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2015 DIGILAW 214 (GUJ)

Ajay S. Modi v. State of Gujarat

2015-02-20

M.R.SHAH

body2015
JUDGMENT : M.R. Shah, J. 1. Present application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as Cr. P.C) has been preferred by the applicant herein - original accused of the offence under the provisions of Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as P.F.A. Act) to quash and set aside the impugned criminal proceedings being Criminal Case No. 400 of 2003 pending in the Court of learned J.M.F.C. Jhagadia, District Bharuch. That sample of the iodine salt was drawn/collected from the shop of applicant herein - original accused No. 1 on 25-2-1992. That the same was immediately reported to the local authority, Food & Drugs, Bharuch on 25-2-1992. Immediately the sealed sample which was sealed after following due procedure as required was sent to the Public Analyst, Food Laboratory, Vadodara on 26-2-1992. On chemical analysis by the Public Analyst, Food Laboratory, Vadodara, on 4-3-1992, it was found that the iodine content in the sample-salt was 6.7% ppm as compared to the prescribed standard of P.F.A. limits of 15% ppm, and therefore, the same was found to be not confirming to the standard under the P.F.A. Act. That the report of the Public Analyst Office, Vadodara dated 24-3-1992 was immediately sent to the Assistant Commissioner and Local Authority, Bharuch as well as the Food Inspector, Bharuch. That the original complainant - Food Inspector immediately sought the sanction for lodging the criminal proceedings as per the provision of P.F.A. Act vide his letter dated 27-4-1992. That the competent Authority granted the sanction vide sanction dated 23-1-2003 and immediately thereafter the Food Inspector filed the impugned criminal complaint against the accused including the applicant - original accused No. 2 in the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Jhagadia, District Bharuch being Criminal Case No. 400 of 2003 for the offences punishable under Section 7 of the P.F.A. Act. That the learned J.M.F.C. has directed to issue summons against the applicant herein and one another for the relevant offences under the P.F.A. Act. 1.1. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the aforesaid criminal proceedings and the filing of the criminal complaint against the applicant and the order passed by the learned Magistrate directing to issue summons against the applicant in Criminal Case No. 400 of 2003, the applicant herein - original accused No. 2 has preferred the present Misc. 1.1. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the aforesaid criminal proceedings and the filing of the criminal complaint against the applicant and the order passed by the learned Magistrate directing to issue summons against the applicant in Criminal Case No. 400 of 2003, the applicant herein - original accused No. 2 has preferred the present Misc. Criminal Application under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. to quash and set aside the impugned criminal proceedings. 2. Shri Tulsi Savani, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the applicant has vehemently submitted that the impugned complaint has been filed by the Food Inspector after a period of 11 years from the date of the sample drawn, and therefore, the valuable right of the applicant to get the sample tested by the Central Laboratory as conferred under Section 13(2) of the P.F.A. Act has been taken away and/or violated. It is submitted that as such under Section 13(2) of the P.F.A. Act, the accused has a right to get the sample tested by the Central Laboratory. It is submitted that therefore, if the sample is now sent to the Central Laboratory, the sample either must have been deteriorated and/or decomposed. It is submitted that therefore the valuable right of the applicant-accused to get the sample tested by the Central Laboratory has been taken away and/or has been violated. It is submitted that therefore on that ground alone the impugned criminal proceedings deserve to be quashed and set aside. Shri Savani, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the applicant has vehemently submitted that therefore, when the applicant - accused has a right to get the sample tested by the Central Laboratory and by the time 11 years have passed, the sample have been decomposed and/or deteriorated, and therefore, if the sample is now got tested by the Central Laboratory, it would cause great prejudice to the applicant-accused. 2.1. It is further submitted that even the impugned complaint/criminal proceedings is barred by law of limitation more particularly Section 468 of the Cr. P.C. it is submitted that the complaint was required to be filed within a period of 3 years from the date on which the cause of action has arisen i.e. in the present case the report dated 25-2-1992 of the Public Analyst, Food and Drugs, Vadodara. P.C. it is submitted that the complaint was required to be filed within a period of 3 years from the date on which the cause of action has arisen i.e. in the present case the report dated 25-2-1992 of the Public Analyst, Food and Drugs, Vadodara. It is submitted that the impugned complaint has been lodged after a period of three years, and therefore also, the impugned criminal proceedings/complaint deserves to be quashed and set aside. Making above submissions and relying upon the decision of the learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of State of Gujarat vs. Divyesh Padmakant Shah, 2007 (2) GCD 950 , it is requested to allow the present application and to quash and set aside the impugned criminal proceedings/complaint. 3. Present application is vehemently opposed by Ms. Nisha Thakore, learned A.P.P. appearing on behalf of the State. An affidavit-in-reply is filed opposing the present application and explaining the delay in granting sanction due to which there was a delay in filing the complaint by the Food Inspector. 3.1. Ms. Nisha Thakore, learned A.P.P. has submitted that in view of the provisions of the P.F.A. Act, without the prior sanction of the competent/appropriate Authority, the Food Inspector could not have filed the complaint. It is submitted that as such immediately on receipt of the report dated 25-2-1992 of the Public Analyst, Food and Drugs, Vadodara, the Food Inspector immediately approached the appropriate Authority for grant of sanction. However, a policy decision was pending before the State Government whether in such cases of iodine in the salt below the prescribed limit under the P.F.A. Act, the criminal proceedings should be launched or not, there was no sanction granted by the appropriate authority and due to which at the relevant time the Food Inspector, Bharuch could not file the complaint. It is submitted that as such number of reminders were also sent to the State Government to grant the sanction. It is submitted that ultimately the appropriate authority vide communication dated 23-1-2003 granted the sanction and directed all the Food Inspectors to file the complaint in case of percentage of iodine in salt found less than the prescribed limit. It is submitted that immediately thereafter the impugned complaint has been filed. It is submitted that therefore as such there is no negligence and/or delay on the part of the Food Inspector. It is submitted that immediately thereafter the impugned complaint has been filed. It is submitted that therefore as such there is no negligence and/or delay on the part of the Food Inspector. It is submitted that after receiving/obtaining/granting the sanction by the appropriate Authority within the prescribed period of limitation the impugned complaint has been filed. It is submitted that therefore, considering sub-Section (2) of Section 468 of the Cr. P.C., the period during which the sanction was pending is required to be excluded. It is submitted that therefore it cannot be said that impugned complaint is required to be dismissed on the ground of limitation as contended on behalf of the applicant-accused. 3.2. Now, so far as the contention on behalf of the applicant that because of the delay in filing the complaint, the valuable right of the applicant -accused to get the sample tested by the Central Laboratory has been taken away and/or the contention on behalf of the applicant that as there was a delay in filing the complaint, the sample must have been decomposed and/or deteriorated, and therefore, great prejudice shall be caused to the applicant is concerned, it is submitted by Ms. Thakore, learned A.P.P. that as such the applicant had never submitted any application before the learned Magistrate to send the sample to the Central Laboratory and/or had made any request before the learned Magistrate to get the sample tested by the Central Laboratory. It is submitted that as such the sample had been kept as it is and in the sealed cover. It is submitted that the contention and submission on behalf of the applicant is absolutely on presumption and assumption. It is submitted that unless and until on the application made by the accused the sample is sent to the Central Laboratory and unless and until after the analysis the Central Laboratory opines that the sample has been deteriorated and/or decomposed, there shall not be such a presumption that the sample has become decomposed and/or deteriorated. It is submitted that on the basis of mere apprehension that by the passage of time the sample must have become decomposed and/or deteriorated, the complaint may not be quashed in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Cr. It is submitted that on the basis of mere apprehension that by the passage of time the sample must have become decomposed and/or deteriorated, the complaint may not be quashed in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. it is submitted that the allegation of prejudice are not required to be only pleaded but they are required to be demonstrated and/or proved and the actual prejudice is required to be demonstrated and proved. It is submitted that mere allegation of prejudice would not suffice at this stage to quash the impugned complaint in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. 3.3. Relying upon recent decision of the learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Pepsi Co. India Holdings Ltd. through its Officer Vinay Mathur vs. State of Gujarat, dated 11-12-2014 in Misc. Criminal Application Nos. 1821 of 2002 with Misc. Criminal Application No. 1822 of 2002 (reported in 2015 (2) GLR 1183 ) and the decision of the learned Single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of M/s. Hyderabad Beverages Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2006 Cri. LJ 3988 and the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ajit Prasad Ramkishan Singh vs. State of Maharashtra, 1972 Cri. LJ 1026 it is requested to dismiss the present application and not to quash and set aside the impugned criminal proceedings in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. 3.4. Now, so far as the reliance placed upon the decision of the learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Divyesh Padmakant Shah (supra) by the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the applicant is concerned, it is submitted that the case before the learned Single Judge was after the trial and the learned Single Judge was considering whether the leave to appeal against the order of acquittal should be granted or not. It is submitted that in the said case, the learned Single Judge found on appreciation of evidence that there was no reason or acceptable ground for such an inordinate delay in granting the sanction. It is submitted that therefore if a reasonable and acceptable ground is shown for the delay in granting the sanction, despite the delay in granting the sanction, the accused can be prosecuted. It is submitted that therefore if a reasonable and acceptable ground is shown for the delay in granting the sanction, despite the delay in granting the sanction, the accused can be prosecuted. It is submitted that in the aforesaid decision the learned Single Judge has not laid down any absolute proposition of law that Section 470(3) of the Cr. P.C. would not be attracted at all. It is submitted that therefore the decision of the learned Single Judge in the aforesaid case would not be applicable to the facts of the case on hand and/or the same would not be of any assistance to the applicant. Making above submissions, it is requested to dismiss the present application and not to quash and set aside the impugned criminal proceedings in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. 4. Heard learned Advocates appearing on behalf of the respective parties at length. At the outset it is required to be noted that the present application has been preferred by the applicant herein - original accused to quash and set aside the impugned criminal proceedings/criminal complaint for the offence punishable under the P.F.A. Act, in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. The impugned criminal proceedings/criminal complaint are requested to be quashed and set aside mainly on the ground that there is an inordinate delay in filing the complaint, and therefore, the valuable right of the accused to get the sample tested by the Central Laboratory conferred under Section 13(2) of the P.F.A. Act has been taken away and/or the same has been violated and/or the grave prejudice shall be caused to the applicant as because of the delay and by the passage of time the sample must have been deteriorated and/or decomposed. The impugned complaint is also requested to be quashed and set aside on the ground of limitation i.e. on the ground that the impugned complaint has been lodged/filed after a period of three years. Therefore, the short question which is posed for consideration of this Court is whether on the aforesaid ground the impugned criminal complaint for the offences under the P.F.A. Act is required to be quashed and set aside in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C.? 4.1. Therefore, the short question which is posed for consideration of this Court is whether on the aforesaid ground the impugned criminal complaint for the offences under the P.F.A. Act is required to be quashed and set aside in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C.? 4.1. Now, so far as the first ground on which the impugned complaint is requested to be quashed and set aside i.e. delay in filing the complaint and the prejudice that may be caused to the accused and/or taking away the right of the accused to get the sample tested through Central Laboratory as conferred under Section 13(2) of the P.F.A. Act is concerned," the submissions seems to be attractive but has no substance. At the outset, it is required to be noted that as such no application has been submitted by the accused and/or any request is made by the accused before the learned Magistrate to send the sample to the Central Laboratory. Therefore, as such the accused has not exercised the option which is conferred under Section 13(2) of the P.F.A. Act of getting the sample examined through the Central Laboratory. Therefore, the contention on behalf of the applicant that a valuable right of the applicant to get the sample tested through Central Laboratory has been taken away cannot be accepted. 4.2. Now, so far as the contention on behalf of the applicant that because of the delay in filing the complaint i.e. in the present case of 11 years, the valuable right of the applicant to get the sample tested through Central Laboratory as conferred under Section 13(2) of the P.F.A. Act has been taken away and/or has been violated and/or a great prejudice would be caused to the applicant, as because of such delay the sample might have become decomposed and/or deteriorated is concerned, the aforesaid are only on presumption and assumption. Unless and until any request is made to send the sample to the Central Laboratory, by exercising the option as conferred under Section 13(2) of the P.F.A. Act and unless and until the sample is sent to the Central Laboratory, and thereafter, after analysis it is opined by the Central Laboratory that as such the sample has deteriorated and/or decomposed, on such presumption and assumption that it must have been deteriorated and/or decomposed, the criminal proceedings cannot be quashed in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. and that too for the offences under the P.F.A. Act. In the case of Ajit Prasad Ramkishan Singh (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court considering its earlier judgment in the case of Sukhmal Gupta, (1984 Cri. LJ 15) has specifically observed and held that it was wrong for Courts to decide, without any data, that the sample would decompose and become incapable of analysis and that no useful purpose would be served in sending the sample for analysis to the Director, when there was no evidence that the sample had so deteriorated at the time of service of summons as to be incapable of being analysed. It is further observed that in absence of evidence, that the sample has so deteriorated as to be incapable of analysis, such a presumption would not be justified. 4.3. Identical question came to be considered by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of M/s. Hyderabad Beverages Pvt. Ltd. (supra) and in Paras 70 to 73, 75, 76 to 78, the Andhra Pradesh High Court has observed and held as under: "70. In Ajit Prasad Ramkishan Singh, (1972 Cri. LJ 1026), the Supreme Court, following its earlier judgment in Sukhmal Gupta, (1984 Cri. LJ 15), held that it was wrong for Courts to decide, without any data, that the sample would decompose and become incapable of analysis and that no useful purpose would be served in sending the sample for analysis to the Director, when there was no evidence that the sample had so deteriorated at the time of service of summons as to be incapable of being analysed. In the absence of evidence, that the sample has so deteriorated as to be incapable of analysis, such a presumption would not be justified. 71. In the absence of evidence, that the sample has so deteriorated as to be incapable of analysis, such a presumption would not be justified. 71. An enquiry, as to whether the sample has decomposed, whether it is fit or unfit for analysis etc., is a statutory function required to be discharged by the Central Food Laboratory and not for this Court, in proceedings under Section 482, Cr. P.C. to presume that every case of delay in furnishing a copy of the Public Analyst's report, beyond the shelf-life of the product, would either result in the sample becoming decomposed or cause prejudice to the accused. 72. As held by the Apex Court in Ajit Prasad Ramkishan Singh, 1972 Cri. LJ 1026, Sukhmal Gupta vs. Charanji Lal, 1984 Cri. LJ 15 and T.V. Usman, AIR 1994 SC 1818 and this Court in G.S. Prasad, 2003 Cri. LJ (N.O.C.) 231 and Gangaiahnaidu Rama Krishna, unless it is shown that the sample has been rendered unfit for analysis and the reasons therefor are on account of the delay in sending the sample for analysis, and thereby, prejudice has been caused to the accused entitling them to acquittal, mere delay in furnishing the report of the public analyst to the accused would not, by itself, be fatal to the case of the prosecution. 73. As held in T.V. Usman, AIR 1994 SC 1818 , there is no time-limit prescribed for launching prosecution. It is relevant to note that a time-limit is prescribed, under Section 9Aof the P.F.A. Act, for sending the second sample for analysis to the Public Analyst, a time-limit of 10 days was prescribed under Rule 9(j), prior to its omission with effect from 4-1-1977, for supplying a copy of the report of the Public Analyst, Rule 22 provides that the quantity of food to be sent for analysis must be as prescribed in the table to the rule and Rule 7(3) requires the Public Analyst to submit his report within 45 days. All these statutory provisions were held in Tulsiram, 1984 Cri. LJ 1731, Dalchand vs. Municipal Corporation, Bhopal, AIR 1983 SC 303 : 1983 Cri. LJ 448, State of Kerala vs. Alassery Mohammed, 1978 (2) SCC 386 : 1978 Cri. LJ 925 and T.V. Usman, AIR 1994 SC 1818 , to be directory and not mandatory. All these statutory provisions were held in Tulsiram, 1984 Cri. LJ 1731, Dalchand vs. Municipal Corporation, Bhopal, AIR 1983 SC 303 : 1983 Cri. LJ 448, State of Kerala vs. Alassery Mohammed, 1978 (2) SCC 386 : 1978 Cri. LJ 925 and T.V. Usman, AIR 1994 SC 1818 , to be directory and not mandatory. When no time-limit is prescribed under the Act for launching prosecution and certain statutory provisions and rules, wherein time-limit is prescribed, were held to be directory and not mandatory, it cannot be said that mere delay in furnishing a copy of the report of the public analyst to the accused, by itself and without any thing more, is fatal to the prosecution. 75. Negligence of officials in discharging their functions, and in not promptly furnishing a copy of the report of the Public Analyst to the accused, must not result in offenders involved in adulteration of the food/seed being permitted to go scot-free, unless prejudice is established. Legitimate prosecution should not be scuttled on mere technicalities, in the absence of any proof of prejudice to the accused. 76. In Dalchand, 1983 Cri. LJ 448, the Supreme Court held thus: "It is well to remember that quite often many rules, though couched in language which appears to be imperative, are no more than mere instructions to those entrusted with the task of discharging statutory duties for public benefit. The negligence of those to whom public duties are entrusted cannot by statutory interpretation be allowed to promote public mischief and cause public inconvenience and defeat the main object of the statute." (Emphasis supplied) 77. Since, the eventual test is one of prejudice, which is to be established, on the facts and circumstances of each case, by way of evidence adduced before the learned Magistrate, it is not for this Court, under Section 482, Cr. P.C. to infer or presume that even in case of delay, say of a few days, beyond the shelf-life of the product, and in the absence of reasonable explanation for the delay in furnishing a copy of the report of the Public Analyst, the accused is prejudiced and his right, under Section 13(2) of the P.F.A. Act and Section 16(2) of the Seeds Act, is violated. 78. In exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, Cr. 78. In exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, Cr. P.C. this Court does not take upon itself the task of examining the evidence or to record an independent finding that the delay in furnishing a copy of the public analyst's report has resulted in prejudice to the accused. Whether the delay is insignificant or inordinate, whether the delay is attributable to lapses of the prosecution in making available a copy of the Public Analyst's report, whether on account of the delay in making the report available, the right of the accused under Section 13(2) of the P.F.A. Act or Section 16(2) of the Seeds Act has been rendered illusory as the sample sent to the Central Laboratory is found unfit for analysis due to decomposition by passage of time or for any other reason attributed to lapses on the part of the prosecution, whether inordinate delay in sending the sample for analysis has by passage of time, rendered the sample "adulterated" are all matters to be examined by the learned Magistrate, in the facts and circumstances of each case, on the basis of the evidence adduced. Delay, by itself and without anything more, cannot form the basis for the High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, Cr. P.C. to quash the criminal proceedings." 4.4. Identical question came to be considered by the learned Single Judge in the recent decision in the case of Pepsi Co. India Holdings Ltd. through its Officer Vinay Mathur, [ 2015 (2) GLR 1183 ] and after considering the aforesaid decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court and after considering other decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court as well as other High Courts on the issue, the learned Single Judge refused to quash and set aside the complaint for the offences punishable under the P.F.A. Act which was requested to be quashed and set aside on the ground of delay in filing the complaint and which was requested to be quashed and set aside on the grounds on which the impugned criminal complaint is requested to be quashed and set aside. 4.5. There cannot be any presumption that the sample must have been deteriorated and/or decomposed and/or would have become incapable of being analyzed. 4.5. There cannot be any presumption that the sample must have been deteriorated and/or decomposed and/or would have become incapable of being analyzed. Whether delay, in furnishing the copy of the report of Public Analyst and/or delay in filing the complaint, has resulted in prejudice to the accused and whether the prosecution has furnished a satisfactory explanation for the delay, are all matter of evidence to be examined by the trial Court and not for this Court in proceedings under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. As per the catena of decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court as well as this Court, the power under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. are to be exercised sparingly with circumspection and in rarest of rare cases. Such a power is not to be exercised to stifle legitimate prosecution. It is required to be noted that in the present case as such the Public Analyst, Food and Drugs, Vadodara had in fact found the percentage of iodine in the sample/salt much less than the prescribed limit under the P.F.A. Act. Therefore, the impugned complaint is not required to be quashed at this stage in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. solely on assumption and presumption that the sample might/must have been deteriorated and/or decomposed and/or incapable of being analyzed now. 4.6. Similarly, the impugned complaint is not required to be quashed and set aside on the ground that because of the delay in filing the complaint, the accused would suffer great prejudice as the sample must have become decomposed and/or deteriorated and/or would have become incapable of being analyzed. The prejudice is not required to be pleaded only but actual prejudice if any caused is to be demonstrated and established. As observed hereinabove, mere allegation of prejudice would not be sufficient to quash the complaint that too in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. 4.7. Now, so far as the contention on behalf of the applicant-accused to quash and set aside the impugned complaint on the ground that the same is beyond the period of limitation as provided under Section 468 of the Cr. P.C. is concerned, it is required to be noted that as per sub-Section (3) of Section 470 of the Cr. P.C., the time spent in obtaining the sanction for lodging the prosecution is required to be excluded. P.C. is concerned, it is required to be noted that as per sub-Section (3) of Section 470 of the Cr. P.C., the time spent in obtaining the sanction for lodging the prosecution is required to be excluded. As observed hereinabove, from the chronological dates of events as mentioned hereinabove, the sample was collected on 25-2-1992 and after following the due procedure as required the sealed sample was sent to the Public Analyst, Food and Drugs, Vadodara on 26-2-1992 and the same was tested by the Public Analyst, Food and Drugs, Vadodara on 4-3-1992 and the report of the Public Analyst that the iodine content was 6.7% ppm as compared to prescribed standard of P.F.A. limit of 15% ppm was sent to the Food Inspector as well as the Assistant Commissioner and Local Health Authority, Bharuch vide communication dated 25-3-1992 and vide application/communication dated 27-4-1992, the respondent No. 2 herein - Food Inspector - original complainant sought sanction for lodging the criminal proceedings as per the provisions of P.F.A. Act and after getting the sanction from the Appropriate Authority on 23-1-2003, immediately thereafter the impugned complaint has been lodged. Delay in granting the sanction by the Appropriate Authority has been explained in the affidavit-in-reply. Therefore, considering the above and sub-Section (3) of Section 470 of the Cr. P.C., the time spent in obtaining the requisite sanction for lodging the prosecution was required to be excluded. It cannot be disputed and it is not disputed that as such without the prior sanction, the Food Inspector could not have lodged the complaint. Under the circumstances, sub-Section (3) of Section 470 of the Cr. P.C. would be attracted, and therefore, the impugned complaint is not required to be set aside on the aforesaid ground and that too in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. 4.8. Now, so far as the reliance placed upon the decision of the learned Single Judge in the case of Divyesh Padmakant Shah (supra) by the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the applicant is concerned, considering the facts of the case before the learned Single Judge and the facts of the case on hand, this Court is of the opinion that the said decision would not be applicable to the facts of the case on hand and/or the same shall not be of any assistance to the applicant. It is required to be noted that in the case before the learned Single Judge, it was an application for leave to appeal against the order passed by the learned trial Court acquitting the accused. Therefore, it was not an application under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. Even the learned trial Court had not declined to take the cognizance on the ground of delay and did not treat the matter to be time-barred and in fact the trial Court after analysis of the evidence adduced by the prosecution came to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed in proving its case beyond reasonable doubt so as to bring home the guilt on the part of accused. Even in the said decision the learned Single Judge has specifically observed that the State has to come out with all convincing and cogent material to establish that despite the due diligence and efforts, the sanction could not be issued within the period of limitation so that the same may be excluded while computing the limitation under Section 468 of the Cr. P.C. Therefore, if the observations made by the learned Single Judge are considered in its true perspective, in that case, if the State is able to prove that despite due diligence and all efforts, the sanction could not be issued, and hence, the same deserves to be excluded under the provisions of Section 470 of the Cr. P.C., in that case, the time taken/spent in obtaining the requisite sanction for lodging the prosecution can be excluded. It appears that in the case before the learned Single Judge, it was found that there was no reasonable and acceptable ground made out for such an inordinate delay. In the present case, in the affidavit-in-reply there seem to be the reasonable explanation. Even otherwise, the same is required to be tested and considered on the evidence led and on the evidence which is yet to be led. Therefore, on the aforesaid ground the impugned complaint is not required to be quashed and set aside in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. In view of the above, and for the reasons stated above, present Misc. Criminal Application fails and the same deserves to be dismissed and is, accordingly, dismissed. Rule is discharged. Ad-interim relief, if any, stands vacated forthwith. P.C. In view of the above, and for the reasons stated above, present Misc. Criminal Application fails and the same deserves to be dismissed and is, accordingly, dismissed. Rule is discharged. Ad-interim relief, if any, stands vacated forthwith. Registry is directed to send the writ of this order to the learned trial Court forthwith so that the trial for the offence under the provisions of P.F.A. Act may be proceeded further at the earliest.