Judgment :- The appellant Insurance Company is the second respondent in M.C.O.P.No.344 of 2001. The respondents 1 to 4 herein are the claimants. The respondents 5 and 6 are the owners of the vehicle, who were respondents 1 and 3 in M.C.O.P.No.344 of 2001. 2. The appellant challenged the order of Tribunal dated 07.08.2009 granting a total sum of Rs.6 lakhs as compensation to the respondents 1 to 4. 3. The facts of the case are as follows: According to the respondents 1 to 4, on 06.06.2001, at about 5.30 p.m, the deceased Sekar was driving his vehicle M.80 slowly along with his friends in Kalanivaasal, Thuraiyur main road from west to east on the left hand side of the road. At that time, one mini lorry bearing Registration No. TN-69-2302 insured with the appellant was driven in a rash and negligent manner from north to south in Thuraiyur road and hit deceased Sekar. The said Sekar suffered serious injury. The driver of the lorry ran away from the scene of accident. The deceased was given first aid in a private hospital at Pudukottai. The deceased suffered serious injuries and therefore, he was admitted in Vinothagam hospital at Thanjavur and he was given intensive treatment. In spite of the same, he died on 09.06.2001. 4. Originally, the respondents 1 to 4 impleaded only 5th respondent as first respondent stating that he was owner of the vehicle which caused accident. Subsequently, they came to know that the said vehicle was sold to 6th respondent by 5th respondent. Further, a typing error had crept in the claim petition that the date of accident was mentioned as 04.06.2001 instead of 06.06.2001. Therefore, petitions were filed for amendment and also to implead 6th respondent. The petitions were ordered and necessary amendments were carried out. 5. The accident took place only due to the rash and negligent driving of the driver of respondents 5 and 6, who did not adhere to the traffic rules. The said driver only is fully responsible to the accident. A complaint was lodged on 17.6.2001 with K.Pudpatti Police Station and the same was registered as Cr.No.93/2001. The deceased was aged 30 years and he was doing business of selling of electrical goods at K.Pudupatti. He was earning Rs.10,000/- per month. On the above facts, the respondents 1 to 4 claimed a sum of Rs.30 lakhs as compensation. 6. A complaint was lodged on 17.6.2001 with K.Pudpatti Police Station and the same was registered as Cr.No.93/2001. The deceased was aged 30 years and he was doing business of selling of electrical goods at K.Pudupatti. He was earning Rs.10,000/- per month. On the above facts, the respondents 1 to 4 claimed a sum of Rs.30 lakhs as compensation. 6. The appellant in the counter denied that mini lorry bearing No. T.N.69-2302 was involved in the accident. The 5th respondent did not inform the appellant about the accident. He did not furnish the Registration Certificate, Fitness Certificate and Driving Licence. The 5th respondent on 10.2.2001 itself had sold the vehicle to 6th respondent. The 6th respondent did not inform the appellant about his purchase and did not seek transfer of ownership. The accident took place only due to the negligence of the deceased. The claim of Rs.30 lakhs by respondents 1to 4 is without any basis and it is excessive. 7. The appellant filed additional counter statement stating that no accident took place on 04.6.2001. The accident took place only due to the act of the deceased. F.I.R was lodged after 14 days on 17.6.2001 by the brother of the deceased. Only to get compensation, the family members of the deceased implicated the vehicle of the 5th respondent in F.I.R. The 5th respondent to cheat the appellant has colluded with respondents 1 to 4. 8. The deceased was discharged from Vindothagan Hospital, Thanjavur, on 09.6.2001 against medical advise. He died on the same day. After 10 days only postmortem was done at Government Hospital, Aranthangi. The death of the deceased on 09.6.2001 is a natural death and not due to the accident. 9. At the time of trial, the first respondent was examined as P.W.,1, brother of deceased Tamil Selvan was examined as P.W.2. One Sathaiya was examined as P.W.3. and 13 documents were marked as Exs.A1 to A13. The 6th respondent was examined as R.W.3. The appellant examined R.W.1, R.W.2, R.W.4 and R.W.5 and marked 10 documents B1 to B10. 10. 9. At the time of trial, the first respondent was examined as P.W.,1, brother of deceased Tamil Selvan was examined as P.W.2. One Sathaiya was examined as P.W.3. and 13 documents were marked as Exs.A1 to A13. The 6th respondent was examined as R.W.3. The appellant examined R.W.1, R.W.2, R.W.4 and R.W.5 and marked 10 documents B1 to B10. 10. The trial Court considering the pleadings and evidence both oral and documentary and Judgments relied on by the parties came to a conclusion that, (i) the accident took place due to the rash and negligent driving of the driver of respondents 5 and 6; (ii) In the facts and circumstances of the case, the delay in filing of the F.I.R is not fatal to the claim of respondents 1 to 4. (iii) The deceased died only due to accident caused by negligent driving of driver of respondents 5 and 6. On these conclusion, the Tribunal adopting multiplier method came to the conclusion that respondents 1 to 4 are entitled to 6 lakhs as compensation. The compensation under different heads granted by the Tribunal are as follows: Loss of income Rs. 5,50,800/- Funeral expenses Rs. 2,000/- Loss of consortium Rs. 10,000/- Loss of love and affection for children each Rs.10,000/- Rs. 20,000/- Loss of love and affection for mother Rs. 20,000/- Total Rs. 6,02,800/- The Tribunal granted Rs.6,02,800/- as compensation, which is rounded off to Rs.6,00,000/-. Against the said order, the present appeal is filed by the insurance company. 11. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that, (i) No accident took place on 04.06.2001 and the vehicle belonging to the 5th respondent which was sold to 6th respondent was not involved in the accident. (ii) The Tribunal failed to see that in F.I.R., date of accident was mentioned as 04.06.2001 whereas in all other criminal proceedings date of accident was mentioned as 06.06.2001. (iii) P.Ws.1 and 2 spoke about the accident which according to them took place on 04.06.2001. F.I.R. was lodged by P.W.2 only on 17.6.2001 as if the alleged accident occurred on 04.06.2001. (iv) The delay in lodging F.I.R and contradiction in the date of accident would prove that no accident took place and F.I.R was lodged as an after thought for claiming compensation. F.I.R. was lodged by P.W.2 only on 17.6.2001 as if the alleged accident occurred on 04.06.2001. (iv) The delay in lodging F.I.R and contradiction in the date of accident would prove that no accident took place and F.I.R was lodged as an after thought for claiming compensation. (v) The Tribunal failed to properly analyse the evidence of Dr.Jayaprakash, who has stated that at the time of admission, it was not informed that injuries suffered by the deceased was due to road accident. That is why the hospital did not mention as road traffic accident in the Accident Register maintained in the hospital which is a mandatory procedure. (vi) The respondents 1 to 4 without knowing the owner of the vehicle alleged to have been involved in the accident filed the claim against the 5th respondent who had already sold the vehicle. (vii) The Tribunal erred in holding that the accident took place due to the rash and negligent driving of the driver of the respondents 5 and 6 solely relying the admission made by the driver in the criminal court. (viii) The Tribunal failed to see that the claim under Section 163(A) of Motor Vehicles Act is not applicable to the case where the income of the deceased was claimed more than Rs.40,000/- per annum. In the present case, respondents 1 to 4 have claimed the income of the deceased at Rs.1,20,000/- per annum. (ix) In the claim under Section 166 of MV Act, the claimants must prove the accident, negligence and the income of the deceased. The Tribunal ought to have seen that the respondents 1to 4 failed to prove the case. (x) The Tribunal erred in fixing the income of the deceased at Rs.4,000/- per month in the absence of any substantial, oral and documentary evidence. The multiplier 17 applied by the Tribunal is excessive and award of compensation at Rs.5,50,800/- towards loss of income is excessive. 12. The learned counsel for the appellant relied on the following Judgments: (i) Deepal Girishbhai Soni Vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Baroda reported in 2004 (5) SCC 385 , wherein in paragraph 67, it has been held as follows: “67. We therefore, are of the opinion that Kodala has correctly been decided. 12. The learned counsel for the appellant relied on the following Judgments: (i) Deepal Girishbhai Soni Vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Baroda reported in 2004 (5) SCC 385 , wherein in paragraph 67, it has been held as follows: “67. We therefore, are of the opinion that Kodala has correctly been decided. However, we do not agree with the findings in Kodala that if a person invokes provisions of Section 163-A, the annual income of Rs.40,000/- per annum shall be treated as a cap. In our opinion, the proceeding under Section 163-A being a social security provision, providing for a distinct scheme, only those whose annual income is up to Rs.40,000/- can take the benefit thereof. All other claims are required to be determined in terms of Chapter XII of the Act." (ii) New India Assurance Co. Ltd., Vs. K.Rameshkumar reported in 2011 (2) TN MAC 78 (DB), wherein paragraphs 21, 22 and 23, it has been held as follows: "21. In the case on hand, the driver viz., the 2nd respondent pleaded guilty before the Criminal Court and his confession was relied upon by the Tribunal while fastening the negligence on him. In the above referred judgments, this Court categorically held that the confession made by the Tribunal before a Criminal Court can be relied upon by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal while fixing his negligence. In the present case, since the 2nd respondent/driver pleaded guilty before the Criminal Court, the Tribunal held that the 2nd respondent was driving the Motorcycle in a rash and negligent manner and was solely responsible for the accident. 22. Though it is clear that the confession made by the driver before a Criminal Court can be relied upon by the Tribunal while considering the issue of negligence, in the present case, according to statement made by the 1st respondent to the Doctor, the accident occurred on 01.05.2002 while he was standing near a bus stop with his friends. R.W.2, the Doctor attached to Nankem Hospital, Coonoor, deposed that the claimant came for treatment for injuries allegedly sustained by him by falling down from the Motorcycle when he was travelling in the Coonoor-Kothagiri road and that after initial treatment, the claimant was sent to the Coimbatore hospital in an ambulance owned by his hospital. This fact has not been considered by the Tribunal. 23. This fact has not been considered by the Tribunal. 23. That apart, though the alleged accident took place on 01.05.2002, even according to the 1st Respondent/Claimant he was admitted at Ramakrishna Hospital, Coimbatore, on the same day and the Police Complaint was lodged only on 03.05.2002. There was no explanation for the delay in lodging the Police Complaint. When the 1st Respondent sustained serious injuries, even the Hospital Authorities could have lodged a Complaint with the police. This was not done immediately. Further, the Criminal Case was closed as mistake of fact. Thereafter, the Counsel, who appeared in the Motor Accidents Claims Petition on behalf of the 1st Respondent/Claimant filed a petition to reopen the Criminal case and the same Counsel appeared on behalf of the 2nd Respondent/ driver in the Criminal case and the 2nd Respondent/driver pleaded guilty before the Criminal Court. It is also pertinent to note that at this juncture that the father of the 1st Respondent/ Claimant was a Sub-Inspector of Police." (iii) National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Sinitha and Others reported in 2012 (1) TN MAC 1 (SC), wherein in paragraph 16, it has been held as follows: “16. At the instant juncture, it is also necessary to reiterate a conclusion already drawn above, namely, that section 163-A of the Act has an overriding effect on all other provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Stated in other words, none of the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act which is in conflict with Section 163-A of the Act will negate the mandate contained therein (in Section 163-A of the Act). Therefore, no matter what, Section 163-A of the Act shall stand on its own, without being diluted by any provision. Furthermore, in the course of our determination including the inferences and conclusions drawn by us from the judgment of this Court in Oriental Insurance Company Limited v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala (supra), as also, the statutory provisions dealt with by this Court in its aforesaid determination, we are of the view, that there is no basis for inferring that Section 163-A of the Act is founded under the "no-fault" liability principle. Additionally, we have concluded herein above, that on the conjoint reading of Sections 140 & 163-A, the legislative intent is clear, namely, that a claim for compensation raised under Section 163-A of the Act, need not be based on pleadings or proof at the hands of the claimants showing absence of "wrongful act", being "neglect" or "default". But that, is not sufficient to determine that the provision falls under the "fault" liability principle. To decide whether a provision is governed by the "fault" liability principle the converse has also to be established, i.e., whether a claim raised there under can be defeated by the concerned party (owner or Insurance Company) by pleading and proving "wrongful act", "neglect"or "default". From the preceding paragraphs (commencing from paragraph 12), we have no hesitation in concluding, that it is open to the owner or Insurance Company, as the case may be, to defeat a claim under section 163-A of the Act by pleading and establishing through cogent evidence a "fault" ground ("wrongful act "or "neglect" or "default"). It is therefore, doubtless, that Section 163-A of the Act is founded under the "fault" liability principle. To this effect, we accept the contention advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the petitioner.” (iv) N. Sathidevi & Others Vs. V.Giridharan & Another reported in 2004 (2) TN MAC 101, wherein in paragraph 24, it has been held as follows: “24. In view of the judgment of the Division Bench, it is clear that the admission made in the criminal proceedings, cannot be relied on. But the case of the claimants have to be established independently, before the Tribunal. In the present case, except the admission made by the driver before the Criminal Court, absolutely, there is no evidence to conclude that the auto bearing registration No.MDG 1948 involved in the accident. P.Ws.1 and 2 had not stated about the same. The Tribunal also decided the case in favour of the claimants only on the basis of the copy of the judgment in C.C.No.1098 of 1991 marked as Ex.A2 and the admission made by the driver in the Criminal Court. So it is clear that the claimants have not established independently before the Tribunal that the said vehicle involved in the accident, though such a dispute had been raised. So it is clear that the claimants have not established independently before the Tribunal that the said vehicle involved in the accident, though such a dispute had been raised. In the absence of any evidence before the Tribunal, the Tribunal is not correct in holding that the accident took place due to the driving of the driver of the auto bearing registration No.MDG 1948 and thereby, the respondents in the claim petition, are liable to pay the compensation." (v) 2011 (14) SCC 639 [Ranjana Prakash and others Vs. Divisional Manager and another], wherein in paragraphs 7 and 8, it has been held as follows: “7. This principle also flows from Order 41 Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure which enables an appellate court to pass any order which ought to have been passed by the trial court and to make such further or other order as the case may require, even if the respondent had not filed any appeal or cross-objections. This power is entrusted to the appellate court to enable it to do complete justice between the parties. Order 41 Rule 33 of the Code can however be pressed into service to make the award more effective or maintain the award on other grounds or to make the other parties to litigation to share the benefits or the liability, but cannot be invoked to get a larger or higher relief. For example, where the claimants seek compensation against the owner and the insurer of the vehicle and the Tribunal makes the award only against the owner, on an appeal by the owner challenging the quantum, the appellate court can make the insurer jointly and severally liable to pay the compensation, along with the owner, even though the claimants had not challenged the non-grant of relief against the insurer. Be that as it may. 8. Where an appeal is filed challenging the quantum of compensation, irrespective of who files the appeal, the appropriate course for the High Court is to examine the facts and by applying the relevant principles, determine the just compensation. If the compensation determined by it is higher than the compensation awarded by the Tribunal, the High Court will allow the appeal, if it is by the claimants and dismiss the appeal, if it is by the owner/insurer. If the compensation determined by it is higher than the compensation awarded by the Tribunal, the High Court will allow the appeal, if it is by the claimants and dismiss the appeal, if it is by the owner/insurer. Similarly, if the compensation determined by the High Court is lesser than the compensation awarded by the Tribunal, the High Court will dismiss any appeal by the claimants for enhancement, but allow any appeal by the owner/insurer for reduction. The High Court cannot obviously increase the compensation in an appeal by the owner/insurer for reducing the compensation, nor can it reduce the compensation in an appeal by the claimants seeking enhancement of compensation. 13. Per contra, Mr.A.R.L.Sundaresan, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of respondents 1 to 3 contended that, (a) The date of accident by mistake was mentioned in the FIR as 04.06.2001 instead of 06.06.2001. (b) In all other documents, the date of accident has been mentioned as 06.06.2001. (c) The delay in giving FIR is not fatal in the facts and circumstances of the case. The delay has been properly explained by respondents 1 to 4. (d) The 5th respondent, who was owner of the mini lorry which caused accident sold it to 6th respondent. The 6th respondent did not get the Registration Certificate changed in his name. That is why, originally, claim petition was filed against 5th respondent. On coming to know about the sale of the vehicle, the 6th respondent was impleaded in the claim petition. (e) The mistake in the date of accident was amended to the correct date as 06.06.2001 and appellant did not object to the same and did not take any further proceedings challenging the amendment. (f) The appellant gave a complaint to the CBCID alleging large scale collusion and bogus claims made by various third parties including respondents 1 to 4. No finding was given by concerned police that respondents 1 to 4 have made bogus claim without there being any accident. (g) The appellant has taken contradictory stand with regard to accident and death of the deceased. The appellant has stated that no accident took place and deceased suffered injuries due to his own action. Subsequently, he has taken a stand that there was motor cycles race in the village. The deceased took part in the race. At that time, an accident occurred and he suffered injuries. The appellant has stated that no accident took place and deceased suffered injuries due to his own action. Subsequently, he has taken a stand that there was motor cycles race in the village. The deceased took part in the race. At that time, an accident occurred and he suffered injuries. Having taken this contradictory stand, the appellant also taken a peculiar stand that death of the deceased is due to natural cause. 14. The learned Senior Counsel for the respondents 1 to 3 relied on the following Judgements: (i) Sarla Verma and others Vs. Delhi Transport Corporation and another reported in 2009 ACJ 1298 . It is relevant to extract paragraphs 11, 17 and 24 of the said decision. "11. In Susamma Thomas, 1994 ACJ 1 (SC), this Court increased the income by nearly 100%, in Sarla Dixit, 1996 ACJ 581 (SC), the income was increased only by 50% and in Abati Bezbaruah, 2003 ACJ 680 (SC), the income was increased by a mere 7 per cent. In view of imponderables and uncertainties, we are in favour of adopting as a rule of thumb, an addition of 50 per cent of actual salary to the actual salary income of the deceased towards future prospects, where the deceased had a permanent job and was below 40 years. [Where the annual income is in the taxable range, the words ‘actual salary’ should be read as ‘actual salary less tax’]. The addition should be only 30 per cent if the age of the deceased was 40 to 50 years. There should be no addition, where the age of deceased is more than 50 years. Though the evidence may indicate a different percentage of increase, it is necessary to standardize the addition to avoid different yardsticks being applied or different methods of calculations being adopted. Where the deceased was self-employed or was on a fixed salary (without provision for annual increments etc.), the courts will usually take only the actual income at the time of death. A departure therefrom should be made only in rare and exceptional cases involving special circumstances. 17. The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 was amended by Act 54 of 1994, inter alia, inserting Section 163-A and the Second Schedule with effect from 14.11.1994. A departure therefrom should be made only in rare and exceptional cases involving special circumstances. 17. The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 was amended by Act 54 of 1994, inter alia, inserting Section 163-A and the Second Schedule with effect from 14.11.1994. Section 163-A of the MV Act contains a special provision as to payment of compensation on structured formula basis, as indicated in the Second Schedule to the Act. The Second Schedule contains a Table prescribing the compensation to be awarded with reference to the age and income of the deceased. It specifies the amount of compensation to be awarded with reference to the annual income range of Rs.3,000/- to Rs.40,000/-. It does not specify the quantum of compensation in case the annual income of the deceased is more than Rs.40,000/-. But it provides the multiplier to be applied with reference to the age of the deceased. The Table starts with a multiplier of 15, goes upto 18, and then steadily comes down to 5. It also provides the standard deduction as one-third on account of personal living expenses of the deceased. Therefore, where the application is under section 163-A of the Act, it is possible to calculate the compensation on the structured formula basis, even where compensation is not specified with reference to the annual income of the deceased, or is more than Rs.40,000/-, by applying the formula : (2/3 x AI x M), that is two-thirds of the annual income multiplied by the multiplier applicable to the age of the deceased would be the compensation. Several principles of tortious liability are excluded when the claim is under section 163-A of MV Act. There are, however, discrepancies/errors in the multiplier scale given in the Second Schedule Table. It prescribes a lesser compensation for the cases where a higher multiplier of 18 is applicable and a larger compensation with reference to cases where a lesser multiplier of 15, 16, or 17 is applicable. From the quantum of compensation specified in the Table, it is possible to infer that a clerical error has crept in the Schedule and the ‘multiplier’ figures got wrongly typed as 15, 16, 17, 18, 17, 16, 15, 13, 11, 8, 5 and 5 instead of 20, 19, 18, 17, 16, 15, 14, 12, 10, 8, 6 and 5. From the quantum of compensation specified in the Table, it is possible to infer that a clerical error has crept in the Schedule and the ‘multiplier’ figures got wrongly typed as 15, 16, 17, 18, 17, 16, 15, 13, 11, 8, 5 and 5 instead of 20, 19, 18, 17, 16, 15, 14, 12, 10, 8, 6 and 5. Another noticeable incongruity is, having prescribed the notional minimum income of non-earning persons as Rs.15,000/- per annum, the Table prescribes the compensation payable even in cases where the annual income ranges between Rs.3,000/- and Rs.12,000/-. This leads to an anomalous position in regard to applications under Section 163-A of MV Act, as the compensation will be higher in cases where the deceased was idle and not having any income, than in cases where the deceased was honestly earning an income ranging between Rs.3,000/- and Rs.12,000/- per annum. Be that as it may. 24. The assumption of the appellants that the actual future pay revisions should be taken into account for the purpose of calculating the income is not sound. As against the contention of the appellants that if the deceased had been alive, he would have earned the benefit of revised pay scales, it is equally possible that if he had not died in the accident, he might have died on account of ill health or other accident, or lost the employment or met some other calamity or disadvantage. The imponderables in life are too many. Another significant aspect is the non-existence of such evidence at the time of accident. In this case, the accident and death occurred in the year 1988. The award was made by the Tribunal in the year 1993. The High Court decided the appeal in 2007. The pendency of the claim proceedings and appeal for nearly two decades is a fortuitous circumstance and that will not entitle the appellants to rely upon the two pay revisions which took place in the course of the said two decades. If the claim petition filed in 1988 had been disposed of in the year 1988-89 itself and if the appeal had been decided by the High Court in the year 1989-90, then obviously the compensation would have been decided only with reference to the scale of pay applicable at the time of death and not with reference to any future revision in pay scales. If the contention urged by the claimants is accepted, it would lead to the following situation: The claimants only could rely upon the pay scales in force at the time of the accident, if they are prompt in conducting the case. But if they delay the proceedings, they can rely upon the revised higher pay scales that may come into effect during such pendency. Surely, promptness cannot be punished in this manner. We therefore reject the contention that the revisions in pay scale subsequent to the death and before the final hearing should be taken note of for the purpose of determining the income for calculating the compensation." (ii) 2015 ACJ 598 [Neeta and others V. Divisional Manager, Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation], wherein in paragraphs 9, 10 and 12, it has been held as follows: "9. Further, in the case of Vimal Kanwar & Ors. v. Kishore Dan & Ors., 2013 ACJ 1441 (SC), this Court has held as under:- "31. In the case of New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Goplai, 2012 ACJ 2131 (SC), this Court had noticed that the High Court determined the compensation by granting 100 per cent increase in the income of the deceased. Taking into consideration the fact that in the normal course, the deceased would have served for 22 years and during that period his salary would have certainly doubled, upheld the judgment of the High Court...." Taking the principle laid down in the aforesaid case, the deceased would have served another 25 years, during that period their salary would have certainly doubled, which is the view taken by this Court in the case of New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Gopali & Ors., 2012 ACJ 2131 (SC). Keeping in view the aforesaid statement of law laid down in the aforesaid cases and monthly income of the deceased who were doing the skilled job of carpentry and added to that income, the income that was derived from the agricultural occupation from their agricultural land and future prospects as held by this Court in the above case, it would be just and proper for this Court to assess their monthly income at Rs.12,000/- p.m. each for the purpose of computation of loss of dependency. Further, in view of the law laid down by this Court in the case of Santosh Devi v. National Insurance Company Ltd. & Ors. Further, in view of the law laid down by this Court in the case of Santosh Devi v. National Insurance Company Ltd. & Ors. 2012 ACJ 1428 (SC), this Court has ruled that even in the case of private employment, the future prospects can be taken into consideration to determine the loss of dependency. Having regard to the age of the deceased, the same shall be added to the annual income of the deceased to determine the just and reasonable compensation under the heading of the loss of dependency. Therefore, it would be just and proper to take the aforesaid additional income from the agricultural occupation and future prospects as claimed by the appellants on the basis of speculation and presumption and apply the multiplier 16, as the same is applicable in view of the age of the deceased as 33 years as on the date of their death, which is sworn to by the witnesses who were examined before the Tribunal on behalf of the appellants, in respect of both the Claim Petitions before the Tribunal. Thus, the annual income of both the deceased would be Rs.1,44,000/- each. Deducting 1/4th of this amount towards their personal expenses, in order to determine the loss of dependency and keeping in view the age of the minor children, their widowed wives and the aged parents, as their units will be 4 and 5 respectively, as provided in the Sarla Verma (supra) case, the balance amount comes to Rs.1,08,000/- [(1,44,000/- (-) Rs.36,000/- (1/4th of Rs.1,44,000/-)]. Therefore, the loss of dependency of the appellants by applying the appropriate multiplier of 16, comes to Rs.17,28,000/- (Rs. 1,08,000/- X 16). 10. Further, we award Rs.1,00,000/- to each of the appellant-children, i.e. Rs.1,00,000/- and Rs.3,00,000/- respectively, as per the principles laid down by this Court in the case of Jiju Kuruvila & Ors. v. Kunjujamma Mohan & Ors., 2013 ACJ 2141 (SC), towards loss of love and affection of the deceased father. Further, an amount of Rs.50,000/- each is to be awarded to the parents of the deceased for the loss of love and affection of their deceased son as per the principles laid down by this Court in the case of M.Mansoor & Anr. v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., 2013 ACJ 2849 (SC). Further, an amount of Rs.50,000/- each is to be awarded to the parents of the deceased for the loss of love and affection of their deceased son as per the principles laid down by this Court in the case of M.Mansoor & Anr. v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., 2013 ACJ 2849 (SC). We further award Rs.25,000/- each towards funeral expenses of both the deceased as held by this Court in the case of Rajesh & Ors. v. Rajbir Singh & Ors., 2013 ACJ 1403 (SC). 12. In the result, the appellants shall be entitled to compensation under the following heads: Sl. No. Heads Claimants of Kallappa Claimants of Vijay 1 Loss of dependency Rs.17,28,000/- Rs.17,28,000/- 2 Funeral Expenses Rs. 25,000/- Rs. 25,000/- 3 Loss of love and affection (children) Rs. 1,00,000/- Rs. 3,00,000/- 4 Loss of love and affection (parents) Rs. 1,00,000/- Rs. 50,000/- 5 Loss of estate Rs. 1,00,000/- Rs. 1,00,000/- 6 Loss of consortium Rs. 1,00,000/- Rs. 1,00,000/- Total Rs.21,53,000/- Rs. 23,03,000/- (Emphasis supplied)" 15. The learned Senior Counsel for respondents 1 to 3 has further contended that the Tribunal erred in rejecting the evidence of respondents 1 to 4 that the deceased was earning R.10,000/- per month in his electrical business and erred in fixing the income at Rs.4,000/- per month. The amount granted for loss of consortium, love and affection, funeral expenses are very low. The learned senior counsel contended that now it is well settled that even without any cross appeal or separate appeal by the claimant, this Court has power to enhance compensation. Therefore prayed for dismissal of the appeal and prayed for enhancement of compensation. 16. I have carefully considered the rival submissions put forth by either side and perused the records. 17. The following points for consideration arises in this appeal: (i) Whether the accident took place as alleged by respondents 1 to 4; (ii) Whether the mini lorry belonging to respondents 5 and 6 was involved in the accident; (iii) Whether the delay in giving complaint to the police is fatal to the claim of respondents 1 to 4; (iv) Whether the driver of the mini lorry was responsible for the accident; and (v) Whether the compensation awarded is excessive as claimed by the appellant or whether it has to be enhanced as claimed by respondents 1 to 4. 18. Point Nos. 18. Point Nos. 1 to 4: (i) The respondents 1 to 4 has stated in their claim petition that the deceased was driving his vehicle slowly on the left hand side while a mini lorry driven by the driver of the respondents in a rash and negligent manner hit against the deceased and ran away from the place of accident. The deceased was given First Aid in private hospital, in Pudukottai and thereafter, he was given treatment in Vindothagan hospital at Thanjavur. In spite of intensive treatment given, the deceased died due to severe injuries suffered by him in the accident. The appellant has not denied the fact that the deceased was treated at Vindothagan hospital for the injuries suffered by him. Their contention is that immediately, after the accident, the same was not reported to the appellant as well as not informed to the hospital authorities at the time of admission in the hospital. (ii) The doctor, who treated the deceased at Vinodhagan hospital gave evidence that the hospital authorities were not informed about the accident. At the same time, the doctor has not spoken about the reason given by the relatives of deceased with regard to injuries suffered by the deceased. The learned counsel for the appellant vehemently contended relying on the Judgments reported in 2011 (2) TN MAC 78 (DB) (cited supra) that delay in giving complaint to the police is fatal. In that case, the accident took place on 01.5.2002 and complaint was given on 03.5.2002. Hospital authorities also did not inform the police about the accident. The said Judgment is not applicable to the facts of the present case. In that case, compensation was claimed for the injury and the claimant did not give evidence. Similarly, eye witnesses were also not examined. There was discrepancy in the version of claimants with regard to the nature of accident. (iii) On the other hand, in the present case, the respondents 1 to 4 have consistently stated and gave evidence as to how the accident took place. Further, D.W.2 eye-witness was examined and he gave evidence as to how the accident took place. The Tribunal considered the evidence and the Judgments relied on by the learned counsel for the appellant and came to a conclusion that there is sufficient valid reason for the delay in giving complaint and rejected the contentions of the appellant. Further, D.W.2 eye-witness was examined and he gave evidence as to how the accident took place. The Tribunal considered the evidence and the Judgments relied on by the learned counsel for the appellant and came to a conclusion that there is sufficient valid reason for the delay in giving complaint and rejected the contentions of the appellant. (iv) There is no infirmity or irregularity in the said finding. In addition to F.I.R, admission by the driver of mini lorry, respondents 1 to 4 have also examined P.W.2, the eyewitness and proved their case as to how the accident had taken place and the accident was only due to the rash and negligent driving of the driver of the mini lorry. (v) According to the appellant, large scale of bogus claims were made alleging that the accident by vehicles insured with the insurance company. The owner of the vehicle as well as claimants colluded and made this claim and therefore, complaints were given to CBCID, Regional Office, Coimbatore, in this regard. The claim petition filed by respondents 1 to 4 were kept pending awaiting the report by CBCID. No report was forthcoming. Therefore, the Tribunal having waited for a reasonable time has taken up the MCOP for final hearing and passed award in the year 2009. The appellants also engaged private investigator and in his oral evidence, he gave a different version as to how the accident took place. (vi) Taking into consideration of all the above facts, I hold that the accident took place only as alleged by respondents 1 to 4, that the mini lorry bearing Registration No.TN-69-2302 insured with the appellant was involved in the accident and the driver of the mini lorry caused the accident by his rash and negligent driving. All the points 1 to 4 are answered accordingly. 19. Point No.5: The respondents 1 to 4 claimed that the deceased was running an electrical shop to sell electrical items. Respondents 1 to 4 except marking documents for purchase of electrical goods have not filed any document to show the income of the deceased. The learned Judge has given a valid reasons for not accepting the claim of respondents 1 to 4 that the deceased was earning Rs.10,000/- per month. The Tribunal taking into account that the deceased was doing business, selling electrical goods fixed monthly income of the deceased at Rs.4,000/- per month. The learned Judge has given a valid reasons for not accepting the claim of respondents 1 to 4 that the deceased was earning Rs.10,000/- per month. The Tribunal taking into account that the deceased was doing business, selling electrical goods fixed monthly income of the deceased at Rs.4,000/- per month. The reasoning is proper and valid. Therefore, the compensation of Rs.5,50,800/- is not excessive as claimed by the appellant. It is just and proper compensation. The Tribunal granted Rs.2,000/- towards funeral expenses. The said sum is enhanced to Rs.10,000/-. The Tribunal took into account of the fact that the first respondent lost her husband at young age, but has granted Rs.10,000/- for loss of consortium. It is very low. The same has been enhanced to Rs.50,000/-. The Tribunal awarded a very low compensation of Rs.10,000/- each to respondents 2 and 3 towards loss of love and affection and the same is enhanced to Rs.50,000/- each. The compensation of Rs.20,000/- awarded to 4th respondent towards loss of love and affection is enhanced to Rs.50,000/-. Further, the Tribunal has not awarded any amount towards transport expenses. Admittedly, the deceased was initially treated at Pudukkottai and then taken to Thanjavur hospital. Therefore, a sum of Rs. 10,000/- is granted towards transport charges. Considering all these aspects, the award stands modified as follows: Sl. No. Head Amount awarded by the Tribunal Modified Award Modified/confirmed/added 1 Loss of income Rs.5,50,800/- Rs. 5,50,800/- confirmed 2 Loss of consortium Rs. 10,000/- Rs. 50,000/- modified 3 Loss of love and affection to children Rs. 20,000/- Rs. 1,00,000/- modified 4 Loss of love and affection to mother Rs. 20,000/- Rs. 50,000/- modified 5 Funeral expenses Rs. 2,000/- Rs. 10,000/- modified 6 Transport expenses - Rs. 10,000/- added Total Rs.6,02,800/- Rs. 7,70,800/- modified Rounded off to Rs.6,00,000/- Rs. 7,71,000/- - The award granted by the Tribunal is enhanced to Rs.7,70,800/- which is rounded off to Rs.7,71,000/-. 20. The learned counsel for the appellant argued that the respondents 1 to 4 cannot maintain claim petition both under Section 163-A and 166 of Motor Vehicles Act. It is well settled that claim petition both under Section 163-A as well as 166 is not maintainable simultaneously. When the claim is made under Section 163-A, claimant need not prove the fault, income or negligence and also can claim income of the injured or deceased up to Rs.40,000/-. It is well settled that claim petition both under Section 163-A as well as 166 is not maintainable simultaneously. When the claim is made under Section 163-A, claimant need not prove the fault, income or negligence and also can claim income of the injured or deceased up to Rs.40,000/-. They have to prove only the age of the injured or deceased. When claim is made under Section 166, claimant must prove the negligence, income, fault and age. 21. In the present case, in the claim petition, respondents 1 to 4 mentioned both Sections 163-A and 166 of Motor Vehicles Act. The Tribunal has held that the respondents 1 to 4 proved age and negligence on the part of the driver of the vehicle herein. They did not prove the income of the deceased by any documentary evidence. Therefore, the Tribunal has fixed the notional income as Rs.4,000/- per month based on the fact that the deceased was selling electrical goods. Therefore, it is clear that the Tribunal decided the claim petition only under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act. The contention of the appellant is not acceptable and hence, rejected. 22. For the reasons aforesaid, while dismissing the Civil Miscellaneous Appeal filed by the Appellant, the amount awarded by the Tribunal is enhanced to Rs.7,71,000/- (Rupees Seven lakhs seventy one thousand only), as total compensation. The appellant is directed to deposit the said amount, with interest @ 7.5% p.a. from the date of petition on Rs.6,00,000/- and on the enhanced amount from the date of this order, till the date of deposit, less the amount, if any, already deposited, within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this Judgment. On such deposit being made, the first respondent would be entitled to Rs.3,11,000/- and the respondents 2 and 3 would be entitled to Rs.1,90,000/- each, and the fourth respondent would be entitled to Rs.80,000/- with respective proportionate accrued interest and costs, less the amount, if any, already withdrawn. The Tribunal shall deposit the share of respondents 2 and 3, who are minor claimants, in a Fixed Deposit in any one of the Nationalised Banks, which shall be renewed periodically, till they attain majority. The Tribunal shall deposit the share of respondents 2 and 3, who are minor claimants, in a Fixed Deposit in any one of the Nationalised Banks, which shall be renewed periodically, till they attain majority. The first respondent – mother of the minors is permitted to withdraw interest on the share of her minor children, viz., respondents 2 and 3, once in three months from the bank directly. No costs.