JUDGMENT Hon’ble Vipin Sinha, J.—Heard learned Additional Government Advocate, learned counsel for the respondents and perused the record. 2. With the consent of learned counsel for the parties, the present Government appeal is being heard finally. 3. As per the report of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Mirzapur dated 3.1.2015 one of the accused-respondent, namely, Yogendra Singh has already expired and the appeal inasmuch it pertains to respondent No. 6 stands abated. 4. The present Government appeal arises out of the judgment and order dated 24.12.1988 passed by Chief Judicial Magistrate, Mirzapur in criminal case No. 1449 of 1983 whereby accused-respondents, namely, Kailash Nath Khatri, S.N. Singh, J.S. Bhatiya, Om Prakash, Mahesh Chandra Agarwal and Yogendra Singh have been acquitted for the offence under Sections 147, 323/149, 342/149, 332/149 I.P.C. 5. Brief facts of the case are that respondents had assaulted the officiating manager Vijay Kumar of the Canara Bank. It is further submitted that accused-respondent Om Prakash is an employee of Central Bank while accused-respondent Kailash Nath Khatri is a Guard in the Canara Bank. There was some dispute with regard to an employee and in pursuance of which the said accused-respondents had assaulted the Manager and inflicted injuries on his person, however, the injuries are simple in nature. 6. Perusal of the judgment and order dated 24.12.1988 shows that the trial Court has recorded categorical findings after perusing the entire evidence on record. There was some dispute with regard to an employee and in pursuance of which the said accused-respondents had assaulted the Manager and inflicted injuries on his person, however, the injuries are simple in nature. 6. Perusal of the judgment and order dated 24.12.1988 shows that the trial Court has recorded categorical findings after perusing the entire evidence on record. Perusal of the judgement also shows that it is a very elaborate order where the entire evidence has been discussed threadbare and thereafter following categorical findings are recorded : **fot; dqekj us viuh ftjg es ;g Lohdkj fd;k gS fd mlds mij dSyk'k ukFk [k=h ds fjiksVZ ij /kkjk 332 Hkk0na0la0 dk eqdnek py jgk gS rFkk dzkl ds'k ds vkjksi i= dh udy izn'kZ [k&1] dzkl dsl dh ,Q0vkbZ0vkj0 dh udy izn'kZ [k&1 v ds voyksdu ls tkfgj gS fd fot; dqekj dzkl ds'k esa vfHk;qDr gS rFkk bl eqdnesa ds vfHk;qDrx.k dzkl ds'k es xokg gSaA ,slh fLFkfr esa vfHk;ksxh fot; dqekj ,d fgr&cnzèk xokg gS vkSj mlds c;ku ds vkèkkj ij ;g ugh dgk tk ldrk gS fd vfHk;qDrx.k izFke vkdzked FksA rgjhjh fjiksVZ izn'kZ d&1 rFkk ih0MCyw&1 fot; dqekj ds c;ku ls ;g tkfgj gksrk gS fd dfFkr ?kVuk ds le; ek= xokg okbZ0 ds0 flag ekStwn Fkk ysfdu Jh okbZ0ds0 flag dk c;ku izLrqr eqdnesa esa ugh djk;k x;k gSA ,slh fLFkfr esa ih0MCyw&1 fot; dqekj dh lk{; dk leFkZu fdlh vU; xokg dh lk{; ls ugh feyrk vkSj ml n'kk esa fcuk fdlh vU; LoraU= lk{; ds leFkZu ds ek= fot; dqekj dh lk{; ds vk/kkj ij tks fd dzkl ds'k esa vfHk;qDr gSA vfHk;qDrx.k dks izFke vkdzked ugh dgk tk ldrk gSA rgjhjh fjiksVZ esa dsoy vfHk;qDrx.k vkse izdk'k] ts0,l0 HkkfV;k] ,l0,u0 flag0] dSyk'k ukFk [k=h dk uke gh vafdr vkSj egs'k pUn o ;ksxsUnz flag dk uke vafdr ugh gS vkSj bu nksuks vfHk;qDrx.k dh dk;Zokgh f'kuk[r vfHk;ksxh n~okjk ugh djk;h x;h gSA ih0MCyw&1 fot; dqekj us viuh ftjg es dgk gS fd mu yksxks dk uke ckn es nwljs yksxks ls irk pyk ysfdu irk pyus ds rqjUr ckn Hkh mlus dksbZ nj[kkLr ugh fn;k cfYd 10&15 fnu ckn bu yksxks ds ckj esa nj[kkLr fn;kA ,slh n'kk esa tc fd egs'k pUn o ;ksxsUnz flag dk uke rgjhjh fjiksVZ esa vafdr ugh Fkk vkSj vfHk;ksxh budks ?kVuk ds le; uke ls ugh tkurk Fkk rks budh dk;Zokgh f'kuk[r djokuh pkfg, FkhA ysfdu vfHk;kstu i{k dh rjQ ls ,slh dksbZ dk;Zokgh ugh dh x;h gSA pwafd ,Q0vkbZ0vkj0 esa vfHk;ksxh fot; dqekj us eqyfte dks NM+ rFkk ikuh ds crZu ls ekjuk fy[kk;k gS ysfdu ih0MCyw0&1 fot; dqekj vfHk;ksxh us vius U;k;ky; esa gksus okys c;ku esa NM+ vkSj ikuh ds crZu esa yxs gq, NM+ dks ,d gh crk;k gS tc fd ;g nksuks ,d nwljs ls fHkUurk j[krk gSA vfHk;kstu i{k ds ds'k ds vuqlkj ?kVuk fnu esa 1-40 cts dh dgh tkrh gSA rFkk vfHk;qDr i{k ds dsl ds vuqlkj ?kVuk 2 cts fnu dh gSA ih0MCyw&1 fot; dqekj us viuh ftjg es dgk gS fd ekjihV 2 cts 'kq: gqbZ Fkh] bles Hkh vfHk;kstu i{k dh ds'k lUnsgkLin gks tkrh gS rFkk vfHk;qDrx.k dh ds'k LokHkkfod izrhr gksrh gSA ih0MCyw&1 fot; dqekj us viuh ftjg es ;g Hkh dgk gS fd ;skxsUnz flag gkFk es dM+k igus gq;s Fkk ysfdu ;g ckr u rks rgjhjh fjiksVZ es vafdr gS vkSj u rks foospuk vf/kdkjh ds le{k gh ,slk c;ku fn;k x;k gSA ,slh fLFkfr es mijksDr c;ku LokHkkfod ugha yxrkA** 7. The Court below has further recorded the following findings that : ^^ih0MCyw&3 Mk0 ,l0,u0 flag ds c;ku ls tkfgj gksrk gS fd vfHk;qDr dSyk'k [k=h ds 'kjhj ij pksVsa vk;h Fkh tks ?kVuk ds le; gh gks ldrh gSa rFkk ih0MCyw&1 vfHk;ksxh fot; dqekj us viuh ftjg esa dgk gS fd ds0,u0 [k=h dks ?kVuk ds le; xqLls esa ekjkihVk ugh Fkk bl rjg vfHk;ksxh fot; dqekj us vfHk;qDr dSyk'k ukFk ds 'kjhj ij vk;h gqbZ pksVksa dk Li"Vhdj.k ugh fn;k gSA blls tkfgj gksrk gS fd xokg fot; dqekj ?kVuk dk lgh fooj.k ugh crkrk gSA bl rjg ls Hkh vfHk;kstu i{k dh ds'k lUnsgkLin gks tkrh gSA** 8. Similarly the Court below has also observed that there are a number of contradictions in the statement of the witnesses, while acquitting the accused-respondents and thus it is apparent that the Court below has given cogent reasons and findings for acquittal. 9. It is not being disputed that the stand taken by the trial Court is duly supported by the evidence on record and it cannot be said that the view taken by the trial Court is absolutely perverse or illegal. 10. However, be as it may, in view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case, it cannot be said that the view taken by the Court below is not possible and thus the judgment of the Court below cannot be interfered with by this Court only on account of the fact that another view is possible. 11. Learned A.G.A. has not been able to point out any illegality or perversity with the findings as recorded by the Court below and thus it cannot be said that the view taken by Trial Court is a perverse view. 12. Regard may also be had to the consistent legal position with regard to the scope and interference by the High Court in the judgement and order of acquittal. The Apex Court in the case of Murlidhar @ Gidda and another v. State of Karnataka, decided on 9.4.2014 in Criminal Appeal No. 791 of 2011 has observed as under: “The Supreme Court started by citing Lord Russell in Sheo Swarup highlighted the approach of the High Court as an appellate Court hearing the appeal against acquittal. The Apex Court in the case of Murlidhar @ Gidda and another v. State of Karnataka, decided on 9.4.2014 in Criminal Appeal No. 791 of 2011 has observed as under: “The Supreme Court started by citing Lord Russell in Sheo Swarup highlighted the approach of the High Court as an appellate Court hearing the appeal against acquittal. Lord Russell said,.....”the High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as: (1) The views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses; (2) The presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial; (3) The right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt; and (4) The slowness of an appellate Court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses.” The opinion of the Lord Russell has been followed over the years. 11. As early as in 1952, this Court in Surajpal Singh[2] while dealing with the powers of the High Court in an appeal against acquittal under Section 417 of the Criminal Procedure Code observed, “..........the High Court has full power to review the evidence upon which the order of acquittal was founded, but it is equally well-settled that the presumption of innocence of the accused is further reinforced by his acquittal by the trial Court, and the findings of the trial Court which had the advantage of seeing the witnesses and hearing their evidence can be reversed only for very substantial and compelling reasons.” 12. The approach of the appellate Court in the appeal against acquittal has been dealt with by this Court in Tulsiram Kanu[3], Madan Mohan Singh[4], Atley[5], Aher Raja Khima[6], Balbir Singh[7], M.G. Agarwal[8], Noor Khan[9], Khedu Mohton[10], Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade[11], Lekha Yadav[12], Khem Karan[13], Bishan Singh[14], Umedbhai Jadavbhai[15], K. Gopal Reddy[16], Tota Singh[17], Ram Kumar[18], Madan Lal[19], Sambasivan[20], Bhagwan Singh[21], Harijana Thirupala[22], C. Antony[23], K. Gopalakrishna[24], Sanjay Thakran[25] and Chandrappa[26]. It is not necessary to deal with these cases individually. It is not necessary to deal with these cases individually. Suffice it to say that this Court has consistently held that in dealing with appeals against acquittal, the appellate Court must bear in mind the following: (i) There is presumption of innocence in favour of an accused person and such presumption is strengthened by the order of acquittal passed in his favour by the trial Court, (ii) The accused person is entitled to the benefit of reasonable doubt when it deals with the merit of the appeal against acquittal, (iii) Though, the power of the appellate Court in considering the appeals against acquittal are as extensive as its powers in appeals against convictions but the appellate Court is generally loath in disturbing the finding of fact recorded by the trial Court. It is so because the trial Court had an advantage of seeing the demeanor of the witnesses. If the trial Court takes a reasonable view of the facts of the case, interference by the appellate Court with the judgment of acquittal is not justified. Unless, the conclusions reached by the trial Court are palpably wrong or based on erroneous view of the law or if such conclusions are allowed to stand, they are likely to result in grave injustice, the reluctance on the part of the appellate Court in interfering with such conclusions is fully justified, and (iv) Merely because the appellate Court on re-appreciation and re-evaluation of the evidence is inclined to take a different view, interference with the judgment of acquittal is not justified if the view taken by the trial Court is a possible view. The evenly balanced views of the evidence must not result in the interference by the appellate Court in the judgment of the trial Court. 13. Reference may also be made to the case of Basappa v. State of Karnataka, decided on 27.2.2014 passed in Criminal Appeal No. 512 of 2014, wherein the Apex Court has observed as under: “8. The High Court in an appeal under Section 378 of Cr.PC is entitled to reappraise the evidence and conclusions drawn by the trial Court, but the same is permissible only if the judgment of the trial Court is perverse, as held by this Court in Gamini Bala Koteswara Rao and others v. State of Andhra Pradesh through Secretary[1]. To quote: “14. To quote: “14. We have considered the arguments advanced and heard the matter at great length. It is true, as contended by Mr Rao, that interference in an appeal against an acquittal recorded by the trial Court should be rare and in exceptional circumstances. It is, however, well-settled by now that it is open to the High Court to reappraise the evidence and conclusions drawn by the trial Court but only in a case when the judgment of the trial Court is stated to be perverse. The word “perverse” in terms as understood in law has been defined to mean “against the weight of evidence”. We have to see accordingly as to whether the judgment of the trial Court which has been found perverse by the High Court was in fact so.” (Emphasis supplied) 9. It is also not the case of the prosecution that the judgment of the trial Court is based on no material or that it suffered from any legal infirmity in the sense that there was non-consideration or misappreciation of the evidence on record. Only in such circumstances, reversal of the acquittal by the High Court would be justified. In K. Prakashan v. P.K. Surenderan [2], it has also been affirmed by this Court that the appellate Court should not reverse the acquittal merely because another view is possible on the evidence. In T. Subramanian v. State of Tamil Nadu [3], it has further been held by this Court that if two views are reasonably possible on the very same evidence, it cannot be said that the prosecution has proved the case beyond reasonable doubt. 10. In Bhim Singh v. State of Haryana [4], it has been clarified that interference by the appellate Court against an order of acquittal would be justified only if the view taken by the trial Court is one which no reasonable person would in the given circumstances, take. 11. In Kallu alias Masih and others v. State of Madhya Pradesh [5], it has been held by this Court that if the view taken by the trial Court is a plausible view, the High Court will not be justified in reversing it merely because a different view is possible. To quote: “8. While deciding an appeal against acquittal, the power of the appellate Court is no less than the power exercised while hearing appeals against conviction. To quote: “8. While deciding an appeal against acquittal, the power of the appellate Court is no less than the power exercised while hearing appeals against conviction. In both types of appeals, the power exists to review the entire evidence. However, one significant difference is that an order of acquittal will not be interfered with, by an appellate Court, where the judgment of the trial Court is based on evidence and the view taken is reasonable and plausible. It will not reverse the decision of the trial Court merely because a different view is possible. The appellate Court will also bear in mind that there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused and the accused is entitled to get the benefit of any doubt. Further, if it decides to interfere, it should assign reasons for differing with the decision of the trial Court.” (Emphasis supplied) 12. In Ramesh Babulal Doshi v. State of Gujarat [6], this Court has taken the view that while considering the appeal against acquittal, the appellate Court is first required to seek an answer to the question whether the findings of the trial Court are palpably wrong, manifestly erroneous or demonstrably unsustainable and if the Court answers the above question in negative, the acquittal cannot be disturbed. 14. The exercise of power under Section 378 of Cr.PC by the Court is to prevent failure of justice or miscarriage of justice. There is miscarriage of justice if an innocent person is convicted; but there is failure of justice if the guilty is let scot-free. As cautioned by this Court in State of Punjab v. Karnail Singh[8]: “6. There is no embargo on the appellate Court reviewing the evidence upon which an order of acquittal is based. Generally, the order of acquittal shall not be interfered with because the presumption of innocence of the accused is further strengthened by acquittal. The golden thread which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. The paramount consideration of the Court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is prevented. The paramount consideration of the Court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is prevented. A miscarriage of justice which may arise from acquittal of the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent. In a case where admissible evidence is ignored, a duty is cast upon the appellate Court to reappreciate the evidence even where the accused has been acquitted, for the purpose of ascertaining as to whether any of the accused committed any offence or not. ...” 14. Last but not the least, reference may also be made to the recent judgement of Supreme Court in the case of Ashok Rai v. State of U.P. and others, Decided on 15.4.2014 in Criminal Appeal No. 1508 of 2005. “8. Several Judgments of this Court have been cited on the principles which should guide the Court while dealing with an appeal against order of acquittal. The law is so well-settled that it is not necessary to refer to those judgments. Suffice it to say that the appellate Court has to be very cautious while reversing an order of acquittal because order of acquittal strengthens the presumption of innocence of the accused. If the view taken by the trial Court is a reasonably possible view it should not be disturbed, because the appellate Court feels that some other view is also possible. A perverse order of acquittal replete with gross errors of facts and law will have to be set aside to prevent miscarriage of justice, because just as the Court has to give due weight to the presumption of innocence and see that innocent person is not sentenced, it is equally the duty of the Court to see that the guilty do not escape punishment. Unless the appellate Court finds the order of acquittal to be clearly unreasonable and is convinced that there are substantial and compelling reasons to interfere with it, it should not interfere with it.” 15. Reference may also be made to a judgment rendered in the case Ramesh Harijan v. State of U.P., 2012 AIR SCW 2990, wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed as under: “only in exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances and the judgment in appeal is found to be perverse, the appellate Court can interfere with the order of the acquittal. The appellate Court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial Court’s acquittal bolsters the presumption of innocence. Interference in a routine manner where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for interference.” 16. Reference may also be made to another judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court rendered in the case of Murugesan v. State through Inspector of Police, 2012 AIR SCW 5627, wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed as under: “the reversal of the acquittal could have been made by the High Court only if the conclusions recorded by the learned trial Court did not reflect a possible view. The use of the expression “possible view” is conscious and not without good reasons. The said expression is in contradistinction to expressions such as “erroneous view” or “wrong view”. A possible view denotes an opinion which can exist or be formed irrespective of the correctness or otherwise of such an opinion. A view taken by a Court lower in the hierarchical structure may be termed as erroneous or wrong by a superior Court upon a mere disagreement. But such a conclusion of the higher Court would not take the view rendered by the subordinate Court outside the arena of a possible view. The correctness or otherwise of any conclusion reached by a Court has to be tested on the basis of what the superior judicial authority perceives to be the correct conclusion. A possible view, on the other hand, denotes a conclusion which can reasonably be arrived at regardless of the fact where it is agreed upon or not by the higher Court. The fundamental distinction between the two situations have to be kept in mind. So long as the view taken by the trial Court can be reasonably formed, regardless of whether the High Court agrees with the same or not, the view taken by the trial Court cannot be interdicted and that of the High Court supplanted over and above the view of the trial Court.” 17. Thus in view of aforesaid consistent legal position as elaborated above and also in view of the fact that learned A.G.A. has failed to point out any illegality or perversity with the findings so recorded in the impugned order, no case for interference has been made out. 18. Thus in view of aforesaid consistent legal position as elaborated above and also in view of the fact that learned A.G.A. has failed to point out any illegality or perversity with the findings so recorded in the impugned order, no case for interference has been made out. 18. It is an established position of law that if the Court below has taken a view which is a possible view in a reasonable manner, then the same shall not be interfered with moreso in view of the fact that more than 25 years have already elapsed as the incident is of the year 1983. 19. On a bare perusal of the judgement and order dated 24.12.1988, it cannot be said that the view taken by the trial Court is not a possible view or a feasible view that could be taken by a reasonable person. Moreover as no illegality or perversity has been pointed out, this Court refuses to grant any indulgence whatsoever to the appellant-State. 20. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstance of the case, the appeal is dismissed. 21. Consequences to follow. 22. Let a copy of this order be certified to the Court concerned. ———————