JUDGMENT By the Court.—The learned Single Judge by the order which is impugned in the special appeal has held that the exercise of powers by the District Inspector of Schools while granting approval to the suspension of the third respondent was not in accordance with the provisions of Section 16-G (7) of the U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921. Accordingly, the order of suspension has been quashed and set aside. 2. In the present case, the third respondent is a Principal of an Inter College. On 2 February 2015, the Vice President of the College made a complaint to the District Inspector of Schools upon which a three member committee was appointed on 6 February 2015. Thereupon, the District Inspector of Schools directed the Manager to take action against the third respondent. On 23 February 2015, the Manager informed the District Inspector of Schools that a resolution had been passed on 22 February 2015 to suspend the third respondent, pending disciplinary proceedings. The District Inspector of Schools was moved by the Management for grant of approval under Section 16-G (7) of the Act. On 6 April 2015, approval was granted. In the meantime, in the disciplinary proceedings, a charge-sheet was issued on 2 March 2015 which was pasted at the premises of the third respondent on 17 March 2015 requiring him to submit his reply by 20 March 2015. The inquiry committee submitted its report on 20 March 2015 holding that the third respondent was guilty of the charges upon which he was terminated from service on 12 April 2015. The proceedings for approval are pending before the Selection Board. 3. The learned Single Judge came to the conclusion that the order passed by the District Inspector of Schools approving the suspension was not in accordance with the provisions of Section 16-G (7). 4. The District Inspector of Schools while deciding whether or not to grant approval under Section 16-G (7) is not expected to enter upon an elaborate discussion on the merits of the charges. The District Inspector of Schools is required to determine as to whether prima facie there is substance in the charges and whether the charges are serious enough to warrant suspension. Ordinarily at the stage when approval is sought, the disciplinary inquiry is still to be held. The District Inspector of Schools is not required to enter upon an elaborate discussion of the charges. Ordinarily at the stage when approval is sought, the disciplinary inquiry is still to be held. The District Inspector of Schools is not required to enter upon an elaborate discussion of the charges. At the same time, the District Inspector of Schools must indicate in brief his reasons for according or refusing to grant approval to show that there has been an application of mind. The requirement of obtaining approval under Section 16-G (7) is to ensure that the power to suspend is not used as a cloak to harass a teacher. In the present case, reading the order of the District Inspector of Schools dated 6 April 2015 as it stands, it is evident that while granting his approval, the District Inspector of Schools did not even prima facie consider the nature or substance of the charges nor did he indicate any reasons. Merely referring to the process which had been undertaken prior to the proposal for approval would not indicate any application of mind by the District Inspector of Schools to the facts of the case nor is it indicative of a prima facie evaluation of the nature of the charges. 5. The learned Single Judge has taken a view both on the law and facts which is consistent with the judgments of this Court and hence we see no reason to entertain the special appeal. At the same time, it is necessary for this Court to also clarify that the observations which are contained in the impugned order of the learned Single Judge in regard to the charges on which the disciplinary inquiry was held would not amount to a conclusive opinion nor would they be regarded as a conclusive pronouncement on the legality of the order of termination which has been passed in the meantime. 6. We find no substance in the submission that once an order of termination had been passed by the Management, there was no occasion for the learned Single Judge to entertain a writ petition challenging grant of approval to the order of suspension. The termination is still subject to the approval of the Selection Board which process is yet to be completed. The termination is still subject to the approval of the Selection Board which process is yet to be completed. The validity of the order of suspension has to be determined independently having due regard to the parameters of Section 16-G (7) and once the learned Single Judge held that the approval of the District Inspector of Schools was not in accordance with law, necessary consequences had to ensue. 7. In this view of the matter and subject to the clarification made above in regard to the observations contained in the impugned judgment and order of the learned Single Judge, we see no reason to interfere in the special appeal. 8. The special appeal is, accordingly, dismissed. 9. There shall be no order as to costs. ———————