JUDGMENT Hon’ble Pankaj Mithal, J.—Heard Sri Vrindavan Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Devendra Pratap Singh, learned counsel for respondent No. 5. Learned Standing counsel has appeared for respondent Nos. 1 to 4. 2. The petitioner has preferred this writ petition against the order dated 15.1.2014 passed by the Deputy Labour Commissioner (in short DLC) under Section 6-H (1) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and the recovery citation dated 12.6.2014 (annexure 2 to the petition). 3. It appears that there was some labour dispute between the petitioner and respondent 5 and the same was referred for adjudication to the Labour Court. The Labour Court made an award on 30.6.1994 which was published on 30.1.2005 directing for reinstatement of petitioner with full back-wages. The aforesaid award is final and conclusive between the parties. 4. The respondent No. 5 in order to implement the said award moved an application under Section 6-H (1) of the Act for his reinstatement and the recovery of back-wages from 16.7.1989 to 31.5.2005 amounting to Rs. 5,58,311/-. The Deputy Labour Commissioner on being satisfied that the aforesaid amount is due as wages directed for recovery of the same. The said order and the recovery citation was challenged by the petitioner by filing writ petition No. 17330 of 1995 wherein initially a stay order was granted but ultimately the petition was dismissed. The Special Leave Petition against the aforesaid order of the High Court was also dismissed on 29.10.2014 by the Supreme Court. Thus, the order directing for recovery of wages for the period 16.7.1989 to 31.5.2005 became final. 5. The respondent No. 5 moved another application demanding wages from 1.6.2005 to 31.12.2005 ie. Rs. 6,65,709/-.The aforesaid application was opposed by the petitioner but the objections were rejected and the impugned order dated 15.1.2014 was passed directing the petitioner to make payment of the aforesaid amount of wages. Consequently, the recovery citation was issued on 12.6.2014 for recovering the said amount. 6. In challenging the above recovery and the impugned order passed by the DLC, basically three arguments have been advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner. The first argument is that as the amount demanded under Section 6-H (1) of the Act is disputed. Consequently, the recovery citation was issued on 12.6.2014 for recovering the said amount. 6. In challenging the above recovery and the impugned order passed by the DLC, basically three arguments have been advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner. The first argument is that as the amount demanded under Section 6-H (1) of the Act is disputed. The DLC has no jurisdiction to decide the same or to pass any order for its recovery except to refer the matter to the appropriate authority for adjudication. Secondly, the petitioner is a Co-operative Society registered under the U.P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1965. The dispute between the parties was referable to Section 70 of the Act and therefore the DLC has no jurisdiction to pass the impugned order. Lastly, as the distillery of the petitioner had remained closed from 25.5.2010 to 31.1.2014, no direction for payment of any wages for the above period could have been issued by the DLC. 7. In regard to first submission that the amount of wages demanded from 1.6.2005 to 31.12.2012 is disputed, it is relevant to refer the application of the petitioner moved under Section 6-H (1) of the Act. The aforesaid application in paragraphs 6 and 7 clearly states that the petitioner is entitle to wages for the period 1.6.2005 to 31.12.2012 and the calculation of the amount so due and payable to him is detailed in the chart enclosed with the application. Since the aforesaid amount of Rs. 6,65,709/- has not been paid by the petitioner, it is liable to be recovered by issuing a recovery. In reply to the averments so made in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the application, the petitioner only stated that the contents of paragraphs 6 and 7 are not acceptable. There are no pleadings that the amount as claimed by the petitioner in the application is incorrect or is not admitted or dispute by the petitioner. 8. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the argument that the amount sought to be recovered by the petitioner is disputed and cannot be adjudicated by the DLC is beyond the pleadings of the petitioner which cannot be allowed to be raised at this stage that too for the first time in discretionary jurisdiction of writ. 9. 8. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the argument that the amount sought to be recovered by the petitioner is disputed and cannot be adjudicated by the DLC is beyond the pleadings of the petitioner which cannot be allowed to be raised at this stage that too for the first time in discretionary jurisdiction of writ. 9. So far as the entitlement of the petitioner for the wages for the period 1.6.2005 to 31.12.2012 is concerned, it is pertinent to note that under the award dated 30.6.1994 petitioner was directed to be reinstated with full back wages. Therefore, he is entitle to the back-wages from the date of termination of his service till the date of his reinstatement. There is no dispute that the petitioner was reinstated on 27.2.2013 and the wages for the period 16.8.1979 to 31.5.2005 amounting to Rs. 5,58,311/- was deposited by the petitioner. The wages thereafter till his reinstatement remains to be paid. 10. The contention that the petitioner is not liable for its payment as the distillery had remained closed, is of no substance. First, for the reason that there is no evidence that the distillery was closed down permanently. The temporary cessation of work of the distillery would not be sufficient to deny wages to respondent No. 5. Secondly, reinstatement of the petitioner is during the aforesaid period; meaning thereby that respondent No. 5 was consciously reinstated, as the distillery was functioning. 11. Now coming to the main question regarding competence and the jurisdiction of the DLC to pass the impugned order. It may be relevant to note that the impugned order has been passed in order to implement the award of the Labour Court. 12. The award passed under the provisions of the Act has to be implemented by the authorities in the manner prescribed under the Act and not by any other procedure. In that sense of the matter, it does not lie in the month of the petitioner to contends that the DLC has no jurisdiction to deal with the matter under Section 6-H (1) of the Act. 13. In that sense of the matter, it does not lie in the month of the petitioner to contends that the DLC has no jurisdiction to deal with the matter under Section 6-H (1) of the Act. 13. In context to the contention that petitioner is a Co-operative Society under the U.P. State Co-operative Societies Act, 1965 and therefore in view of Section 70 of the said Act the matter is referable to arbitration, the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Ghaziabad Zila Sahakari Bank Limited v. Additional Labour Commissioner and others, (2007) 11 SCC 756 , clinches the issues wherein it has been laid down that the aforesaid Act is a complete Code in itself as regard to employment in co-operative societies and since the aforesaid Act is in the nature of a special enactment, it would prevail over the general enactment. 14. In short, it was held that the said Act would apply in the matter of employment of Co-operative Society to the exclusion of all other labour laws. However, I am afraid that the benefit of the same is not available to the petitioner for the reason that in the previous round of litigation arising out of a similar order passed under Section 6-H (1) of the Act by the DLC, the matter was taken up to the High Court and the Supreme Court and the petition was dismissed, meaning thereby that all controversies whether raised or not between the parties in respect of the implementation of the award stood settled/decided. 15. The petitioner could have raised the above objection in those proceedings and the failure on its part to raise such objection would esstop it in law in raising it by means of these proceedings on the principle of constructive res-judicata. 16. The submission that the question of jurisdiction can be raised by the petitioner at any stage even during the proceedings for execution, may be correct but it does not mean that an argument which was open to be taken up in the earlier round can be allowed to be raised in the second round. 16. The submission that the question of jurisdiction can be raised by the petitioner at any stage even during the proceedings for execution, may be correct but it does not mean that an argument which was open to be taken up in the earlier round can be allowed to be raised in the second round. The petitioner had the opportunity to raise such an objection in the earlier proceedings arising from the same kind of order but having failed to do so, cannot be permitted to contest the proceedings on the same very ground at this stage as this would be totally against the public policy and the principle of constructive res-judicata. 17. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, I find no force in any of the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner. 18. The petitioner had already deposited half of the amount directed to be recovered under the impugned order/citation and for the balance of the amount a month’s time is allowed to the petitioner for making the deposit. 19. The petition is dismissed with the above indulgence only. ———————