JUDGMENT : 1. Instant Civil Misc. Appeal has been preferred by the plaintiff-appellant assailing the order dated 06/10/2015 passed by the trial court by which the temporary injunction application filed by the plaintiff-appellant under Order 39, Rule 1 and 2 CPC has been rejected. 2. Brief facts of the case are that the plaintiff-appellant filed a suit before the trial court along with temporary injunction application under Order 39, Rule 1 and 2 CPC against the defendants-respondents. It was pleaded in the temporary injunction application that the land bearing Khasra No. 1692 Rakba 2 Biswa; Khasra No. 1692 Rakba 2 Biswa and Khasra No. 2580 Rakba 18 Bigha 10 Biswa situated in village Udai Kalan, Tehsil Gangapur City was recorded in the Khatedari of Isar S/o Jemla and after death of Isar, Khatedari equally devolved in the name of Ranjeeta and Moti and after death of Moti, Khatedari of his 1/2 share of the land, was recorded in the name of his sons i.e. the plaintiff-appellant herein (Ramswaroop) and Raju Lal (defendant No.1) equally i.e. 1/4th share each. It was further pleaded that thereafter the plaintiff-appellant was adopted by Ranjeeta and after death of Ranjeeta his 1/2 share in the Khatedari land devolved upon the plaintiff-appellant and thus he became Khatedar of ⅓th share of the land while the defendant No. 1 became Khatedar of 1/4th share in the land and they both were cultivating the land accordingly for last more than 37 years on their 3/4th and 1/4th share in the land respectively and the land was not yet partitioned and was still undivided. It was further pleaded that the defendant-respondent No. 1 in a fraudulent and illegal manner, recorded 1/2 share of the land in question in his name whereas he had only 1/4th share in the land in question. It was further pleaded that the defendant-respondent No. 1 in a fraudulent and illegal manner, recorded 1/2 share of the land in question in his name whereas he had only 1/4th share in the land in question. It was further asserted that revenue suit is also pending before the Court of Sub Divisional Officer, Gangapur City in between both the parties wherein status quo order was passed which is still in force but even then, in order to cause loss to the plaintiff-appellant, despite pendency of the revenue suit and status quo order being in operation, the defendant-respondent No.1 sold the disputed land through registered sale deed dated 20/04/2012 to the defendant-respondents No. 2 & 3 and the said sale deed, being collusive and void in nature, is not binding on the plaintiff-appellant and now in the garb of the said alleged sale deed, the defendants-respondents are bent upon to dispossess the plaintiff-appellant and raise construction on the disputed land and to further sale and alienate the same. 3. The defendants-respondents No. 1 to 3 filed reply separately to the temporary injunction application contending that after death of Isar, mutation was attested in the name of Moti being adopted son of Isar on 27/02/1978 and Ranjeeta had no concern with the disputed land and after death of Moti, the plaintiff-appellant and the defendant-respondent No. 1 have equal share in the land in dispute. 4. The defendant-respondent No. 6 (Nagar Palika) also filed separate reply contending that it was unnecessarily impleaded as party and prayed for rejection of the temporary injunction application so far as the Nagar Palika is concerned. 5. The trial court, after hearing arguments, rejected the temporary injunction application vide order impugned. Hence instant appeal by the plaintiff-appellant. 6. Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant contends that the trial court is unjustified in rejecting the temporary injunction application as the appellant had made out a specific case. 5. The trial court, after hearing arguments, rejected the temporary injunction application vide order impugned. Hence instant appeal by the plaintiff-appellant. 6. Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant contends that the trial court is unjustified in rejecting the temporary injunction application as the appellant had made out a specific case. He further contends that the appellant herein was taken in adoption by Ranjeeta who had admittedly half share in the disputed property and not only that since real father of the appellant namely; Moti Lal died, therefore, the appellant became owner of full half share of Ranjeeta and 1/4th share out of the property owned by Moti Lal and thus, he became original owner of 3/4th share in the disputed property whereas Raju Lal (defendant respondent No. 1) became owner only to the extent of 1/4th . He further contends that appellant was minor at the time when the alleged compromise is said to have taken place as his date of birth as per the school records is 01/11/1963 and at the time when the so-called compromise had taken place, he was just about 15 years of age and any compromise by a minor was not at all valid. He further contends that the appellant, being minor, the court ought to have appointed a guardian but no guardian was appointed by the Court and therefore, the compromise was a nullity. He further contends that, if any decree has been obtained by fraud or otherwise, it is nullity and illegality has been committed as provisions of Order 32, Rule 7 CPC have not been followed. He further contends that the statements of mother of the appellant (Soni) were recorded in the proceedings where she categorically stated that her husband's name was Moti Lal who had two brothers namely; Ranjeet and Isar and Isar had no issue and that she had given Pappu @ Ram Swaroop (appellant) in adoption as when her husband died, he had instructed her to give Ram Swaroop (appellant) in adoption to Ranjeeta and at the time when Ram Swaroop (appellant) was given in adoption, he was 15 years of age and since then he became original owner of the properties owned by Ranjeeta and that the appellant is in possession of all the assets owned by Ranjeeta. She further stated that this adoption took place in the presence of several people including relatives and villagers. She further stated that this adoption took place in the presence of several people including relatives and villagers. He further contends that on her such statements she was also cross examined. He further contends that the status-quo was maintained by the trial court and during the course of the status-quo, the respondents have sold their share in utter violation of the status-quo order granted by the trial court and thus contended that all the three ingredients namely; prima-facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss & injury are in favour of the appellant. He relied upon the judgments rendered in the case of Munyaraj v. Venkatpati & others, AIR 1955 Hyderabad 172; M/s. Birla Cement Works and another v. State of Rajasthan and others, AIR 2000 Raj. 251 ; Surajbai w/o Kaluram and others v. Sadashiv Jugal Kishore and another, AIR 1958 MP 100 ; Sanjay Kaushish v. D.C. Kaushish and others, AIR 1992 Del. 118 (1); State of Punjab (now Haryana) and others v. Amar Singh and another, AIR 1974 SC 994 ; Lakhwinder Singh v. Miss Paramjit kaur, 2004 AIR (Punj.) 6; Dina Nath v. Deo Narain and others, 1986 All.LJ 340 and P. Sangili and others v. Ramakrishnan and others, AIR 1974 Mad. 160 ; George v. State, AIR 1972 Ker. 181 ; Sukkha Singh and another v. Mahal Singh and another, AIR 2003 Raj. 21 ; Pulavarthi Venkata Subba Rao and others v. Valluri Jagannadha Rao (deceased) by his heirs and legal representatives and others, AIR 1967 SC 591 ; Jehal Tanti and others v. Nageshwar Singh (dead) through L.Rs., 2013 AIR SCW 3663. 7. Per-contra, ld. counsel for the defendant-respondent No. 1(Raju Lal) contends that the order passed by the trial court is just and proper and is not required to be interfered with. The case of the defendant-respondent is that Isar had no issue and Moti Lal went in adoption of Isar and Ranjeeta had nothing to do with the disputed property and further contends that the appellant is not adopted son of Ranjeeta and the whole story has been built up by the appellant. When Ranjeeta had no property, then question of the appellant receiving property of Ranjeeta does not arise. The fact is that both i.e. the appellant and respondent (Raju Lal) are sons and legal heirs of Moti Lal who was recorded Khatedar of the disputed land after death of Isar. When Ranjeeta had no property, then question of the appellant receiving property of Ranjeeta does not arise. The fact is that both i.e. the appellant and respondent (Raju Lal) are sons and legal heirs of Moti Lal who was recorded Khatedar of the disputed land after death of Isar. He further contends that the appellant and respondent No. 1 both have equal share in the disputed property which is proved from the evidence led by the respondents namely; (i) the defendant-respondent filed a suit for partition in the year 1974 against the plaintiff-appellant in which the plaintiff-appellant filed written statement asserting that he was adopted son of Isar and ultimately both the parties entered into compromise on 26/05/1977 by which the appellant agreed with respect to half share each of the both the brothers in the disputed property and on the basis of which the compromise decree was passed on 25/07/1978; (ii) the plaintiff-appellant filed an appeal after 29 years of the said compromise before the Revenue Appellate Authority which was dismissed on 29/01/2008 and second appeal was also dismissed by the Board of Revenue; (3) Even the plaintiff-appellant stated on oath before the Tehsildar (ASO), Sawai Madhopur that both brothers have equal (half share) in the disputed property and the same may be entered in the revenue records accordingly and consequent thereto, entire property was entered in the revenue record in the ratio of 1/2 each and was also recorded accordingly in the Parcha Khatoni. He further contends that the Civil Suit was filed by the appellant before Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Gangapur City, as Civil Suit bearing No. 15/2010 which was dismissed on 22/10/2010 wherein it was observed that the appellant was not adopted son of Ranjeeta and this judgment was confirmed by the appellate court also. Thus he contends that there was no status-quo order from 09/08/2007 to 22/04/2012 whereas the sale deed was executed on 20/04/2012 and submitted for registration on the same day, which was registered on 23/04/2012. He thus contended that the appellant has suppressed the material facts before the Court and has not come with clean hands and has tried to mislead the Court by placing wrong facts, injunction is an equitable relief, the same cannot be granted in favour of a person who has not come before the Court with clean hands. 8. He thus contended that the appellant has suppressed the material facts before the Court and has not come with clean hands and has tried to mislead the Court by placing wrong facts, injunction is an equitable relief, the same cannot be granted in favour of a person who has not come before the Court with clean hands. 8. Counsel for the respondents No. 2 & 3, who have purchased the property in dispute, supports the contention of counsel for the respondent No. 1 and reiterates that the trial court has taken into consideration all the material and facts on record and held that the appellant has no prima-facie case. He further contends that they have purchased the property in rightful manner and in accordance with law and the present appeal of the appellant deserves to be dismissed with costs. They relied upon the judgments rendered in the case of V. Chandrasekran & Anr. v. The Administrative Officer & ors., Meghmala & Ors. v. G. Narasimha Reddy & ors., Chotu Meena v. M/s. Osho Real Estate & ors., Gopal Lal v. Babu Lal & ors., 2004 (1) DNJ (Raj.) 470; Sri Hanumanthappa v. Sri Muninarayanappa, 1997 DNJ (SC) 6; 9. I have considered the arguments advanced by counsel for the parties and have perused the impugned order and also the judgments relied upon by counsels for the parties and in my view, the appeal deserves to be dismissed. The trial court in the order impugned, after elaborate discussion, has rightly concluded that the appellant has not been able to primafacie prove that either he had possession over the disputed land or had any other evidence to support the claim made by him. It is an admitted fact that a compromise was entered on 26/05/1977 and decree was passed on 25/07/1978 and the present appellant being aware of all these facts, filed the present suit in the year 2012 knowing fully well that there is delay of 29 years. The undisputed fact noticed by the trial court was that on the basis of a compromise entered on 26/05/1977, a decree was passed on 25/07/1978 which was upheld upto the Board of Revenue. The undisputed fact noticed by the trial court was that on the basis of a compromise entered on 26/05/1977, a decree was passed on 25/07/1978 which was upheld upto the Board of Revenue. It is also an admitted position that in another civil suit No. 15/2010 before ACJM, Gangapur City, an order was passed on 22/10/2010 wherein the Court held that the appellant has not proved himself to be adopted son of Ranjeeta and the appeal arising therefrom was also dismissed. A bare glance of the order-sheets, also discloses that the status-quo order was passed on 18/06/2007 which was extended till 09/08/2007 only and thereafter, there was no status-quo operating with reference to the property in question. It is also noticed by the trial court that the appellant has not been able to prove possession over the land in question and on the contrary, after the sale deed was executed on 20/04/2012 and registered on 23/04/2012 in favour of the respondents No. 2 & 3, mutation has also been opened in the name of the respondents NO. 2 & 3. Consequently, the appellant has failed to prove the necessary parameters of prima-facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss. There appears to be no perversity or arbitrariness in the impugned order so as to call for interference of this Court. 10. The judgment relied upon by counsel for the appellant in the case of Jehal Tanti and others v. Nageshwar Singh (dead) through L.Rs. (supra) is distinguishable on facts in so far as the facts in the aforesaid judgment were that the sale deed was executed during continuance of the injunction order and therefore, it was held to be invalid by the Hon'ble Apex Court. However, as has been noticed herein above and on perusal of the order-sheets, it is apparent that on 20/04/2012, the sale deed was presented before the Sub-Registrar and on that day, there was no injunction order. Thus, the said judgment is inapplicable on the facts of the instant case. 11. However, as has been noticed herein above and on perusal of the order-sheets, it is apparent that on 20/04/2012, the sale deed was presented before the Sub-Registrar and on that day, there was no injunction order. Thus, the said judgment is inapplicable on the facts of the instant case. 11. The judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Pulavarthi Venkata Subba Rao and others v. Valluri Jagannadha Rao (deceased) by his heirs and legal representatives and others (supra) is also inapplicable in the facts of the instant case as in that case, though decree was passed on compromise but it was held that there was not an effective decision by the Court whereas in the instant case, the compromise decree was passed and was in force for at least 29 long years and the appellant had no grudge or grievance during the intervening period. 12. The judgment in the case of State of Punjab and Haryana and others v. Amar Singh (supra) is also on a different proposition and it has been held that where a compromise was against the public policy, prescription of a statute or a mandatory direction to the Court, it cannot operate to defeat the same. However, in the instant case, compromise is in between two persons, both claiming rights and after compromise, the parties agreed to divide the property and it was acted upon by them for years together. The compromise is not against any public policy, prescription or statute or a mandatory direction to the Court. 13. The other judgments relied upon by counsel for the appellant are on the same proposition and in my view, are distinguishable, as noticed herein above. 14. The judgment relied upon by counsel for the respondents in the case of Gopal Lal v. Babu Lal & ors. (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court after noticing the facts, found that the compromise was entered into by and between the parties and the trial court passed compromise decree and several years later, the appellant (Gopal Lal) filed civil suit for declaring the compromise decree to be vitiated by fraud and after considering several judgments, the Court held that the suit filed by the appellant questioning the compromise decree was not competent and was barred by Order 23, Rule 3A CPC. This supports the contention of counsel for the respondents. 15. This supports the contention of counsel for the respondents. 15. The judgment relied upon by counsel for the respondents in the case of Sri Hanumanthappa v. Sri Muninarayanappa (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court held in Para 4 as under:- "4. The question, therefore, arises whether an injunction can be issued against the appellant ? It is not in dispute that pending that partition suit No. 88/66, the respondent had purchased the land belonging to his vendors including 39 guntas of land under registered sale deed dated 24.2.1986. Undoubtedly, the respondent was not a party to the compromise decree dated 29.2.1990. Since he purchased the property pending the suit for partition, a compromise decree having been executed by the parties in which the right of the appellant to the extent of 39 guntas was crystallised and he was duly put in possession, necessarily, he was in lawful possession of the property as an owner. The question is: whether an injunction can be issued against the lawful owner ? It is settled legal position that no injunction can be issued against a lawful owner of the property. The High Court proceeded on the premise that the appellant was put in possession of the property after the interim injunction was granted by the trial court. It is factually incorrect since the injunction was granted by the trial Court only on 5.1.1994 by which date he had already been put in possession by the Tehsildar under the Panchnama dated 22.7.1993. Under these circumstances, the High Court also was in error in coming to the conclusion that the appellant cannot be in lawful possession since he had come in possession after the injunction was issued u/O. 39 Rr. 1 & 2 of CPC." Thus, above judgment also supports the contention of counsel for the respondents. 16. The other judgments relied upon by counsel for the respondents are on the proposition that the appellant has not come with clean hands and has suppressed material facts before the trial court as well as before this Court, as noticed herein above and as has been held by the Apex Court as well as this Court that a person who has not come before the Court with clean hands is not entitled to any relief as one who seeks equity must do equity and suppression of material facts and documents amounts to fraud on court. 17. 17. Consequently, the appeal, being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs but in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, this Court, in the interest of justice, deems it proper to direct the trial court to finally decide the suit within a period of one year from the submission of a certified copy of this order in accordance with law without being influenced/inhibited by any of the observations made herein above by this Court.Appeal dismissed.