace every form of control actual or legal, direct or indirect, negative or affirmative. 28. Administer or overseen. The ability to exercise a restraining or directing influence over something. 27. As per Corpus Juris Secundum, Volume 18, the word, "control" when broadly used, may embrace every form of control actual or legal, direct or indirect, negative or affirmative. 28. The meaning of the words, 'administer', 'administrate' and 'administration' as per Burton's Legal Thesaurus, is as follows:- "Administer (conduct) verb administrate, carry out, control, direct, dispose of, effect, effectuate, enforce, engineer, govern, guide, handle, have executive charge of, manage, mastermind, minister, officiate, operate, overlook, oversee, pilot, prescribe, preside over, procurare, put in force, regulate, rem administrare, rempublicam gubernare, settle, steer, superintend, supervise. Associated Concepts: administer a bankrupt's assets, administer an estate, administer the law. Administer (Tender), verb accord, afford, bestow on, confer, deal out, disburse, dispense, disperse, distribute, dole out, extend, give, impart, issue, measure out, mete out, offer, procurer, provide with, render. Administrate, verb administer, captain, command, conduct, control, direct, govern, head, lead, manage, officiate, operate, preside, regulate, render, sit in judgment, stand over, superintend, supervise. Administration, noun administration, care conduct, control, direction, dispensation, disposal, disposition, distribution, execution, executive charge, guardianship, guidance, handling, keeping, management, ministration, oversight, performance of executive duties, practical management, procurator, regulation, settlement of an estate, superintendence, supervision." 29. The meaning of the word, 'control', as per Burton's Legal Thesaurus, is as follows:- "Control, verb arrange, cause, collude, compose, conceive, concoct, connive, consider, conspire, counterplot, design, develop a course, devise, draft, effect, ex-cogitare, fabricate, fashion, forecast, form, frame, imagine, improvise, induce, intrigue, in venire, invent, lay plans, machinari, machinate, make up, maneuver, mine, organize, pattern, plan, plot, predesign, preestablish, prepare, procure, project, provoke, scheme, shape out a course, sketch, systematize. Control (Restriction), noun blockade, brake, check, constraint, curb, deterrence, deterrent, disallowance, exclusion, inhibition, limitation, moderation, prevention, prohibition, qualification, rationing, repression, restraint, restrictive practice, subdual, suppression. Control (Supervision), noun administration, auspices, authority, care charge, command, custody, direction, discipline, dominance, domination, dominion, government, guardianship, guidance, jurisdiction, keeping management, managership, mastery, ministry, moderatio, oversight, patronage, power, proctorship, protectorship, regimen, regulation, stewardship, superintendence, temperantia, ward, wardenship, wardship. Associated Concepts : absolute control, circumstances beyond control, complete control, constructive control, exclusive control, immediate control, indirect control, joint control, loss of control, mutuality of control, parental control, reasonable control. Associated Concepts : absolute control, circumstances beyond control, complete control, constructive control, exclusive control, immediate control, indirect control, joint control, loss of control, mutuality of control, parental control, reasonable control. Control (Regulate) verb administer, administrate, check, coercere, command, conduct, direct dominate, engineer, govern, guide, handle, have charge of, have in one's charge, have the direction of, have under control, instruct, lead, look after, maintain, manage, manipulate, moderari, operate, order, overlook, oversee, pilot, preside over, regiment, rule, superintend, supervise, take care of. Control (Restrain) verb arrest, confine, constrain, continere, guard, hamper, hinder, hold back, hold in check, impede, inhibit, keep in check, keep under control, limit, obstruct, prohibit, put under restraint, restrict retard, sub-due, suppress, tempereare, trammel." 30. Thus a combined reading of the dictionary meaning of the words 'administration' and 'discipline', makes it clear that in order to control, regulate, handle, effectuate, directions can be issued by the Correspondent of a school in the matter of day-to-day administration, to have an effective disciplinary control, over the teaching and non teaching staff. As stated supra, if any directions, instructions, and orders are issued, to a teaching or non teaching staff, and if there is any violation or contravention of the rules and regulations, or the code of conduct of teaching and non teaching staff, the Correspondent of the school, who is in direct day-to-day administration of the school, should be given the latitude and power, to carry out his functions, enumerated in the Rules and Regulations for the schools, under the Corporate Management of R.C. Diocese of Kottar and if any such action or order, issued by him, affects a teaching or non teaching staff, the aggrieved person can prefer an appeal, under rule 42 of the rules, to the Corporate Manager. As per rule 20 of the rules, Corporate Manager being the appointing authority, is empowered to take disciplinary action, on his own. 31. Thus from a combined reading of the rules enumerating duties and functions of the Correspondent, vis-a-vis, the Corporate Manager, we are able to deduce that a two-tier arrangement is provided for, in the rules, thereby, enabling the Correspondent of the school, to have disciplinary control, over the teaching and non teaching staff, and if any action or order, is issued, affecting the interest of a teaching or non teaching staff, an appeal remedy is provided for. Corporate Manager being the appointing authority, as well as the appellate authority, is also provided with the powers to appoint, promote, effect transfers, and to take disciplinary action over any of the teaching and non teaching staff, under the corporate management. When action is taken by the Corporate Manager, revision is provided under rule 44 of the rules. When action is taken by the Correspondent, appeal is provided under rule 42 of the rules. 32. Thus, in our view, both the provisions can be enforced independently and whenever there are instances of overlapping, it could always be rectified, by the highest authority, under the hierarchy. On the aspect of harmonious and purposive construction, this Court deems it fit to extract few decisions as to how statutes have to be read and interpreted. (i) In LT.-Col. Prithi Pal Singh Bedi v. Union of India, reported in 1983 (3) SCC 140, at Paragraph 8, held as follows: "8. The dominant purpose in construing a statute is to ascertain the intention of the Parliament. One of the well recognized canons of construction is that the legislature speaks its mind by use of correct expression and unless there is any ambiguity in the language of the provision the Court should adopt literal construction if it does not lead to an absurdity. ..........If the literal construction leads to an absurdity, external aids to construction can be resorted to. To ascertain the literal meaning it is equally necessary first to ascertain the juxtaposition in which the rule is placed, the purpose for which it is enacted and the object which it is required to subserve and the aumority by which the rule is framed. This necessitates examination of the broad features of the Act." (ii) In Narendra H. Khzurana v. Commissioner of Police reported in 2004 (2) Mh.L.R. 72, it is held that it must be noted the proper course in interpreting a statute in the first instance is to examine its language and then ask what is the natural meaning uninfluenced by the considerations derived from previous state of law and then assume that it was property intended to leave unaltered. It is settled legal position, therefore, that the Courts must try to discover the real intent by keeping the direction of the statute intact. It is settled legal position, therefore, that the Courts must try to discover the real intent by keeping the direction of the statute intact. (iii) In Nathi Devi v. Radha Devi Gupta reported in AIR 2005 SC 648 , the Apex Court held as follows:- "The interpretation function of the Court is to discover the true legislative intent, it is trite that in interpreting a statute the Court must, if the words are clear, plain, unambiguous and reasonably susceptible to only one meaning, give to the words that meaning, irrespective of the consequences. Those words must be expounded in their natural and ordinary sense. When a language is plain and unambiguous and admits of only one meaning no question of construction of statute arises, for the Act speaks for itself. Courts are not concerned with the policy involved or that the results are injurious or otherwise, which may follow from giving effect to the language used. If the words used are capable of one construction only then it would not be open to the Courts to adopt any other hypothetical construction on the ground that such construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act. In considering whether there is ambiguity, the Court must look at the statute as a whole and consider the appropriateness of the meaning in a particular context avoiding absurdity and inconsistencies or unreasonableness which may render the statute unconstitutional." In Nathi Devi's case, it is further held that, "It is equally well-settled that in interpreting a statute, effort should be made to give effect to each and every word used by the Legislature. The Courts always presume that the Legislature inserted every part thereof for a purpose and the legislative intention is that every part of the statute should have effect. A construction which attributes redundancy to the legislature will not be accepted except for compelling reasons such as obvious drafting errors." 33. Let me consider some more judgments on the interpretation of the statutes:- (i) In Justice G.P. Singh's Principles of Statutory Interpretation (11th Edn., 2008), the learned author while referring to judgments of different Courts states (at page 134) that procedural laws regulating proceedings in court are to be construed as to render justice wherever reasonably possible and to avoid injustice from a mistake of court. He further states (at pages 135 and 136) that: "Consideration of hardship, injustice or absurdity as avoiding a particular construction is a rule which must be applied with great care. "The argument ab inconvenienti", said LORD MOULTON, "is one which requires to be used with great caution". (ii) In the words of Tindal, C.J., in Sussex Peerage case [(1844) 11 C1 & F85], wherein, he said thus, "If the words of the statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense. The words themselves so alone in such cases best declare the intent of the lawgiver. (iii) In Nairin v. University of St. Andrews reported in (1909 AC 147, the Apex Court held that, "Unless there is any ambiguity it would not be open to the Court to depart from the normal rule of construction which is that the intention of the Legislature should be primarily gathered from the words which are used. It is only when the words used are ambiguous that they would stand to be examined and construed in the light of surrounding circumstances and constitutional principle and practice." (iv) In Ram Rattan v. Parma Nand reported in AIR 1946 PC 51 , the Hon'ble Mr. S.R. Das, held as follows: "The cardinal rule of construction of statutes is to read the statutes literally, that is, by giving to the words their ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning. If, however, such a reading leads to absurdity and the words are susceptible of another meaning, the Court may adopt the same. But if no such alternative construction is possible, the Court must adopt the ordinary rule of literal interpretation. If, however, such a reading leads to absurdity and the words are susceptible of another meaning, the Court may adopt the same. But if no such alternative construction is possible, the Court must adopt the ordinary rule of literal interpretation. In the present case, the literal construction leads to no apparent absurdity and therefore, there can be no compelling reason for departing from that golden rule of construction." (v) In Poppatlal Shah v. State of Madras reported in AIR 1953 SC 274 , the Supreme Court held that, "It is settled rule of construction that to ascertain the legislative intent all the constituent parts of a statute are to be taken together and each word, phrase and sentence is to be considered in the light of the general purpose and object of the Act itself." (vi) In Rao Shive Bahadur Singh v. State, reported in AIR 1953 SC 394 , the Supreme Court held that, "While, no doubt, it is not permissible to supply a clear and obvious lacuna in a statute, and imply a right of appeal, it is incumbent on the Court to avoid a construction, if reasonably permissible on the language, which would render a part of the statute devoid of any meaning or application." (vii) What is the spirit of law, Hon'ble Mr. Justice S.R. Das in Rananjaya Singh v. Baijnath Singh reported in AIR 1954 SC 749 , said that, "The spirit of the law may well be an elusive and unsafe guide and the supposed spirit can certainly not be given effect to in opposition to the plain language of the Sections of the Act." (viii) In Hari Prasad Shivashanker Shukla v. A.D. Divelkar reported in AIR 1957 SC 121 , the Apex Court held that, "It is true that an artificial definition may include a meaning different from or in excess of the ordinary acceptation of the word which is the subject of definition; but there must then be compelling words to show that such a meaning different from or in excess of the ordinary meaning is intended, Where, within the framework of the ordinary acceptation of the word, every single requirement of the definition clause is fulfilled, it would be wrong to take the definition as destroying the essential meaning of the word defined." (ix) In Kanai Lal Sur v. Paramnidhi Sadhukhan reported in AIR 1957 SC 907 , the Supreme Court held that, "it must always be borne in mind that the first and primary rule of construction is that the intention of the Legislature must be found in the words used by the Legislature itself. If the words used are capable of one construction only then it would not be open to the courts to adopt any other hypothetical construction on the ground that such hypothetical construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act. The words used in the material provisions of the statute must be interpreted in their plain grammatical meaning and it is only when such words are capable of two constructions that the question of giving effect to the policy or object of the Act can legitimately arise. When the material words are capable of two constructions, one of which is likely to defeat or impair the policy of the Act whilst the other construction is likely to assist the achievement of the said policy, then the courts would prefer to adopt the latter construction. When the material words are capable of two constructions, one of which is likely to defeat or impair the policy of the Act whilst the other construction is likely to assist the achievement of the said policy, then the courts would prefer to adopt the latter construction. It is only in such cases that it becomes relevant to consider the mischief and defect which the, Act purports to remedy and correct." (x) In Attorney-General v. HRH Prince Ernest Augustus of Hanover reported in (1957) 1 All.ER 49, Lord Somervell of Harrow has explained the unambiguous, as "unambiguous in context". (xi) In State of W.B., v. Union of India reported in AIR 1963 SC 1241 , the Apex Court held that in considering the expression used by the Legislature, the Court should have regard to the aim, object and scope of the statute to be read in its entirety. (xii) In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Dr. Vijay Anand Maharaj reported in AIR 1963 SC 946 , the Supreme Court held as follows: "But it is said, relying upon certain passages in Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, at p, 68, and in Crawford on "Statutory Construction' at p. 492, that it is the duty of the Judge "to make such construction of a statute as shall suppress the mischief and advance the remedy," and for that purpose the more extended meaning could be attributed to the words so as to bring all matters fairly within the scope of such a statute even though outside the letter, if within its spirit or reason. But both Maxwell and Crawford administered a caution in resorting to such a construction. Maxwell says at p. 68 of his book: "The construction must not, of course, be strained to include cases plainly omitted from the natural meaning of the words." Crawford says that a liberal construction does not justify an extension of the statute's scope beyond the contemplation of the Legislature. The fundamental and elementary rule of construction is that the words and phrases used by the Legislature shall be given their ordinary meaning and shall be constructed according to the rules of grammar. When the language is plain and unambiguous and admits of only one meaning, no question of construction of a statute arises, for the Act speaks for itself. The fundamental and elementary rule of construction is that the words and phrases used by the Legislature shall be given their ordinary meaning and shall be constructed according to the rules of grammar. When the language is plain and unambiguous and admits of only one meaning, no question of construction of a statute arises, for the Act speaks for itself. It is a well recognized rule of construction that the meaning must be collected from the expressed intention of the Legislature." (xiii) In Namamal v. Radhey Shyam reported in AIR 1970 Rajasthan 26, the Court held as follows: "It was observed by Pollock C.B. in Waugh v. Middleton, 1853-8 Ex 352 (356):--" It must, however, be conceded that where the grammatical construction is clear and manifest and without doubt, that construction ought to prevail, unless there be some strong and obvious reason to the contrary. But the rule adverted to is subject to this condition, that however plain the apparent grammatical construction of a sentence may be, if it be properly clear from the contents of the same document that the apparent grammatical construction cannot be the true one, then that which, upon the whole, is the true meaning shall prevail, in spite of the grammatical construction of a particular part of it." And substantially the same opinion is expressed by Lord Selborne in Caledonian Ry. v. North British Ry. (1881) 6 AC 114 (222):-- "The mere literal construction of a statute ought not to prevail if it is opposed to the intentions of the legislature as apparent by the statute, and if the words are sufficiently flexible to admit of some other construction by which, that intention can be better effectuated." Again Lord Fitzgerald in Bradlaugh v. Clarke, (1883) 8 AC 354 at p. 384 observed as follows:-- "I apprehend it is a rule in the construction of statutes that in the first instance the grammatical sense of the words is to be adhered to. If that is contrary to, or inconsistent with, any expressed intention or declared purpose of the statutes, or if it would involve any absurdity, repugnance, or inconsistency, the grammatical sense must then be modified, extended, or abridged, so far as to avoid such an inconvenience, but no further." 11. If that is contrary to, or inconsistent with, any expressed intention or declared purpose of the statutes, or if it would involve any absurdity, repugnance, or inconsistency, the grammatical sense must then be modified, extended, or abridged, so far as to avoid such an inconvenience, but no further." 11. Maxwell in his book on Interpretation of Statutes (11th Edition) at page 226 observes thus:-- "The rule of strict construction, however, whenever invoked, comes attended with qualifications and other rules no less important, and it is by the light which each contributes that the meaning must be determined. Among them is the rule that sense of the words is to be adopted which best harmonizes with the context and promotes in the fullest manner the policy and object of the legislature. The paramount object, in construing penal as well us other statutes, is to ascertain the legislative intent and the rule of strict construction is not violated by permitting the words to have their full meaning, or the more extensive of two meanings, when best effectuating the intention. They are indeed frequently taken in the widest sense, sometimes even in a sense more wide than etymologically belongs or is popularly attached to them, in order to carry out effectually the legislative intent, or, to use Sir Edward Cole's words, to suppress the mischief and advance the remedy." (xiv) In Inland Revenue Commissioner v. Joiner reported in (1975) 3 All. ER 1050, it has been held that normally a statutory provision consists of a general description of some factual situation and the legal consequences ensuing from it. Whether the general description is wide or narrow, it will have some limits. The question before a court of law in dealing with a statute is whether the factual situation proved before it falls within the general description given in the statute. A real difficulty in determining the right answer can be said to arise from an "ambiguity" in the statute. It is in this sense that the words, "ambiguity" and "ambiguous" are widely used in judgments. A real difficulty in determining the right answer can be said to arise from an "ambiguity" in the statute. It is in this sense that the words, "ambiguity" and "ambiguous" are widely used in judgments. (xv) In Commissioner of Sales Tax v. M/s. Mangal Sen Shyamlal reported in 1975 (4) SCC 35 : AIR 1975 SC 1106 , the Apex Court held that, "A statute is supposed to be an authentic repository of the legislative will and the function of a court is to interpret it "according to the intent of them that made it". From that function the court is not to resile. It has to abide by the maxim, "ut res magis valiat quam pereat", lest the intention of the legislature may go in vain or be left to evaporate into thin air." (xvi) In C.I.T., Madras v. T. Sundram Iyengar (P.) Ltd., reported in 1976 (1) SCC 77 , the Supreme Court held that, if the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and if two interpretations are not reasonably possible, it would be wrong to discard the plain meaning of the words used, in order to meet a possible injustice. (xvii) If the words are precise and unambiguous, then it should be accepted, as declaring the express intention of the legislature. In Ku. Sonia Bhatia v. State of U.P., and others reported in 1981 (2) SCC 585 : AIR 1981 SC 1274 , the Supreme Court held that a legislature does not waste words, without any intention and every word that is used by the legislature must be given its due import and significance. (xviii) In Philips India Ltd., v. Labour Court reported in 1985 (3) SCC 103 , the Apex Court, at Paragraph 15, held as follows: "(15) No cannon of statutory construction is more firmly, established than that the statute must be read as a whole. This is a general rule of construction applicable to all statutes alike which is spoken of as construction ex visceribus acts. This rule of statutory construction is so firmly established that it is variously styled as 'elementary rule' (See Attorney General v. Bastow [(1957) 1 All.ER (497)] and as a 'settled rule' (See Poppatlal Shall v. State of Madras [1953 SCR 667 : AIR 1953 SC 274 ]. This rule of statutory construction is so firmly established that it is variously styled as 'elementary rule' (See Attorney General v. Bastow [(1957) 1 All.ER (497)] and as a 'settled rule' (See Poppatlal Shall v. State of Madras [1953 SCR 667 : AIR 1953 SC 274 ]. The only recognized exception to this well-laid principle is that it cannot be called in aid to alter the meaning of what is of itself clear and explicit. Lord Coke laid down that: 'it is the most natural and genuine exposition of a statute, to construe one part of a statute by another part of the same statute, for that best expressed meaning of the makers' (Quoted with approval in Punjab Breverages Pvt. Ltd. v. Suresh Chand [ (1978) 3 SCR 370 : (1978) 2 SCC 144 : 1978 SCC (L&S) 165])." (xix) In Nyadar Singh v. Union of India reported in AIR 1988 SC 1979 , observed that ambiguity need not necessarily be a grammatical ambiguity, but one of the appropriateness of the meaning in a particular context. (xx) It is a well settled law of interpretation that "when the words of the statute are clear, plain or unambiguous, i.e., they are reasonably susceptible to only one meaning, the Courts are bound to give effect to that meaning irrespective of consequences. Reference can be made to the decision of the Apex Court in Nelson Motis v. Union of India reported in AIR 1992 SC 1981 . (xxi) In M/s. Oswal Agro Mills Ltd., v. Collector of Central Excise and others reported in 1993 Supp (3) SCC 716 : AIR 1993 SC 2288 , the Apex Court held that, where the words of the statute are plain and clear, there is no room for applying any of the principles of interpretation, which are merely presumption in cases of ambiguity in the statute. The Court would interpret them as they stand. (xxii) In Nasiruddin v. Sita Ram Agarwal reported in (2003) 2 SCC 577 , the Supreme Court held as follows: "35. In a case where the statutory provision is plain and unambiguous, the court shall not interpret the same in a different manner, only because of harsh consequences arising there from.... 37. The court's jurisdiction to interpret a statute can be invoked when the same is ambiguous. In a case where the statutory provision is plain and unambiguous, the court shall not interpret the same in a different manner, only because of harsh consequences arising there from.... 37. The court's jurisdiction to interpret a statute can be invoked when the same is ambiguous. It is well known that in a given case the court can iron out the fabric but it cannot change the texture of the fabric. It cannot enlarge the scope of legislation or intention when the language of the provision is plain and unambiguous. It cannot add or subtract words to a statute or read something into it which is not there. It cannot rewrite or recast legislation. It is also necessary to determine that there exists a presumption that the legislature has not used any superfluous words. It is well settled that the real intention of the legislation must be gathered from the language used.......But the intention of the legislature must be found out from the scheme of the Act." (xxiii) In Indian Dental Association, Kerala v. Union of India reported in 2004 (1) Kant. LJ 282, the Court held that, "The cardinal rule for the construction of Acts of Parliament is that they should be construed according to the intention expressed in the Acts themselves. The object of all interpretation is to discover the intention of Parliament, "but the intention of Parliament must be deduced from the language used", for it is well-accepted that the beliefs and assumptions of those who frame Acts of Parliament cannot make the law. If the words of the statute are themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their ordinary and natural sense. Where the language of an Act is clear and explicit, the Court must give effect to it, whatever may be the consequences, for in that case the words of the statute speak the intention of the Legislature. Where the language is plain and admits of but one meaning, the task of interpretation can hardly be said to arise. The decision in a case calls for a full and fair application of particular statutory language to particular facts as found. Where the language is plain and admits of but one meaning, the task of interpretation can hardly be said to arise. The decision in a case calls for a full and fair application of particular statutory language to particular facts as found. It is a corollary to the general rule of literal construction that nothing is to be added to or taken from a statute unless there are adequate grounds to justify the inference that the Legislature intended something which it omitted to express. A construction which would leave without effect any part of the language of a statute will normally be rejected." (xxiv) In State of Jharkhand v. Govind Singh reported in (2005) 10 SCC 437 , the Supreme Court held that, "12. It is said that a statute is an edict of the legislature. The elementary principle of interpreting or construing a statute is to gather the mens or sententia legis of the legislature. 13. Interpretation postulates the search for the true meaning of the words used in the statute as a medium of expression to communicate a particular thought. The task is not easy as the "language" is often misunderstood even in ordinary conversation or correspondence. The tragedy is that although in the matter of correspondence or conversation the person who has spoken the words or used the language can be approached for clarification, the legislature cannot be approached as the legislature, after enacting a law or Act, becomes functus officio so far as that particular Act is concerned and it cannot itself interpret it. No doubt, the legislature retains the power to amend or repeal the law so made and can also declare its meaning, but mat can be done only by making another law or statute after undertaking the whole process of lawmaking. 14. Statute being an edict of the legislature, it is necessary that it is expressed in clear and unambiguous language..... 15. Where, however, the words were clear, there is no obscurity, there is no ambiguity and the intention of the legislature is clearly conveyed, there is no scope for the court to innovate or take upon itself the task of amending or altering the statutory provisions. In that situation the judges should not proclaim that they are playing the role of a lawmaker merely for an exhibition of judicial valour. In that situation the judges should not proclaim that they are playing the role of a lawmaker merely for an exhibition of judicial valour. They have to remember that there is a line, though thin, which separates adjudication from legislation. That line should not be crossed or erased. This can be vouchsafed by "an alert recognition of the necessity not to cross it and instinctive, as well as trained reluctance to do so". (See Frankfurter: "Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes" in Essays on Jurisprudence, Columbia Law Review, p. 51.) 16. It is true that this Court in interpreting the Constitution enjoys a freedom which is not available in interpreting a statute and, therefore, it will be useful at this stage to reproduce what Lord Diplock said in Duport Steels Ltd. v. Sirs [(1980 (1) All.ER 529] (All ER at p. 542c-d): "It endangers continued public confidence in the political impartiality of the judiciary, which is essential to the continuance of the rule of law, if judges, under the guise of interpretation, provide their own preferred amendments to statutes which experience of their operation has shown to have had consequences that members of the court before whom the matter comes consider to be injurious to the public interest. 19. In D.R. Venkatachalam v. Dy. Transport Commr. [ 1977 (2) SCC 273 ] it was observed that courts must avoid the danger of a priori determination of the meaning of a provision based on their own preconceived notions of ideological structure or scheme into which the provision to be interpreted is somewhat fitted. They are not entitled to usurp legislative function under the disguise of interpretation." (xxv) In Vemareddy Kumaraswamy Reddy v. State of A.P. reported in (2006) 2 SCC 670 , the Supreme Court held that, "12. It is said that a statute is an edict of the legislature. The elementary principle of interpreting or construing a statute is to gather the mens or sententia legis of the legislature. It is said that a statute is an edict of the legislature. The elementary principle of interpreting or construing a statute is to gather the mens or sententia legis of the legislature. It is well-settled principle in law mat the court cannot read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous." (xxvi) In A.N. Roy Commissioner of Police v. Suresh Sham Singh reported in AIR 2006 SC 2677 , the Apex Court held that, "It is now well settled principle of law that, the Court cannot change the scope of legislation or intention, when the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous. Narrow and pedantic construction may not always be given effect to. Courts should avoid a construction, which would reduce the legislation to futility. It is also well settled that every statute is to be interpreted without any violence to its language. It is also trite that when an expression is capable of more than one meaning, the Court would attempt to resolve the ambiguity in a manner consistent with the purpose of the provision, having regard to the great consequences of the alternative constructions." (xxvii) In Adamji Lookmanji & Co. v. State of Maharashtra reported in AIR 2007 Bom. 56 , the Bombay High Court held that, when the words of status are clear, plain or unambiguous, and reasonably susceptible to only meaning, Courts are bound to give effect to that meaning irrespective of the consequences. The intention of the legislature is primarily to be gathered from the language used. Attention should be paid to what has been said in the statute, as also to what has not been said. (xxviii) In State of Haryana v. Suresh reported in 2007 (3) KLT 213, the Supreme Court held that, "One of the basic principles of Interpretation of Statutes is to construe them according to plain, literal and grammatical meaning of the words. If that is contrary, to or inconsistent with any express intention or declared purpose of the Statute, or if it would involve any absurdity, repugnancy or inconsistency, the grammatical sense must then be modified, extended or abridged, so far as to avoid such an inconvenience, but no further. If that is contrary, to or inconsistent with any express intention or declared purpose of the Statute, or if it would involve any absurdity, repugnancy or inconsistency, the grammatical sense must then be modified, extended or abridged, so far as to avoid such an inconvenience, but no further. The onus of showing that the words do not mean what they say lies heavily on the party who alleges it must advance something which clearly shows that the grammatical construction would be repugnant to the intention of the Act or lead to some manifest absurdity." (xxix) In Visitor Amu v. K.S. Misra reported in 2007 (8) SCC 594, the Supreme Court held that, "It is well settled principle of interpretation of the statute that it is incumbent upon the Court to avoid a construction, if reasonably permissible on the language, which will render a part of the statute devoid of any meaning or application. The Courts always presume that the legislature inserted every part thereof for a purpose and the legislative intent is that every of the statute should have effect. The legislature is deemed not to waste its words or to say anything in vain and a construction which attributes redundancy to the legislature will not be accepted except for compelling reasons. It is not a sound principle of construction to brush aside words in a statute as being in apposite surplusage, if they can have appropriate application in circumstances conceivably within the contemplation of the statute." (xxx) In Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Essar Power Ltd., reported in (2008) 4 SCC 755 , the Supreme Court, at Paragraphs 52, 54, 55 and 56, held as follows: "52. No doubt ordinarily the literal rule of interpretation should be followed, and hence the court should neither add nor delete words in a statute. However, in exceptional cases this can be done where not doing so would deprive certain existing words in a statute of all meaning, or some part of the statute may become absurd." (xxxi) In Phool Patti v. Ram Singh reported in (2009) 13 SCC 22 , the Supreme Court held that, "9. It is a well-settled principle of interpretation that the court cannot add words to the statute or change its language, particularly when on a plain reading the meaning seems to be clear." (xxxii) In Mohd. It is a well-settled principle of interpretation that the court cannot add words to the statute or change its language, particularly when on a plain reading the meaning seems to be clear." (xxxii) In Mohd. Shahabuddin v. State of Bihar, reported in (2010) 4 SCC 653 , the Supreme Court held that, "179. Even otherwise, it is a well-settled principle in law that the court cannot read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous. The language employed in a statute is a determinative factor of the legislative intent. If the language of the enactment is clear and unambiguous, it would not be proper for the courts to add any words thereto and evolve some legislative intent, not found in the statute. Reference in this regard may be made to a recent decision of this Court in Ansal Properties & Industries Ltd. v. State of Haryana [ 2009 (3) SCC 553 ] 180. Further, it is a well-established principle of statutory interpretation that the legislature is specially precise and careful in its choice of language. Thus, if a statutory provision is enacted by the legislature, which prescribes a condition at one place but not at some other place in the same provision, the only reasonable interpretation which can be resorted to by the courts is that such was the intention of the legislature and that the provision was consciously enacted in that manner. In such cases, it will be wrong to presume that such omission was inadvertent or that by incorporating the condition at one place in the provision the legislature also intended the condition to be applied at some other place in that provision." (xxxiii) In Satheedevi v. Prasanna reported in (2010) 5 SCC 622 , the Supreme Court held as follows: "12. Before proceeding further, we may notice two well-recognized rules of interpretation of statutes. The first and primary rule of construction is that the intention of the legislature must be found in the words used by the legislature itself. If the words used are capable of one construction, only then it would not be open to the courts to adopt any other hypothetical construction on the ground that such hypothetical construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act. If the words used are capable of one construction, only then it would not be open to the courts to adopt any other hypothetical construction on the ground that such hypothetical construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act. The words used in the material provisions of the statute must be interpreted in their plain grammatical meaning and it is only when such words are capable of two constructions that the question of giving effect to the policy or object of the Act can legitimately arise--Kanai Lal Sur v. Paramnidhi Sadhukhan [ AIR 1957 SC 907 ] 13. The other important rule of interpretation is that the court cannot rewrite, recast or reframe the legislation because it has no power to do so. The court cannot add words to a statute or read words which are not there in it. Even if there is a defect or an omission in the statute, the court cannot correct the defect or supply the omission - Union of India v. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal [1992 Supp (1) SCC 323] and Shyam Kishori Devi v. Patna Municipal Corpn. [ AIR 1966 SC 1678 ]" (xxxiv) In Sri Jeyaram Educational Trust & Ors. v. A.G. Syed Mohideen & Ors. reported in 2010 CIJ 273 SC (1), it is held that, "6. It is now well settled that a provision of a statute should have to be read as it is, in a natural manner, plain and straight, without adding, substituting or omitting any words. While doing so, the words used in the provision should be assigned and ascribed their natural, ordinary or popular meaning. Only when such plain and straight reading, or ascribing the natural and normal meaning to the words on such reading, leads to ambiguity, vagueness, uncertainty, or absurdity which were not obviously intended by the Legislature or the Lawmaker, a court should open its interpretation tool kit containing the settled rules of construction and interpretation, to arrive at the true meaning of the provision. While using the tools of interpretation, the court should remember that it is not the author of the Statute who is empowered to amend, substitute or delete, so as to change the structure and contents. A court as an interpreter cannot alter or amend the law. While using the tools of interpretation, the court should remember that it is not the author of the Statute who is empowered to amend, substitute or delete, so as to change the structure and contents. A court as an interpreter cannot alter or amend the law. It can only interpret the provision, to make it meaningful and workable so as to achieve the legislative object, when there is vagueness, ambiguity or absurdity. The purpose of interpretation is not to make a provision what the Judge thinks it should be, but to make it what the legislature intended it to be." (xxxv) In Delhi Airtech Services (P.) Ltd. v. State of U.P., reported in (2011) 9 SCC 354 , the Supreme Court, while dealing with a provision under Section 17(3-A) of the Act, held that, "Therefore, the provision of Section 17(3-A) cannot be viewed in isolation as it is an intrinsic and mandatory step in exercising special powers in cases of emergency. Sections 17(1) and 17(2) and 17(3-A) must be read together. Sections 17(1) and 17(2) cannot be worked out in isolation. It is well settled as a canon of construction that a statute has to be read as a whole and in its context. In Attorney General v. Prince Ernest Augustus of Hanover [1957 AC 436], Lord Viscount Simonds very elegantly stated the principle that it is the duty of court to examine every word of a statute in its context. The learned Law Lord further said that in understanding the meaning of the provision, the Court must take into consideration "not only other enacting provisions of the same statute, but its preamble, the existing state of the law, other statutes in pari materia, and the mischief which I can, by those and other legitimate means, discern that the statute was intended to remedy." (All ER p. 53 I) 57. These principles have been followed by this Court in its Constitution Bench decision in Union of India v. Sankalchand Himatlal Sheth [ 1977 (4) SCC 193 ]. At SCC p. 240, Bhagwati, J. as His Lordship then was, in a concurring opinion held that words in a statute cannot be read in isolation, their colour and content are derived from their context and every word in a statute is to be examined in its context. At SCC p. 240, Bhagwati, J. as His Lordship then was, in a concurring opinion held that words in a statute cannot be read in isolation, their colour and content are derived from their context and every word in a statute is to be examined in its context. His Lordship explained that the word context has to be taken in its widest sense and expressly quoted the formulations of Lord Viscount Simonds, set out above." 34. Thus going through the Rules and Regulations for the schools, in the Corporate Management of the R.C. Diocese of Kottar, in entirety, and on the facts and circumstances of this case, we are of the view that Corporate Manager, being the appointing authority, is also conferred with the power, to take disciplinary action, on the teaching and non teaching staff. We do not accept the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant, that the Correspondent of the school is the only authority, who can take disciplinary action against teaching and non teaching staff. In the light of the above discussion and decisions, we do not find any valid reason to interfere with the impugned order. Accordingly, Writ Appeal is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, M.P. (MD) No. 1 of 2015 is closed. Appeal Dismissed