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2015 DIGILAW 23 (CAL)

Lalwani Ferro Alloys Limited v. Maheswari Steel Supply

2015-01-14

ASHIM KUMAR BANERJEE, SAMAPTI CHATTERJEE

body2015
JUDGMENT : Banerjee, J. The order of the learned Single Judge has stopped operation of the bank account. Let the same be lifted for the limited purpose to pay the cost so directed by us on the last occasion. 2. The parties had commercial transactions. The appellant placed order upon the respondents for purchase of goods and paid a sum of Rs. 1 crore as and by way of advance. The respondents could not supply the goods in time resulting in claim for refund made by the appellant. The respondents issued five cheques of Rs. 20 lacs each. One cheque for Rs. 20 lacs was duly encashed. The parties were, however, silent as to why the other four cheques were not encashed contemporaneously. The appellant belatedly placed all the four cheques in bank for encashment that were dishonoured for non-payment. The appellant issued a statutory notice of demand upon the respondents and filed a suit. The respondents took a stand, they supplied the goods worth Rs. 81.03 lacs. Hence, they would be entitled to Rs. 1.03 lacs after adjusting the said sum of Rs. 80 lacs. The appellant would deny such supply. According to the appellant, the invoices did not bear the seal of the appellant. The respondents would claim, seal was there on the challans, the authenticity whereof was very much in dispute. 3. In this backdrop, an application for summary judgment was filed by the appellant. The learned Single Judge expressed doubt as to the claim and the defence. According to His Lordship, it would be somewhat peculiar, rather surprising, the respondents would not raise any grievance when one of the cheques was placed for encashment. They would also not make any contemporaneous claim for the balance amount of Rs. 1.03 lacs. His Lordship was also in doubt as to whether there could be a summary decree as according to His Lordship in case suit would go to trial, the respondents would get opportunity to prove the seal of the appellant appearing on the challans. Striking the balance, His Lordship directed the respondents to secure the claim to the extent of Rs. 80 lacs. The parties are aggrieved. 4. The appellant would claim, the learned Judge should have passed a decree whereas the respondents filed a cross-objection and pray for setting aside of the entire judgment and order impugned and consequential dismissal of the application for summary judgment. 80 lacs. The parties are aggrieved. 4. The appellant would claim, the learned Judge should have passed a decree whereas the respondents filed a cross-objection and pray for setting aside of the entire judgment and order impugned and consequential dismissal of the application for summary judgment. 5. On the last occasion we heard the matter. In course of hearing, Mr. Jishnu Chowdhury, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant, on instruction, submitted, he would rather wait for a final decision by the civil court in case the respondents would secure the claim so directed by His Lordship. Mr. Chowdhury also in his usual fairness gave up his claim on the cost so awarded by His Lordship that the respondents agreed to pay to the District Legal Services Authority, 24 Parganas (North). 6. Today, when the matter is called on, Mr. Sarbapriya Mukherjee, learned Counsel appearing for the respondents and the cross-objector would strenuously rely upon a decision of the Apex Court in the case of M/s. Mechalec Engineers & Manufacturers v. M/s. Basic Equipment Corporation, reported in All India Reporter 1977 SC 577 that scrupulously followed and quoted the age old decision of this Court in the case of Sm. Kiranmoyee Dassi v. Dr. J. Chatterjee, reported in (1945) Volume 49 Calcutta Weekly Notes Page 246. Five eventualities were tabulated to consider an application of the like nature. The eventualities are as follows : "(a) If the defendant satisfies the Court that he has a good defence to the claim on its merits the plaintiff is not entitled to leave to sign judgment and the defendant is entitled to unconditional leave to defend. (b) If the defendant raises a triable issue indicating that he has a fair or bona fide or reasonable defence although not a positively good defence the plaintiff is not entitled to sign judgment and the defendant is entitled to conditional leave to defend. (b) If the defendant raises a triable issue indicating that he has a fair or bona fide or reasonable defence although not a positively good defence the plaintiff is not entitled to sign judgment and the defendant is entitled to conditional leave to defend. (c) If the defendant discloses such facts as may be deemed sufficient to entitle him to defend that is to say, although the affidavit does not positively and immediately make it clear that he had a defence, yet, shews such a state of facts as leads to the inference that at the trial of the action he may be able to establish a defence to the plaintiffs claim the plaintiff is not entitled to judgment and the defendant is entitled to leave to defend but in such a case the Court may in its discretion impose conditions as to the time or mode of trial but not as to payment into Court or furnishing security. (d) If the defendant has no defence or the defence set up is illusory or sham or practically moonshine then ordinarily the plaintiff is entitled to leave to sign judgment and the defendant is not entitled to leave to defend. (e) If the defendant has no defence or the defence is illusory or sham or practically moonshine then although ordinarily the plaintiff is entitled to leave to sign judgment the Court may protect the plaintiff by only allowing the defence to proceed if the amount claimed is paid into Court or otherwise secured and give leave to the defendant on such condition and thereby show mercy to the defendant by enabling him to try to prove a defence". 7. Mr. Mukherjee would rely upon Clause (c) and would submit his case would fit in Clause (c). According to Mr. Mukherjee, the defence was not unusual on the face of the record. The learned Judge possibly misunderstood the defence. According to Mr. Mukherjee, the parties agreed, goods would be supplied upon receipt of advance. Accordingly, advance of Rs. 1 crore was made. When the supplier could not supply, the parties agreed, security would remain as it was, for a future supply. The advance was repaid by five post-dated cheques. The appellant encashed the one and did not present any of the other four cheques. Accordingly, advance of Rs. 1 crore was made. When the supplier could not supply, the parties agreed, security would remain as it was, for a future supply. The advance was repaid by five post-dated cheques. The appellant encashed the one and did not present any of the other four cheques. The learned Judge possibly overlooked the fact, there was no explanation forthcoming from the appellant as to why they would not contemporaneously encash those cheques that would rather support his case for supply made subsequently. 8. In such an event, Clause (c) quoted above would cover the field. He is prepared to face any restriction that this Court would impose on the trial of the suit so contemplated in Clause (c). 9. We have considered Mr. Mukherjees contention. We have carefully examined the rival pleadings. In an application for summary judgment if the Court finds a dispute moonshine or colourable or sham, the decree is obvious consequence. Often, there would be a situation where the Court would be in doubt as to whether the defence so taken would succeed or not and at the same time that could not be brushed aside at the threshold. In such a doubtful case the Court in its discretion was competent to put the defendant on terms to test their bona fide. We are unable to accept Mr. Mukherjees submission, the eventuality talked about would suggest, the defendant would be entitled to leave to defend on terms that the Court may in its discretion impose being the restriction only as to the time or the mode of trial and not payment into Court or furnishing security. If we consider (e) that would suggest, the defence once found to be illusory, the Court may protect the plaintiff by allowing the defence to proceed by securing the claim and thereby showing mercy to the defendant to try to prove the defence. In between (c) and (e) there might be a situation like the present one. This was earlier considered again by this Court while deciding a winding-up petition in the case of Ofu Lynx Ltd. v. Simon Carves India Limited, reported in Volume 41 Company Cases Page 174. In the said case, the learned Judge considered the eventuality when the Court would be in doubt as to the genuineness of the defence and at the same time could not throw it at the threshold. In the said case, the learned Judge considered the eventuality when the Court would be in doubt as to the genuineness of the defence and at the same time could not throw it at the threshold. In such a situation, allowing the defence to proceed subject to terms is now an accepted proposition. 10. The relevant extract is quoted below : "If in particular cases the court is in some doubt as to whether the disputes are bona fide or not and is not in a position to come to any definite conclusion that the disputes are mala fide and manufactured only to create a defence to the winding-up petition, the court may stay the winding-up proceeding and relegate the parties to an action on terms as to security or otherwise; the court may direct the company to furnish security to prove its bona fides and solvency and relegate the claimant to a suit on such security being furnished and the court may stay the winding-up proceeding". 11. Following the above, the learned Judge very rightly decided the issue that would deserve no interference. 12. The appeal and the cross-objection fail on such score. 13. We are told, the respondents are yet to put in security. The learned Judge has already put a default clause attaching the bank account. However, the money lying in the bank might not satisfy the claim of the appellant. In such event, in case of default in putting the security within four weeks from date, the respondents would suffer a decree for a sum of Rs. 80 lacs. The appellants balance claim would then be decided in the suit as directed by His Lordship. 14. The appeal is disposed of with the modification as above, made in the judgment and order impugned. 15. The cross-objection is dismissed. Appeal is disposed of with modification and the cross-objection is dismissed.