JUDGMENT Anjani Kumar Mishra, J. 1. Heard Sri A.D. Singh learned Counsel for the petitioners and learned Standing Counsel for the State respondents. This writ petition has been filed seeking a writ of certiorari for quashing the order dated 25.6.2015 passed by the District Magistrate, Firozabad. 2. By this order the petitioner (Pradhan) has been directed to deposit a sum of Rs. 27,500/- failing which the same is to be recovered as arrears of land revenue. Further in exercise of power under section 95(1)(g) of the Panchayat Raj Act the financial powers of the Pradhan had been curtailed. This order has been passed upon a finding that the petitioner (the Pradhan) and the Lekhpal had collected Rs. 55,000/- as illegal gratification for making allotments in favour of the villagers. Since both the parties have been found guilty, a direction for deposit of half of the aforementioned amount from each of them and therefore, half of Rs. 55,000/- is to be recovered from the petitioner. 3. It has been submitted by learned Counsel for the petitioner that on complaints received from some villagers a preliminary enquiry was held and on the basis of the findings therein an order of recovery was passed against the petitioner. Aggrieved by the said order the petitioner preferred a Writ Petition No. 15960 of 2014. The said writ petition was entertained and the effect and operation of the impugned order therein, dated 26.2.2014 was stayed. It was further directed that the on going enquiry proceedings against the petitioner be concluded expeditiously, preferably within a period two months from the date of production of certified copy of the order. 4. Learned Counsel for the petitioner contends that in pursuance of the directions contained in the order dated 25.3.2014 an enquiry was held and enquiry report was submitted. This enquiry report was submitted on 11.7.2014 and communication in this regard was sent on 21.7.2014. 5. It appears that yet another enquiry report was prepared. This enquiry is said to have been concluded on 1.10.2014 and the same was submitted along with a covering letter dated 22.10.2014. A show-cause notice was issued to the petitioner relying upon this second enquiry report. 6. The petitioner submitted his reply on 9.2.2015 denying the allegations made against him, yet the impugned order was passed by the respondent No. 2.
A show-cause notice was issued to the petitioner relying upon this second enquiry report. 6. The petitioner submitted his reply on 9.2.2015 denying the allegations made against him, yet the impugned order was passed by the respondent No. 2. The contention therefore, is that there is no explanation as to why and how a second enquiry was conducted after submission of the first enquiry report. The opposite party No. 2 while passing the impugned order has not referred to the first enquiry report which was in favour of the petitioner, which vitiates the impugned order. 7. Learned Counsel for the petitioner further submits that the impugned order is mala fide and has been passed on account of political considerations and the same is therefore liable to be set aside. 8. Learned Standing Counsel on the other hand has supported the impugned order. 9. I have considered the submissions made by learned Counsel for the parties and have perused the record. 10. At the very out set, it would be very relevant to note that by the order dated 26.2.2014 apart from other directions, the Deputy Director Agriculture (Prasaran) and the Executive Rural Engineer Services, Firozabad, were nominated as the enquiry officers. 11. The first enquiry report relied upon by the petitioner which exonerated him of the charges has been filed on record as Annexure 10 to the writ petition. Perusal of this report, indicates that it was submitted by the Deputy Director and the Assistant Engineer of the Rural Engineering Department, Firoza-bad. It is therefore, abundantly clear that this report was not submitted by the persons who were nominated as the enquiry officers. It was the Executive Engineer of the Rural Engineering Department and not its Assistant Engineer who had been nominated as the Enquiry Officer along with Deputy Director, Agriculture Prashanskaran. 12. Under the circumstances, the first enquiry report exonerating the petitioner could not have been relied upon. It therefore, follows that the second enquiry which is, in fact, by the persons nominated as enquiry officers, was rightly relied upon for proceeding against the petitioner. 13. Under the circumstances, therefore, the first submission of learned counsel for the petitioner that the second enquiry report was un-called for and not worthy of reliance cannot be accepted.
It therefore, follows that the second enquiry which is, in fact, by the persons nominated as enquiry officers, was rightly relied upon for proceeding against the petitioner. 13. Under the circumstances, therefore, the first submission of learned counsel for the petitioner that the second enquiry report was un-called for and not worthy of reliance cannot be accepted. It is this second enquiry report which alone could have been taken into consideration as it was submitted by the persons duly nominated as the enquiry officers for the purpose of the disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner. 14. The impugned order also categorically records that a show cause notice was issued to the petitioner on 28.11.2014 calling upon him to submit his explanation within fifteen days. However, this was not done. Therefore, by another letter dated 12.1.2015 a further period of fifteen days was granted to the petitioner. Although this letter was duly served, yet the same was not replied by him. The Pradhan ultimately submitted his reply on 24.5.2015, more than four months after the expiry of period granted to him for furnishing the same. It has further been recorded that this highly belated explanation was rejected because it was devoid of any evidence in support there of. The impugned order therefore, found the charges against the petitioner proved and passed the order impugned. 15. Learned Counsel for the petitioner had no explanation as to why such a long time was taken for furnishing the reply. He has also not been able to point out any evidence that was adduced by him to rebut the charges and the findings in the enquiry report. In such view of the matter the impugned order cannot be faulted with. 16. Learned Counsel for the petitioner thereafter submitted that the complainant, namely Laxmi Devi W/o. Radhey furnished an affidavit denying that she had made any complaint against the petitioner. However, no copy of such an affidavit has been filed on record. Moreover, this contention raised on behalf of the petitioner cannot be accepted for another cogent reason. 17. When this matter initially came up before this Court, an order was passed on 17.7.2015 summoning the record of Writ Petition No. 15960 of 2014, the earlier petition filed by the petitioner, referred to in the foregoing paragraphs of this order. 18.
Moreover, this contention raised on behalf of the petitioner cannot be accepted for another cogent reason. 17. When this matter initially came up before this Court, an order was passed on 17.7.2015 summoning the record of Writ Petition No. 15960 of 2014, the earlier petition filed by the petitioner, referred to in the foregoing paragraphs of this order. 18. Perusal of this record reveals that an impleadment application was filed in this writ petition on behalf of Laxmi Devi. Impleadment was sought on the ground that although the certified copy of the interim order dated 25.3.2014 was filed in the office of the District Magistrate, Firozabad on 28.3.2014, yet the enquiry had not been concluded. 19. In paragraph 1.5 of the affidavit filed in support of impleadment application it has been averred that the proceedings against the petitioner were initiated on the complaint/application of the deponent of the affidavit namely Laxmi Devi W/o. Radhey. It has therefore, writ large, on the face of the record, that not only a complaint against the petitioner was made by Laxmi Devi, she was also pursuing the same. The submission of learned Counsel for the petitioner therefore, is unacceptable. 20. All the contentions made by learned Counsel for the petitioner are repelled, and no other point has been pressed. In view of the above discussion the petition lacks force. It is accordingly dismissed.