JUDGMENT Sudhir Agarwal, J. 1. This appeal under Section 100 C.P.C. filed by plaintiff-appellant is barred by time by 138 days, hence application under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 seeking condonation thereof has been filed. 2. Heard Sri Karn Prakash Tiwari, Advocate, holding brief of Sri Rahul Sahai, learned counsel for the appellant-applicant. 3. A very vague and perfunctory explanation has been given in the affidavit accompanying delay condonation application, as is evident from the averments contained in paras 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the affidavit accompanying delay condonation application, which read as under : "2. That the judgment/decree dated 16.4.2009 passed in Appeal No.59/06 was not communicated to the plaintiffppellant and same was communicated to her and she got the knowledge of the appellate judgment when she visited her local counsel to enquire about the status of the case in the second week of May, 2009 and thereafter the judgment of the appellate court was applied for and obtained. 3. That after passing of the judgment and decree the plaintiffppellant who is having a rustic back ground and does not have social contact with educated people, who in turn could have advised her for challenging the impugned judgment and decree which was passed against him by filing an appeal kept mum for some time but in the last week of May, 2009 he was advised by one of her relative for filing an appeal before the Hon'ble High Court. 4. That the appellant contacted his local counsel and obtained the entire records with him and who advised to go to high court for filing of the appeal. 5. That appellant came to Allahabad in the first week of June 2009 and found that the High Court was closed and met with the person who said that he will file the second appeal and gave all the papers to him but later on it was discovered that the person was a fake and the contact number was also forged one and he did not file any appeal in the High Court." 4. In either way, neither name of advocate nor any details thereof have been given and in a very vague manner, it has been said that documents were given to some wrong person. The delay has not been explained satisfactorily. 5. In either way, neither name of advocate nor any details thereof have been given and in a very vague manner, it has been said that documents were given to some wrong person. The delay has not been explained satisfactorily. 5. The expression "sufficient cause" in Section 5 of Act, 1963 has been held to receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and generally a delay in preferring appeal, revision etc. may be condoned in interest of justice where no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fide is imputable to parties, seeking condonation of delay. In Collector, Land Acquisition Vs. Katiji, 1987(2) SCC 107 , the Court said, that, when substantial justice and technical considerations are taken against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred, for, the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non deliberate delay. The Court further said that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. 6. In P.K. Ramachandran Vs. State of Kerala, AIR 1998 SC 2276 the Court said: "Law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribe and the Courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds." 7. The Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy rights of parties. They virtually take away the remedy. They are meant with the objective that parties should not resort to dilatory tactics and sleep over their rights. They must seek remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. The statute relating to limitation determines a life span for such legal remedy for redress of the legal injury, one has suffered. Time is precious and the wasted time would never revisit. During efflux of time, newer causes would come up, necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a life span must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The statute providing limitation is founded on public policy. During efflux of time, newer causes would come up, necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a life span must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The statute providing limitation is founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim Interest reipublicae up sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). It is for this reason that when an action becomes barred by time, the Court should be slow to ignore delay for the reason that once limitation expires, other party matures his rights on the subject with attainment of finality. Though it cannot be doubted that refusal to condone delay would result in foreclosing the suiter from putting forth his cause but simultaneously the party on the other hand is also entitled to sit and feel carefree after a particular length of time, getting relieved from persistent and continued litigation. 8. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the court is always deliberate. No person gains from deliberate delaying a matter by not resorting to take appropriate legal remedy within time but then the words "sufficient cause" show that delay, if any, occurred, should not be deliberate, negligent and due to casual approach of concerned litigant, but, it should be bona fide, and, for the reasons beyond his control, and, in any case should not lack bona fide. If the explanation does not smack of lack of bona fide, the Court should show due consideration to the suiter, but, when there is apparent casual approach on the part of suiter, the approach of Court is also bound to change. Lapse on the part of litigant in approaching Court within time is understandable but a total inaction for long period of delay without any explanation whatsoever and that too in absence of showing any sincere attempt on the part of suiter, would add to his negligence, and would be relevant factor going against him. 9. I need not to burden this judgment with a catena of decisions explaining and laying down as to what should be the approach of Court on construing "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of Act, 1963 and it would be suffice to refer a very few of them besides those already referred. 10. In Shakuntala Devi Jain Vs. 9. I need not to burden this judgment with a catena of decisions explaining and laying down as to what should be the approach of Court on construing "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of Act, 1963 and it would be suffice to refer a very few of them besides those already referred. 10. In Shakuntala Devi Jain Vs. Kuntal Kumari, AIR 1969 SC 575 a three Judge Bench of the Court said, that, unless want of bona fide of such inaction or negligence as would deprive a party of the protection of Section 5 is proved, the application must not be thrown out or any delay cannot be refused to be condoned. 11. The Privy Council in Brij Indar Singh Vs. Kanshi Ram, ILR (1918) 45 Cal 94 observed that true guide for a court to exercise the discretion under Section 5 is whether the appellant acted with reasonable diligence in prosecuting the appeal. This principle still holds good, inasmuch as, the aforesaid decision of Privy Council has repeatedly been referred to, and, recently in State of Nagaland Vs. Lipok AO and others, AIR 2005 SC 2191 . 12. In Vedabai @ Vaijayanatabai Baburao Vs. Shantaram Baburao Patil and others, JT 2001(5) SC 608 the Court said that under Section 5 of Act, 1963 it should adopt a pragmatic approach. A distinction must be made between a case where the delay is inordinate and a case where the delay is of a few days. In the former case consideration of prejudice to the other side will be a relevant factor so the case calls for a more cautious approach but in the latter case no such consideration may arise and such a case deserves a liberal approach. No hard and fast rule can be laid down in this regard and the basic guiding factor is advancement of substantial justice. 13. In Pundlik Jalam Patil (dead) by LRS. Vs. Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project and Anr. (2008) 17 SCC 448 , in para 17 of the judgment, the Court said : "...The evidence on record suggests neglect of its own right for long time in preferring appeals. The court cannot enquire into belated and state claims on the ground of equity. Delay defeats equity. The court helps those who are vigilant and "do not slumber over their rights." 14. In Maniben Devraj Shah Vs. The court cannot enquire into belated and state claims on the ground of equity. Delay defeats equity. The court helps those who are vigilant and "do not slumber over their rights." 14. In Maniben Devraj Shah Vs. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, 2012 (5) SCC 157 , in para 18 of the judgment, the Court said as under: "What needs to be emphasised is that even though a liberal and justice oriented approach is required to be adopted in the exercise of power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and other similar statutes, the Courts can neither become oblivious of the fact that the successful litigant has acquired certain rights on the basis of the judgment under challenge and a lot of time is consumed at various stages of litigation apart from the cost. What colour the expression 'sufficient cause' would get in the factual matrix of a given case would largely depend on bona fide nature of the explanation. If the Court finds that there has been no negligence on the part of the applicant and the cause shown for the delay does not lack bona fides, then it may condone the delay. If, on the other hand, the explanation given by the applicant is found to be concocted or he is thoroughly negligent in prosecuting his cause, then it would be a legitimate exercise of discretion not to condone the delay." 15. In my view, the kind of explanation rendered in the case in hand does not satisfy the observations of Apex Court that if delay has occurred for reasons which does not smack of mala fide, the Court should be reluctant to refuse condonation. On the contrary, I find that here is a case which shows a complete careless and reckless long delay on the part of applicant, which has remained virtually unexplained at all. Therefore, I do not find any reason to exercise my judicial discretion exercising judiciously so as to justify condonation of delay in the present case. 16. However, I permitted learned counsel for the appellant to address the Court under Order 41, Rule 11 C.P.C. so that if there is any substantial issue, that may not go unadjudicated for technical reasons. 17. 16. However, I permitted learned counsel for the appellant to address the Court under Order 41, Rule 11 C.P.C. so that if there is any substantial issue, that may not go unadjudicated for technical reasons. 17. This is plaintiff's second appeal under Section 100 C.P.C. The plaintiff instituted Original Suit No.757 of 2001 for recovery, which has proceeded ex parte but the appellant failed to prove his case at all. Consequently, the Trial Court i.e. Civil Judge (Senior Division) Mathura, dismissed the suit vide judgment and decree dated 29.07.2005 whereagainst plaintiff preferred Civil Appeal No. 59 of 2006. Lower Appellate Court having concurred with the findings recorded by Trial Court, decided the same against plaintiff-appellant and dismissed the appeal vide judgment and decree dated 16.04.2014. 18. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that both the Courts below have not examined evidence properly and the view taken by Courts below is not correct. 19. So far as contention that evidence has not been examined, despite repeated query, learned counsel for the appellant could not point out as to which evidence has been misread or relevant evidence has been omitted or impermissible evidence has been taken into account. Except of oral argument he could not point out anything from record. 20. Similarly the contention that view taken by Courts below is not correct by itself will not give rise to even a question of law what to say of a substantial question of law. This Court will not sit as if it is considering a regular first appeal so as to examine the entire matter on facts and law both. The scope of appeal under Section 100 C.P.C. is very limited and this Court shall enter upon the matter only when there has arisen a substantial question of law and not otherwise. What is "substantial question of law" is no more res integra, having been settled by Apex Court in Santosh Hazari Vs. Purushottam Tiwari, 2001(3) SCC 179 . The decision in Santosh Hazari (supra) has been followed in Thiagarajan and others Vs. Sri Venugopalswamay B. Koll and others, AIR 2004 SC 1913 and Govindaraju Vs. Mariamman, 2005(2) SCC 500 . This aspect has also been considered recently by Apex Court in Vijay Kumar Talwar Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, New Delhi (2011) 1 SCC 763 and Union of India Vs. Ibrahim Uddin & Anr. (2012) 8 SCC 148 . Sri Venugopalswamay B. Koll and others, AIR 2004 SC 1913 and Govindaraju Vs. Mariamman, 2005(2) SCC 500 . This aspect has also been considered recently by Apex Court in Vijay Kumar Talwar Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, New Delhi (2011) 1 SCC 763 and Union of India Vs. Ibrahim Uddin & Anr. (2012) 8 SCC 148 . The above authorities have also been followed by this Court recently in State of U.P. & Ors. Vs. Shanti Devi & Ors., 2013 (4) ALJ 383 . 21. In the case in hand, both the Courts below have considered the issues and recorded concurrent findings of fact. Learned counsel for the appellant could not point out any manifest error or illegality in the judgments impugned in this second appeal which may give rise to any substantial question of law warranting adjudication by this court. Since no substantial question of law has been shown to have arisen in this matter, this appeal deserves to be dismissed at this stage under Order 41 Rule 11 C.P.C. 22. The appeal is accordingly dismissed involving no substantial question of law as also being barred by limitation.