JUDGMENT : 1. Admit. 2. Heard finally with the consent of the Counsel for the parties. 3. The question that arises for consideration in the present appeal is whether the Civil Court after holding that it has no jurisdiction to try the suit can direct return of the plaint for presenting the same before the proper forum. 4. This appeal filed under provisions of Order XLIII Rule 1(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short the Code) takes exception to the order passed by the trial Court whereby it has held that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to try the suit as filed and then directed the plaint to be returned to the plaintiff for being presented before the proper forum. 5. The facts relevant for adjudication of the appeal are that it is the case of the appellant that it is a society registered under provisions of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 and is also a public trust under provisions of the Maharashtra Public Trusts Act, 1950. It is running an educational institution since last many years and the same is being run on the basis of donations received by the trust from its members and other donors. A lease of land was granted to the appellant for construction of a School by the State Government. According to the appellant, it was exempted from payment of municipal taxes under provisions of the Maharashtra Municipal Corporations Act, 1949 (for short the said Act). However, the respondent – Corporation had issued a bill for current taxes as well as arrears of taxes for a sum of Rs.21,79,957/. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid demand which according to the appellant was illegal and without jurisdiction, it filed suit for declaration that said demand was illegal and without jurisdiction. A declaration was also sought that it was not liable to pay municipal taxes as the land and building was used for charitable purposes. A decree for permanent injunction was also sought seeking to restrain the Corporation from putting any seal on the building of the appellant – trust. 6. Along with the suit, the appellant also filed an application under provisions of Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 of the Code seeking temporary injunction so as to restrain the Corporation from taking any coercive action for recovery of the taxes as demanded. 6. Along with the suit, the appellant also filed an application under provisions of Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 of the Code seeking temporary injunction so as to restrain the Corporation from taking any coercive action for recovery of the taxes as demanded. The respondent filed an application vide Exhibit-30 under Section 9 of the Code pointing out that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to try and entertain the suit as an alternate statutory remedy was available under Section 406 of the said Act. This application was replied by the appellant asserting jurisdiction of the Civil Court. The trial Court on 16.6.2015 framed a preliminary issue as regards its jurisdiction to try and entertain the suit. The trial Court after hearing the parties by the impugned order dated 3.8.2015 came to the conclusion that the suit as filed for declaration was barred by law and that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to try and entertain the same. It held that remedy under Section 406 of the said Act was available and instead of filing an appeal under said provision, the suit in question had been filed which was barred by law. After coming to said conclusion, the trial Court directed the plaint to be returned to the plaintiff for being presented before the proper forum. This order is under challenge in the present appeal. 7. Shri A. R. Deshpande, the learned Counsel for the respondent raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the appeal on the ground that the order impugned had the effect of holding that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction whatsoever to entertain the suit as it was barred by law. In such situation, the aforesaid adjudication amounted to rejection of the plaint under Section 9A of the Code and, therefore, an appeal under Section 96 of the Code was maintainable. It was submitted that under provisions of Order VII Rule 10 of the Code, the plaint could not be directed to be returned for being presented before the proper forum and it could be returned only for being presented to the Court in which the suit should have been instituted. It was, therefore, submitted that against aforesaid adjudication appeal under provisions of Order XLIII Rule 1(a) of the Code was not maintainable. 8. It was, therefore, submitted that against aforesaid adjudication appeal under provisions of Order XLIII Rule 1(a) of the Code was not maintainable. 8. Shri M. G. Sarda, the learned Counsel for the appellant, however, submitted that considering the direction issued by the trial Court for returning the plaint for being presented before the proper forum, appeal under provisions of Order XLIII Rule 1(a) of the Code was maintainable. It was submitted that aforesaid provision providing remedy of appeal was clear and as the plaint had been directed to be returned, the present appeal was maintainable. He submitted that a somewhat similar direction was issued by the learned Single Judge in Greave Cotton Limited vs. Pimpri Chinchwad Municipal Corporation Ors., 2013 (6) ALL MR 871. It was, therefore, submitted that the appeal deserves to be entertained on merits. 9. Having heard the learned Counsel at length and having perused the material placed on record, I am of the view that though the present appeal is maintainable in view of the direction issued by the trial court to return the plaint, such direction could not have been issued in law. 10. As noted above, in the suit filed by the appellant, a declaration has been sought that the demand of municipal taxes by the respondent was illegal and without jurisdiction. On an objection being raised to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court, the trial Court came to the conclusion that in view of a remedy available under Section 406 of the said Act, the suit for declaration was barred by law. Perusal of the entire order passed by the trial Court below Exhibit-30 clearly indicates that it has come to the clear conclusion that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to consider the prayers as made in the suit was barred by law. 11. Since the trial Court has directed the plaint to be returned for presentation before the proper forum, reference to provisions of Order VII Rule 10(1) would be necessary. Said provisions reads thus: 10. Return of plaint.(1) [Subject to the provisions of Rule 10A, the plaint shall] at any stage of the suit be returned to be presented to the Court in which the suit should have been instituted. Said provisions reads thus: 10. Return of plaint.(1) [Subject to the provisions of Rule 10A, the plaint shall] at any stage of the suit be returned to be presented to the Court in which the suit should have been instituted. (Emphasis supplied on underlined portion) The aforesaid provision clearly indicates that the plaint can be returned to the plaintiff for being presented to the Court in which the suit should have been instituted. It is only when the Civil Court in which the suit has been filed comes to the conclusion that the plaint ought to be returned for presentation to another Court either on account of lack of its pecuniary and/or territorial jurisdiction that such direction can be given. This position is further clear from a reading of provisions of Order VII Rule 10A and Rule 10B of the Code. 12. The scheme of Rule 10 of Order VII of the Code is thus clear that the plaint can be directed to be returned only after the Court comes to the conclusion that the suit ought to have been instituted in another Court. If, however, the Civil Court comes to the conclusion that the suit as filed is barred by law due to which its cognizance cannot be taken by the Civil Court, the question of returning the plaint for its presentation to another Court in which the suit should have been instituted would not arise. It would then be a case of the jurisdiction of the civil Court being barred thereby precluding any contest on merits. If any statutory remedy under a statute is available to the plaintiff thereby resulting in a bar to the maintainability of the civil suit, the question of returning the plaint for being presented before the such forum would not arise. The expression “suit” as employed in Rule 10(1) of Order VII of the Code has a definite connotation and a statutory appeal under Section 406 of the said Act can hardly be equated with a suit under the Code. The finding that the civil court has no jurisdiction to entertain the subject matter of the suit has the force of a decree under Section 2(2) of the Code and, therefore, a remedy of appeal under Section 96 of the Code would be available. 13. The finding that the civil court has no jurisdiction to entertain the subject matter of the suit has the force of a decree under Section 2(2) of the Code and, therefore, a remedy of appeal under Section 96 of the Code would be available. 13. In Greave Cotton Limited (supra), the trial Court came to the conclusion that the civil suit was not maintainable in view of availability of a statutory remedy under Section 406 of the said Act. On appeal being filed by the plaintiff therein, the conclusion as arrived at by the Civil Court as regards lack of jurisdiction was upheld. Thereafter, on a prayer being made by the appellant therein that the plaint be directed to be returned so that its contents would be relied upon along with the memorandum of appeal before the Appellate Authority, this Court instead of dismissing the suit directed the plaint to be returned to enable the plaintiff therein to avail statutory remedy of appeal. Though the learned Counsel for the appellant sought to support the direction issued by the trial Court for returning the plaint for availing the statutory remedy by relying upon aforesaid decision, it is to be noted that the same is not the ratio of aforesaid judgment. Only on the request made by the Counsel for the plaintiff therein, the plaint was directed to be returned. Hence, aforesaid decision cannot assist the case of the appellant on the ground that similar course was followed by the trial Court. 14. At this stage, reference can be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in Raizada Topandas and another. vs. M/s Gorakhram Gokalchand, AIR 1964 SC 1348 wherein it was observed thus: “(7) In answering this question it is perhaps necessary to refer to the general principle which admittedly governs the question of jurisdiction at the inception of suits. This general principle has been well explained in the Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court, Ananti v. Channu, ILR 52 All 501: (AIR 1930 All 193) (FB) and has not been disputed before us. It was observed there: “The plaintiff chooses his forum and files his suit. If he establishes the correctness of his facts he will get his relief from the forum chosen. If............. It was observed there: “The plaintiff chooses his forum and files his suit. If he establishes the correctness of his facts he will get his relief from the forum chosen. If............. he frames his suit in a manner not warranted by the facts, and goes for his relief to a court which cannot grant him relief on the true facts he will have his suit dismissed. Then there will be no question of returning the plaint for presentation to the proper Court, for the plaint, as framed, would not justify the other kind of court to grant him the relief …............. If it is found, on a trial on the merits so far as this issue of jurisdiction goes, that the facts alleged by the plaintiff are not true and the facts alleged by the defendants are true, and that the case is not cognisable by the court, there will be two kinds of orders to be passed. If the jurisdiction is only one relating to territorial limits or pecuniary limits, the plaint will be ordered to be returned for presentation to the proper court. If, on the other hand, it is found that, having regard to the nature of the suit, it is not cognizable by the class of court to which the court belongs, the plaintiff's suit will have to be dismissed in its entirety.” Aforesaid principle has been followed by the Division Bench of this Court in Lt. Col. Anil Bhat and ors. vs. Citi Bank, Mumbai, 2009(3) Mh.L.J. 111 . 15. It is, therefore, clear that once the Civil Court comes to the conclusion that it has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit on the ground that the same is barred due to availability of a statutory remedy under a statute, there would be no occasion whatsoever to direct return of the plaint for being presented before the proper forum. Under provisions of Order VII Rule 10(1) of the Code, the plaint can be returned only for being presented before the Court in which the suit ought to have been instituted. Hence, direction No.2 in the operative order dated 3.8.2015 is without jurisdiction and the same is liable to be set aside. 16. Under provisions of Order VII Rule 10(1) of the Code, the plaint can be returned only for being presented before the Court in which the suit ought to have been instituted. Hence, direction No.2 in the operative order dated 3.8.2015 is without jurisdiction and the same is liable to be set aside. 16. Though the learned Counsel for the parties addressed the Court on the merits of the impugned order and also relied upon various decisions, since it has been found that the impugned order has the effect of dismissing the suit for want of jurisdiction, the remedy under Section 96 of the Code is available to the appellant. Moreover, during pendency of the present appeal, the pecuniary jurisdiction of the District Court stands enhanced with effect from 1.9.2015 and, therefore, it would be open for the appellant to prefer appeal before the District Court under Section 96 of the Code, if so advised for challenging the order impugned in this appeal. Hence, it is not necessary to record any findings on the merits of the challenge to the impugned order. 17. In view of aforesaid discussion, the following order is passed: ORDER (1) It is held that the order passed below Exhibit30 dated 3.8.2015 in Special Civil Suit No.67/2014 is an order dismissing the suit under Sections 9 and 9A of the Code against which remedy of appeal under Section 96 of the Code is available. (b) Direction no.2 in the impugned order dated 3.8.2015 is set aside. (c) As the present appeal was filed on 13.8.2015 within limitation, it would be open for the appellant to file appeal under Section 96 of the Code within a period of three weeks from today, if so advised. If such appeal is filed within a period of three weeks from today, the same shall be entertained on merits by the District Court. It is made clear that this Court has not examined the correctness of the conclusions as regards jurisdiction of the Civil Court that have been recorded by the trial Court. (d) With a view to enable the appellant to invoke the jurisdiction of the Appellate Court and seek interim relief, for a period of three weeks from today, no coercive steps shall be taken by the respondent in aforesaid matter. (e) The appeal is partly allowed in aforesaid terms but with no order as to costs.