JUDGMENT This intra-Court appeal is directed against the order dated 13.08.2014 passed in Writ Petition No. 893 (S/S) of 1994, whereby the learned Single Judge has found the present appellants unjustified in discontinuing with the service of the writ-petitioner (respondent herein) after assuming his date of birth to be different than that mentioned in the service book; and while allowing the writ petition, has held the respondent entitled to all consequential benefits as if he had continued to serve the respondents until the age of 60 years as per his date of birth mentioned in the service book. 2. This appeal is reportedly time-barred by a period of about eight months and fourteen days. An application seeking condonation of delay has been filed on behalf of the appellants wherein exchange of certain communications amongst different offices until 29.01.2015 has been referred and then, it is suggested that the matter was pursued by the Administrative Department with the Law Department and that the permission to file the Special Appeal was granted on 27.02.2015. Even thereafter, this appeal has been filed only on 29.05.2015 with the suggestions about other steps taken by the officers for preparation and filing of the appeal. 3. In a comprehension of what has been stated in the affidavit filed in support of the application seeking condonation of delay, it is difficult to accept that the appellants had been pursuing the matter with due diligence or that there had been circumstances beyond their control, so as to explain excessive delay of beyond eight months. 4. Apart from the above, we have examined the record to find, if there be any merit in this intra-Court appeal; and, after having given thoughtful consideration to the entire matter, we do not find the present one be a case worth interference. 5. The relevant facts and background aspects of the matter are that the respondent (writ-petitioner) was appointed as Choukidar with the Public Works Department, Provincial Division, Hardoi w.e.f. 1.3.1971. The service book of the respondent was prepared on 9.11.1978 wherein his date of birth was mentioned as 06.06.1940, based on a Certificate issued by the Chief Medical Officer, Hardoi on 06.06.1978 wherein his probable age was stated as 38 years. The respondent continued to serve the appellants and there had not been any alteration in the date of birth mentioned in the service book. The respondent continued to serve the appellants and there had not been any alteration in the date of birth mentioned in the service book. However, the appellant No.2/Executive Engineer, Provincial Division, Public Works Department, Hardoi chose to serve a notice on the respondent on 19.02.1994 with the suggestion that he would be completing 60 years of age on 28.02.1994 and hence, would be discharged from service on that date. Aggrieved, the respondent filed the writ petition in this Court, which has been decided by the learned Single Judge by the impugned order dated 13.08.2014. 6. The present appellants took the stand before the learned Single Judge that the respondent had submitted a Medical Certificate dated 24.02.1969 at the time of his engagement on daily wage basis and his date of birth was required to be fixed according to the said Certificate, where he was stated to be 38 years of age as on 24.02.1969. It was submitted that though the date of birth of the respondent was to be fixed according to the said Certificate but, upon his submitting a different Certificate later, his date of birth came to be wrongly mentioned in the service book as 06.06.1940. It was also submitted that in fact, as per the correct date of birth, the respondent attained the age of superannuation of 60 years on 28.02.1994 but, due to mistake, he could not be retired on the said date and subsequently, when the facts came to knowledge, the notice of retirement was served upon him. The appellants also attempted to rely upon the U.P. Recruitment of Government Servants (Fixation of Date of Birth) Rules, 1974 ['the Rules of 1974']. 7. The learned Single Judge declined to accept the suggestion put forward by the appellants, while observing that the date of birth mentioned in the service book had to be relied upon for the purpose of counting the age, particularly when no alteration or change in the service book had been made until the date of the order impugned. The learned Single Judge also indicated that going by the date suggested by the present appellants, the respondent had reached 63 years of age in the year 1994, though it was sought to be suggested that he was attaining the age of superannuation in the month of February, 1994. The learned Single Judge also indicated that going by the date suggested by the present appellants, the respondent had reached 63 years of age in the year 1994, though it was sought to be suggested that he was attaining the age of superannuation in the month of February, 1994. Thus, findings uncertainty and infirmity in the appellant's suggestions, the learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition and granted relief to the present respondent. 8. Seeking to question the order so passed by the learned Single Judge, it is contended that as per the Rules of 1974, the date of birth of the respondent, as recorded at the time of initial appointment, is deemed to be correct for all purposes; and since at the time of his initial induction in service, the date of birth of the respondent was 24.02.1931 as per the Certificate issued by the Medical Officer, Hardoi dated 24.02.1969, the learned Single Judge has erred in allowing the writ petition. It is also submitted that in view of the confusion in age, particularly when in both the Certificates issued by the Medical Officers on 24.02.1969 and 06.06.1978, the age of the respondent was mentioned to be same as 38 years; the learned Single Judge ought to have directed for re-determination of correct date of birth of the respondent and in any case, he could not have been granted all service benefits by taking the date of birth as 06.06.1940. 9. Having given thoughtful consideration to the submissions made and having examined the record, we do not feel persuaded to consider interference in this matter. 10. On the very submissions made by the appellants, it remains indisputable that the date of birth as mentioned in the service book, at the time of entry of the employee in service, is required to be taken as correct. 10. On the very submissions made by the appellants, it remains indisputable that the date of birth as mentioned in the service book, at the time of entry of the employee in service, is required to be taken as correct. Rule 2 of the Rules of 1974, as sought to be referred by the appellants, reads as under: - "2- Bhd tUe fnukad ;k vk;q dk vo/kkj.k & fdlh ljdkjh lsod dk tUe fnukad] tSlk fd lsok esa] muds izos'k ds le; mlds gkbZ Ldwy ;k led{k ijh{kk esa mRrh.kZ gksus ds izek.k&i= esa vfHkfyf[kr gks] ;k tgka fdlh ljdkjh lsod us mi;qZDr ,slh dksbZ ijh{kk mRrh.kZ u dh gks ;k lsok esa] izos'k djus ds i'pkr~ ,slh ijh{kk mRrh.kZ dh gks] ogka mlds ljdkjh lsok esa izos'k djus ds le; mldh lsok&iqfLrdk esa vfHkfy[kr tUe fnukad ;k vk;q mldh lsok ds lEcU/k esa lHkh iz;kstuksa ds fy;s] ftlds vUrxZr inksUufr] vf/kokf"kZdh] le; iwoZ lsok&fuo`fRr ;k lsok&fuo`fRr ykHk ds fy;s ik=rk Hkh gS] ;FkkfLFkfr] mldk Bhd tUe fnukad ;k vk;q] le>h tk;sxh vkSj ,sls fnukad ;k vk;q dks 'kq+) djus ds ckjs es dksbZ vkosnu&i= ;k vH;kosnu fdUgha Hkh ifjfLFkfr;ksa esa] pkgs tks Hkh gks] xzg.k ugha fd;k tk;sxk A " 11. Indisputably, at the time of the respondent's entry into regular service, his date of birth was mentioned in the service book as 06.06.1940. There had not been any manipulation in the service book by the respondent. In fact, his date of birth, as 06.06.1940, was regularly accepted by the appellants themselves, as would appear from the tentative seniority list dated 7.12.1991, placed on record as Annexure - 2 to the petition. As per the applicable rule, the entry in the service record is taken to be correct for all purposes and, ordinarily, any amendment thereof is not envisaged. In the present matter, it had been rather a strange position that despite such recording of the date of birth in the service record of the respondent and without taking any steps for its alteration, the appellant No.2 chose to issue the cryptic order dated 19.02.1994 suggesting that the respondent was to complete 60 years of age on 28.02.1994. In the present matter, it had been rather a strange position that despite such recording of the date of birth in the service record of the respondent and without taking any steps for its alteration, the appellant No.2 chose to issue the cryptic order dated 19.02.1994 suggesting that the respondent was to complete 60 years of age on 28.02.1994. Apart from the fact that such an order stands contrary to the date of birth of the respondent mentioned in the service record, it does not stand in conformity even with the other suggestion sought to be made by the appellants with reference to the certificate dated 24.02.1969. Even on the basis of the said Certificate, it was incorrect to suggest that the respondent was to complete 60 years of age on 28.02.1994. 12. We have noticed another flaw in this matter inasmuch as even the Certificate dated 24.02.1969 seems to be a cryptic one. The said Certificate had only been for the purpose of certifying the fitness of a person for government service and could not have been taken conclusive as regards the date of birth. In any case, the appellants themselves consciously entered the date of birth of the respondent as 06.06.1940 in the service record, may be on the basis of the similar nature other cryptic Certificate which has not come on record; and the same was never altered. In the given fact situation, the appellants cannot be held entitled to suddenly serve a notice of retirement on the employee by themselves assuming an altered date of birth, contrary to the service record. It has also not been shown as to in which particular record any different date of birth was entered at the time of induction of the respondent in service? The suggestion about the Medical Certificate said to have been given at the time of his engagement on Muster Roll remains too remote and uncertain. 13. In the totality of circumstances, where the appellants have failed to adhere to the applicable rules and have not taken the proceedings in accordance with law, the learned Single Judge cannot be faulted in finding the impugned order dated 19.02.1994 as being entirely unjustified and unsustainable. 14. In view of the above, we find no good ground to entertain this intra-Court Appeal. 15. Accordingly, the appeal stands dismissed.